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Versant Media Group, Inc. (VSNT) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$16.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$17.49 $51.24
bear $17.49 base $32.91 bull $51.24 margin of safety $16.00 market price* $31.77
THE BUSINESS. Versant is the group of cable networks and digital businesses Comcast spun off on January 2, 2026: USA Network, CNBC, MS NOW (formerly MSNBC), Golf Channel, E!, Syfy and Oxygen, plus Fandango, Rotten Tomatoes, GolfNow and GolfPass (SportsEngine is being sold). In 2025 revenue was $6.69 billion: $4.09 billion from fees cable, satellite and streaming TV providers pay per subscriber, $1.58 billion from advertising, $826 million from the digital platforms and the rest from content licensing. Revenue fell 5.1% in 2024 and 5.3% in 2025. The company's own filing says subscribers to its networks fell 8% in each of 2024 and 2025 and that it expects continued declines; network ratings fell 17% in 2025. Contractual fee increases partly offset the subscriber losses. The digital platforms grew 3.9% in 2025 but are about an eighth of revenue. This is a high-cash-flow business in managed decline. EARNINGS LEVEL. Owner earnings (operating cash flow, less working-capital swings, stock pay and capital spending) were $2.34 billion in 2023, $2.16 billion in 2024 and $1.68 billion in 2025. These years were reported as part of Comcast: they carry almost no interest and use Comcast's cost allocations, and 2025 includes $142 million of one-time separation costs. The roughly $1 billion a year of amortization added back comes mostly from intangibles Comcast pushed down onto the business, so it is not a real cost - but because those years overstate a standalone company, we do not anchor on their median. We start from 2025 ($1.69 billion before interest), add back the one-time separation costs, and deduct the ongoing costs of being independent - new public-company functions and payments to Comcast under the separation's commercial and licensing agreements - to reach a standalone cash flow of about $1.35 billion a year before interest. The first half of 2026 (operating cash flow $967 million, interest paid $62 million, capital spending $59 million, stock pay $33 million) is consistent with this, but a large working-capital swing in the half could not be cleanly separated, so this level carries real uncertainty in both directions. GROWTH PATH. Cash flow fell from $2.16 billion to $1.68 billion in 2025 (about -22%, though partly separation costs); on a like-for-like basis the decline is closer to 8-10% a year, driven by the subscriber erosion the filing describes. The base case assumes no reversal: we credit no growth from digital platforms, Full Swing or new sports deals because none is yet a demonstrated, repeatable engine, and the linear networks keep shrinking. Sports costs are largely fixed by contract (Premier League through 2027-28, WWE SmackDown to 2029, NASCAR 2031, USGA 2032, WNBA 2036), so profit falls faster than revenue. CASES (business value, then debt). Debt at June 30, 2026 was $2.95 billion: $1.0 billion of 7.25% senior notes due January 2031 and $2.0 billion of term loans due January 2031 (weighted coupon about 6.6%), with a 3.50x first-lien net leverage covenant. Cash was $1.48 billion before the $530 million paid for Full Swing in August; holding back about $300 million as operating cash and adding $111 million owed to minority partners, net debt is about $2.42 billion. - Bear: cash flow declines 14% a year with no floor, as cord-cutting accelerates and renewals with the large distributors (the ten largest account for over half of receivables; Comcast alone is 10% or more of revenue) come at lower rates, plus an advertising recession on the scale of 2008-2009, when national TV ad spending fell by roughly a sixth, taking about $120 million more out of year two. With every 2031 maturity falling in the same window, refinancing costs more; we add about $350 million to the debt for that. Business worth about $5.24 billion, owes about $2.77 billion, leaving $2.47 billion, or about $17.49 a share. - Base: cash flow declines 11% a year, roughly the subscriber decline plus fixed sports costs, continuing indefinitely with nothing replacing it. Business worth about $7.07 billion, owes $2.42 billion, leaving $4.65 billion, or about $32.91 a share. - Bull: annual fee escalators and the growing golf platforms slow the decline to 7% a year. Business worth about $9.66 billion, owes $2.42 billion, leaving $7.24 billion, or about $51.24 a share. In every case the business generates several times its roughly $200 million annual interest bill for years, so the debt is serviceable; the risk is the 2031 refinancing wall, not near-term solvency. WHAT CHANGED. The previous analysis used different valuation inputs, so its figures are not comparable. On the business itself, the main new facts are the closing of the $530 million Full Swing purchase (which reduced cash) and the pending SportsEngine sale. MARGIN-OF-SAFETY PRICE. How sure are we of the earnings level? Only moderately: there is less than one year of standalone history, and the separation agreements and a first-half working-capital swing make the standalone level hard to pin down within about 15%. The worst plausible outcome is a faster collapse of the cable bundle combined with a major distributor dropping the networks at renewal - something no case fully models - while all $3 billion of debt comes due in 2031; the business would survive, because it produces well over a billion dollars before interest today, but most of the value would go to debt holders and buybacks would stop. If we are wrong about the pace of decline (15% a year rather than 11%) and the standalone cost level, the shares are worth in the high teens to low twenties. Because this is a shrinking business, value has to come from cash returned during the holding period rather than from the price rising over time: the $0.375 quarterly dividend plus buybacks and debt paydown must do the work. Counting only the cash the business can distribute after interest and repaying the term loans by 2031, from a price of about $16 a share the base case implies roughly 20% a year, and the bear case implies recovery of the purchase price if the dividend is held. The margin-of-safety price is $16, below the bear case value of about $17-18, which leaves room for the uncertainty in the earnings level. Above that price the 20% target depends on the decline staying at or slower than the base case.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $11.63 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,022M; dWC (receivables $84M + content costs $99M + payables $25M + other operating $(58)M) = $150M; SBC=$29M; capex=$167M (incl. separation build-out), growth capex=$0 (revenue fell $7,062M to $6,688M) so maintenance capex=$167M; OE=$1,676M; diluted shares=144.169M (first reported diluted count, pro forma); OE/sh=$11.63. Check: NI $931M + D&A $1,010M + SBC $29M + investment loss $41M - deferred tax $139M - capex $167M - SBC $29M = $1,676M (0% gap). Includes $142M separation transaction costs; $13M interest; still carve-out basis. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0002067876-26-000010.
2024 $14.95 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,211M; dWC (receivables $100M + content costs $68M + payables $(3)M + other operating $(179)M) = $(14)M; SBC=$16M; capex=$54M, growth capex=$0 (revenue fell $7,445M to $7,062M) so maintenance capex=$54M; OE=$2,155M; diluted shares=144.169M (first reported diluted count, pro forma); OE/sh=$14.95. Check: NI $1,365M + D&A $989M + SBC $16M - deferred tax $145M - capex $54M - SBC $16M = $2,155M (0% gap). Carve-out period: no interest expense, Comcast allocations. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0002067876-26-000010.
2023 $16.23 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,428M; dWC (cash inflow from receivables $41M + content costs $155M + payables $(12)M + other operating $(167)M) = $17M; SBC=$15M; capex=$56M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined 2023 vs 2022 per carve-out trend) so maintenance capex=$56M; OE=$2,340M; diluted shares=144.169M (first reported diluted count, pro forma 1-for-25 Comcast distribution); OE/sh=$16.23. Check: NI $1,540M + D&A $991M + SBC $15M + other $1M - deferred tax $135M - capex $56M - SBC $15M = $2,341M (0.0% gap). Carve-out period: no interest expense and Comcast cost allocations, not standalone. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0002067876-26-000010.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Northeast, Midwest, West, South) national cable distribution and advertising; GolfNow and Golf Channel content sold in more than 50 countries including United Kingdom, Canada and Europe
Historical growth strategy
Historically grew as part of Comcast/NBCUniversal by acquiring and bundling cable networks (USA, CNBC, MSNBC, Golf Channel, E!, Syfy, Oxygen) and buying digital platforms (Fandango, GolfNow, SportsEngine, Rotten Tomatoes). As a standalone company since January 2026 it is pairing cash returns from shrinking linear networks with bolt-on acquisitions in sports and golf technology (Full Swing, 2026) and selling non-core assets (SportsEngine).
Chart analysis
The stock has only traded since January 2026, so there is no long-term chart. A chartist would see a short post-spin history typical of spin-offs: early weakness followed by a range-bound pattern with no established long-term trend. With less than a year of data there are no meaningful long-term moving averages or multi-year support and resistance levels; a chartist would wait for a base to form and a break above the post-listing range before calling a trend.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of VSNT. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

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