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PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. (PARR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$14.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$4.67 $50.24
bear $4.67 base $32.33 bull $50.24 margin of safety $14.00 market price* $83.42
Par Pacific owns four refineries: Kapolei, Hawaii (the only refinery in the state), Tacoma, Washington, Billings, Montana and Newcastle, Wyoming. It also runs a network of fuel stations and convenience stores in Hawaii and the Pacific Northwest, plus pipelines, terminals and marine assets that feed those markets. Each plant serves an isolated or niche market where freight from competing refineries is costly. That is a real, lasting advantage, but the company's profit is still set mainly by refining margins (the gap between crude and product prices), which nobody controls. Earnings record. We measure owner earnings as operating cash flow with working-capital swings removed, less stock-based pay and the capital spending needed to keep the plants running. Turnaround spending, the large periodic overhauls refineries need, stays in as a running cost. Per share, owner earnings over the last ten years were -$1.61 (2016), $1.84, $1.10, $1.70, -$5.83 (2020), -$1.49, $6.68, $9.43 (2023), -$1.96 (2024) and $5.84 (2025). The 2025 figure includes a one-time $199.5 million recovery after the EPA granted small-refinery relief for the 2019-2024 compliance years. Without it, 2025 was about $1.97 a share, a year that also lost 66 days to the Wyoming outage. Four losing years in ten is the nature of the business. Normal earning power. The company doubled in size by buying Tacoma in 2019 and Billings in 2023, so we judge earnings against today's asset base, using 2021 to 2025 as one full margin cycle: a trough, two boom years, a bust and a recovery. Adding back cash interest of $63-80 million a year, the business itself (before lenders) produced roughly -$22 million, $463 million, $653 million, -$44 million and $182 million (ex-relief) in those years. The median is about $180 million. The 2024 bust came in a healthy economy, which shows how deep an ordinary downturn can be. We use about $165 million a year as normal business cash flow before interest. That is slightly below the median, because a portion of each year's cash goes to the 36.5% outside partner in the new Hawaii renewables venture, and because the most recent year was flattered by unusually high Hawaii margins. In 2025 owner earnings rose sharply off the 2024 loss. For 2026 we credit one exceptional year only because it has largely happened already: first-half net income was $509 million, and second-quarter margins reached $57 a barrel in Hawaii, driven by Middle East and Strait of Hormuz disruption. We do not extend those margins beyond 2026. Debt. At mid-2026 the company owed about $749 million of term debt, notes and credit-line borrowings, $13 million of finance leases, and about $41 million representing the partner's share of the renewables venture, against roughly $135 million of cash beyond operating needs. We also add about $40 million for repurchasing inventory under its supply and offtake financing and about $50 million because its new 7.375% notes due 2034 and floating-rate loans cost more than our yardstick. That makes net obligations of about $760 million, or about $15 a share. The ABL credit line was extended in 2026 and the $500 million notes run to 2034, so no maturity is near. Base case: one exceptional 2026 (about $500 million of business cash), then $165 million a year through 2035, fading 3% a year after that as the plants age and fuel demand on the West Coast slowly declines. Nothing is credited for growth, renewables profits or more acquisitions. The business is worth about $2.36 billion; less about $0.76 billion of obligations, that leaves about $1.6 billion, or $32 a share. Bear case: a strong but smaller 2026, then a 2027-2028 bust as deep as 2020 (the business lost about $250 million of cash in the pandemic year) followed by a weak second year. After that, earnings settle at the 2024-2025 level of about $110 million a year, fading 6% a year after 2035. On top of that, Washington's climate rules and a steadily shrinking pool of small-refinery relief keep compliance costs climbing. The business is worth about $990 million against obligations of about $760 million, leaving about $230 million, or $5 a share. In this case the company would rely on its asset-backed credit line through the trough. That is survivable on today's balance sheet, but it leaves little for shareholders. Bull case: 2026 finishes with about $550 million of business cash, and the company's own levers work: the Hawaii and Rockies plants keep their freight-protected premium, retail keeps growing steadily, and buybacks continue. Business cash averages $230 million, close to the 2022-2025 average, fading 2% a year after 2035. That is worth about $3.24 billion; less obligations, about $2.5 billion, or $50 a share. What changed since our last look. We now have the second-quarter 2026 results, which turned an expected good year into an exceptional one, and a refinancing that pushed the main debt out to 2034. Offsetting that, earnings are now measured without the swings in working capital and inventory financing, and the cases are built differently, so the previous figures are not comparable. Margin-of-safety price. We are only moderately sure of the normal earnings level: it rests on five volatile years whose median sits between a loss and a boom. The worst plausible outcome is a long margin drought like 2020 combined with an unplanned outage at Kapolei, which supplies the larger part of the company's profit. Because debt ranks ahead of shareholders, that would leave equity near zero. If we are wrong about the normal level by $50 million a year, the base falls to about $22 a share. If 2026's windfall is smaller than expected, value falls by a few dollars. The business pays no dividend, so any return would come from buybacks and a rerating, and the price assumes a holding period of three to five years, typical for a refiner. At $14, the price is for a business that in an ordinary cycle earns over $3 a share before debt, with this year's cash used to pay down borrowings. A return to normal conditions over four or five years implies roughly double that price, to the low $30s, and the hard assets plus a 2034 maturity mean a bust year does not end the story. The margin-of-safety price is $14.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $5.84 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$445,337K; dWC=$(21,259)K use (AR +84,674; prepaids +37,842; inventories -144,104; inventory financing -59,901; payables +60,230); deferred turnaround $(101,242)K kept inside; CFO ex-WC=$466,596K; SBC=$16,599K; capex=$148,873K (revenue fell, all maintenance); OE=$301,124K; diluted shares=51,591K; OE/sh=$5.84. Includes one-time $199.5M EPA small-refinery-exemption gain for 2019-2024 compliance years; ex-SRE OE=$101,624K or $1.97/sh. Wyoming idle 66 days. Source: FY2025 10-K 0000821483-26-000005.
2024 -$1.96 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$83,776K; dWC=+$33,994K source (AR +26,036; prepaids +55,930; inventories +62,853; inventory financing -53,498; payables -57,327); deferred turnaround $(73,453)K kept inside; CFO ex-WC=$49,782K; SBC=$25,704K; capex=$135,540K (revenue fell, all maintenance); OE=$(111,462)K; diluted shares=56,775K; OE/sh=$(1.96). Margin trough year. Source: FY2025 10-K 0000821483-26-000005.
2023 $9.43 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$579,156K; dWC=$(90,409)K use (AR -112,421; prepaids -82,027; inventories +180,235; inventory financing -91,624; payables +15,428); deferred turnaround only $(5,851)K kept inside (abnormally light vs $70-100M typical, flatters year); CFO ex-WC=$669,565K; SBC=$11,633K; capex=$82,277K all maintenance (Billings refinery acquired, not built; growth capex 0); OE=$575,655K; diluted shares=61,014K; OE/sh=$9.43. Peak-margin year. Source: FY2025 10-K 0000821483-26-000005.
2022 $6.68 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$452,606K; dWC=$(9,622)K use (AR -57,391; prepaids -35,356; inventories -254,437; inventory financing +74,680; payables +262,882); deferred turnaround $(29,608)K kept inside; CFO ex-WC=$462,228K; SBC=$9,353K; capex=$53,025K all maintenance (growth capex 0, revenue growth crude-price driven); OE=$399,850K; diluted shares=59,883K; OE/sh=$6.68. Source: FY2022 10-K 0000821483-23-000008.
2021 -$1.49 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record did not remove working capital). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(27,622)K; dWC=+$21,557K source (AR -83,955; prepaids -6,321; inventories -350,652; inventory financing +252,920; payables +209,565); deferred turnaround $(9,451)K kept inside as maintenance; CFO ex-WC=$(49,179)K; SBC=$8,165K; capex=$29,533K all maintenance (refiner revenue growth is crude-price driven; capacity added by acquisition, growth capex 0); OE=$(86,877)K; diluted shares=58,268K; OE/sh=$(1.49). Source: FY2022 10-K 0000821483-23-000008.
2020 -$5.83 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(37,214)K; dWC=+$202,543K source (AR +117,801; collateral+prepaids +36,500; inventories +171,880; inventory financing -190,831; payables +67,193), so CFO ex-WC=$(239,757)K (pandemic demand collapse; $85.8M impairment already added back inside CFO); deferred turnaround $(49,770)K kept inside; SBC=$7,342K; capex=$63,522K (revenue fell, all maintenance); OE=$(310,621)K; diluted shares=53,295K; OE/sh=$(5.83). Source: FY2020 10-K 0000821483-21-000018.
2019 $1.70 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$105,630K; dWC=$(70,304)K use (AR -36,652; collateral -8,797; prepaids -24,121; inventories -191,688; inventory financing +121,985; payables +68,969), so CFO ex-WC=$175,934K; deferred turnaround $(9,800)K kept inside as maintenance; SBC=$6,437K; capex=$83,920K all maintenance (Tacoma acquired, not built); OE=$85,577K; diluted shares=50,470K; OE/sh=$1.70. Source: FY2020 10-K 0000821483-21-000018.
2018 $1.10 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$90,620K; dWC=$(14,266)K use (AR -35,790; collateral -3,790; prepaids -5,521; inventories +28,088 restated; inventory financing -17,138; payables +19,885), so CFO ex-WC=$104,886K; SBC=$6,196K; capex=$48,439K all maintenance (growth capex 0: revenue growth crude-price driven, capacity acquired); OE=$50,251K; diluted shares=45,755K; OE/sh=$1.10. Source: FY2020 10-K 0000821483-21-000018 (restated 2018 column).
2017 $1.84 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$106,483K; dWC=$(16,235)K use (AR -19,100; collateral +2,499; prepaids +37,645; inventories -146,533; inventory financing +143,034; payables -33,780), so CFO ex-WC=$122,718K; SBC=$7,204K; capex=$31,708K all maintenance (refiner revenue growth is crude-price driven; capacity added by acquisition, so growth capex set to 0); OE=$83,806K; diluted shares=45,583K; OE/sh=$1.84. Source: FY2017 10-K 0000821483-18-000017.
2016 -$1.61 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(23,393)K (restated); dWC (receivables, broker collateral, prepaids, inventories, inventory-financing obligations, payables, contingent consideration; deferred turnaround spend kept inside as a maintenance cost)=+$13,505K source, so CFO ex-WC=$(36,898)K; SBC=$6,625K; capex=$24,833K, all treated as maintenance (revenue fell; refiner revenue moves with crude price, capacity growth came by acquisition); OE=$(68,356)K; diluted shares=42,349K; OE/sh=$(1.61). Source: FY2017 10-K 0000821483-18-000017 as restated in FY2018 10-K 0000821483-19-000014.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - West (Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Montana, Wyoming) and the Rocky Mountain region including South Dakota and Colorado; Hawaii and Washington state are the largest markets; minor export sales to Asia.
Historical growth strategy
Growth by buying refineries and fuel distribution assets other owners wanted to sell, in isolated or niche markets, and funding the purchases with debt and stock. Examples: Hawaii refinery (2013), Wyoming refinery (2016), Tacoma, Washington (2019), Billings, Montana (2023). Hawaii retail and logistics were added by bolt-on purchases, and a renewable fuels joint venture in Hawaii was formed in 2025. Since 2023 surplus cash has also gone to large share buybacks.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a classic boom-and-bust refiner chart. The shares collapsed in 2020, rebuilt through the 2022-2023 margin boom, broke down hard through 2024 as cracks compressed, then based and turned higher through 2025. In 2026 they surged as global refining margins spiked, leaving the stock extended well above its rising long-term moving averages. A technician would call the primary trend up with strong momentum. They would also warn that the move is news- and margin-driven and vulnerable to sharp pullbacks toward the breakout zone if crack spreads fade, and that prior cycle peaks have been followed by deep retracements.
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Circle of competence

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