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OXFORD INDUSTRIES INC (OXM) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$22.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$25.00 $83.50
bear $25.00 base $60.50 bull $83.50 margin of safety $22.00 market price* $26.42
Oxford Industries owns a portfolio of lifestyle apparel brands, sold almost entirely in the United States. Tommy Bahama is the largest and includes 15 Marlin Bars and 13 restaurants alongside its stores. Lilly Pulitzer is the second major brand. Johnny Was was acquired in 2022, and the smaller brands include Southern Tide, TBBC and Duck Head. Most sales are direct to consumers through owned stores and e-commerce; the rest go through a shrinking wholesale channel. Earnings record. We measure the cash the business produces after stock compensation, after the capital spending needed to keep the business running, and after removing inventory and receivable timing swings. On that basis, Oxford earned about $4.30-4.80 a share before the pandemic. It lost money in the 2020 shutdown and earned roughly $8.60-10.20 a share in the 2021-2023 reopening boom. It then fell to about $1.90 in fiscal 2024 and a loss of $1.34 in fiscal 2025. Much of that recent decline was a one-time building project, not lost earning power. Oxford spent $123 million over fiscal 2024-25 on a new distribution center in Lyons, Georgia, which opened in February 2026, and capital spending has since roughly halved. Even so, the operating business is weaker than it was. Tariff costs rose sharply in 2025. Johnny Was turned unprofitable, and $61 million was written off against it and Jack Rogers. Lilly Pulitzer's sales are now soft, which management attributes to product and marketing missteps. Tommy Bahama is the bright spot, with comparable sales growing again in mid-2026, including in Florida. What changed since our previous analysis. We previously read the first half of fiscal 2026 as a recovery under way. Most of that improvement was a one-time $42 million refund of previously paid tariffs. Excluding it, earnings were roughly flat, and management has since lowered its full-year outlook because of Lilly Pulitzer. We now treat the refund as cash that reduced debt, not as recurring earnings. The previous figures were also built on a different basis and are not comparable to these. What the company owes. Borrowings were $73 million on August 1, 2026, under a revolving credit line that matures in March 2028. About $13 million of tariff refunds received after the quarter brings net debt to roughly $60 million, or about $4 a share. The company owns its main distribution centers. It has paid a dividend every quarter since 1960, currently $0.70 a quarter. That dividend is more than the business is earning right now, so it is not secure. Base case ($60.50 a share). Earning power recovers over about three years to roughly $4.00 a share, before interest, and holds there. That is below the pre-pandemic level, because today's tariff costs and Johnny Was's losses are real and still present. The recovery rests on capital spending returning to normal now that the distribution center is finished, and on sourcing shifting away from China, from 29% of production toward about 15%. We give no credit for new Marlin Bar openings, which management is slowing, or for any fix at Lilly Pulitzer. Tommy Bahama and Lilly Pulitzer have each sustained their franchises for decades, which supports holding that level long term. The business is worth about $64.50 a share, less $4 of net debt. Bear case ($25 a share). The brand problems persist and earning power stays near today's level of about $2.25 a share. Then a consumer downturn like the 2020 one wipes out two years of earnings entirely, as fiscal 2020 and fiscal 2025 each nearly did. The business recovers only to $2.25 afterward, and fades to about $1.75 a share in the long run as fashion brands lose relevance. The revolving credit line has ample room to carry the business through two lean years, as it did in 2020, though the dividend would almost certainly be cut. The business is worth about $29 a share, less $4 of debt. Bull case ($83.50 a share). Tommy Bahama's momentum holds and the business returns over three to four years to about $5.50 a share. That level was demonstrated in the pre-pandemic and fiscal 2024 years, once one-time construction spending is excluded. The business is worth about $87.50, less $4 of debt. Margin of safety price ($22). We are not very sure of the earnings level. Owner earnings have ranged from a loss to about $10 a share within five years, and today's run rate sits well below the long-run typical figure. The worst plausible outcome is a recession arriving while Lilly Pulitzer is still struggling and tariffs remain high. Even then, modest debt, owned distribution centers and decades-old brands mean the company should survive it. If we are wrong about Lilly recovering and about the downturn, the shares are worth about the bear value of $25. Below that, the dividend is the main payment over the holding period, and it is likely to be smaller. At $22, the bear value sits slightly above that price, and the base case implies well above a 20% annual return over three to five years as earnings normalize. That is the highest price at which we believe the target is met across the realistic range of outcomes.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$1.34 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$119,646K (includes $60,980K Johnny Was/Jack Rogers impairments reversed inside CFO); WC cash effect=$15,740K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$15,679K; capex=$108,339K (includes $54,000K for the one-time Lyons, GA distribution center, opened Feb 2026), revenue fell so growth capex=$0, maint capex=$108,339K; OE=$(20,112)K; diluted shares=14,963K; OE/sh=$(1.34). Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC (previously omitted); reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 3%. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000075288-26-000026.
2024 $1.93 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$194,032K; WC cash effect=$12,612K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable incl. $14,225K refund collected, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$16,674K; capex=$134,231K (includes $69,000K for the one-time Lyons, GA distribution center), revenue fell so growth capex=$0, maint capex=$134,231K; OE=$30,515K; diluted shares=15,827K; OE/sh=$1.93. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable previously omitted from WC, which caused an ~8% reconciliation gap; now reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 2%. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000075288-26-000026.
2023 $9.35 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$244,284K (includes $113,611K non-cash goodwill/intangible/equity-method impairment reversed inside CFO); WC cash effect=$14,404K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$14,473K; capex=$74,098K, revenue rose $159,947K so growth capex=$7,347K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$66,751K; OE=$148,656K; diluted shares=15,906K; OE/sh=$9.35. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC and capex ratio now 10-yr (value unchanged); reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 1%. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000075288-26-000026.
2022 $10.18 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$125,610K; WC cash effect=$(84,802)K (receivables, inventories incl. $78,966K inventory build, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$10,577K; capex=$46,668K, revenue rose $269,449K so growth capex=$12,377K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$34,291K; OE=$165,544K; diluted shares=16,259K; OE/sh=$10.18. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC and capex ratio now 10-yr; reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 1%. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000075288-25-000033.
2021 $8.64 ▼
Reopening-surge year. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$198,006K; WC cash effect=$30,306K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$8,186K; capex=$31,894K, revenue rose $393,246K so growth capex=$18,064K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$13,830K; OE=$145,684K; diluted shares=16,869K; OE/sh=$8.64. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC and capex ratio now 10-yr; reconciles to NI + non-cash items (incl. $11,586K gain on sale of unconsolidated entity) exactly. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0000075288-22-000004.
2020 -$0.98 ▼
COVID shutdown year. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$83,850K; WC cash effect=$63,346K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$7,755K; capex=$28,924K, revenue fell so growth capex=$0, maint capex=$28,924K; OE=$(16,175)K; diluted shares=16,576K; OE/sh=$(0.98). Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC (previously omitted, causing FY2024 reconciliation gap); reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 3%. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0000075288-22-000004.
2019 $4.30 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$121,926K; WC cash effect=$4,782K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$7,620K; capex=$37,421K, revenue rose $15,324K so growth capex=$704K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$36,717K; OE=$72,807K; diluted shares=16,914K; OE/sh=$4.30. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC (previously omitted, causing FY2024 reconciliation gap) and capex ratio now 10-yr; reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 3%. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0000075288-22-000004.
2018 $4.76 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$96,377K; WC cash effect=$(27,149)K (receivables, inventories, income tax receivable, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$7,327K; capex=$37,043K, revenue rose $21,255K so growth capex=$976K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$36,067K; OE=$80,132K; diluted shares=16,842K; OE/sh=$4.76. Recomputed 2026-10-14: income tax receivable now included in WC (previously omitted, causing FY2024 reconciliation gap) and capex ratio now 10-yr; reconciles to NI + non-cash items within 3%. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001558370-20-003379.
2017 $4.44 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$118,593K; WC cash effect=$2,042K (receivables, inventories, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$6,413K; capex=$38,748K, revenue rose $63,623K so growth capex=$2,923K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$35,825K; OE=$74,313K; diluted shares=16,734K; OE/sh=$4.44. Reconciles to NI + non-cash items exactly (non-current balance changes $398K). Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001558370-20-003379.
2016 $3.30 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$118,565K; WC cash effect=$10,234K (receivables, inventories, prepaids, current liabilities); SBC=$6,445K; capex=$49,415K, revenue rose $53,298K so growth capex=$2,448K (capex_ratio 10-yr FY16-25 mean 4.59%), maint capex=$46,967K; OE=$54,919K; diluted shares=16,649K; OE/sh=$3.30. Includes $2,038K loss from discontinued Ben Sherman operations in NI. Reconciles to NI + non-cash items exactly (other balance sheet changes $(1,367)K). Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0000075288-19-000024.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
About 97% of sales are booked in the United States. They are concentrated in the South, especially Florida, and in the West, including California and Hawaii, with the remainder spread across the Northeast and Midwest. The small balance comes from Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan.
Historical growth strategy
Oxford grows by buying established lifestyle brands, then expanding their own stores, e-commerce and, for Tommy Bahama, Marlin Bar restaurant locations, all funded from operating cash. It bought Tommy Bahama in 2003, Lilly Pulitzer in 2010, Southern Tide in 2016, TBBC in 2022 and Johnny Was in 2022. Along the way it sold or exited lower-margin businesses: Ben Sherman, Lanier Clothes and its private-label manufacturing.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a long-term downtrend: a peak in the 2023 reopening boom, then a series of lower highs and lower lows through 2024-2026. The September 2026 guidance cut produced a roughly 16% gap down to new multi-year lows, which confirms the downtrend. There is no sign of a base or reversal yet. A chartist would want a period of sideways basing, or a reclaim of the post-gap level, before calling a bottom.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of OXM. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.