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PERMA FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC (PESI) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.50 ComplexityAverage Updated
$0.00 $2.80
bear $0.00 base $0.85 bull $2.80 margin of safety $0.50 market price* $12.31
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Two consecutive quarters of positive cash flow from continuing operations, or the company reporting in a 10-Q or 10-K that it is receiving and treating DFLAW-related effluent waste from Hanford at its Perma-Fix Northwest facility.
Perma-Fix Environmental Services treats radioactive, mixed and hazardous waste, mostly for the federal government. Its Treatment business ($45.1 million of 2025's $61.7 million revenue) runs specialty plants in Richland, Washington (next to the Hanford nuclear site), Oak Ridge/Kingston, Tennessee and Gainesville, Florida. A smaller, project-based Services business ($16.6 million, down from $24.2 million) does on-site nuclear cleanup work. About 64% of revenue comes directly or indirectly from the Department of Energy and the Department of War, and that work can be cancelled when the government chooses. The company is also starting to sell Perma-FAS, its process for destroying PFAS ('forever chemicals'). Earnings level. We measure owner cash earnings as operating cash flow, with working-capital swings removed and share-based pay subtracted. Shares issued to vendors for services count as share-based pay. We also subtract the capital spending needed to keep the existing plants running. Over the ten years from 2016 to 2025 this figure was positive only three times (2019, 2020 and 2023, at most about $3.3 million). The median year was a loss of about $3.4 million. 2024 (minus $14.8 million) and 2025 (minus $10.3 million) were the worst years in the record. One accounting judgement matters here. In 2024 and 2025, capital spending rose to $3.4 million and then $4.7 million while revenue fell, and the filings tie much of that increase to PFAS equipment. We counted only the company's long-run normal level of spending (about 1.9% of revenue) as upkeep of the existing business. We treated the rest as optional investment in the new technology. Interest is tiny (about $0.2 million a year), so earnings before and after paying lenders are almost the same. What has happened since. The first half of 2026 was worse, not better. Revenue fell 16% to $24.0 million and gross profit swung to a $5.4 million loss. Operating cash outflow reached $9.0 million in six months, against $3.7 million a year earlier. In May 2026 the company sold about $21 million of new stock, its second large raise in three years. The share count has gone from 11.6 million in 2016 to about 21.2 million. On the positive side, the evidence is real but not yet showing in the numbers. Hanford's Low-Activity Waste Vitrification Facility began hot commissioning in October 2025. Under the next phase of that program (DFLAW), the Richland plant is expected to treat several of the effluent waste streams. In December 2025 that plant's permit was renewed, roughly tripling its liquid mixed-waste capacity to about 1.2 million gallons a year. The Treatment backlog grew 51% to $11.9 million. Foreign revenue rose to $6.4 million. The company had expected DFLAW waste to begin arriving in the first half of 2026, but no volume of that size is visible in the results through June. The Department of Energy controls the timing. What the company owes. At June 30, 2026 it had about $20.5 million of cash, against roughly $2.0 million of term debt and $1.9 million of finance leases. That is net cash of about $16.6 million, or about $0.77 per share on roughly 21.5 million diluted shares. A separate $13.2 million fund is set aside for closing the facilities, and it roughly covers the $8.7 million of recorded closure obligations. We counted neither the fund nor the obligations. Debt maturities and covenants do not drive any case. Base case. Losses continue for the next year at a slower pace than the first half of 2026 (about $12 million), then narrow to about $4 million as DFLAW waste begins arriving. From there the business settles at about $1.5 million a year of owner cash earnings, below its best years (2019, 2020 and 2023) and above its ten-year median. Why we credit that recovery: the federal government is required to clean up Hanford over decades, the program has started, and the extra plant capacity is already built, staffed and permitted. Why it is capped at a modest level: no volumes are contracted. On that basis we let the earnings run 25 years, the length of Hanford's mandated cleanup work. The business is worth about $2 million. Add the $16.6 million of net cash and the total is about $18 million, roughly $0.85 per share. The case assumes the near-term losses are paid from existing cash and credit without another stock sale. Bull case. DFLAW volumes arrive in 2027. The tripled Richland permit and the second-generation PFAS unit planned for Oak Ridge in late 2026 (which would roughly triple PFAS capacity) push the business to about $5 million a year of owner cash earnings, held for 25 years. That is above anything in the last ten years. It is credited only as the 90th-percentile outcome, because capacity, permits and the government program are all already in place. The business is worth about $43 million. Add net cash and the total is about $60 million, or about $2.80 per share. We gave PFAS no separate value beyond this. It has no contracted revenue, and its record so far is spending, not earnings. Bear case. Hanford funding or timing slips again, which has happened often enough in the program's history to be the base rate. The company keeps losing money at roughly its 2024 to 2026 pace (about $15 million and then $10 million in the next two years) before cutting back to a small Treatment business that loses about $3 million a year, as it did in 2016, 2018 and 2022. Those losses would use up the $16.6 million of net cash within two years. The arithmetic puts the business at about $23 million less than nothing. In practice the losses would be paid for by issuing more shares at low prices, as the company has done before, until today's shareholders are left with essentially nothing. Shareholders are not liable for losses beyond what they paid, so we put this case at zero rather than below it. Previous analysis. Our earlier estimate rested partly on the PFAS business becoming commercially important and on the Hanford volumes starting in 2026. Since then, the first half of 2026 has brought falling revenue, negative gross margins, faster cash burn and another large stock sale, and the expected Hanford volumes have not yet appeared. The permit renewal and larger backlog are genuine positives, but they are not yet earnings. The earlier figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable. Margin of safety price. We have low confidence in the earnings level. The business has lost cash in seven of the last ten years and has made its money only in years with unusually heavy government work. The worst plausible outcome is a long delay or cut in Department of Energy cleanup funding while fixed costs stay high. The light debt means the company would probably survive that, but only by selling more stock, which leaves little for existing owners. If we are wrong about when DFLAW arrives or how big it is, the shares are worth roughly their net cash or less. If we are wrong about the PFAS spending ending, the cash runs out faster. The company pays no dividend, so the whole return depends on the operating turnaround showing up within about three years. The margin-of-safety price is $0.50, and it applies only once the business has shown it has turned. That price is a little below the cash per share, and from it the base case implies about 20% a year if it arrives on schedule. It also limits the damage if Hanford volumes come late, because the price is less than the company's cash. Price alone is not sufficient; the price applies only after two consecutive quarters of positive operating cash flow, or a filing confirming that DFLAW waste is being received and treated in Richland.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.56 ▼
CFO=-$10,752K; working-capital movement (AR $216K + unbilled -$3,791K + prepaid/other $2,314K + AP/accrued -$1,660K) = -$2,921K; SBC broad (stock comp $818K + stock for services $477K)=$1,295K; capex=$4,708K, again substantially PFAS-technology-related per the filing's disclosure of PFAS treatment system spending. Same judgment applied: maintenance capex = 1.862%x61,674 = $1,148K. OE = -10,752 -(-2,921) - 1,295 - 1,148 = -$10,274K. Diluted shares=18,464K. OE/sh=-$0.56. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001493152-26-012314.
2024 -$0.98 ▼
CFO=-$14,743K; working-capital movement (AR -$2,076K + unbilled $3,442K + prepaid/other $3,072K + AP/accrued -$6,667K) = -$2,229K; SBC broad (stock comp $656K + stock for services $480K)=$1,136K; capex=$3,405K, of which the company discloses a material portion was PFAS-destruction-technology prototype spend rather than sustaining capex. Because revenue fell YoY, the mechanical formula would call the entire $3,405K maintenance capex, which conflicts with that disclosure; as a judgment call, maintenance capex is instead set at the FY2017-FY2023 average capex/revenue ratio (1.862%) applied to FY2024 revenue: 1.862%x59,117=$1,100K. OE = -14,743 -(-2,229) - 1,136 - 1,100 = -$14,750K. Diluted shares=15,072K. OE/sh=-$0.98. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001493152-25-010161.
2023 $0.12 ▼
CFO=$6,148K; working-capital movement (AR -$403K + unbilled -$2,370K + prepaid/other $4,193K + AP/accrued $665K) = $2,085K; SBC broad (stock comp $548K + stock for services $477K)=$1,025K; capex=$1,714K; revenue grew YoY (+$19,136K to $89,735K); growth capex=1.862%x19,136=$356K; maintenance capex=1,714-356=$1,358K. OE = 6,148 - 2,085 - 1,025 - 1,358 = $1,680K. Diluted shares=13,739K. OE/sh=$0.12. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001493152-24-009805.
2022 -$0.24 ▼
CFO=-$553K; working-capital movement (AR $2,028K + unbilled $2,933K + prepaid/other $2,018K + AP/accrued -$6,270K) = $709K; SBC broad (stock comp $408K + stock for services $481K)=$889K; capex=$1,023K; revenue fell YoY (-$1,592K to $70,599K) so maintenance capex = full capex = $1,023K. OE = -553 - 709 - 889 - 1,023 = -$3,174K. Diluted shares=13,280K. OE/sh=-$0.24. This is the median year of the FY2017-2025 window and the DCF anchor. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001493152-23-008673.
2021 -$0.59 ▼
CFO=-$6,837K; working-capital movement (AR -$1,739K + unbilled $5,458K + prepaid/other $1,165K + AP/accrued -$6,552K) = -$1,668K; SBC broad (stock comp $250K + stock for services $427K)=$677K; capex=$1,577K; revenue fell YoY (-$33,235K to $72,191K) so maintenance capex = full capex = $1,577K. OE = -6,837 -(-1,668) - 677 - 1,577 = -$7,423K. Diluted shares=12,673K. OE/sh=-$0.59. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001493152-22-009260.
2020 $0.26 ▼
CFO=$7,368K; working-capital movement (AR $3,620K + unbilled -$6,469K + prepaid/other $1,147K + AP/accrued $4,217K) = $2,515K; SBC broad (stock comp $236K + stock for services $232K)=$468K; capex=$1,715K; revenue grew YoY (+$31,967K to $105,426K); growth capex=1.862%x31,967=$595K; maintenance capex=1,715-595=$1,120K. OE = 7,368 - 2,515 - 468 - 1,120 = $3,265K. Diluted shares=12,347K. OE/sh=$0.26. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001493152-21-007032.
2019 $0.24 ▼
CFO=-$4,683K; working-capital movement (AR -$5,829K + unbilled -$4,879K + prepaid/other $923K + AP/accrued $664K) = -$9,121K; SBC broad (stock comp $179K + stock for services $241K)=$420K; capex=$1,535K; revenue grew YoY (+$23,920K to $73,459K); capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, FY2017-FY2023)=1.862%; growth capex=1.862%x23,920=$445K; maintenance capex=1,535-445=$1,090K. OE = -4,683 -(-9,121) - 420 - 1,090 = $2,928K. Diluted shares=12,046K. OE/sh=$0.24. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001493152-20-004463.
2018 -$0.37 ▼
CFO=$1,960K; working-capital movement (AR $139K + unbilled $1,626K + prepaid/other $1,932K + AP/accrued $765K) = $4,462K; SBC broad (stock comp $198K + stock for services $249K) = $447K; capex=$1,432K; revenue fell YoY ($49,539K vs $49,769K) so maintenance capex = full capex = $1,432K. OE = 1,960 - 4,462 - 447 - 1,432 = -$4,381K. Diluted shares=11,855K. OE/sh=-$0.37. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001493152-19-004464.
2017 -$0.03 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC(broad) - maintenance capex. CFO=$442K. Working-capital movement (sum of AR, unbilled receivables, prepaid/other, AP/accrued/unearned lines in the cash-flow reconciliation) = $0K. SBC broadly defined (cash-flow stock comp $144K + stock issued for services $225K, both non-cash and dilutive) = $369K. Capex (PP&E purchases) = $439K; revenue fell YoY ($49,769K vs $51,219K in 2016) so growth capex = $0 and maintenance capex = full capex = $439K. OE = 442 - 0 - 369 - 439 = -$366K. Diluted shares = 11,706K. OE/sh = -$0.03. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001493152-18-003480.
2016 -$0.31 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC(broad) - maintenance capex, same basis as FY2017-2025 records. CFO (total, incl. discontinued ops -$959K) = $104K. Working-capital movement (AR $1,070K + unbilled $2,134K + prepaid/inventories/other $2,870K + AP/accrued/unearned -$3,187K) = $2,887K (restricted cash line of $35K left in CFO as immaterial). SBC broad (stock comp $98K + stock issued for services $238K) = $336K. Capex = $436K; revenue fell YoY ($51,219K vs $62,383K in 2015) so growth capex = $0 and maintenance capex = $436K. Non-cash impairments ($1,816K tangible + $8,288K intangible) are added back automatically via CFO. OE = 104 - 2,887 - 336 - 436 = -$3,555K. Diluted shares = 11,608K. OE/sh = -$0.31. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001437749-17-005194.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (about 90% of revenue; mostly federal Department of Energy and Department of War sites, with treatment plants in the West - Washington (Richland, next to the Hanford site) - and the South - Tennessee (Oak Ridge/Kingston) and Florida (Gainesville)); international about 10% (Canada, Mexico, Italy, Germany)
Historical growth strategy
Growth has come from buying and permitting specialty nuclear and mixed-waste treatment facilities, then winning government cleanup and treatment work, much of it as a subcontractor to prime Department of Energy contractors. Since the 2010s the company has paid for new initiatives (the Hanford-adjacent facility build-out for DFLAW, international treatment work, and its Perma-FAS PFAS destruction technology) mainly by issuing new shares rather than from operating cash flow.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a long, range-bound microcap: years spent roughly between $3 and $6, then a sharp run in 2024 that carried the shares into the low teens, followed by a jagged, volatile pattern with deep pullbacks. Moves tend to be fast in both directions. A technician would treat the prior multi-year base as major support and the 2024 highs as heavy overhead resistance, and would want to see a sustained higher-low pattern on rising volume before calling a durable uptrend.
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Circle of competence

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