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TAPESTRY, INC. (TPR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$50.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$80.00 $334.00
bear $80.00 base $182.00 bull $334.00 margin of safety $50.00 market price* $120.18
Tapestry is the parent of Coach and kate spade new york, and until early August 2025 also owned Stuart Weitzman, which was sold to Caleres. The business today is essentially two brands: Coach, roughly 86% of sales, and kate spade new york, roughly 13%. Coach has had two strong years in a row: net sales grew 9.9% in fiscal 2025 and then accelerated to 23.5% in fiscal 2026, to $6.91 billion, led by direct-to-consumer sales in North America, Greater China and Europe, higher average selling prices, and fewer promotions. kate spade, by contrast, has struggled - sales fell 10.2% in fiscal 2026, on top of an $854.8 million non-cash write-down of the brand's goodwill and trademark value taken in fiscal 2025. That write-down doesn't reduce the cash the business generates (it's an accounting adjustment tied to a past acquisition, not a current cost), but it is a real signal that kate spade's competitive position has weakened, and we have carried that risk in our growth assumptions rather than in this year's earnings figure. Fiscal 2025 was also messy for another reason: Tapestry spent much of fiscal 2024 and 2025 trying to buy Capri Holdings (Michael Kors, Versace, Jimmy Choo) for about $8.5 billion. A federal court blocked the deal on antitrust grounds in October 2024, Tapestry terminated it that November, redeemed roughly $6 billion of debt it had raised to finance the purchase, and absorbed about $350 million of one-time deal, financing and severance costs. None of that recurred in fiscal 2026, which is one reason this year's results look so much stronger than last year's. We valued the business assuming none of that one-time drama repeats, and thought instead about what Coach and kate spade can sustainably earn from here, using three cases. Base case: Coach's momentum continues but decelerates from its unusually strong 23.5% pace - we assumed growth slowing from around 8% next year to roughly 2.5-3% within a decade, with kate spade remaining a modest drag throughout. After ten years we assumed earnings simply hold at that level rather than keep growing, since we don't have a specific reason today to expect further expansion beyond what the two brands can support. Bull case: Coach's direct-to-consumer strength and pricing power continue closer to their recent pace for several more years, and kate spade stabilizes rather than continuing to shrink. We also gave credit, in this case only, to Tapestry's demonstrated multi-year habit of shrinking its share count through buybacks (diluted shares outstanding have fallen from about 289 million in fiscal 2018 to about 210 million today), assuming that continues at a modest pace indefinitely. Bear case: the recent margin gains - higher prices, fewer promotions - don't fully hold, kate spade's decline continues, and new U.S. tariffs on imported goods eat into some of the margin progress of the last two years (nearly all of Tapestry's products are made in Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines and other Asian countries; the company already paid about $117 million in tariffs this year, with further tariff decisions still working through the courts). Earnings settle back near their fiscal 2023-2025 historical norm and simply hold there rather than growing. We discounted all three cases at a uniform, low rate tied to long-term U.S. government bond yields plus a small buffer, and put the difference in risk between the cases into the cash-flow assumptions themselves rather than into the discount rate. That is why the range between the cases is wide - it reflects genuine uncertainty about how much of the last two years' improvement is durable, not a mechanical formula. On these three cases, we estimate the shares are worth roughly $80 in the bear case, $182 in the base case, and $334 in the bull case. Given how concentrated the business is in a single fashion-driven brand, and how quickly consumer taste for handbags can turn (kate spade's own recent history is a reminder of that), the margin-of-safety price is set with a substantial cushion below the bear-case estimate, at around $50 a share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2026 $7.71 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$1,527.7M (no impairment this year); D&A=$160.8M; deferred tax=$50.8M; other non-cash=$27.7M; capex=$166.0M, revenue grew $7,010.7M to $8,004.2M (Stuart Weitzman divested Aug 4, 2025; continuing business is Coach + Kate Spade) so growth capex=1.93%x$993.5M=$19.1M, maintenance capex=$146.9M; OE=$1,620.1M; diluted shares=210.2M; OE/sh=$7.71. CFO=$1,978.5M, SBC=$104.5M. The filing's own MD&A cash-flow walk ties the $761.9M rise in CFO to +$1.34B net income, +$158.5M favorable working-capital swing, and -$741.1M from non-recurrence of FY2025's impairment add-backs, corroborating the components used here. Coach net sales grew 23.5% (2nd consecutive year of acceleration after +9.9% in FY2025), driven by DTC growth in North America, Greater China and Europe; Kate Spade net sales declined 10.2%. capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, FY2022-FY2026) = 1.93%. Source: FY2026 10-K, accession 0001116132-26-000018.
2025 $5.54 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + goodwill impairment + intangible impairment + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$183.2M, depressed by a $854.8M non-cash impairment ($610.7M Kate Spade indefinite-lived brand intangible + $244.1M Kate Spade goodwill) and by roughly $352M of one-time cash costs (Capri Holdings acquisition costs of $268.4M, $60.2M related financing charges, $23.7M Stuart Weitzman divestiture costs) following the FTC-blocked, November 2024-terminated Capri Holdings merger. The impairment is added back as non-cash (its economic effect - a structurally weaker Kate Spade brand - is carried in the bear case and growth path, not the earnings level); the one-time cash Capri/divestiture costs are real costs and are NOT added back, so they genuinely depress this year's owner earnings - this is why FY2025 is treated as a distorted, non-anchor year. D&A=$162.9M; deferred tax=$(139.8)M; other non-cash=$43.2M; capex=$122.7M, revenue grew $6,671.2M to $7,010.7M so growth capex=1.93%x$339.5M=$6.5M, maintenance capex=$116.2M; OE=$1,232.2M; diluted shares=222.5M; OE/sh=$5.54. CFO=$1,216.6M, SBC=$87.3M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001116132-25-000019.
2024 $3.82 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$816.0M; D&A=$174.0M; deferred tax=$2.5M; other non-cash=$7.4M; capex=$108.9M, revenue roughly flat ($6,660.9M to $6,671.2M) so growth capex=1.93%x$10.3M=$0.2M, maintenance capex=$108.7M; OE=$891.2M; diluted shares=233.2M; OE/sh=$3.82. CFO=$1,255.6M, SBC=$85.9M. Tapestry signed the Capri Holdings merger agreement in August 2023; no material Capri-related cash costs hit FY2024 operating cash flow. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001116132-24-000018.
2023 $4.11 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$936.0M; D&A=$182.2M; deferred tax=$41.2M; other non-cash=$15.8M; capex=$184.2M, revenue declined slightly ($6,684.5M to $6,660.9M) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$184.2M (=full capex); OE=$991.0M; diluted shares=241.3M; OE/sh=$4.11. CFO=$975.2M, SBC=$78.8M. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001116132-23-000020.
2022 $3.61 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$856.3M; D&A=$195.3M; deferred tax=$29.9M; other non-cash=$(31.3)M; capex=$93.9M, revenue grew $5,746.3M to $6,684.5M so growth capex=1.93%x$938.2M=$18.1M, maintenance capex=$75.8M; OE=$974.4M; diluted shares=270.1M; OE/sh=$3.61. CFO=$853.2M, SBC=$72.2M. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001116132-22-000018.
2021 $3.48 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$834.2M; D&A=$220.5M; deferred tax=$52.6M; other non-cash=$(21.4)M; capex=$116.0M, revenue grew $4,961.4M to $5,746.3M (COVID recovery) so growth capex=1.93%x$784.9M=$15.1M, maintenance capex=$100.9M; OE=$985.0M; diluted shares=283.0M; OE/sh=$3.48. CFO=$1,323.7M, SBC=$64.1M. Excluded from the anchor as a COVID-recovery-year outlier. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001116132-21-000020.
2020 $3.15 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + goodwill impairment + intangible impairment + other non-cash - maintenance capex. Fiscal 2020 (COVID-19) net loss of $(652.1)M included $210.7M goodwill impairment and $813.5M indefinite-lived intangible impairment (Kate Spade), both non-cash and added back per methodology; the economic decay of the impaired Kate Spade brand is carried in the growth path/bear case, not the earnings level. D&A=$829.2M (elevated, includes store/lease-related impairment effects); deferred tax=$(115.7)M; other non-cash=$(2.3)M; capex=$205.4M, revenue declined YoY so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$205.4M; OE=$877.9M; diluted shares=278.6M; OE/sh=$3.15. Excluded from the valuation anchor as a non-recurring pandemic/impairment-distorted year. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001116132-20-000022.
2019 $2.35 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$643.4M; D&A=$270.4M; deferred tax=$34.5M; other non-cash=$5.5M; capex=$274.2M, revenue grew $5,880.0M to $6,027.1M so growth capex=1.93%x$147.1M=$2.8M, maintenance capex=$271.4M; OE=$682.4M; diluted shares=290.8M; OE/sh=$2.35. CFO=$792.4M (latest restated), SBC=$84.8M. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001116132-19-000016.
2018 $1.47 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + other non-cash - maintenance capex. NI=$397.5M (CFO=$997.5M per latest restatement in FY2019 10-K); D&A=$271.3M; deferred tax not separately tagged this year (TCJA transition-tax year), treated as $0, immaterial since FY2018 is not used in the valuation anchor; other non-cash=$(3.1)M; capex=$267.4M, revenue grew $4,488.3M to $5,880.0M so growth capex=1.93%x$1,391.7M=$26.8M, maintenance capex=$240.6M; OE=$425.1M; diluted shares=288.6M; OE/sh=$1.47. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001116132-18-000021 (CFO restated in accession 0001116132-19-000016).
2017 $2.21 ▼
OE = NI + D&A + deferred tax + other non-cash - maintenance capex (SBC cancels algebraically since CFO already adds it back and OE subtracts it once). NI=$591.0M; D&A=$218.9M; deferred tax=$78.0M; other non-cash=$19.1M; capex=$283.1M, revenue declined YoY ($4,491.8M to $4,488.3M) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$283.1M; OE=$623.9M; diluted shares=282.8M; OE/sh=$2.21. CFO=$853.8M, SBC=$73.6M (for reference/cross-check). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001116132-17-000011.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Primarily North America (the largest market, with especially strong direct-to-consumer sales), plus meaningful and growing sales in Greater China, Japan, and Europe; global wholesale and licensing distribution in numerous other countries, with a minimal (under 1% of sales) distributor business in the Middle East. Products are manufactured mainly by third-party contractors in Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Bangladesh and other Asian countries.
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