valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

W.W. GRAINGER, INC. (GWW) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$475.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$489.19 $1484.47
bear $489.19 base $928.42 bull $1484.47 margin of safety $475.00 market price* $1330.70
W.W. Grainger is North America's largest broad-line distributor of maintenance, repair and operating (MRO) supplies: motors, safety gear, fasteners, tools, cleaning and plumbing products and the like, which businesses need to keep running but rarely plan around. It sells in two ways. High-Touch Solutions North America (2025 sales $13.99B, gross margin 41.7%, operating earnings $2.35B) serves large and mid-sized customers in the United States, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico through a sales force, branches, distribution centers and on-site inventory services. Endless Assortment (2025 sales $3.63B, up 16%, operating earnings $345M) is two online businesses: Zoro in the United States and MonotaRO in Japan, which Grainger controls but does not fully own. In December 2025 Grainger sold Cromwell and closed Zoro U.K., leaving Britain. The $196M loss on that exit was an accounting charge, not cash, and has no effect on the earnings figures below. How we measure earnings. We start from cash generated by operations, subtract stock-based pay, and subtract the capital spending needed to keep the business as it is. Because sales grew only slowly in 2023-2025, we count almost all of the recent distribution-center spending as upkeep ($665M of the $684M spent in 2025). That is a cautious choice. We strip out year-to-year swings in receivables, inventory and payables. Growth does need more working capital, though: from 2016 to 2025 Grainger tied up about 25 cents for every extra dollar of sales. Every case below charges that cost against growth. Owner earnings per share rose from $11.08 in 2016 to $34.91 in 2024, then eased to $33.72 in 2025 as capital spending peaked. To value the business before its lenders, we add back interest paid (about $106M a year). On that basis the business produced $1.71B in 2022, $1.84B in 2023, $1.82B in 2024 and $1.73B in 2025. The starting level is $1.775B, about $37.50 for each of the 47.3M diluted shares. It is the middle of 2022-2025. We start in 2022 because that is when the business took its present shape: gross margins recovered to 38.4-39.4% after the 2017 price reset and the pandemic years. Those four years include the soft industrial demand of 2023-2025, but not a true recession, so the cases carry one. Amortization of intangibles (about $81M a year) is mostly capitalized software, which Grainger amortizes over three to five years and replaces through the capital spending we already deduct, so no wasting asset is being treated as permanent. The near term. In 2025, cash generation before interest fell 5.3%, mostly because capital spending rose. The base case's first year is 8% above the starting level, about 11% above 2025. This rests on the first half of 2026, reported in August 2026. Sales rose 10.2%. Net earnings rose 17% ($1,181M against $1,008M). Operating cash flow was $1,183M against $1,023M, and capital spending was slightly lower. In the second quarter, volume added 7.4 points of U.S. High-Touch growth. The first year is set below that pace for two reasons. Part of the price gain passes tariff costs through to customers. The second quarter also included a one-time $43M refund of tariffs. Bear case ($489 per share). A modest first year, then an industrial downturn as deep as 2014-2016, when consolidated net earnings fell 22% (from $812M to $633M). Here earnings fall 12% and then 10% while sales fall 9% and 5%, and they recover over the following two years. Then Grainger permanently gives up about 1.5 points of gross margin to online price competition, cutting earnings about 11%. That is a third of what actually happened from 2014 to 2019, when gross margin fell from 43.3% to 38.3% as prices became transparent online and Grainger cut list prices. Growth is then 1.5% a year to year 10, and earnings stay flat in dollars after that, which is a slow real decline. The business is worth about $26.2B. The outside owners' share of MonotaRO is about $1.3B and net debt about $1.8B, leaving $23.1B, or $489 per share. Base case ($928 per share). The first year described above, then about 4% a year. One milder downturn around year five takes 8% off earnings, followed by recovery. Growth after year ten is 2% a year. This growth is credited because it is proven and repeatable. Sales grew 6.5% a year from 2016 to 2025, through the 2020 shutdown. Grainger has a long record of passing rising costs on to customers. The online businesses have grown at double-digit rates, including 16% in 2025. Not credited: further High-Touch market-share gains at the recent pace, any margin expansion, management's long-range targets and the value of buybacks, which are paid from cash already counted. The business is worth about $48.1B, the MonotaRO minority $2.4B and net debt $1.8B, leaving $43.9B, or $928 per share. Bull case ($1,484 per share). The 2026 pace mostly holds in year one (+12%). Then growth is 7% a year through year five, near the 6.5% sales growth of 2016-2025 and below the roughly 10% annual growth in cash generation over that decade. It eases to 5% through year ten and 3% after. This growth comes from the company's own levers already visible in its reported results: MonotaRO grew 24% and Zoro 18% in the second quarter of 2026, and High-Touch volume is strong. It assumes no deep recession. The business is worth about $75.8B, the MonotaRO minority $3.8B and net debt $1.8B, leaving $70.2B, or $1,484 per share. Debt. At mid-2026 Grainger owed about $2.41B. Most of it is four fixed-rate bonds: $500M at 4.45% due 2034, $1.0B at 4.60% due 2045, $400M at 3.75% due 2046 and $400M at 4.20% due 2047. Grainger has locked in cheap money for decades, so we count the bonds at about $1.93B rather than their $2.3B face. We add yen loans of about $0.13B and subtract about $0.29B of cash beyond operating needs, for net debt of about $1.77B. Even at the bear case's low point, the business generates roughly $1.45B a year against about $0.1B of interest. The first bond is not due until 2034. Debt does not materially change the outcome for shareholders in any of the cases. What could make this wrong. Most of all, the 38.4-39.4% gross margin since 2022 could slip back toward the 2019-2021 level of 36-38% if Amazon Business or other online sellers force another round of price cuts. That would leave value near or below the bear case. Second, tariff-driven price increases could reverse, and they flattered 2026 results. Third, long-run growth matters: if growth after year ten were nil, the base case would fall to roughly $715. Two things could not be fully reconciled. The 2026 interim working-capital lines were not available in full detail. Before 2023, lease payments were netted inside working capital, a difference of about $15-20M a year that does not change the conclusion. Our previous estimate was built on a different basis and is not comparable. Margin-of-safety price ($475). We are fairly sure of the earnings level. Cash generation has held between $1.71B and $1.84B for four years through weak industrial demand and is running higher in 2026. The worst plausible outcome is a deep recession combined with another online pricing reset like 2014-2017. Grainger has weathered that kind of episode before: it has a broad and diverse customer base buying mostly non-discretionary supplies, little debt with no bond due before 2034, a national distribution network and a 98-year record. It would bend, not break. If margins slip back to the 2019-2021 level and growth stops after year ten, the shares are worth roughly $575. If a deep recession comes on top of that, the bear case's $489 is the better guide. A price of $475 corresponds to about $37.50 a share of current business cash generation, more at the 2026 pace, and the dividend is about $9.70 a share during the holding period. The business itself would compound at roughly 11-13% a year. A 20% annual return then needs the price to move toward our base case within about five years. If the bear case plays out instead, it implies only a mid-single-digit annual return from that price. The margin-of-safety price is $475, set with that bear-case outcome weighed against the durability of the business.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $33.72 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (current basis; replaces prior CFO-capex-SBC figure, which deducted total capex and left working-capital swings in). CFO=$2,015M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(190)M; inventories $(147)M; prepaid/other assets $(73)M; trade AP $43M; accrued/other current liabilities $38M; income taxes $(4)M) = $(333)M, removed; SBC=$64M; capex=$684M, revenue $17,942M vs $17,168M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$19M, maintenance capex=$665M; OE=$1,619M; diluted shares=48.00M; OE/sh=$33.72. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$106M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000277135-26-000011.
2024 $34.91 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (current basis; replaces prior CFO-capex-SBC figure, which deducted total capex and left working-capital swings in). CFO=$2,111M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(110)M; inventories $(77)M; prepaid/other assets $(36)M; trade AP $20M; accrued/other current liabilities $20M; income taxes $(3)M) = $(186)M, removed; SBC=$62M; capex=$541M, revenue $17,168M vs $16,478M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$17M, maintenance capex=$524M; OE=$1,711M; diluted shares=49.00M; OE/sh=$34.91. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$111M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000277135-26-000011.
2023 $34.47 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (current basis; replaces prior CFO-capex-SBC figure, which deducted total capex and left working-capital swings in). CFO=$2,031M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(98)M; inventories $(16)M; prepaid/other assets $101M; trade AP $(65)M; accrued/other current liabilities $(91)M; income taxes $(4)M) = $(173)M, removed; SBC=$62M; capex=$445M, revenue $16,478M vs $15,228M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$30M, maintenance capex=$415M; OE=$1,727M; diluted shares=50.10M; OE/sh=$34.47. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$109M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000277135-26-000011.
2022 $31.73 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (current basis; replaces prior CFO-capex-SBC figure, which deducted total capex and left working-capital swings in). CFO=$1,333M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(436)M; inventories $(412)M; prepaid/other assets $(158)M; trade AP $225M; accrued/other current liabilities $200M; income taxes $42M) = $(539)M, removed; SBC=$48M; capex=$256M, revenue $15,228M vs $13,022M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$53M, maintenance capex=$203M; OE=$1,621M; diluted shares=51.10M; OE/sh=$31.73. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$91M. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000277135-23-000014.
2021 $20.87 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (current basis; replaces prior CFO-capex-SBC figure, which deducted total capex and left working-capital swings in). CFO=$937M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(324)M; inventories $(152)M; prepaid/other assets $(15)M; trade AP $54M; accrued/other current liabilities $43M; income taxes $(26)M) = $(420)M, removed; SBC=$42M; capex=$255M, revenue $13,022M vs $11,797M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$30M, maintenance capex=$225M; OE=$1,090M; diluted shares=52.20M; OE/sh=$20.87. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$87M. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000277135-23-000014.
2020 $19.93 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,123M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(121)M; inventories $(158)M; prepaid/other assets $(23)M; trade AP $80M; accrued/other current liabilities $15M; income taxes $24M) = $(183)M, removed; SBC=$46M; capex=$197M, revenue $11,797M vs $11,486M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$7M, maintenance capex=$190M; OE=$1,070M; diluted shares=53.70M; OE/sh=$19.93. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$94M. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000277135-23-000014.
2019 $18.64 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,042M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(42)M; inventories $(106)M; prepaid/other assets $(33)M; trade AP $32M; accrued/other current liabilities $(84)M; income taxes $(3)M) = $(236)M, removed; SBC=$40M; capex=$221M, revenue $11,486M vs $11,221M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$6M, maintenance capex=$215M; OE=$1,023M; diluted shares=54.90M; OE/sh=$18.64. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$84M. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000277135-20-000007.
2018 $17.65 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,057M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(79)M; inventories $(129)M; prepaid/other assets $(2)M; trade AP $(51)M; accrued/other current liabilities $18M; income taxes $36M) = $(207)M, removed; SBC=$47M; capex=$239M, revenue $11,221M vs $10,425M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$19M, maintenance capex=$220M; OE=$997M; diluted shares=56.50M; OE/sh=$17.65. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$86M. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000277135-20-000007.
2017 $12.38 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,057M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(103)M; inventories $(5)M; prepaid/other assets $(5)M; trade AP $72M; accrued/other current liabilities $113M; income taxes $4M) = $76M, removed; SBC=$33M; capex=$237M, revenue $10,425M vs $10,137M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$7M, maintenance capex=$230M; OE=$718M; diluted shares=57.98M; OE/sh=$12.38. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$78M. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000277135-20-000007.
2016 $11.08 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,024M; dWC (cash effect of AR $(45.6)M; inventories $(4.4)M; prepaid/other assets $18.6M; trade AP $72.9M; accrued/other current liabilities $(3.9)M; income taxes $(3.5)M) = $34.1M, removed; SBC=$36M; capex=$284M, revenue $10,137M vs $9,973M prior, capex_ratio=2.41% (2016-2025 mean capex/revenue), growth capex=$4M, maintenance capex=$280M; OE=$674M; diluted shares=60.84M; OE/sh=$11.08. Operating-lease liability payments and other non-current items left in CFO. Interest paid (for business cash flow, not in OE)=$63M. Source: FY2017 10-K (restated 2016 cash flow), accession 0000277135-18-000007.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), Japan, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico. United Kingdom exited in December 2025.
Historical growth strategy
Mostly organic. Grainger wins a larger share of large and mid-sized customers' MRO spending through its direct sales force, branch and distribution-center network, on-site inventory management (KeepStock) and e-commerce, and it passes cost increases through in price. It has also built online endless-assortment businesses (MonotaRO in Japan, Zoro in the United States) that grow by adding products and customers. Acquisitions have been occasional (Fabory in Europe, Cromwell in the United Kingdom), and both were later sold. Surplus cash goes to steady share repurchases and a long record of annual dividend increases.
Chart analysis
GWW has been in a decade-long uptrend, climbing from the low $200s in 2016 to above $1,000 with a pattern of higher highs and higher lows and only shallow corrections. Over the past year the shares ran from a 52-week low near $907 to a high near $1,420 in late July 2026. They sold off around the early-August earnings report to about $1,277, bounced to roughly $1,335 in late August and slid back to about $1,280 by early October. A chartist would read the July peak and the lower high in late August as a short-term topping or consolidation phase within the larger uptrend, with the $1,275 area (the August low) as key support. A decisive break below it would open room toward the $1,200 area, while a move back above $1,340-1,400 would signal that the uptrend has resumed.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of GWW. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.