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BLUE DOLPHIN ENERGY CO (BDCO) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.80 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$2.38 $5.69
bear -$2.38 base $0.83 bull $5.69 margin of safety $0.80 market price* $13.19
Blue Dolphin Energy owns a small crude refinery at Nixon, Texas (a 15,000 barrel-a-day distillation tower) and about 1.25 million barrels of storage tanks on the same site. It buys light-sweet Eagle Ford crude from MVP under an agreement that renews quarterly, with no long-term supply contract. It makes one finished product, jet fuel, plus naphtha, heavy oil-based mud blendstock and gas oil (AGO), selling mainly on the U.S. Gulf Coast with occasional exports to Mexico. Most of the jet fuel is bought by Lazarus Energy Holdings (LEH), which resells it to the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency on preferential terms tied to LEH's HUBZone small-business certification; LEH accounted for 36.1% of 2025 revenue. LEH and CEO Jonathan Carroll together own 84.4% of the shares. LEH also runs the refinery under a one-year operating agreement (latest renewal effective April 1, 2026; the board can end it on 90 days' notice), is paid 5% of operating costs excluding crude, depreciation, amortization and interest, and lends money to the company. Mr. Carroll personally guarantees the main bank loans and is paid a 2% annual fee on the Huntington term loans. Outside shareholders therefore depend on terms they do not set. What the refinery earns swings with the spread between crude cost and product prices. We measure the cash it produces for owners as operating cash flow, less swings in inventory, receivables and payables, less stock-based pay and maintenance capital spending. Over 2016 to 2025 that figure summed to roughly minus $1 million: two boom years (2022 and 2023, about $72 million together) offset losses elsewhere, including 2016 with $14.1 million of capital spending and 2020 to 2021 when revenue fell from $309 million in 2019 to $175 million in 2020. An arbitration award of $27.1 million accrued in 2017 and paid down by $6 million in 2018 and $12 million in 2019 is treated as a one-off and left out of these figures. To see the business before its lenders, we add cash interest back and subtract the debt separately. On that basis the yearly figures for 2018 to 2025 were about +$3.3M, +$4.5M, -$9.5M, -$6.2M, +$43.3M, +$45.4M, -$2.8M and +$5.2M. We take the median of those eight years, about $0.33 a share or $4.9 million a year, as the typical year. The window starts in 2018 because 2016 and 2017 were distorted by the large capital spending and the award accrual, and it covers the 2020-21 trough, the 2022-23 boom and the weak 2024-25 years. In the first half of 2026 net income was $32.5 million ($14.7 million in the first quarter, $17.7 million in the second) and operating cash flow $39.0 million on revenue of $225.7 million. We do not lift the typical level for this: the 2022-23 surge gave way to a $8.6 million net loss in 2024. The cash the 2026 surge produced is counted through the balance sheet below. These 2026 figures come from the company's structured quarterly data; we did not have the narrative report text, so we cannot say from the filing what caused the spike. Growth path: in 2025, the most recent full year, cash generated before lenders rose from -$2.8M to +$5.2M, so a percentage growth rate is not meaningful from a negative base. The base case starts at the typical level with no growth. Revenue has moved from $175M in 2020 to $488M in 2022 and $279M in 2025, not along a steady path, and nothing contracted supports expansion, so no growth is credited in any case. Earlier estimates for this company were prepared on a different basis and are not comparable. Base case: typical-year cash of $4.9M less $1.0M a year of reinvestment, so $3.9M. The reinvestment is evidence-based: capital spending was $1.1M to $2.0M a year in 2018-2020 but almost nothing in 2022-2025 ($13,000 in 2025) against about $2.9M of annual depreciation, and the company wrote down $3.0M of fixed assets in 2025. The $3.9M runs flat for ten years, then fades to zero over the following ten, because the filings evidence ten years of operation and nothing beyond. No boom years are counted. The business is worth about $36.7M. Against that, the net claims described below total $24.3M, leaving about $12.4M, or $0.83 a share. Debt and other claims. At December 31, 2025 borrowings were about $49.1M: $35.8M from banks and the SBA (Huntington term loans of $17.5M and $7.3M due 2034, a GNCU term loan of $8.5M due 2031, and small SBA loans) and $13.3M from LEH. All three bank term loans, about $33M in total, were in default at year end and through the filing date in March 2026 (financial covenants on the two Huntington loans, non-financial covenants on the GNCU loan), so the lenders could demand repayment; we treat them as due. By June 30, 2026 total debt had fallen to about $39.8M and cash had risen to $30.7M. We could not confirm from the filing text whether the defaults had been cured by then. Management concluded the company can meet its obligations for the coming year, and the auditor made the question a critical audit matter. We count $25.7M of the cash as excess after leaving $5M for operations (year-end 2025 cash was only $1.0M, with the refinery leaning on the LEH revolving loan). We subtract the $5.2M asset retirement obligation and about $5M for interest above what the debt should cost: 2025 cash interest was $6.1M on average borrowings near $48M, about 12.7%. Net claims: $39.8M debt + $5.0M extra interest + $5.2M retirement obligation - $25.7M excess cash = $24.3M. Other exposures. A crude supplier dispute: $10.1M is recorded as payable, the supplier says more is due, and the company says a further loss of up to about $3.4M is reasonably possible; that is counted in the bear case. Most trade receivables are owed by LEH: related-party receivables were $8.1M of $8.3M at the end of 2025 and rose by about $3.2M in the first half of 2026. Tax-loss carryforwards fell from about $31.8M to $8.2M in the first half (tax expense was $8.7M on $41.2M of pre-tax profit, about 21%), so future boom profits will be taxed; the bull case is taxed accordingly. Bear case: a repeat of the 2020-21 trough, two years at about -$7.9M a year (the average of those two years), then about $1.2M a year (the average of 2024 and 2025) through year 10, and nothing after that because nothing we can evidence sustains an under-invested plant. The supplier dispute costs $3.4M. The business is worth about -$7.9M (it consumes more than it earns), the company owes $24.3M net plus the $3.4M dispute, and the difference is about -$35.6M, or -$2.38 a share. In this case the company owes roughly $36M more than it is worth, and shareholders would be left with nothing. Bull case: booms recur at the frequency the record shows (2022, 2023 and the first half of 2026 are about three boom years in nine), so three boom years in the next ten, each worth about $36M after tax (the 2022-23 average of $44.3M before interest, less roughly $8M of tax), with the $3.9M typical year in the other seven and the same fade after year 10. The business is worth about $109.2M, net claims are $24.3M, and the difference is about $84.9M, or $5.69 a share. What would make this wrong: if the typical year earns nothing, as in 2020-21, the business is worth less than the $24.3M of net claims, about -$1.63 a share; if it earns double ($7.8M), the shares are worth about $3.29. Our base case counts no boom years at all, so a single boom would add roughly $2.40 a share after tax. Margin-of-safety price: $0.80. We are not confident of the earnings level: of the eight years since 2018, three were modestly positive, three lost money and two earned over $40 million. The worst plausible outcome is a trough like 2020-21 arriving while the bank loans are still in default and the cash is used up; the lenders, the affiliate and the crude supplier would all stand ahead of shareholders and the equity would be worth nothing. The structure does not cushion that: one refinery, crude with no long-term contract, a controlling owner that is also operator, largest customer, lender and guarantor, and an operating agreement renewed yearly. The price assumes a three-to-five-year holding period; the company paid no dividends in 2024 or 2025, so any return depends on cash being retained and a boom coming. At June 30, 2026 current assets of $81.2M exceeded all liabilities of $70.5M by $10.7M, about $0.72 a share, so $0.80 is little more than what would remain after settling every obligation, with almost no value assigned to the refinery, the tanks (plant carried at $48.8M) or any future boom. The 20% return then rests on a margin boom within a few years, as in 2022-23 and 2026, or on typical-year cash being retained. The price is not set higher because the bear case would leave shareholders with nothing.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.06 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(766)K; dWC=+$103K (source of cash, removed: receivables +437, related-party receivables (2,821), prepaids +44, inventory +4,770, payables/accrued (2,327)); SBC=$0; capex=$13K, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$13K; OE=$(882)K; diluted shares=14.922M; OE/sh=$(0.059). Reconciliation: net loss $(5,601)K + D&A $2,867K + other non-cash $1,865K (deferred tax (1,365), debt costs 204, fixed-asset impairment 3,026) - capex $13K = $(882)K (gap 0%). Cash interest paid=$6,107K. Recomputed on the current basis (previous stored value of $(0.05) did not remove working-capital movement). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001437749-26-010712.
2024 -$0.65 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(15,674)K; dWC=+$6,033K (source of cash, removed: receivables (667), related-party receivables (1,063), prepaids (358), inventory (11,086), payables/accrued +8,030, related-party payables (889)); asset retirement payments $(1,505)K and long-term bond assets $(1,025)K are not working capital and stay in OE; SBC=$0; capex=$46K, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$46K; OE=$(9,687)K; diluted shares=14.922M; OE/sh=$(0.649). Reconciliation: net loss $(8,636)K + D&A $2,806K + other non-cash $(1,281)K (deferred tax (1,554), debt costs 203, bad debt 70) - ARO $1,505K - bonds $1,025K - capex $46K = $(9,687)K (gap 0%). Cash interest paid=$6,911K. Recomputed on the current basis (previous stored value of $(1.05) did not remove working-capital movement). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001437749-26-010712 (FY2024 comparative).
2023 $2.29 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$20,005K; dWC=$(14,189)K (use of cash, added back: receivables +1,032, related-party receivables (4,184), deferred revenue (1,140), prepaids +1,875, inventory (4,732), payables/accrued (7,774), related-party payables +734); SBC=$0; capex=$102K, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$102K; OE=$34,092K; diluted shares=14.922M; OE/sh=$2.285. Reconciliation: net income $31,011K + D&A $2,798K + other non-cash $385K (accretion 59, deferred tax (1,436), debt costs 204, impairment 1,558) - capex $102K = $34,092K (gap 0%). Cash interest paid=$11,288K. Recomputed on the current basis (previous stored value of $1.33 did not remove working-capital movement). Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001437749-24-010434.
2022 $2.68 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$16,272K; dWC=$(21,492)K (use of cash, added back: receivables (1,084), deferred revenue (540), prepaids (1,033), inventory (16,746), payables/accrued (2,089)); SBC=$0; capex=$102K, but growth capex (1.11% mean capex/revenue x revenue increase of $186,684K = $2,078K) exceeds capex so maintenance capex=$0; OE=$37,764K; diluted shares=14.079M; OE/sh=$2.682. Reconciliation: net income $32,892K + D&A $2,798K + other non-cash $2,074K = $37,764K (gap 0%). Cash interest paid=$5,534K. Recomputed on the current basis (previous stored value of $1.15 deducted total capex only and did not remove working-capital movement). Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001437749-24-010434 (FY2022 comparative).
2021 -$0.59 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(6,056)K; dWC=+$1,417K (source of cash, removed: receivables +88, prepaids +1,131, deposits +14, inventory (2,036), payables/accrued +2,220); SBC=$0; capex=$0; OE=$(7,473)K; diluted shares=12.694M; OE/sh=$(0.589). Cash interest paid=$1,252K. Recomputed on the current basis (previous stored value of $(0.48) deducted only capex and did not remove working-capital movement). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001654954-23-004195.
2020 -$0.94 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(3,901)K; dWC=+$6,830K (source of cash, removed); SBC=$0; capex=$1,085K, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$1,085K; OE=$(11,816)K; diluted shares=12.574M; OE/sh=$(0.940). Cash interest paid=$2,311K. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001654954-22-004427.
2019 $0.09 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(8,190)K (as restated in FY2020 10-K); dWC=$(10,802)K (use of cash, added back; includes $(12,000)K payment of the accrued arbitration award treated as non-recurring); SBC=$0; capex=$1,574K, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$1,574K; OE=$1,038K; diluted shares=11.157M; OE/sh=$0.093. Cash interest paid=$3,474K. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001654954-21-003642.
2018 $0.04 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,005K; dWC=$(613)K (use of cash, added back; includes $(6,000)K payment of the accrued arbitration award treated as non-recurring); SBC (stock issued for services)=$30K; capex=$2,029K; capex_ratio 2016-2025 mean=1.11%; growth capex=1.11% x (revenue $340,761K - $258,449K)=$916K so maintenance capex=$1,113K; OE=$475K; diluted shares=10.936M; OE/sh=$0.043. Cash interest paid=$2,823K. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001654954-20-003540.
2017 -$1.98 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(4,944)K; dWC=+$14,714K (source of cash, removed; includes the $27,128K accrual of an arbitration award, treated as a non-recurring liability so its accrual and the later 2018-19 payments are kept out of owner earnings); SBC (stock issued for services)=$60K; capex=$2,432K; capex_ratio=mean(capex/revenue) 2016-2025=1.11%; growth capex=1.11% x (revenue $258,449K - $167,855K)=$1,009K so maintenance capex=$1,423K; OE=$(21,141)K; diluted shares=10.690M; OE/sh=$(1.978). Cash interest paid=$2,688K. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001654954-19-003873.
2016 -$2.24 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(3,879)K; dWC (cash effect of receivables, related-party receivables, prepaids, deposits, inventory, payables and related-party payables)=+$5,379K (source of cash, removed); SBC (stock issued for services)=$80K; capex=$14,101K, revenue declined vs 2015 so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$14,101K; OE=$(23,439)K; diluted shares=10.464M; OE/sh=$(2.240). Cash interest paid=$2,357K (used separately for business cash flow). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001654954-18-003531.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Texas and the Gulf Coast region of the United States (South; Nixon, Texas refinery, EIA PADD 3), with occasional export sales to Mexico. Most jet fuel is sold to an affiliate that resells it to the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency.
Historical growth strategy
No acquisition program. Growth has come from building out its single refinery and storage site at Nixon, Texas (about $14.1 million of capital spending in 2016, versus $2.5 million or less in every year since), selling most jet fuel through an affiliate with a small-business certification, and relying on its controlling owner for operations and funding. Revenue has swung widely ($175 million in 2020, $488 million in 2022, $279 million in 2025) rather than expanding steadily.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a thinly traded over-the-counter stock that went nearly vertical in the summer of 2026: from about $4 in late July (low near $3.70 on August 10) to $8.55 at the end of August, then a spike to an intraday high near $24.89 on September 18. That spike looks like a blow-off top: the shares then fell by more than half, closing September at $10.70, and have since rebounded to about $13.30 (October 7). The pattern is a climax run followed by a sharp reversal and a partial recovery inside a wide $8 to $14 range. A chartist would mark support near $8.3 to $8.9 (the late-August close and September low), nearer support around $11.8 (the October low), and resistance at the October high near $13.6, with the $24.89 spike far above. Before the advance the stock had been in a low single-digit range (a quote page showed a 52-week range of roughly $1 to $4.40). Volume is very light (about 19,000 shares on a recent day), so gaps and reversals are large and the trend is unreliable. Holding above $11.8 and closing above $13.6 would be needed to call the rebound a new uptrend; a break below $8.3 would suggest the surge has fully unwound.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of BDCO. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.