valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

SYPRIS SOLUTIONS INC (SYPR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.20 ComplexityAverage Updated
-$1.78 -$0.62
bear -$1.78 base -$1.29 bull -$0.62 margin of safety $0.20 market price* $1.77
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Two consecutive completed fiscal years in which cash from operations, excluding working-capital swings and after capital spending, stock compensation and lease costs, totals at least $3 million a year, achieved without any increase in the Gill Family Capital Management note or new share issuance, as reported in an annual report.
Sypris Solutions is a small Louisville, Kentucky holding company with two unrelated businesses. Sypris Electronics (57% of 2025 revenue) builds circuit cards and complete assemblies for defence and aerospace primes such as Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Collins Aerospace, Lockheed and L3Harris, mostly on federally funded programs. Sypris Technologies (43%) forges and machines drivetrain components for heavy trucks and off-highway equipment, and makes high-pressure closures for oil and gas pipelines. Five customers - Northrop Grumman (23%), Detroit Diesel (13%), SubCom (11%), ADI and Sistemas - were 63% of 2025 revenue of $119.9 million. The earnings record. We measure the cash the business produces for its owners after stripping out swings in inventory, payables and customer prepayments, and after charging stock compensation, the cost of replacing equipment and lease costs. On that basis Sypris has not had a single year of meaningful positive cash generation since it divested its Dana-related operations in 2016. From 2018 through 2025 the yearly figures ran from a loss of $6.5 million to a best of $1.0 million (2024), with a middle value of about a $1.7 million loss a year. The large swings in reported operating cash flow - $13.8 million in at 2022, $11.1 million out in 2023 - were almost entirely customer prepayments on electronics contracts and the inventory they funded; once those are set aside the underlying business was close to breakeven in its best years and well below it in its worst. 2025 was a step backwards: truck-component revenue fell 31% as North American Class 8 truck production dropped 24%, electronics margins collapsed on program delays, extra engineering and $1.2 million of inventory write-downs, and the business lost about $5.4 million on our measure. The first half of 2026 was worse - a $7.2 million net loss on revenue down 8% - so the recent trend is down, not up. One accounting note: we count the $4.0 million of plant and equipment taken on under new finance leases in 2025 as debt rather than as spending, and we excluded the $2.4 million gain from the sale-leaseback of the Louisville plant. What it owes. At 5 July 2026 the company owed about $12.0 million to Gill Family Capital Management, an entity controlled by the Chairman and CEO Jeffrey Gill and director Scott Gill, plus about $2.1 million of accrued interest on that note, $4.3 million of finance leases at roughly 13%, about $1.1 million of equipment loans and a $0.5 million credit line, against $5.9 million of cash - net debt of about $14.3 million. The Gill note carries at least 8% and its interest is being deferred rather than paid; in early 2026 every tranche was pushed out a year, to maturities of April 2027 ($2.0 million), 2028 ($2.0 million), 2029 ($5.0 million) and 2030 ($3.0 million). Because the note and the leases cost well above a normal long-term borrowing rate for several more years, we add about $1.8 million for that excess cost, for an all-in debt burden of roughly $16.1 million, or $0.72 a share. Shareholders' equity on the books fell from $17.8 million at the end of 2025 to $11.7 million (about $0.52 a share) by July 2026. The cases. In the base case 2026 finishes near its first-half pace (business cash flow about a $7 million loss), the electronics backlog that management says supports higher 2026-27 shipments lifts 2027 to a smaller loss, and from then on the business runs at about its 2018-2025 middle value, a loss of roughly $0.9 million a year before interest, for ten years. We gave no credit for growth: the electronics backlog is real, but every previous ramp (2021-2024) failed to produce owner cash, so higher revenue alone is not evidence of profit. The business is worth about minus $12.9 million on that path; with $16.1 million owed, the shares are worth about minus $1.29 each - the company appears to owe roughly $29 million more than it is worth. The bear case adds a full truck-cycle downturn of the 2019-2020 kind (Sypris Technologies revenue fell by about a quarter then) arriving while defence programs slip as they did in 2023-2025, with losses of $8 million, $5 million and $3 million in 2026-2028 and about $2 million a year after; the business is worth about minus $23.9 million, or minus $1.78 a share after debt. In this case the Gill note could not be repaid from operations and shareholders would face heavy dilution or a restructuring. The bull case has the electronics backlog and a truck recovery restore the 2024 result - the best year since 2016, about $1.3 million of business cash flow - from 2028, held to 2035 and fading thereafter; even that path is worth only about $2.2 million against $16.1 million owed, or minus $0.62 a share. What this means. All three cases come out below zero: on the record the company has actually produced, the operating business does not generate enough cash to carry its debt, let alone return anything to shareholders. Liquidating the assets would not obviously rescue the equity either - the balance sheet's $11.7 million of book equity sits on $50.5 million of inventory and specialised forging and electronics plant that would fetch well below book in a disposal, while $44 million of customer prepayments must be worked off or refunded. The company has survived because the controlling family keeps lending to it ($5.5 million of new money in 2024-2025) and deferring its own interest; that support is real but discretionary and secured ahead of the common shares on substantially all assets. What would make the estimate wrong. A sustained step-up in electronics margins as the new programs reach full rate, combined with a truck-cycle recovery, could produce cash the company has not shown in a decade. If Sypris reports two consecutive years of at least $3 million of owner cash flow without new borrowing from the Gill family or new shares, the business would be worth roughly $0.40 a share after its debt. The margin-of-safety price in that event is $0.20, because even a proven recovery would rest on five customers, a cyclical truck market and a lender that is also the controlling shareholder, and the shares would pay no dividend during the holding period. Without that evidence there is no margin-of-safety price. We previously valued the company with a base case of about $0.68 a share. Those figures are not comparable: the earlier work credited a return to about $2 million a year of owner earnings that the business had not demonstrated, and the 2026 first-half loss and further increase in what is owed have since moved the picture further in the wrong direction.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.24 ▼
RECOMPUTED on current basis (prior record of $(0.3415) did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$(5,731)K; working-capital cash effect=$(3,640)K (AR 692, inventory 13,265, prepaid 626, AP (8,239), accrued and other incl. contract-liability run-off (9,984)) so CFO ex-WC=$(2,091)K; SBC=$1,118K; capex=$756K cash plus $317K bought through equipment financing = $1,073K, revenue fell (140.2M to 119.9M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$1,073K; non-cash operating lease expense $1,105K; OE=$(5,387)K; diluted shares=22,270K; OE/sh=$(0.2419). Reconciliation: NI (6,338) + D&A 2,844 + deferred tax 105 + SBC 1,118 + loan costs 7 + inventory provision 1,322 + lease 1,105 - sale-leaseback gain 2,370 + other 451 - pension 335 = (2,091) ties. Excludes $4,033K of assets taken on under new finance leases (treated as debt). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001437749-26-009882.
2024 $0.05 ▼
RECOMPUTED on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$2,004K; working-capital cash effect=$(2,060)K (AR (1,826), inventory 9,129, prepaid (1,934), AP (8,163), accrued and other 734) so CFO ex-WC=$4,064K; SBC=$868K; capex=$1,083K, revenue +3,957K x 1.772% = growth capex $70K so maintenance capex=$1,013K; non-cash operating lease expense $1,160K; OE=$1,023K; diluted shares=22,043K; OE/sh=$0.0464. Reconciliation: NI (1,680) + D&A 3,181 + deferred tax 232 + SBC 868 + loan costs 8 + inventory provision 593 + lease 1,160 + other 414 - pension 712 = 4,064 ties. Source: FY2025 10-K comparative column, accession 0001437749-26-009882.
2023 -$0.01 ▼
RECOMPUTED on current basis (prior record of $(0.6418) did not remove working capital; the 2023 outflow was an inventory build of $34.7M). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$(11,089)K; working-capital cash effect=$(14,325)K (AR (1,096), inventory (34,693), prepaid (1,105), AP 8,984, accrued and other 13,585) so CFO ex-WC=$3,236K; SBC=$813K; capex=$2,139K, revenue +26,102K x 1.772% = growth capex $463K so maintenance capex=$1,676K; non-cash operating lease expense $942K; OE=$(195)K; diluted shares=21,876K; OE/sh=$(0.0089). Reconciliation: NI (1,596) + D&A 3,259 + deferred tax 54 + SBC 813 + loan costs 3 + inventory provision (167) + lease 942 + other (56) - pension 16 = 3,236 ties. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001437749-24-010216.
2022 -$0.09 ▼
RECOMPUTED on current basis (prior record of $0.4634 did not remove working capital; the cash came from customer prepayments, which are now stripped). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$13,793K; working-capital cash effect=$11,434K (AR 345, inventory (11,804), prepaid (3,072), AP 5,556, accrued and other 20,409) so CFO ex-WC=$2,359K; SBC=$683K; capex=$3,041K, revenue +12,687K x 1.772% = growth capex $225K so maintenance capex=$2,816K; non-cash operating lease expense $890K; OE=$(2,030)K; diluted shares=21,729K; OE/sh=$(0.0934). Reconciliation: NI (2,494) + D&A 3,088 + deferred tax 329 + SBC 683 + loan costs 6 + inventory provision 65 + lease 890 + other (148) - pension 60 = 2,359 ties. Source: FY2023 10-K comparative column, accession 0001437749-24-010216.
2021 $0.02 ▼
RECOMPUTED on current basis (prior record used CFO - capex - SBC without removing working capital; whole series restated for consistency). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$4,238K; working-capital cash effect=$(234)K (AR (1,265), inventory (13,978), prepaid (1,314), AP 5,268, accrued and other 11,055) so CFO ex-WC=$4,472K; SBC=$491K; capex=$2,824K, capex/revenue mean 2016-2025=1.772%, revenue +15,088K so growth capex=$267K and maintenance capex=$2,557K; non-cash operating lease expense $963K deducted because operating-lease payments run through the stripped accrued-liabilities line; OE=$461K; diluted shares=23,001K; OE/sh=$0.0200. Reconciliation: NI 2,923 + D&A 2,646 - PPP forgiveness 3,599 + deferred tax 1,015 + SBC 491 + loan costs 7 + disposal 11 + inventory provision 162 + lease 963 + other 150 - pension 297 = 4,472 ties. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001437749-22-006515.
2020 -$0.06 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$3,648K; working-capital cash effect=$2,073K (AR 214, inventory 4,230, prepaid (204), AP (2,591), accrued 424) so CFO ex-WC=$1,575K; SBC=$426K; capex=$1,542K, growth capex=$0 (revenue fell to 82.3M) so maintenance capex=$1,542K; non-cash operating lease expense $911K deducted (lease payments are inside the stripped accrued-liabilities line); OE=$(1,304)K; diluted shares=21,086K; OE/sh=$(0.0618). Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001437749-21-006412.
2019 -$0.13 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - non-cash operating lease expense. CFO=$(5,853)K (restated); working-capital cash effect=$(5,077)K (AR 2,425, inventory (2,621), prepaid 756, AP (4,100), accrued (1,537)) so CFO ex-WC=$(776)K; SBC=$469K; capex=$859K, growth capex=$0 (revenue flat/down) so maintenance capex=$859K; non-cash operating lease expense $650K deducted because operating-lease payments sit inside the accrued/other liabilities line that is stripped as working capital (without this the lease cost would be dropped entirely); OE=$(2,754)K; diluted shares=20,865K; OE/sh=$(0.1320). Source: FY2020 10-K comparative column, accession 0001437749-21-006412.
2018 -$0.32 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,892K; working-capital cash effect=$5,802K (AR (612), inventory (2,857), prepaid (1,163), AP 2,948, accrued 7,486) so CFO ex-WC=$(3,910)K; SBC=$637K; capex=$2,051K; capex/revenue mean 2016-2025=1.77%, revenue +5,675K so growth capex=$100K and maintenance capex=$1,951K; OE=$(6,498)K; diluted shares=20,512K; OE/sh=$(0.3168). Source: FY2019 10-K comparative column, accession 0001437749-20-005641.
2017 -$0.58 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(9,459)K; working-capital cash effect=$(60)K (AR (1,419), inventory (3,204), prepaid 951, AP 3,491, accrued 121) so CFO ex-WC=$(9,399)K; SBC=$730K; capex=$1,637K, growth capex=$0 (revenue fell to 82.3M) so maintenance capex=$1,637K; OE=$(11,766)K; diluted shares=20,326K; OE/sh=$(0.5789). Reconciliation: NI (10,822) + D&A 3,884 + deferred tax (667) + SBC 730 + loan costs 60 - gain on sale (2,668) + inventory provision 116 + other (32) = (9,399) ties. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001437749-18-005023.
2016 -$1.00 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (operating-lease ROU amortisation not applicable pre-ASC 842). CFO=$(19,304)K; working-capital cash effect=$(2,603)K (AR +4,072, inventory (1,809), prepaid (81), AP (4,610), accrued (175)) so CFO ex-WC=$(16,701)K; SBC=$1,372K; capex=$1,763K, growth capex=$0 (revenue fell 145.3M to 91.8M) so maintenance capex=$1,763K; OE=$(19,836)K; diluted shares=19,861K; OE/sh=$(0.9987). Reconciliation: NI 6,043 + D&A 6,288 + deferred loan costs 2,261 + debt extinguishment 1,521 + SBC 1,372 + inventory provision 880 + other (1,440) - gain on asset sales (33,626) = (16,701) ties. Year distorted by the Dana-related divestiture; not representative. Source: FY2017 10-K comparative column, accession 0001437749-18-005023.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Midwest including Michigan, South including Florida and Kentucky, West, Northeast); Mexico (about 26% of 2025 revenue); minor sales to Europe
Historical growth strategy
Since divesting its Dana-related operations in 2015-2016, Sypris has sought growth organically by winning new long-term electronics programs with defence and aerospace primes (often funded by customer prepayments) and adding new truck, off-highway and energy component programs with existing customers, with expansion financed by loans from its controlling shareholder rather than acquisitions.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe Sypris as a long-term downtrend that has flattened into a multi-year sideways base in the low single digits, far below the levels it traded at before 2008. Rallies within the base, such as the 2021 run, have repeatedly failed at overhead resistance and given back their gains, leaving a pattern of lower highs. Volume is thin and spiky, typical of a micro-cap, so breakouts are unreliable. Technicians would want a close above the upper end of the multi-year range on expanding volume before calling a trend change; until then the chart reads as range-bound with a bearish tilt.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of SYPR. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.