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SOLV Energy, Inc. (MWH) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$7.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$5.26 $19.42
bear $5.26 base $12.84 bull $19.42 margin of safety $7.00 market price* $23.96
SOLV Energy builds and maintains utility-scale solar farms, battery-storage plants and the substations and high-voltage lines that connect them, almost entirely in the United States. It has built more than 500 plants (over 21 GW) since 2008 and runs operations-and-maintenance contracts on about 150 plants. Roughly 93% of its $8.0 billion year-end 2025 backlog is construction work and 7% is maintenance. The company went public in February 2026 and used the IPO proceeds to repay its entire ~$401 million term loan, so it now has essentially no funded debt beyond roughly $70 million of equipment loans and finance leases, against about $364 million of cash at June 30, 2026. Earnings history. Only three audited years exist, and they swing hard. Cash earnings available to owners (operating cash flow, with working-capital timing swings removed, stock compensation charged as a cost, and only the capital spending needed to sustain the business deducted) were about -$38 million in 2023, $91 million in 2024 and $227 million in 2025, or roughly -$0.19, $0.45 and $1.14 per share on today's ~200 million shares. Adding back the interest the company paid on its now-retired loans ($54M, $43M and $56M) gives the cash the business itself produced: about $15M, $134M and $283M on revenue of $2.10B, $1.85B and $2.49B. Gross margin went from 5.2% to 14.0% to 18.6%. 2023 shows what a bad year looks like in this industry: fixed-price construction contracts can turn unprofitable quickly. Two caveats matter for the future: the company was a tax pass-through before the IPO and paid almost no income tax, so we charge roughly a quarter of pre-tax profit for tax going forward; and the $58 million a year of acquisition intangibles amortisation is added back as a sunk cost, with the decay of those acquired customer relationships carried in the revenue fade below rather than in the earnings level. The central fact. The July 2025 tax law (the One Big Beautiful Bill Act) ends the federal production and investment credits for solar and wind projects that do not begin construction by July 4, 2026 or are not placed in service by December 31, 2027. Battery storage keeps its credit. Today's backlog and the first-half 2026 revenue surge (revenue $1.63B, up 72% on the first half of 2025) reflect developers racing to qualify. That means the current earning power is partly borrowed from later years. 2025's level is the best year in a three-year record, so it is not a safe long-run anchor. Base case ($12.84 per share). Revenue of about $3.4B in 2026 and $3.6B in 2027, which the backlog supports, then $3.4B, $2.9B and $2.4B as the credit-qualified solar pipeline gets built out, settling at $2.2B a year from 2031 on. That is about the 2023-2024 level, carried by storage (which keeps its credit), substation and transmission work, repowering, and the maintenance book. After-tax business cash margin is 6%, which is below 2025's level and above the 2023-2025 median. Near-term check: 2025 owner earnings grew 151%; the base case's 2026 business cash of about $204M after tax is below 2025's pre-tax $283M, so the base assumes no acceleration. The business is worth about $2.45B. Add back about $145M of cash beyond what the company needs to run its contracts (net of equipment loans and finance leases) and the equity is about $2.59B, or $12.84 per share. No growth beyond the backlog and the existing maintenance book is credited. Industry forecasts of rising power demand from data centers are not a contract, so they are left out. Bear case ($5.26). Backlog delivers about $3.2B in 2026 and $3.0B in 2027 at thinner margins, then the post-credit cliff arrives together with a contract-loss year like 2023, when gross margin fell to 5% and the company lost $110M. Revenue drops to $2.0B with no profit, then to about $1.4B a year at a 3.5% after-tax cash margin. The business is worth about $0.92B; plus about $0.15B of excess cash, that is about $1.06B of equity. Because there is essentially no debt, the company survives this case; owners just earn much less. Bull case ($19.42). The company's demonstrated 2025 pricing and productivity hold (7.5% after-tax cash margin), storage, substation and repowering work replaces more of the lost solar volume, and revenue peaks near $4.1B in 2027-2028 before settling at $2.8B. The business is worth about $3.77B, and equity is about $3.92B, or $19.42 per share. What could make this wrong. (1) A tax receivable agreement requires the company to pay former owners 85% of certain tax savings it realizes. That is a real future cash claim that the filings do not quantify in a way we could reconcile, so it is not deducted. It would lower every case. (2) Customer concentration: the ten largest customers were 73% of 2025 revenue, the largest 14%, and contracts can be cancelled on short notice. (3) The settled level after 2030 is a judgement: if storage and grid work hold up better than the 2023-2024 level, the base is too low; if solar construction collapses further, it is too high. Margin-of-safety price. We are not very sure of the earnings level: there are three years of history, one of them a loss, and a known policy cliff that is two to four years away. The worst plausible outcome is a repeat of 2023 colliding with the end of the solar credits. The balance sheet would survive that because there is no funded debt, but earnings could be close to zero for a year or two, and the company pays no dividend in the meantime. At $7 a share, roughly $1.4B for the company, about $1.25B net of surplus cash, the backlog-secured 2026-2028 years should produce on the order of $550-600M of cash after tax. That equals close to half of that price within three years even if the business then shrinks to the bear-case level, and if the base case holds the shares would be worth about $12-13 in three years, which implies roughly 20% a year from $7. The margin-of-safety price is $7. Above that price, the bear case, which this industry has already shown once in the past three years, leaves too little cushion.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $1.14 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$331.6M; dWC=+$60.1M inflow removed (AR +21.5, contract assets -100.4, other assets -32.8, AP/accrued +109.3, contract liabilities +66.9, LT liabilities -4.3); SBC=$27.3M; capex=$21.4M, capex ratio mean 2023-25=0.67% of revenue, growth capex=0.67%x($2,490.5M-$1,847.8M)=$4.3M so maintenance capex=$17.1M; OE=$227.2M. Reconciliation: NI 149.7 + D&A 85.5 + other non-cash 8.3 (excl SBC) - maint capex 17.1 = $226.4M (gap <1%). Shares: pre-IPO LLC had no diluted share count; used 199.4M (112.27M Class A + 87.14M Class B exchangeable) per FY2025 10-K. OE/sh=$1.14. Pre-IPO pass-through entity, minimal income tax. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-124117.
2024 $0.45 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$117.6M; dWC=+$9.8M inflow removed (AR -50.0, contract assets +133.1, other -2.5, AP/accrued -96.5, contract liabilities +24.3, LT liab +1.3); SBC=$8.6M; capex=$8.6M, revenue declined ($2,100.6M to $1,847.8M) so growth capex=0, maintenance capex=$8.6M; OE=$90.6M. Shares 199.4M (Class A + Class B post-IPO count; no pre-IPO diluted share count). OE/sh=$0.45. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-124117.
2023 -$0.19 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$50.3M; dWC=+$72.0M inflow removed (AR +81.7, contract assets +30.7, other -24.7, AP/accrued -89.8, contract liabilities +75.7, LT liab -1.7); SBC=$2.4M; capex=$14.4M, 2022 revenue not in filing so all capex treated as maintenance; OE=-$38.5M (NI -$109.8M year, gross margin 5.2%). Shares 199.4M (post-IPO Class A + Class B). OE/sh=-$0.19. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-124117.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (nationwide utility-scale projects, concentrated in the West and South, especially the southwestern United States including California, Arizona and Nevada)
Historical growth strategy
Organic growth by winning large utility-scale solar and battery-storage EPC contracts and then attaching long-term operations and maintenance agreements to the plants it builds, supplemented by private-equity-sponsored acquisitions (the 2024 merger with CS Energy, and the 2025 purchases of SDI and Spartan Infrastructure to add substation and high-voltage transmission capability).
Chart analysis
A chartist would have very little to work with: the shares have traded only since the February 2026 IPO at $25, so there is no multi-year base, no prior cycle highs or lows, and no long-term moving averages to anchor support or resistance. Until the stock builds a longer record, most chartists would regard the IPO price as the main reference level and defer any trend call.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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