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KOHLS Corp (KSS) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$11.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$7.00 $70.00
bear $7.00 base $38.00 bull $70.00 margin of safety $11.00 market price* $21.59
Kohl's runs about 1,150 moderately priced department stores across the United States, roughly 400 of them on owned property, together with Kohls.com, a large private-label assortment, a store-brand credit card program and Sephora shop-in-shops in nearly every store. Sales have fallen from $19.4 billion in fiscal 2021 to $15.5 billion in fiscal 2025 (the year ended January 2026), about 5% a year, with comparable sales down 3.1% last year. The decline slowed in the first half of fiscal 2026 (sales down 1.4%, net income flat at $137 million), and management expects sales between flat and down 2% this year. How we measure earnings. We take operating cash flow, strip out swings in inventory, payables and other working capital, subtract stock compensation and capital spending, and treat lease payments as rent. Because sales have been falling, we treat all capital spending as the cost of maintaining the business. On that basis owner earnings over the last ten years ranged from $1.31 billion (fiscal 2018) down to a $93 million loss (fiscal 2022, a year of heavy Sephora build-out spending and weak margins), and were $486 million, $334 million and $653 million in the last three years. Fiscal 2025 included a one-time $129 million cash gain from a credit card interchange-fee lawsuit settlement, which we do not treat as recurring. Last year's cash flow also looked much stronger than profit because inventory was cut by $203 million. That is a one-time release, and our measure removes it. Capital spending ($372 million last year, $350 to $400 million guided) is now well below depreciation of about $700 million. Some of that gap reflects past Sephora build-outs running off, but an aging store base may eventually need more spending than we assume. Before its lenders, the business produced about $820 million in cash in fiscal 2023 and fiscal 2025 (excluding the settlement), $650 million in fiscal 2024 and under $200 million in fiscal 2022. We anchor on about $730 million a year, the median of fiscal 2022 to 2025. We use that window because it describes today's smaller, post-pandemic business with Sephora in place. Earlier years came from a $19 to $20 billion sales base that no longer exists. Last year this pre-interest cash flow grew about 27% excluding the settlement, but that came from cost cuts and lower capital spending on falling sales. We assume no growth in year one and credit no growth anywhere. No store openings, market share gains or margin expansion are in the cases, because the company has none it can point to. What it owes. Senior notes total about $1.34 billion after recent open-market repurchases. They include $360 million of 10% secured notes due 2030, issued in 2025 after the credit rating fell to B3/BB-, plus $425 million of 2031 notes whose coupon has risen 175 basis points through rating-triggered step-ups, and smaller issues due 2029, 2033, 2037 and 2045. Finance leases and financing obligations add about $2.4 billion. We credit about $450 million of the $821 million cash balance at August 2026 as surplus, since cash builds seasonally before the holidays. We add about $100 million for refinancing costs, because the bonds trade below face value and recent debt was raised at 10%. That puts net debt at about $3.4 billion, or roughly $29 a share. There is no going-concern warning, and the revolving credit line had nothing drawn at year end. Base case: sales keep eroding at roughly the slowed pace of the last year, and pre-interest cash flow falls 3% a year from $730 million with no end point assumed. The business is worth about $7.9 billion. After $3.4 billion of debt that leaves about $4.5 billion, or roughly $38 a share. Bear case: the 2022 to 2025 decline of about 5% a year continues, and lower sales spread fixed store costs thinner, so cash flow shrinks about 8% a year. On top of that comes one recession like 2008 to 2009 or fiscal 2022, which removes about 40% of cash flow for two years. Fiscal 2022 shows this business can swing to negative owner earnings. The 2030 and 2031 maturities are refinanced at roughly 10%. The business is then worth about $4.4 billion against $3.55 billion of debt, leaving about $7 a share. By the tenth year cash flow would barely cover interest and lease costs, so in this case the owned real estate and store closures, not operations, are what protect shareholders. Bull case: the first-half 2026 stabilisation holds, and pre-interest cash flow stays near the $820 million already earned in fiscal 2023 and fiscal 2025, fading only 1% a year. The business is worth about $11.6 billion against $3.35 billion of debt, about $70 a share. Margin of safety price. We are not sure of the earnings level. Owner earnings ranged from a loss to $653 million over four years, and the only reliable trend is lower sales. The worst plausible outcome is a recession arriving while sales are still shrinking, with $2.4 billion of lease-type obligations that cannot be cut quickly and bonds rated deep junk. What makes that survivable is the hard assets: roughly 400 owned stores and $6.7 billion of net property, part of which already secures the 2030 notes and is therefore not available to common shareholders first. The things we are most likely to be wrong about are the pace of sales decline and whether capital spending can stay this far below depreciation. If both go against us, the shares are worth single digits. At $11 a share, owner earnings after interest of about $3.70 a share would be a cash return of roughly a third of the price, and the 50-cent dividend is about 4.5% of that price over the holding period. Even with earnings halved in a downturn, the cash yield would stay in the high teens, and only a modest re-rating within three to four years would be needed for the cases to imply 20% a year. Below $11 the bear case is the main risk and the base case implies several times the price. Much above it, the gap between a business that stabilises and one that keeps shrinking 5% a year is too wide to be confident of 20% a year.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $5.73 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted the working-capital adjustment). FY2025 = year ended 1/31/2026, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,380M; dWC (inventories +203, other assets +91, AP +130, accrued -103) = +$321M removed; operating-lease liability payments (-96) treated as rent, offsetting non-cash lease expense (+87); SBC=$34M; capex=$372M, revenue fell (16,221 to 15,527) so maintenance capex=$372M; OE=$653M; diluted shares=114M; OE/sh=$5.73. Includes a one-time $129M pre-tax interchange-fee lawsuit settlement gain (cash); ex-settlement OE roughly $555M. Reconciliation: NI 272 + D&A 700 + deferred tax 69 + impairments 11 + lease 87-96 - other 18 - capex 372 = 653 (0% gap). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-115982.
2024 $2.98 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted the working-capital adjustment). FY2024 = year ended 2/1/2025, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$648M; dWC (inventories -60, other assets -50, AP -92, accrued +20) = -$182M added back; operating-lease liability payments (-93) treated as rent, offsetting non-cash lease expense (+89); SBC=$30M; capex=$466M, revenue fell (17,476 to 16,221) so maintenance capex=$466M; OE=$334M; diluted shares=112M; OE/sh=$2.98. Reconciliation: NI 109 + D&A 743 - deferred tax 85 + impairments 36 + lease 89-93 + other 1 - capex 466 = 334 (0% gap). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-115982.
2023 $4.38 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted the working-capital adjustment). FY2023 = year ended 2/3/2024, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,168M; dWC (inventories +315, other assets +11, AP -196, accrued -67) = +$63M removed; operating-lease liability payments (-93) treated as rent, offsetting non-cash lease expense (+92); SBC=$42M; capex=$577M, revenue fell (18,098 to 17,476) so maintenance capex=$577M; OE=$486M; diluted shares=111M; OE/sh=$4.38. Reconciliation: NI 317 + D&A 749 - deferred tax 8 + lease 92-93 + other 6 - capex 577 = 486 (0% gap). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-115982.
2022 -$0.78 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted the working-capital adjustment). FY2022 = year ended 1/28/2023, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$282M; dWC (inventories -116, other assets +87, AP -353, accrued -99) = -$481M added back; operating-lease liability payments (-108) treated as rent, offsetting non-cash lease expense (+106); SBC=$30M; capex=$826M, revenue fell (19,433 to 18,098) so maintenance capex=$826M; OE=-$93M; diluted shares=120M; OE/sh=-$0.78. Reconciliation: NI -19 + D&A 808 - deferred tax 84 + lease 106-108 + other 30 - capex 826 = -93 (0% gap). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-008444.
2021 $8.71 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted the working-capital adjustment and used net investing as capex). FY2021 = year ended 1/29/2022, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,271M; dWC (inventories -467, other assets +569 incl. tax refund, AP +206, accrued +21) = +$329M removed; operating-lease liability payments (-142) treated as rent, offsetting non-cash lease expense (+139); SBC=$48M; capex=$605M; revenue rebounded 15,955 to 19,433 but stayed below FY2019's 19,974, so judged a recovery not growth: growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$605M; OE=$1,289M; diluted shares=148M; OE/sh=$8.71. Reconciliation: NI 938 + D&A 838 - deferred tax 92 + loss on debt extinguishment 201 + lease 139-142 + other 12 - capex 605 = 1,289 (0% gap). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-008444.
2020 $3.51 ▼
FY2020 = year ended 1/30/2021 (COVID year), $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,338M; dWC (inventories +768, other assets -813 incl. tax receivable, AP +270, accrued +199) = +$424M removed; operating-lease liability payments (-150) treated as rent; SBC=$40M; capex=$334M, revenue fell (19,974 to 15,955) so maintenance capex=$334M; OE=$540M; diluted shares=154M; OE/sh=$3.51. Reconciliation: NI -163 + D&A 874 + deferred tax 18 + impairments 64 - gain on real estate 127 + non-cash inventory 187 + lease 149-150 + other 22 - capex 334 = 540 (0% gap). Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001564590-21-014145.
2019 $5.47 ▼
FY2019 = year ended 2/1/2020, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,657M; dWC (inventories -51, other assets +48, AP +19, accrued -134) = -$118M added back; operating-lease liability payments (-156) treated as rent, not working capital, offsetting the non-cash lease expense add-back (+150); SBC=$56M; capex=$855M, revenue fell (20,229 to 19,974) so maintenance capex=$855M; OE=$864M; diluted shares=158M; OE/sh=$5.47. Reconciliation: NI 691 + D&A 917 + deferred tax 51 + impairments 64 - gain on debt 9 + lease 150-156 + other 11 - capex 855 = 864 (0% gap). Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001564590-21-014145.
2018 $7.96 ▼
FY2018 = year ended 2/2/2019, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,107M; dWC as restated (inventories +79, other assets +106, AP -84, accrued +32) = +$133M removed; SBC=$87M; capex=$578M; revenue rose $145M (20,084 to 20,229) x 3.27% = growth capex $5M, maintenance capex=$573M; OE=$1,314M; diluted shares=165M; OE/sh=$7.96. Reconciliation: NI 801 + D&A 964 - deferred tax 31 + impairments 72 + loss on debt 63 + other 18 - maint capex 573 = 1,314 (0% gap). Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001564590-21-014145.
2017 $6.74 ▼
FY2017 = year ended 2/3/2018, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,691M; dWC (inventories +264, other assets -83, AP -236, accrued -50, income taxes -50) = -$155M (cash outflow, added back); SBC=$55M; capex=$672M; capex/revenue mean FY2016-25 = 3.27%; revenue rose $403M (19,681 to 20,084) so growth capex=$13M, maintenance capex=$659M; OE=$1,132M; diluted shares=168M; OE/sh=$6.74. Reconciliation: NI 859 + D&A 991 - deferred tax 61 + other 2 - maint capex 659 = 1,132 (0% gap). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001564590-18-006671.
2016 $4.61 ▼
FY2016 = year ended 1/28/2017, $M. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,153M; dWC (inventories +249, other assets -45, AP +256, accrued +81, income taxes -23) = +$518M cash inflow removed; SBC=$41M; capex (acquisition of property and equipment)=$768M, growth capex=$0 (net sales fell to $18,686M from $19,204M) so maintenance capex=$768M; OE=$826M; diluted shares=179M; OE/sh=$4.61. Reconciliation: NI 556 + D&A 938 + deferred tax 13 + other non-cash 30 + impairments 57 - capex 768 = 826 (0% gap). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001564590-18-006671.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - all four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) through about 1,150 stores in 49 states plus Kohls.com; historically strongest in the Midwest (Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan) and Northeast, with large store counts in California and Texas.
Historical growth strategy
Grew for decades by opening new off-mall department stores across the US, many on owned land, with a large private-label and exclusive-brand assortment and the Kohl's Cash loyalty and credit card program. Since store growth stopped around 2013 it has relied on partnerships (Amazon returns, Sephora shop-in-shops in nearly every store), cost cutting, sale-leasebacks and share buybacks rather than unit growth.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a long secular downtrend: lower highs from the 2015 peak in the mid-$70s, a pandemic crash and 2021 rebound into the $60s, then a steady slide that bottomed in single digits in spring 2025. A sharp spike followed in July 2025, and the rebound since has formed a base well above the 2025 low. The long-term moving averages still slope down, so a technician would want to see a sustained break above the prior rally highs before calling the downtrend over; until then rallies are treated as countertrend.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of KSS. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.