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PENN Entertainment, Inc. (PENN) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$16.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$8.72 $62.11
bear $8.72 base $37.22 bull $62.11 margin of safety $16.00 market price* $14.94
PENN Entertainment runs about 40 regional casinos and racetracks across the United States under brands such as Hollywood Casino, Ameristar, L'Auberge and M Resort. It leases nearly all of that real estate from two gaming landlords, Gaming and Leisure Properties and VICI, under long-term triple-net leases with rent that rises up to 1-2% a year. It also runs an online sportsbook and iCasino business. On November 5, 2025, PENN and ESPN agreed to end the ESPN BET sportsbook deal early, effective December 1, 2025. The U.S. sportsbook was renamed theScore Bet, and the company now leans more on its Hollywood-branded iCasino and its Canadian operations. That ends the roughly $150 million a year in fees PENN was paying ESPN; the termination cost $38.1 million plus $5.0 million of media. ESPN's unvested warrants were cancelled, and it still holds warrants for about 8.0 million shares at $26.08 to $32.60. How we measure earnings. We start from operating cash flow and take out working-capital swings, stock-based compensation and the capital spending needed just to keep the properties competitive. PENN reports that maintenance figure separately: $239 million in 2025 and about $220 million planned for 2026. The large spending on new casinos and hotel towers is left out. We count cash rent to the landlords, about $630 million a year, as a real operating cost, because it does not reverse the way a timing swing does. Non-cash write-offs, including $945 million in 2025 mostly tied to the online business, are added back. The repeated pattern of paying for digital growth and then writing it off is charged in the bear case instead. On this basis, owner earnings per share were $3.00 to $3.97 in 2017-2022 and $2.00 in 2020, then fell to $0.56 in 2023, $0.52 in 2024 and $1.55 in 2025. The drop came from online losses: the Interactive segment lost $403 million in 2023, $500 million in 2024 and $268 million in 2025 on an adjusted basis. Because PENN carries a lot of debt and debt-like lease obligations, we value the business before its lenders and then subtract what it owes. Adding cash interest back, the business produced about $607 million in 2025, $496 million in 2024 and $505 million in 2023. It produced $1.0 to $1.4 billion before the online push, but that was also before a 2022-2023 restructuring that turned some financing payments into rent. So we treat the business as it has been since 2023. The level we start from is about $660 million, below what 2025 would have been without the ESPN fees (roughly $760 million). That leaves room for theScore Bet to spend on marketing to replace a brand it no longer has. In 2025 business cash flow grew far faster than this from a depressed base. Our first-year assumption of about 9% growth is well below that. First-half 2026 operating cash flow of $363 million, against $220 million a year earlier, supports the direction. What it owes. Borrowings were about $2.8 billion at June 30, 2026: term loans due 2027 and 2029, 5.625% notes due 2027, 4.125% notes due 2029 and the revolver. Add $2.06 billion of finance-lease obligations and $2.32 billion of financing obligations on the Pinnacle master lease. Subtract about $490 million of cash above operating needs. We also reduce the debt figure by about $260 million because the financing obligations (about 5.2%) and the 4.125% notes cost less than a long-term rate. Net debt is about $6.45 billion. The 2027 maturities, about $850 million of term loan A and notes, have to be refinanced. Nothing in the filings suggests the company is shut out of credit markets, but the bear case charges for a harder refinancing. Base case: the land-based casinos keep earning roughly what they earn now, adjusted for the June 2026 rent escalators and normal labor-cost pressure. The landlord-funded Joliet relocation (opened August 2025) and M Resort tower (opened December 2025) add their first full years. The online business stops losing money at the 2025 rate now that the ESPN fees are gone, but we give it no credit for becoming a meaningful profit source. Business cash flow settles near $700 million a year and stays there. After year 10 we assume no growth. Gaming licenses renew routinely and the leases run for decades, which supports durability, but nothing we can point to supports growth beyond the rent escalators. The business is worth about $11.6 billion, it owes about $6.45 billion, and the difference, after the dilution and cash from ESPN's warrants, is about $37 per share. A little over half of that value comes from after year 10. Bear case: a regional-gaming downturn like 2008-2010 or the 2020 closures. Revenue falls in the low double digits for two years while rent keeps rising on schedule, so business cash flow drops from about $600 million to about $360 million in the worst years. That is slightly below the roughly $390 million cash interest bill for two years, which cash on hand and about $411 million of unused revolver capacity can cover. Refinancing the 2027 debt costs about $100 million more in present value. Cash flow recovers only to about $520 million, as theScore Bet is assumed to keep losing money, and then shrinks about 1% a year. The business is worth about $7.7 billion against about $6.55 billion owed, leaving about $9 per share. In this case nearly all of the equity rests on the leases and debt being serviced through a downturn. Bull case: the online business turns modestly profitable on its iCasino strength, the new hotel towers and the Aurora relocation ramp as planned, and the rent escalators are covered by normal pricing. Business cash flow reaches about $950 million by year 10 and holds there. The business is worth about $15.2 billion, against about $6.45 billion owed, or about $62 per share. Margin-of-safety price. We are reasonably confident in the casino earnings. They have been stable outside 2020 and are backed by maintenance spending that PENN discloses separately. We are much less confident in the online business, which has lost about $1.2 billion in three years and has now lost its national brand. The worst plausible outcome is a gaming recession on top of continued online losses. The structure is the weak point: rent and debt service together take well over $1 billion a year before owners see anything, and that does not flex down. Both earlier analyses were too generous to the digital business. If we are also wrong about how fast online losses shrink, and about how much revenue a downturn would take, the shares are worth roughly $10 to $20. PENN pays no dividend, so returns depend entirely on value being recognized, and the price assumes a three-to-five-year holding period. From $16 a share, the base case implies well over 20% a year if it is recognized within about four years. The bear case implies the shares would be worth about half that price. The margin-of-safety price is $16. What changed since the previous analysis: the ESPN partnership has ended, which removes about $150 million a year of fees but also the brand built around it. We now value only what the casinos and a break-even online business can support. The previous figures are not directly comparable.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $1.55 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$508.2M; WC movement = AR $1.6M + prepaid $(19.0)M + other assets $(12.1)M + AP $(2.4)M + accrued expenses $18.0M + income taxes $(3.8)M + other current/LT liabilities $(23.9)M + other $26.1M = $(15.5)M net use (added back); operating-lease-liability line of $(356.6)M excluded from WC and left inside CFO, judged a real recurring cash rent cost under the Triple Net Leases with gaming REIT landlords (GLPI/VICI), not a working-capital timing swing - including it in WC would have overstated OE by roughly $350M; SBC=$60.9M; maintenance capex disclosed explicitly=$239.3M (of $647.7M total capex, project capex $408.4M mostly new-development spend). Goodwill/intangible impairment of $945.3M (mostly Interactive segment) is a non-cash addback inside CFO and not separately adjusted here - its economic decay is instead reflected in the growth path used for the DCF, not the earnings level. OE = 508.2 - (-15.5) - 60.9 - 239.3 = $223.5M. Diluted shares=144.6M. OE/sh=$1.55. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000921738-26-000008.
2024 $0.52 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$359.3M; WC movement (excl. operating-lease-liability line)=$(2.6)M net use (added back); SBC=$52.9M; maintenance capex disclosed explicitly=$229.4M (of $482.7M total capex, project capex ~$253.3M). OE = 359.3 - (-2.6) - 52.9 - 229.4 = $79.6M. Diluted shares=152.1M. OE/sh=$0.52. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000921738-25-000008.
2023 $0.56 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$455.9M; WC movement (excl. operating-lease-liability line, a real recurring rent cost under the Triple Net Leases, left inside CFO)=$(75.1)M net use (added back); SBC=$85.9M. No maintenance/project capex split disclosed this year; total capex=$360.0M and revenue declined slightly YoY ($6,401.7M to $6,362.9M) so per policy growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full $360.0M - flagged as a judgment call: this likely bundles some discretionary project/technology spend (e.g. ESPN Bet launch buildout) that the declining-revenue rule conservatively treats as maintenance, understating OE for this year. OE = 455.9 - (-75.1) - 85.9 - 360.0 = $85.1M. Diluted shares=152.1M. OE/sh=$0.56. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0000921738-24-000012.
2022 $3.77 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$878.2M; WC movement (excl. operating-lease-liability line)=$(65.3)M net use (added back); SBC=$58.1M. Total capex=$263.4M disclosed as consisting of maintenance capex + $17.1M York/Morgantown project capex + $26.0M hurricane-related rebuild (insurance-funded, treated as non-maintenance) => maintenance capex = 263.4-17.1-26.0 = $220.3M. OE = 878.2 - (-65.3) - 58.1 - 220.3 = $665.1M. Diluted shares=176.6M. OE/sh=$3.77. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000921738-23-000010.
2021 $3.97 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$896.1M; WC movement (excl. operating-lease-liability line, treated as real rent cost)=$46.3M net source; SBC=$35.1M. No explicit maintenance/project capex split disclosed this year; total capex=$244.1M, revenue grew from $3,578.7M to $5,905.0M; applying capex_ratio = mean(total capex/revenue) over FY2019-2025 = 5.43%, growth capex = 5.43% x (5905.0-3578.7) = $126.2M, maintenance capex = 244.1-126.2 = $117.9M. OE = 896.1 - 46.3 - 35.1 - 117.9 = $696.8M. Diluted shares=175.5M. OE/sh=$3.97. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000921738-23-000010 (comparative FY2021 column); FY2021 10-K accession 0000921738-22-000011.
2020 $2.00 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$338.8M; WC movement (AR, prepaid, other assets, AP, accrued expenses, income taxes, other current/LT liabilities; operating-lease-liability line excluded, treated as real rent cost)=$(80.6)M net use (added back); SBC=$14.5M; total capex=$137.0M and revenue declined YoY (COVID-19 closures) so per policy growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full $137.0M. OE = 338.8 - (-80.6) - 14.5 - 137.0 = $267.9M. Diluted shares=134.0M. OE/sh=$2.00. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000921738-23-000010 (comparative FY2020 column); FY2020 10-K accession 0000921738-21-000009.
2019 $3.80 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$703.9M; WC movement=$75.3M net source (first year including new operating-lease-liability line under ASC 842, excluded from WC as a real recurring rent cost, not timing noise - see FY2025 methodology note); SBC=$14.9M; maintenance capex disclosed explicitly=$165.5M (project capex $25.1M separate). OE = 703.9 - 75.3 - 14.9 - 165.5 = $448.2M. Diluted shares=117.8M. OE/sh=$3.80. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000921738-20-000009.
2018 $3.00 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$352.8M; WC movement=$(50.2)M net use of cash (subtracting it adds back to OE); SBC=$12.0M; maintenance capex disclosed explicitly=$89.7M (project capex $2.9M separate). OE = 352.8 - (-50.2) - 12.0 - 89.7 = $301.3M. Diluted shares=100.3M. OE/sh=$3.00. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000921738-20-000009 (comparative FY2018 column); FY2018 10-K accession 0000921738-19-000011.
2017 $3.09 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex. Figures from FY2019 10-K comparative columns (consistent 3-yr cash-flow disclosure). CFO=$477.8M; WC movement (AR, prepaid, other assets, AP, accrued expenses, income taxes, other current/LT liabilities; excludes nothing here as pre-ASC842 lease-liability line not yet material)=$107.4M net source; SBC=$7.8M; maintenance capex disclosed explicitly=$74.2M (project capex $25.1M separate). OE = 477.8 - 107.4 - 7.8 - 74.2 = $288.4M. Diluted shares=93.4M. OE/sh=$3.09. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000921738-20-000009 (comparative FY2017 column); FY2017 10-K accession 0001558370-18-001376.
2016 $3.60 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex, all as originally reported in the FY2016 10-K. CFO=$404.823M; changes in operating assets/liabilities (AR, prepaid, other assets, AP, accrued expenses, accrued interest, accrued salaries, gaming taxes, income taxes, other liabilities) = $(9.277)M (i.e. WC was a net cash source, so subtracting it reduces OE); SBC=$6.871M; capex disclosed as Project $18.740M + Maintenance $78.505M = maintenance capex used = $78.505M (company-disclosed split, pre-master-lease era). OE = 404.823 - (-9.277) - 6.871 - 78.505 = $328.724M. Diluted shares=91.407M. OE/sh=$3.60. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001558370-17-001016.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Northeast: Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan; Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas; South: Louisiana, Mississippi; West: Nevada) plus online sports betting and iCasino in multiple U.S. states and Canada (Ontario)
Historical growth strategy
Grew mainly by acquiring regional casino operators (Pinnacle 2018, Ameristar and others) while selling the real estate to gaming landlords (GLPI, VICI) and leasing it back; more recently spent heavily to build an online sportsbook and iCasino business (Barstool stake, theScore acquisition 2021, ESPN BET partnership 2023-2025) and on landlord-funded casino relocations and hotel towers (Joliet, Aurora, M Resort, Columbus).
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a long, persistent downtrend: the shares spiked to a pandemic-era online-betting peak around $140 in early 2021 and then broke down through every major support level as the digital strategy disappointed. Since 2023 the stock has traded in a low, sideways base in roughly the mid-teens to low-twenties, below declining long-term moving averages. A chartist would want a decisive break above the top of that range on rising volume before calling the multi-year downtrend over.
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