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CAPRICOR THERAPEUTICS, INC. (CAPR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$4.50 ComplexityHigh Updated
$0.00 $39.37
bear $0.00 base $11.35 bull $39.37 margin of safety $4.50 market price* $6.71
Capricor Therapeutics is a clinical-stage cell therapy company built around one asset: deramiocel, a cardiac-derived cell therapy for Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). The company has never had an approved product and has funded itself for years through equity raises, government/foundation grants, and upfront and milestone payments from its commercial partner, Nippon Shinyaku (through its U.S. subsidiary NS Pharma), which holds exclusive distribution rights for deramiocel in the United States and Japan. The regulatory picture is genuinely unresolved and is the whole story right now. The FDA issued a Complete Response Letter on the first deramiocel application in mid-2025, citing insufficient evidence of effectiveness. Capricor resubmitted with a narrower requested indication (focused on upper-limb function rather than the original combined cardiac and skeletal-muscle claim), and the FDA's target action date was pushed out to November 2026 while it reviews that narrower submission. In between, an FDA advisory committee voted against the therapy's effectiveness (9 to 3), even though the underlying trial data was separately published and validated in a peer-reviewed medical journal. So the science has outside support, but the regulatory bar for approval has already been missed once and the expert panel leaned negative the second time. As of today, no decision has been made. Because there is no approved product, there is no revenue to build a normal earnings estimate from. Cash used in operations has grown every year as the company built out manufacturing capacity and funded the resubmission and advisory-committee process — from roughly $40 million in 2024 to about $70 million in 2025, and running close to double that pace so far in 2026. None of that is a criticism of how the money was spent (spending ahead of an approval decision is normal for this industry), but it means the business today is a cash-burning shell around a single binary decision, sitting on a large, real cash and investment balance (a little over $200 million, and rising steadily from a series of stock offerings) with no debt. Given that, the three cases here are less about how a stable business performs and more about the three ways this decision plays out. The bear case assumes deramiocel is not approved within the next several years. Spending stays elevated through the November 2026 decision, the company then scales back the program significantly, and the remaining cash is spent down over time with no product revenue ever materializing to replace it. Under that path, the cash on hand is consumed faster than any realistic value case for the business, and — because there is no debt to make things worse, but also nothing to make them better — the shares are worth close to nothing in this case. That is a real possibility, not a remote one, given the history here. The base case assumes the narrower, upper-limb indication is eventually approved, with some further delay beyond the current date (this program has already been pushed back twice, so more slippage is the reasonable expectation rather than the exception). Approval itself triggers an $80 million payment from NS Pharma under the existing U.S. distribution contract, and Capricor begins collecting a contracted share of U.S. net sales (a share that rises with sales volume, capped at a $605 million annual sales tier in the contract) plus a smaller, similar arrangement in Japan. Because the approved indication is the narrower one, the number of patients who would actually use it is smaller than the original pitch, so this case assumes a modest, sub-blockbuster commercial ramp — well below the contract's own upper sales tier — reaching a steady state within five to seven years and then holding flat, since nothing in the filings supports assuming further growth beyond that. Capricor's own costs are assumed to fall from today's elevated level once the regulatory process concludes, though they stay well above the pre-2023 level to reflect ongoing manufacturing and reduced but continuing R&D. The bull case assumes the fuller, original indication (including the cardiac benefit) is eventually approved, roughly a year sooner than in the base case, given the trial data's independent publication. That reaches a larger patient population, a higher tier of the U.S. revenue share, the full disclosed Japan milestones, and a partial, later contribution from a signed but still-contingent European distribution term sheet (worth up to $715 million in further milestones if that region's own regulatory process eventually succeeds — included only as a partial, delayed contribution given how uncertain and already-delayed that European step has been). Putting each of those stories through a 10-year cash-flow estimate, discounted at a flat 6%, together with the company's real cash position today, values the shares at roughly $0 in the bear case, about $11 in the base case, and about $39 in the bull case. The honest summary: this is a real option on a single FDA decision, sitting on top of a large, genuine cash pile. The company could lose almost all of that value if the therapy is never approved, or be worth many times today's implied price if it is. Given how real the downside is — one rejection already happened, and the expert panel's most recent vote was negative — the margin-of-safety price sits at a large discount to the base-case estimate, and this should not be treated as a typical operating business.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$2.21 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(69,811,261). WC movement (receivables +10,309,322, prepaid -4,093,633, AP/accrued +5,983,992, deferred revenue $0) = +$12,199,681; SBC (incl. restricted stock awards)=$17,225,260; total capex $11,724,196, of which $8,436,196 is construction-in-progress for future commercial manufacturing capacity (judged growth capex, not maintenance, since it builds capacity for a product not yet approved) - maintenance capex = PP&E $2,904,461 + leasehold $383,539 = $3,288,000. OE = -69,811,261-12,199,681-17,225,260-3,288,000 = -$102,524,202. Diluted shares=46,478,416. OE/sh=-$2.21. Reconciliation: NI(-105,043,946)+D&A(1,889,041)+other non-cash(loss on disposal 157,519, lease chg 715,459, non-cash CIRM interest 3,045,725 = 3,918,703)-maint capex(3,288,000) = -102,524,202, matches. Burn roughly 2.5x FY2024 owner-earnings loss, driven by BLA resubmission/advisory-committee costs and manufacturing capacity buildout ahead of a still-pending FDA decision. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-029580.
2024 -$1.15 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(39,995,742). WC movement (receivables +3,504, prepaid -458,653, AP/accrued +1,941,136, deferred revenue -12,270,465) = -$10,784,478; SBC=$9,765,164; capex (PP&E $1,166,871 + leasehold $372,104)=$1,538,975 maintenance. OE = -39,995,742+10,784,478-9,765,164-1,538,975 = -$40,515,403. Diluted shares=35,218,628. OE/sh=-$1.15. Reconciliation: NI(-40,467,186)+D&A(1,425,214)+other non-cash(loss on disposal 112,805, lease chg -47,261 = 65,544)-maint capex(1,538,975) = -40,515,403, matches. Anchor year for the FY2025 analysis (median of FY2023-2025 window). Source: FY2025 10-K (prior-year column), accession 0001104659-26-029580.
2023 -$0.87 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(25,596,545). WC movement (receivables -9,824,413, prepaid -75,884, AP/accrued +1,326,323, deferred revenue -3,178,066) = -$11,752,040; SBC=$7,392,396; capex (PP&E $1,311,660 + leasehold $735,873)=$2,047,533 maintenance. OE = -25,596,545+11,752,040-7,392,396-2,047,533 = -$23,284,434. Diluted shares=26,778,360. OE/sh=-$0.87. Reconciliation: NI(-22,287,542)+D&A(1,068,882)+other non-cash(loss on disposal 6,041, lease chg -24,282 = -18,241)-maint capex(2,047,533) = -23,284,434, matches. Source: FY2024 10-K (prior-year column), accession 0001558370-25-003707.
2022 -$1.29 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$4,916,637 (positive, driven by a $27.4M increase in deferred revenue from upfront/milestone cash received under the 2022 Nippon Shinyaku distribution agreements). WC movement = -155,830+240,045+7,550+1,718,312-510,154+27,448,531 = +$28,748,454; SBC=$4,458,578; capex (PP&E $2,000,243 + leasehold $1,359,488)=$3,359,731 maintenance. OE = 4,916,637-28,748,454-4,458,578-3,359,731 = -$31,650,126. Diluted shares=24,552,688. OE/sh=-$1.29. Reconciliation: NI(-29,019,532)+D&A(533,131)+other non-cash(34,266+161,740=196,006)-maint capex(3,359,731)=-31,650,126, matches. The large deferred-revenue inflow is upfront licensing cash, not operating earnings, which is why it is stripped out as a working-capital movement. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001558370-23-004124.
2021 -$0.92 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(16,809,324); WC movement (receivables -391,750, prepaid -148,728, other assets -187,021, AP/accrued +400,750, AP/accrued-related party +590,416, deferred revenue $0) = +$263,667; SBC=$2,965,692; capex (PP&E $1,196,286 + leasehold $0)=$1,196,286, treated as maintenance (no growth buildout flagged). OE = -16,809,324-263,667-2,965,692-1,196,286 = -$21,234,969. Diluted shares=23,089,323. OE/sh=-$0.92. Reconciliation check: NI(-20,022,520)+D&A(245,697)+other non-cash(loss on disposal 7,905, debt forgiveness -318,160, lease chg 48,395 = -261,860)-maint capex(1,196,286) = -21,234,969, matches exactly. Source: FY2022 10-K (prior-year column), accession 0001558370-23-004124.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
No approved commercial product yet; the company's revenue to date has been collaboration, milestone, and grant income booked in the United States (headquartered in California, West), with contracted commercialization/distribution rights for its lead therapy held by a Japan-based partner (Nippon Shinyaku) covering both the United States and Japan, plus a contingent, not-yet-effective term sheet covering the European region.
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