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AMAZON COM INC (AMZN) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$121.00 Updated
$82.00 $315.00
bear $82.00 base $213.00 bull $315.00 margin of safety $121.00 market price* $250.00
Amazon runs three connected businesses: a low-margin North America and international retail operation (increasingly profitable through its third-party marketplace fees and a fast-growing advertising business), and AWS, its cloud-computing arm, which is high-margin but very capital-intensive. Over the past decade the cash Amazon's owners could actually take out of the business each year, after real running costs (including stock-based compensation, which we treat as a genuine cost even though it doesn't use cash directly), has grown from roughly $0.27 per share in 2016 to about $6.86 per share in 2025, with the growth accelerating sharply over the last three years as AWS and advertising have become a larger share of the profit mix and as the company executed a cost-efficiency and warehouse-network 'regionalization' program starting in 2023. Because that recent growth has been unusually fast, we anchored our valuation on the median of the last three years (roughly the 2024 level, about $5.28 per share) rather than the most recent, highest year, and we assume this pace slows to a more sustainable rate going forward rather than continuing to accelerate. The single biggest judgment in this valuation is how to treat Amazon's enormous and rapidly rising spending on property and equipment -- $131.8 billion in 2025, versus $52.7 billion just two years earlier. Management has said this spending 'primarily reflects investments in technology infrastructure, the majority of which is to support AWS business growth' and additional fulfillment capacity, and that both are expected to keep rising in 2026. Since this is overwhelmingly expansion spending rather than the cost of keeping today's business running, we treated only the amount roughly equal to depreciation each year as the true cost of maintaining the current business, and everything spent above that as growth investment that shouldn't be charged against today's owner earnings. We also excluded a large, one-time-feeling non-cash gain of roughly $14.9 billion in 2025 from the rising value of Amazon's investment portfolio (notably its stake in Anthropic), since paper investment gains are not cash the operating business generates. Our base case assumes owner earnings grow at a mid-teens rate next year -- well below the roughly 30% growth actually achieved in 2025, since that year benefited from an unusual decline in stock-based compensation that we don't assume repeats -- fading gradually to mid-single-digit growth by year ten, followed by a modest, capped permanent growth rate reflecting AWS and advertising as durable, non-wasting franchises. That gives a base-case value of roughly $213 per share. Our bear case (roughly $82 per share, about the worst outcome in ten) assumes the AI/AWS capital spending program fails to generate revenue growth proportional to its cost -- a real and widely discussed risk given the unprecedented scale and pace of this buildout -- so that rising depreciation on the new data-center asset base compresses margins for several years, compounded by renewed retail pricing pressure and a reversal of the recent improvement in stock-based compensation discipline. Our bull case (roughly $315 per share) assumes the opposite: that AI infrastructure investment translates into durable AWS share gains and margin expansion, advertising keeps compounding at a high rate, and the fulfillment-network efficiency program keeps lowering cost-to-serve. In every case, the value attributable to the years beyond our ten-year forecast is a majority of the total estimate; that is typical for a business with this long a growth runway, but it means the valuation leans heavily on Amazon's cloud and advertising franchises remaining durable and well-defended for a very long time, and we've kept the assumed long-run growth rate deliberately modest given the sheer size of the business today. Weighing the unusually wide range between our bear and base cases -- reflecting real execution risk in the capital spending program rather than a lack of research -- against the size of the opportunity if it succeeds, the margin-of-safety price sits at a meaningful discount to our base-case estimate, around $121 per share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $6.86 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$139,514M; WC_cash_effect=-$19,969M (Other assets -$15,632M, AR&other -$7,333M, unearned rev -$214M decrease, offset by AP +$11,231M; inventory build -$3,002M, accrued -$5,019M); SBC=$19,467M (declined in dollar terms y/y, a real deceleration in equity comp intensity); capex=$131,819M (Purchases of property and equipment, gross -- primarily AI/AWS data-center and custom-chip infrastructure plus fulfillment capacity, per management commentary that 'the majority' supports AWS growth); D&A=$65,756M; capex>>D&A so growth capex=$66,063M, maintenance capex=D&A=$65,756M (judgment call: maintenance capex proxied by D&A rather than the mechanical capex-ratio-vs-revenue-growth formula, which would treat >90% of this capex as 'maintenance' and understate owner earnings -- see AMZN-specific analysis notes). Non-operating adjustment includes a large non-cash gain (~$14.9B, largely mark-to-market on equity investments, notably Anthropic), correctly excluded from owner earnings as it is not a cash return to the business. OE = 139,514 - (-19,969) - 19,467 - 65,756 = $74,260M. Diluted shares = 10,827M. OE/sh = $6.86. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001018724-26-000004).
2024 $5.28 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$115,877M; WC_cash_effect=-$15,541M (Other assets -$14,483M, AR&other -$3,249M, offset by AP +$2,972M, unearned rev +$4,007M, partly offset by inventory build -$1,884M and accrued -$2,904M); SBC=$22,011M; capex=$82,999M; D&A=$52,795M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$30,204M (AWS/AI data-center buildout begins accelerating), maintenance capex=D&A=$52,795M. OE = 115,877 - (-15,541) - 22,011 - 52,795 = $56,612M. Diluted shares = 10,721M. OE/sh = $5.28. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001018724-26-000004), latest comparative figures for FY2024.
2023 $2.27 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$84,946M; WC_cash_effect=-$11,541M (Other assets -$12,265M, AR&other -$8,348M, offset by AP +$5,473M, unearned rev +$4,578M, inventory decrease +$1,449M); SBC=$24,023M; capex=$52,729M; D&A=$48,663M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$4,066M, maintenance capex=D&A=$48,663M. OE = 84,946 - (-11,541) - 24,023 - 48,663 = $23,801M. Reflects early results of Andy Jassy's 2023 cost-efficiency/fulfillment-regionalization program. Diluted shares = 10,492M. OE/sh = $2.27. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001018724-26-000004), latest comparative figures for FY2023.
2022 $0.60 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$46,752M; WC_cash_effect=-$20,886M (Other assets -$13,275M, AR&other -$8,622M, partly offset by AP +$2,945M and unearned rev +$2,216M); SBC=$19,621M (sharp step-up, partly a response to the 2022 stock price decline requiring more RSUs to deliver equivalent value); capex=$63,645M; D&A=$41,921M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$21,724M, maintenance capex=D&A=$41,921M. OE = 46,752 - (-20,886) - 19,621 - 41,921 = $6,096M. This is a genuine trough year (post-COVID fulfillment-network overcapacity unwind, shipping cost inflation, elevated SBC), not excluded as one-time noise. Diluted shares = 10,189M. OE/sh = $0.60. Source: FY2024 10-K (accession 0001018724-25-000004), latest comparative figures for FY2022.
2021 $1.82 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$46,327M; WC_cash_effect=-$19,611M (first year 'Other assets' broken out separately, -$9,018M of the total); SBC=$12,757M; capex=$61,053M; D&A=$34,433M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$26,620M, maintenance capex=D&A=$34,433M. OE = 46,327 - (-19,611) - 12,757 - 34,433 = $18,748M. Diluted shares = 10,296M (post-split, restated). OE/sh = $1.82. Source: FY2023 10-K (accession 0001018724-24-000008), latest comparative figures for FY2021.
2020 $1.78 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$66,064M; WC_cash_effect=+$13,481M (COVID-era demand pulled forward AP/accrued liabilities); SBC=$9,208M; capex=$40,140M; D&A=$25,180M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$14,960M (COVID-driven fulfillment network expansion), maintenance capex=D&A=$25,180M. OE = 66,064 - 13,481 - 9,208 - 25,180 = $18,195M. Diluted shares = 10,198M (post 2022 20-for-1 split, as restated). OE/sh = $1.78. Source: FY2022 10-K (accession 0001018724-23-000004), latest post-split comparative figures for FY2020.
2019 $1.71 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$38,514M; WC_cash_effect=-$2,438M; SBC=$6,864M; capex=$16,861M; D&A=$21,789M; capex<D&A so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=capex=$16,861M. OE = 38,514 - (-2,438) - 6,864 - 16,861 = $17,227M. Diluted shares = 10,080M (504M as reported, restated x20). OE/sh = $1.71. Source: FY2021 10-K (accession 0001018724-22-000005), latest comparative figures for FY2019.
2018 $1.29 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$30,723M; WC_cash_effect=-$1,043M; SBC=$5,418M; capex=$13,427M; D&A=$15,341M; capex<D&A so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=capex=$13,427M. OE = 30,723 - (-1,043) - 5,418 - 13,427 = $12,921M. Diluted shares = 10,000M (500M as reported, restated x20). OE/sh = $1.29. Source: FY2020 10-K (accession 0001018724-21-000004), latest comparative figures for FY2018.
2017 $0.30 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$18,365M; WC_cash_effect=-$242M (net WC a small use of cash); SBC=$4,215M; capex=$11,955M; D&A=$11,478M; capex>D&A so growth capex=$477M, maintenance capex=D&A=$11,478M (maintenance capex=min(capex,D&A); see FY2016 methodology note). OE = 18,365 - (-242) - 4,215 - 11,478 = $2,914M. Diluted shares = 9,860M (493M as reported, restated x20 for 2022 stock split). OE/sh = $0.30. Source: FY2019 10-K (accession 0001018724-20-000004), latest comparative figures for FY2017.
2016 $0.27 ▼
OE = CFO - WC_cash_effect - SBC - maintenance_capex. CFO=$17,203M; WC_cash_effect=+$3,847M (net WC was a source of cash: -AR&other $3,436M +AP $5,030M +accrued&other $1,724M -inventory $1,426M +unearned rev $1,955M); SBC=$2,975M; capex(gross PP&E purchases)=$7,804M; D&A=$8,116M; since capex<D&A, growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=capex=$7,804M (judgment: maintenance capex = min(capex, D&A) -- spend needed to replace the depreciating asset base; anything above D&A is growth capex. Used instead of the mechanical capex-ratio formula because AWS/fulfillment capacity spend does not track consolidated revenue growth 1:1, per FY2025 10-K MD&A: capex 'primarily reflect[s] investments in technology infrastructure (the majority of which is to support AWS business growth)'). OE = 17,203 - 3,847 - 2,975 - 7,804 = $2,577M. Diluted shares = 9,680M (484M as originally reported, restated x20 for the June 2022 20-for-1 stock split). OE/sh = $0.27. Source: FY2018 10-K (accession 0001018724-19-000004), latest available comparative figures for FY2016.

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