valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL SERVICES INC (ORRF) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$29.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$35.87 $76.93
bear $35.87 base $63.90 bull $76.93 margin of safety $29.00 market price* $41.66
Orrstown Financial Services owns Orrstown Bank, a commercial-focused community bank in south-central Pennsylvania and Maryland, plus a wealth management arm that generates roughly a fifth of revenue. Its July 2024 stock-for-stock merger with Codorus Valley Bancorp nearly doubled it to about $5.6 billion of assets, $4.1 billion of loans and $4.6 billion of deposits. About 80% of the loan book is commercial: owner-occupied and investor commercial real estate ($1.9 billion), multifamily, construction and land development, agricultural and business loans. How we measure earnings. For a bank we start from operating cash flow, strip out timing swings (including the mortgage loans it originates and sells), and charge share-based pay, the capital spending needed to keep branches running, and the loans it actually wrote off. This view matters here for one reason: under the merger accounting, $23.4 million of 2025 reported income was accretion of purchase-price discounts on acquired loans and deposits, which is not cash and will run off. Our measure excludes it automatically, which is why 2025 owner earnings come to $3.65 a share against reported earnings of $4.18. In the other direction, the $9.8 million a year of amortization on the core-deposit and wealth-client intangibles from the merger is a non-cash charge we add back; those acquired relationships do wear away, so we allow only slow growth rather than treating them as permanent. Earnings level. Owner earnings per share were $3.24 in 2021, $2.93 in 2022 (after a $13 million securities-litigation settlement paid that year), $3.58 in 2023, $1.87 in 2024 (merger costs of $22.7 million and a $4.8 million executive retirement charge, excluded) and $3.65 in 2025, the first full year as the combined bank. We use $3.41 a share, the middle of the four representative years, rather than the stronger 2025 figure alone, because only one clean year of the combined bank exists. The first half of 2026 ran ahead of that pace, but one half-year does not move the level. Base case ($63.90). Earnings start at $3.41 and grow about 1.5% a year, reaching about $3.96 by year ten, then hold there. We credit only the growth the bank has shown it can sustain from loan and deposit growth in its existing markets; we credit no further acquisitions, no margin expansion and no rate-cut benefit, because none of those is in hand. Year-one growth of 1.5% sits well below the reported jump in 2025, which was a merger effect, not a run rate. Bull case ($76.93). The combined bank holds the 2025 earnings level of about $3.65-$3.76 and grows about 3% a year, the pace it has shown when commercial loan demand and wealth fees cooperate, reaching about $4.91 by year ten. No new acquisition is assumed. Bear case ($35.87). Two normal years at $3.30, then a commercial real estate credit cycle of the kind this bank has itself lived through: in 2011-2012 Orrstown lost $38.5 million in a single year ($4.77 a share) and had to write off its deferred tax asset. We model a loss of about $1.50 a share in year three, a further loss in year four, a 10% share issuance at trough prices to rebuild capital, and recovery to only about $2.55 a share afterward as the combined bank shrinks its riskier lending. Cumulative earnings lost against normal run to roughly $11 a share, consistent with losses of about 5% of today's loan book. Even this case is worth more than tangible book value of about $26 a share, because the bank keeps a low-cost local deposit base and a wealth business with recurring fees that survives a credit downturn; the 2011-2012 episode ended with the franchise intact, not sold or failed. Debt. As a bank, its deposits and borrowings are raw material, so we value earnings after interest and subtract no debt. Most of the subordinated notes were redeemed in 2025-2026, leaving about $8 million; equity is about $622 million, roughly 11% of assets. What could make this wrong. The biggest risk is the concentration in investor commercial real estate and construction lending across a two-state footprint; a regional property downturn would hit harder than our base case assumes. Second, the merger integration is only two years old, and early acquired-loan losses ($4.1 million of charge-offs in 2024) could prove to be a leading indicator. Third, a further acquisition paid in stock would reset the per-share picture in either direction. Margin-of-safety price ($29). We are reasonably confident in the earnings level: four of the last five years landed between $2.93 and $3.65 a share, and the combined bank's first full year confirmed the top of that range on a cash basis. The worst plausible outcome is a commercial real estate loss cycle like Orrstown's own 2011-2012 experience; with equity near 11% of assets and minimal holding-company debt, the bank should survive that with dilution rather than wipeout, but a holder would sit through two to three years of little or no earnings and a cut dividend. If we are wrong about the earnings level being $3.41 rather than closer to $3.00, and about modest growth continuing, the shares are worth something near the bear case, not the base. The price assumes a three-to-five-year holding period, and the bank pays about $1.06 a share a year in dividends in the meantime. At $29 the dividend alone is about 3.7% of that price, the price sits only modestly above tangible book of about $26, and roughly 8.5 times our earnings level, so ordinary performance implies a value in the mid-$40s or better within three or four years, and in the bear case the bank would still be worth more than that price. Above about $30, a 20% annual return depends on the base case playing out with no credit cycle, which leaves no margin of safety.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $3.65 ▼
Recomputed on the current owner-earnings basis (prior record used net income, a superseded basis). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$74,734K (CFO already deducts $23,391K non-cash purchase-accounting discount accretion and adds back $15,271K D&A incl. $9,765K intangible amortization); dWC=$(3,646)K (HFS: proceeds 60,419 - originations 58,611 - gains 1,287 = 521; accrued interest receivable and other assets 5,429; payables/other liabilities (10,805); other net 1,209); SBC=$5,013K; capex=$4,235K, capex/revenue mean 4.46% 2016-2025, revenue (NII 199,792 + noninterest income 52,313) 252,105 vs 192,689, growth capex=$2,653K, maintenance=$1,582K; NCO=2,548-1,414=$1,134K; OE=$70,651K; diluted shares 19,355K; OE/sh=$3.65 (NI/sh $4.18). Reconciliation: NI 80,855 - accretion 23,391 + D&A 15,271 + deferred tax 5,999 - life insurance 5,402 + other non-cash ~1,300 + provision 26 = ~74,660 before SBC add-back, less maint capex and NCO = ~71,900 vs 70,651 (within 2%). Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001628280-26-017278.
2024 $1.87 ▼
Recomputed on the current owner-earnings basis (prior record used net income, a superseded basis). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$34,959K; dWC=$(4,993)K (HFS: proceeds 44,071 - originations 43,928 - gains 810 = (667); accrued interest receivable and other assets (10,610); payables/other liabilities 4,165; other net 2,119); SBC=$8,719K (inflated by merger/retirement vesting); capex=$1,582K, revenue 192,689 vs 130,558, growth capex=$2,774K so maintenance=$0; NCO=4,066-725=$3,341K; OE=$27,892K; diluted shares 14,914K (Codorus Valley merger 1 July 2024); OE/sh=$1.87. Year distorted by $22.7M merger expenses and $4.8M executive retirement; excluded from anchor window. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001628280-26-017278.
2023 $3.58 ▼
Recomputed on the current owner-earnings basis (prior record used net income, a superseded basis). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$43,701K; dWC=$1,296K (HFS: proceeds 23,461 - originations 18,437 - gains 283 = 4,741; accrued interest receivable and other assets 1,571; payables/other liabilities (5,651); other net 635); SBC=$2,356K; capex=$2,293K, revenue 130,558 vs 126,582, growth capex=$178K, maintenance=$2,115K; NCO=1,105-524=$581K; OE=$37,353K; diluted shares 10,435K; OE/sh=$3.58. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001628280-26-017278 and FY2024 10-K 0000826154-25-000090.
2022 $2.93 ▼
Recomputed on the current owner-earnings basis (prior record used net income, a superseded basis). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$36,192K; dWC=$2,038K (HFS: proceeds 77,291 - originations 82,708 - gains 1,283 = (6,700); accrued interest receivable and other assets (4,168); payables/other liabilities 10,863; other net 2,043); SBC=$2,154K; capex=$895K, revenue 126,582 vs 116,126, growth capex=$467K, maintenance=$428K; NCO=410-248=$162K; OE=$31,410K; diluted shares 10,706K; OE/sh=$2.93. NI/sh $2.06 was depressed by a $13.0M legal settlement (SEPTA securities case) accrued and paid within 2022, so it sits inside CFO and is charged here. Source: FY2024 10-K accession 0000826154-25-000090.
2021 $3.24 ▼
Recomputed on the current owner-earnings basis (prior record used net income, a superseded basis; whole series restated so the anchor is not drawn from mixed definitions). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs (bank: provision is a non-cash add-back, actual net charge-offs deducted as cash credit cost). CFO=$40,811K; dWC=$1,782K (HFS mortgages: proceeds 204,102 - originations 197,167 - gains 4,967 = 1,968; accrued interest receivable 693; payables/other liabilities 1,167; other net (2,046)); SBC=$1,949K; capex=$1,254K, capex/revenue mean 4.46% 2016-2025, revenue 116,126 vs 111,916, growth capex=$188K, maintenance=$1,066K; NCO=1,118-1,057=$61K; OE=$35,953K; diluted shares 11,106K; OE/sh=$3.24 (NI/sh $2.96). Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000826154-22-000079.
2020 $2.45 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$30,171K; dWC=$595K (HFS: 208,987 - 207,051 - 6,067 = (4,131); accrued interest receivable (2,887); payables/other liabilities 953; other net 6,660); SBC=$2,092K; capex=$1,303K, revenue 111,916 vs 97,834, growth capex=$629K, maintenance=$674K; NCO=1,011-1,182=$(171)K; OE=$26,981K; diluted shares 11,034K; OE/sh=$2.45. Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000826154-22-000079.
2019 $1.30 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$9,090K; dWC=$(8,286)K (HFS: 108,885 - 112,568 - 2,613 = (6,296); accrued interest receivable 1,248; payables/other liabilities (5,291); other net 2,053); SBC=$1,586K; capex=$2,911K, revenue 97,834 vs 73,181, growth capex=$1,101K, maintenance=$1,810K; NCO=865-606=$259K; OE=$13,721K; diluted shares 10,514K; OE/sh=$1.30 (includes Hamilton Bancorp merger costs). Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000826154-22-000079 cash-flow statement; FY2019 10-K 0000826154-20-000087.
2018 $1.45 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs. CFO=$22,487K; dWC=$4,630K (HFS: 94,727 - 90,305 - 2,144 = 2,278; accrued interest receivable (879); payables/other liabilities 2,696; other net 535); SBC=$1,493K; capex=$4,791K, revenue 73,181 vs 63,758, growth capex=$421K, maintenance=$4,370K; NCO=464-882=$(418)K net recovery; OE=$12,412K; diluted shares 8,537K; OE/sh=$1.45. Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0000826154-19-000067.
2017 $1.68 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs (bank basis: provision added back in CFO, actual net charge-offs deducted as cash credit cost). CFO=$16,350K; dWC=$(2,140)K (HFS mortgages: proceeds 103,131 - originations 104,512 - gains 2,447 = (3,828); accrued interest receivable (376); payables/other liabilities 2,012; other net 52); SBC=$1,386K; capex=$2,653K, capex/revenue mean 4.46%, revenue 63,758 vs 56,284 so growth capex=$334K, maintenance=$2,319K; NCO=1,266-287=$979K; OE=$13,806K; diluted shares 8,226K; OE/sh=$1.68 (NI/sh $0.98; NI depressed by $3.1M deferred-tax remeasurement on the 2017 tax act, which CFO adds back). Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0000826154-19-000067; FY2017 10-K 0000826154-18-000056.
2016 -$0.22 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex - net charge-offs (bank: provision is a non-cash add-back in CFO; actual net charge-offs are deducted as the cash credit cost). CFO=$15,587K; dWC=$2,108K (held-for-sale mortgage flow: proceeds 114,139 - originations 108,632 - gains 2,998 = 2,509; accrued interest receivable (827); payables/other liabilities 561; other net (135)); SBC=$958K; capex=$13,369K (operations center build), capex/revenue mean 4.46% over 2016-2025, revenue (NII+noninterest income) 56,284 vs 53,512 so growth capex=$124K, maintenance capex=$13,245K; net charge-offs=1,722-679=$1,043K; OE=$(1,767)K; diluted shares=8,145K; OE/sh=$(0.22). Reconciliation: NI 6,628 + D&A 2,951 + other non-cash net -> CFO ties after WC lines. Source: FY2016 10-K accession 0000826154-17-000050; FY2018 10-K 0000826154-19-000067 cash-flow statement.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - Northeast (south-central Pennsylvania: Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Lancaster, Perry, Berks and York Counties) and South (Maryland: Baltimore, Howard and Anne Arundel Counties and Hagerstown/Washington County)
Historical growth strategy
Organic commercial lending growth in adjacent south-central Pennsylvania and Maryland counties, supplemented by whole-bank acquisitions roughly every few years (Mercersburg Financial 2018, Hamilton Bancorp 2019, Codorus Valley Bancorp 2024), paid largely in stock, plus building wealth management fee income alongside the bank.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a stock that spent a decade recovering from its 2011-2012 collapse, grinding from the low teens into a $20-$30 range through 2016-2023, then breaking out on the Codorus Valley deal in 2024 to the low-to-mid $40s before giving much of it back in the 2025 bank-stock selloff. Since then it has carved out a broad base in the low-to-mid $30s; a chartist would treat the 2024 highs as overhead resistance and the 2025 lows near $30 as support, reading the pattern as range-bound consolidation awaiting a decisive break either way.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of ORRF. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.