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OPEN TEXT CORP (OTEX) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$20.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$15.09 $55.66
bear $15.09 base $40.32 bull $55.66 margin of safety $20.00 market price* $25.50
OpenText, based in Waterloo, Ontario, sells enterprise information-management software: content management, the Business Network that moves electronic transactions between trading partners, IT operations management, and cybersecurity for both large enterprises and small businesses and consumers (the Carbonite and Zix brands). Most of its $5.25 billion of fiscal 2026 revenue (year ended June 30) comes from customer support contracts and cloud subscriptions on systems that large organizations run in core processes, which makes customers slow to leave. The business was remade by the roughly $6 billion Micro Focus purchase in January 2023 and by the sale of the Application Modernization and Connectivity business in May 2024; it has since also sold Vertica and eDOCS. The board removed the long-time chief executive in August 2025, Ayman Antoun now leads the company, and an end-to-end review of strategy and the product portfolio launched in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026 is due to finish in early fiscal 2027. Earning power. We measure the cash the business generates after the real costs of running it: operating cash flow with working-capital timing swings removed, stock-based pay charged as a cost, and only the capital spending needed to maintain today's business deducted. Because the company carries about $5.8 billion of debt, we value the business before its lenders are paid and then subtract what it owes. Adding back cash interest paid ($352 million in fiscal 2025 and $322 million in fiscal 2026), the business produced about $1,245 million in fiscal 2025 and $1,325 million in fiscal 2026, a 6.4% rise. We start from the average of those two years, about $1,285 million, because they are the only full years of the business as it exists today; fiscal 2024 still contained the since-sold AMC business. Large non-cash amortization of acquired technology and customer relationships ($463 million in fiscal 2026) is added back as a sunk acquisition cost; because many of those acquired product lines are mature and slowly shrinking, that decay is carried in the growth path instead, which is why no case assumes lasting growth. Two judgements matter. First, working capital: in each of the last three years working capital absorbed cash even after setting aside a $247 million tax payment tied to the AMC sale, mainly because amounts earned on multi-year licence contracts are collected later than they are booked (contract assets absorbed $148 million in fiscal 2026 and $136 million in fiscal 2025). With revenue flat this cannot run forever, but it has persisted, so we charge about $140 million in year one fading to zero by year five in the base case, and for all ten years in the bear case. Second, the starting level: management's fiscal 2027 outlook calls for revenue of $5.135 to $5.185 billion (below fiscal 2026's $5.25 billion, with about $30 million of currency drag and no more Vertica or eDOCS revenue, which was $82 million in fiscal 2026) and free cash flow of $625 to $725 million against about $807 million in fiscal 2026. The guidance does not explain the cash-flow step down, and we cannot reconcile it from the filings; rather than dismiss it, we treat the guided decline as a lasting reduction in the level in every case. Growth-path check. Before-interest cash flow rose 6.4% in fiscal 2026. Our base case year one is about $957 million, roughly 28% below fiscal 2026, because it carries the guided $132 million step down, the working-capital charge and two one-off cash items in the filings: about $36 million of remaining restructuring cost under the Business Optimization Plan and a $19 million deposit due to the Canada Revenue Agency by December 2026. We credit no growth. Revenue excluding divestitures grew 2.1% in fiscal 2026 after falling in fiscal 2025, the cloud renewal rate for enterprise customers fell to 94% from 96%, and the company's growth has historically come from large debt-funded acquisitions, which are not a repeatable step we can count on. Base case (about $40 per share): the guided step down sets a lasting level of about $1,153 million a year; working capital drains about $140 million in year one fading to zero by year five; cash flow then slips 1% a year to year ten and 2% a year for thirty more years as older on-premises products shrink. What keeps it going is the installed base: customer support contracts renewed at 93% in fiscal 2026, up from 91%. The business is worth about $14.78 billion, it owes about $5.00 billion net, and the difference, $9.78 billion, is about $40.32 per share. Bear case (about $15 per share): the step down is at the low end of guidance ($182 million below the starting level), working capital keeps draining $140 million a year for three years and $80 million a year after that, and a recession of the 2008 to 2009 kind hits the discretionary licence and professional services lines (together about $940 million of fiscal 2025 revenue), so cash flow falls 5% a year in years two and three, then 3% a year to year ten as cloud renewals keep slipping, then 5% a year, ending after year 25. On debt, this case also assumes the company loses its long-running transfer-pricing dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency (about $87 million of penalties and interest for fiscal 2012 to 2016, plus up to $470 million of cash tax on the fiscal 2017 to 2021 reassessments, which we spread over years three to ten) and that the five note issues are refinanced at maturity 1.5 percentage points above a 6% long-term cost for five years. The business is worth about $9.30 billion against about $5.64 billion owed on this basis, leaving $3.66 billion, or about $15.09 per share. Cash flow in this case stays above $700 million a year through year ten, more than twice the current interest bill of roughly $320 million, so it can carry its debt. Bull case (about $56 per share): the cash-flow step down is at the top end of guidance, and the remaining 30% of the $490 to $550 million in annual savings from the Business Optimization Plan, already paid for and due to finish by the second quarter of fiscal 2027, adds about $75 million a year by year four. Working capital normalizes faster. Cash flow then holds flat at about $1,278 million through year ten and fades 1% a year over forty more years. We did not credit management's goal of returning to organic growth, or the 8% to 10% guided growth in cloud revenue in the enterprise lines, because the company has not yet shown it can deliver that across a full year. The business is worth about $18.50 billion against $5.00 billion owed, leaving $13.50 billion, or about $55.66 per share. What it owes. At June 30, 2026 debt principal was $5.84 billion: a $1.54 billion floating-rate term loan (5.37%), $1.0 billion of 6.90% secured notes due December 2027, $900 million of 3.875% notes due February 2028, $850 million of 3.875% notes due December 2029, $900 million of 4.125% notes due February 2030 and $650 million of 4.125% notes due December 2031. The four low-coupon note issues cost less than a 6% long-term rate, which, net of the extra cost of the 6.90% notes, is worth about $180 million to shareholders until they mature. We subtract cash beyond an assumed $300 million operating need (cash was $956 million), giving net debt of about $5.00 billion. The term loan and revolver require net leverage of no more than 4.5 times; it was 2.75 times at June 30, 2026, and no case approaches the limit. Per-share figures use about 242.5 million diluted shares (242.1 million outstanding on July 31, 2026). What changed. Our previous estimates were $15 / $45 / $67. The business itself has not changed much in the past few weeks; the lower base and bull values come from treating the full guided fiscal 2027 cash-flow step down as lasting rather than partly temporary, and from no longer crediting growth in the enterprise lines that has not yet been delivered. The bear value is about unchanged: it now carries a recession, the Canadian tax dispute and costlier refinancing, offset by a less severe long-term decline. Margin-of-safety price. How sure are we of the earnings level? Moderately: two clean years agree within about 6%, but management itself guides lower for fiscal 2027 without a clear explanation, and the working-capital drain has persisted for three years. The worst plausible outcome is a recession arriving while cloud renewals keep slipping and the strategic review produces costly reinvestment or another large debt-funded deal; the structure would survive it, because revenue is spread across thousands of enterprise customers, more than three-quarters is recurring, and the debt is spread across maturities from 2027 to 2031 with leverage well inside its covenant, but shareholders would be left with roughly the bear value of about $15. If we are wrong about the two things we are most likely to be wrong about, that the working-capital drain stops and that the Canadian tax dispute and refinancing come out neutral, the shares are worth about $30. The price assumes a three-to-four-year holding period, during which the company pays $1.12 a share a year in dividends. From $20, the base value plus dividends implies about 30% a year over three years and 22% over four; the $30 'wrong' outcome implies about 19% a year over three years, close to our target, and only the bear case implies a loss. The margin-of-safety price is $20, a price at which the outcomes we think most likely clear 20% a year and the one we fear most implies a loss of about a quarter rather than a wipe-out.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2026 $4.02 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,006.817M; WC movement=$(273.895)M (use of cash: contract assets +$147.7M, income taxes +$39.4M, AP/accrued +$39.7M); SBC=$80.636M; capex=$199.300M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $78.0M so growth capex=$2.217M, maintenance capex=$197.083M; OE=$1,200.076M-$197.083M=$1,002.993M; diluted shares=249.373M; OE/sh=$4.02. Reconciliation check: NI $643.263M + D&A $607.150M + SBC $80.636M + other non-cash items (pension, debt discount amort, ROU write-off, loss on debt extinguishment, gain on divestiture, loss on PP&E sale, deferred taxes, equity investee income, derivative fair value changes) net to $637.449M, so NI+non-cash=$1,280.712M, exactly equal to CFO-WC movement ($1,280.712M); 0% gap, confirms no missed/mis-signed items. Source: FY2026 10-K, accession 0001002638-26-000068.
2025 $3.38 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$830.618M; WC movement=$(309.700)M (large use of cash: contract assets +$135.9M, income taxes -$246.7M); SBC=$104.840M; capex=$143.222M; revenue DECLINED $601.2M YoY (5,769.6M->5,168.4M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full capex=$143.222M; OE=$1,035.478M-$143.222M=$892.256M; diluted shares=263.650M; OE/sh=$3.38. This is the median of the FY2024-26 anchor window (post Micro Focus integration) and serves as the anchor. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001002638-25-000053.
2024 $2.62 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$967.691M; WC movement=$(8.599)M; SBC=$140.079M; capex=$159.295M, capex_ratio=2.842% (mean capex/revenue FY2017-26 anchor window), revenue grew $1,284.6M (first full year with Micro Focus consolidated) so growth capex=$36.507M, maintenance capex=$122.788M; OE=$836.211M-$122.788M=$713.423M; diluted shares=272.588M; OE/sh=$2.62. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001002638-24-000052.
2023 $2.81 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$779.205M; WC movement=$(207.441)M (large use of cash, Micro Focus acquisition-related working capital, closed Jan 2023); SBC=$130.302M; capex=$123.832M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $991.1M (mostly acquired, 5 months of Micro Focus) so growth capex=$28.168M, maintenance capex=$95.664M; OE=$856.344M-$95.664M=$760.680M; diluted shares=270.451M; OE/sh=$2.81. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001002638-23-000022.
2022 $2.85 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$981.810M; WC movement=$48.390M; SBC=$69.556M; capex=$93.109M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $107.7M so growth capex=$3.061M, maintenance capex=$90.048M; OE=$863.864M-$90.048M=$773.816M; diluted shares=271.909M; OE/sh=$2.85. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001002638-22-000029.
2021 $2.92 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$876.120M; WC movement=$(31.395)M; SBC=$51.969M; capex=$63.675M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $276.4M so growth capex=$7.854M, maintenance capex=$55.821M; OE=$855.546M-$55.821M=$799.725M; diluted shares=273.479M; OE/sh=$2.92. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001002638-21-000029.
2020 $2.95 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$954.536M; WC movement=$58.347M; SBC=$29.532M; capex=$72.709M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $240.98M so growth capex=$6.848M, maintenance capex=$65.861M; OE=$866.657M-$65.861M=$800.796M; diluted shares=271.817M; OE/sh=$2.95. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001002638-20-000026.
2019 $2.77 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$876.278M; WC movement=$40.794M (source of cash); SBC=$26.770M; capex=$63.837M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $53.5M so growth capex=$1.521M, maintenance capex=$62.316M; OE=$808.714M-$62.316M=$746.398M; diluted shares=269.908M; OE/sh=$2.77. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001002638-19-000014.
2018 $2.64 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$708.081M (restated, FY2020 10-K); WC movement=$(114.883)M; SBC=$27.594M; capex=$105.318M, capex_ratio=2.842%, revenue grew $524.2M so growth capex=$14.897M, maintenance capex=$90.421M; OE=$795.370M-$90.421M=$704.949M; diluted shares=267.492M; OE/sh=$2.64. Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0001002638-18-000022, CFO restated per FY2020 10-K accession 0001002638-20-000026.
2017 $1.74 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$440.353M (restated, FY2019 10-K); WC movement=$(102.058)M (use of cash) so subtracting adds it back; SBC=$30.507M; capex=$79.592M, capex_ratio=2.842% (mean capex/revenue FY2017-26), revenue grew $466.8M YoY so growth capex=$13.266M, maintenance capex=$66.326M; OE=$511.904M-$66.326M=$445.578M; diluted shares=255.805M; OE/sh=$1.74. Source: FY2017 10-K accession 0001002638-17-000032, CFO restated per FY2019 10-K accession 0001002638-19-000014.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Global. Americas about 55% of fiscal 2026 revenue (United States across the Northeast, Midwest, South and West, plus Canada and Latin America); Europe, Middle East and Africa about 36% (including the United Kingdom, Germany and France); Asia Pacific and other regions the remainder, including Australia, Japan and India.
Historical growth strategy
OpenText has grown mainly through large, debt-funded acquisitions of mature enterprise software businesses (Documentum, GXS, Carbonite, Zix, Micro Focus), then cutting costs, raising maintenance and cloud prices to the installed base, and paying down debt from the recurring cash flow before the next deal. Organic revenue growth has been roughly flat. Since 2024 it has reversed course, selling non-core units (AMC, Vertica, eDOCS) to reduce debt while buying back shares and paying a rising dividend.
Chart analysis
OTEX has been in a long, choppy downtrend. Year-end prices ran from about $47 in 2021 to about $30 in 2022, back to about $42 in 2023, down to about $28 in 2024 and about $33 in 2025, a pattern of lower highs. Over the past 52 weeks the stock traded as high as about $40 before collapsing to a low near $20, and it now sits around $26, in the lower part of that range. A chartist would read the move off the $20 low as a relief bounce inside a downtrend until proven otherwise: the old $28 to $30 area, which marked the 2022 and 2024 lows, is now overhead resistance, and the series of lower highs since 2021 is intact. A sustained move above about $30 with a higher low above $20 would be needed to argue a base has formed; a break back below $20 would signal the downtrend is resuming.
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