Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.
Search a ticker above to see our analysis, browse all covered companies, or see the stocks currently trading below our margin-of-safety value.
Every valuation on this site follows the same discipline: work out what a business actually earns for its owners, build a range of outcomes from evidence we can point to, subtract what the business owes, and only then compare the result with the share price.
Every figure traces to the company's own audited annual and quarterly SEC filings. We read the risk factors, legal proceedings and subsequent events closely, because pricing agreements, settlements and patent expiries often appear only there. Where a filing and an earnings call disagree, the filing wins. Management guidance, "adjusted" earnings and analyst estimates never set a number in our model.
We measure the cash a business produces for its owners: operating cash flow, with short-term working-capital swings removed, stock-based compensation charged as the real cost it is, and only the capital spending needed to maintain the business deducted. Spending to grow is treated as investment, not cost. Non-cash charges such as acquisition amortisation are added back — but where acquired assets are wearing out, that decline is carried in our outlook rather than ignored.
Our starting point is the median of owner earnings over a period that represents the business as it exists today — a full cycle for a cyclical company, or the years since a major acquisition or restructuring, excluding one-off distortions. We never start from the last twelve months, because a weak recent stretch is often exactly why a share price fell. Recent quarters shape the near-term outlook; they move the baseline only when several quarters confirm the change.
Every business is discounted at 6% — roughly the 30-year US Treasury yield plus a small premium. We never raise the rate for a riskier business, because doing so simply imports the market's own view of risk and can never find a bargain. Risk shows up in the spread between our bear and bull cases instead.
Bear, base and bull are roughly the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile outcomes. Each is one continuous story built only from drivers we can name and point to evidence for — a signed contract, a patent expiry, a concentration disclosed in the filings, a plant under construction. The bear case is the worst outcome those named risks support, not the worst imaginable, and a "market recovery" is never a driver. We forecast ten years explicitly; after that, value continues only as far as something specific keeps the earning power going, and otherwise fades to what demonstrably persists, or to zero.
We credit growth only when it is secured — contracted, backlogged or already under way — or when it is the continuation of something the business has done steadily for years, through at least one downturn, funded from its own cash. Even then we use a rate at or below its long-run record and taper it as the room runs out. Hoped-for market growth, share gains, new products, margin expansion, turnarounds and management targets are left out.
We value the cash the whole business produces before paying its lenders, then subtract net debt — borrowings, preferred stock and firm commitments, less surplus cash — adjusting for debt that will cost materially more or less than 6%. Refinancing risk is carried in the bear case. A heavily indebted company can be worth less than nothing to shareholders, and when that's the case we say so. For banks and insurers, where borrowing is the raw material of the business, we value earnings after interest instead.
The valuation is finished before we look at the share price, so a falling or rising price can't quietly shift our judgement. When we update an analysis, we start from our previous work but challenge every assumption, test the key drivers against specific facts in the filings, and explain what changed and why.
The margin-of-safety value is set below our base-case value to leave room for error. Its size is driven by the downside, not the upside — small for bond-like, highly predictable businesses and much larger for cyclical, patent-exposed or very small companies. It is a judgement call, not a formula, and it is not a price target or a recommendation to buy. Where price alone isn't enough, we also name a business condition that would need to be met.
We don't update our analysis on every company on a fixed schedule. Our time is limited, so we put it where it matters most. Updates are focused on companies whose share price is close to our margin-of-safety value. Where we believe a company is grossly overvalued, we revisit less often because a fresh look is unlikely to change the conclusion. Each company page shows the date of its most recent analysis.
Each company page also shows its owner-earnings history year by year, with the arithmetic and source filing behind every figure; where it books its sales; how complex the business is to understand; and its competitors. The chart analysis describes what a technical analyst might read in the price history — it is kept entirely separate and plays no part in our valuation.
We don't publish valuations for China-controlled companies listed in the US, cannabis or cryptocurrency businesses, non-operating shell companies, most small banks, companies that engage in business we consider immoral, or companies facing serious doubt about continuing to operate or staying listed.
This describes our own approach and is not investment advice. Our estimates are judgement calls and can be wrong — each analysis explains what it assumes and what would have to be true for it to be mistaken. Read the full methodology.