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SM Energy Co (SM) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$25.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$18.44 $91.63
bear $18.44 base $54.50 bull $91.63 margin of safety $25.00 market price* $39.50
SM Energy is a U.S. onshore oil and gas producer. Until January 2026 it was a mid-sized company drilling in the Midland Basin of West Texas, the Eagle Ford/Maverick area of South Texas, and (from October 2024) Utah's Uinta Basin. On January 30, 2026 it completed an all-stock merger with Civitas Resources, issuing about 124 million shares (1.45 SM shares per Civitas share) and assuming about $4.9 billion of Civitas senior notes. Civitas brought the DJ Basin in Colorado and a large Delaware Basin position in Texas and New Mexico. On April 30, 2026 the company sold about 61,000 net acres of its southern Maverick Basin position for $950 million, completing its promised $1 billion of post-merger asset sales. Today the company produces roughly 420-440 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day, a little over half of it oil, with about 238 million shares outstanding. What changed since our previous analysis: we now have two quarters of results for the combined company. The South Texas sale has closed, the 2026 notes ($819 million) have been repaid, and the $417 million of 2027 notes are being redeemed from cash, so there is nothing material maturing before mid-2028. Management reports that 95% of its $355 million cost-savings target has already been put in place. We previously required this evidence before naming a margin-of-safety price, and it is now in hand. We have also rebuilt the earnings base from Civitas's own filed history rather than assuming the merger was simply fair value for fair value, so the previous figures are not directly comparable. How we measured earning power. We look at owner earnings: operating cash flow with working-capital swings removed, minus stock compensation and the drilling spending needed to hold production flat. We count money spent buying new acreage or companies as investment, not upkeep. Because the business is valued before its lenders and the debt is then subtracted, we add cash interest back. Standalone SM produced owner earnings of about $1.90 to $9.86 per share a year from 2020 to 2025 (median about $5.85, roughly $790 million a year before interest). Civitas, built from filed cash-flow statements, produced about $1.6 billion before interest in 2024 and roughly $1.2 billion annualized in the first nine months of 2025 at about $65 oil. Taking out the South Texas cash flow that was sold, the combined business earns roughly $2.0-2.4 billion a year before interest at mid-cycle prices. We use $2.1 billion, about $8.75 per share. This credits only part of the cost savings already put in place and none of the unusually high oil prices of the first half of 2026 (realized oil was about $97 a barrel in the second quarter), which we treat as a price spike rather than a new normal. In 2025 owner earnings grew 29% for standalone SM. We assume no growth in year one, because that growth came from drilling more wells and higher prices, not from anything secured. The cases. Oil and gas reserves run down: the company's proved reserves would last about 8.9 years at the current production rate. So every case pays for drilling just to stand still, and every case eventually ends. We credit no production growth. Expanding output depends on drilling results and prices, not on anything contracted. We do credit the fact that the company has replaced its production with new reserves for many years, and that its multi-basin inventory supports more than a decade of drilling. - Base case: about $2.1 billion a year of pre-interest cash flow for ten years, then fading to zero over the following ten as inventory runs out. The business is worth about $19.8 billion ($82 per share). Net debt is about $6.3 billion, plus about $0.4 billion for the extra cost of the higher-coupon Civitas notes (8.4%-9.6%) compared with ordinary long-term rates, so the business owes about $6.7 billion ($28 per share). That leaves about $54.50 per share. - Bear case: an oil price collapse like 2015-16 or 2020, when standalone SM's owner earnings turned negative and operating cash flow roughly halved. We model two years at about $300 million of pre-interest cash flow, below the roughly $450-500 million annual interest bill, with the gap funded from the undrawn $2.5 billion credit line. We add about $250 million for refinancing the 2028-2029 maturities on worse terms. After that, a lower mid-cycle level of $1.6 billion for eight years, then a six-year fade. The business is worth about $11.3 billion ($47 per share) against about $6.9 billion owed ($29 per share), leaving about $18.40 per share. - Bull case: the cost savings are fully delivered and the larger inventory in the Delaware, Midland and DJ basins lets the company hold about $2.55 billion a year for fifteen years before fading. The business is worth about $28.7 billion ($119 per share) against $6.7 billion owed, leaving about $91.60 per share. Margin of safety price. We are moderately confident in the earnings level. Both companies have long filed histories, but the combined company has only two quarters of results, both at unusually high oil prices, and Civitas's own cash flow varied widely from year to year. The worst plausible outcome is a long price slump while the company carries about $6.3 billion of net debt. It has no maturities before 2028, an undrawn $2.5 billion credit line, and long-lived reserves, so it should survive a 2015-16-style downturn. But shareholders would probably get little more than our bear case, and buybacks and the $0.22 quarterly dividend would likely shrink. The things we are most likely to be wrong about are the true mid-cycle oil price, how fast the inventory depletes, and whether Civitas's higher-decline DJ Basin wells need more maintenance spending than we have assumed. If two of these went against us, the shares would be worth about the bear value. Over the holding period, the business pays about $0.88 per share a year in dividends plus buybacks. Because the outcome depends so heavily on commodity prices, the margin-of-safety price is set where the bear case alone roughly equals the price and the base case implies well above 20% a year over three to five years. That price is about $25 per share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $6.60 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,011M; ΔWC=$14M; SBC=$29M; organic capex=$1,438M; revenue rose $463.7M (to $3,154M) so growth capex=$229.2M, maintenance capex=$1,438-229.2=$1,208.8M; OE=$2,011-14-29-1,208.8=$759.2M; diluted shares=115M; OE/sh=$6.60. Acquisition capex $34M excluded. Note: this is the last full fiscal year before the transformational, all-stock Civitas Merger closed Jan 30, 2026 (roughly doubling shares outstanding to ~238M and adding Permian Delaware Basin and DJ Basin, Colorado assets plus ~$4.9B of assumed debt) - a structural break addressed in the current valuation's scenario analysis rather than in this historical series. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000893538-26-000032.
2024 $5.13 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,782.5M; ΔWC=$10.0M; SBC=$25.0M; organic capex=$1,310.6M; revenue rose $316.4M (to $2,690.3M) so growth capex=$156.4M, maintenance capex=$1,310.6-156.4=$1,154.2M; OE=$1,782.5-10.0-25.0-1,154.2=$593.3M; diluted shares=115.533M; OE/sh=$5.13. Acquisition-of-properties capex of $2,103.7M (the debt-funded Uinta Basin, Utah acquisition closed Oct 1, 2024 - a transformational, transaction) excluded from maintenance calc as discretionary growth/M&A capex. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000893538-25-000008.
2023 $4.77 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,574.4M; ΔWC=$(4.0)M; SBC=$20.3M; organic capex=$989.4M; revenue fell $2,373.9M vs $3,358.6M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$989.4M; OE=$1,574.4-(-4.0)-20.3-989.4=$568.7M; diluted shares=119.240M; OE/sh=$4.77. Acquisition capex $109.9M excluded (growth). Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0000893538-24-000009.
2022 $9.86 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,686.4M; ΔWC=$(72.1)M; SBC=$18.8M; organic capex=$879.9M; revenue rose $735.8M (to $3,358.6M) so growth capex=$363.8M, maintenance capex=$879.9-363.8=$516.2M; OE=$1,686.4-(-72.1)-18.8-516.2=$1,223.5M; diluted shares=124.084M; OE/sh=$9.86. Acquisition capex ~$0.0M excluded. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000893538-23-000014.
2021 $8.27 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,159.8M; ΔWC=$117.4M; SBC=$18.8M; organic capex=$674.8M; revenue rose $1,496.2M (price recovery, to $2,622.9M); 49.4% ratio implies growth capex=$739.7M, which exceeds actual organic capex, so maintenance capex clamps to $0 (formula artifact of a price-driven, not volume-driven, revenue rebound - noted as a judgment call); OE=$1,159.8-117.4-18.8-0=$1,023.5M; diluted shares=123.690M; OE/sh=$8.27. Acquisition capex $3.3M excluded. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0000893538-22-000020.
2020 $1.90 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$790.9M; ΔWC=$11.6M; SBC=$15.0M; organic capex=$547.8M; revenue fell $1,126.7M vs $1,590.1M (COVID demand shock) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$547.8M; OE=$790.9-11.6-15.0-547.8=$216.6M; diluted shares=113.730M; OE/sh=$1.90. Acquisition capex $7.9M excluded. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0000893538-21-000008.
2019 -$2.14 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$823.6M; ΔWC=$16.9M; SBC=$24.3M; organic capex=$1,023.8M; revenue fell $1,590.1M vs $2,067.1M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$1,023.8M; OE=$823.6-16.9-24.3-1,023.8=$(241.4)M; diluted shares=112.544M; OE/sh=$(2.14). Acquisition capex $2.6M excluded. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000893538-20-000009.
2018 -$1.38 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$720.6M; ΔWC=$13.7M; SBC=$23.9M; organic capex=$1,303.2M; revenue rose $937.7M (to $2,067.1M); using mean organic-capex/revenue ratio of 49.4% (2016-2025 window) growth capex=$463.6M, maintenance capex=$1,303.2-463.6=$839.6M; OE=$720.6-13.7-23.9-839.6=$(156.6)M; diluted shares=113.502M; OE/sh=$(1.38). Acquisition capex $33.3M excluded (growth). Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0000893538-19-000012.
2017 -$4.18 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$515.4M; ΔWC=$69.6M; SBC=$22.7M; organic capex=$888.4M; revenue fell $1,129.4M vs $1,217.5M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$888.4M; OE=$515.4-69.6-22.7-888.4=$(465.3)M; diluted shares=111.428M; OE/sh=$(4.18). Acquisition capex $89.9M excluded (treated as growth). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0000893538-18-000005.
2016 -$1.09 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex (acquisitions of oil & gas properties excluded from maintenance capex; treated as discretionary M&A growth investment, not deducted from OE). CFO=$552.8M; ΔWC (AR+prepaid+AP+accrued deriv settlements cash effect)=$(20.8)M; SBC=$26.9M; organic (explore & develop) capex=$629.9M; revenue fell $1,217.5M vs $1,556.97M prior year so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$629.9M (=full organic capex); OE=$552.8-(-20.8)-26.9-629.9=$(83.3)M; diluted shares=76.568M; OE/sh=$(1.09). Acquisition-of-properties capex of $2,183.8M (transformational portfolio shift, funded largely by proceeds from divestitures/financing) excluded from maintenance calc. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0000893538-17-000013.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States: South (Texas - Midland Basin, Delaware Basin, Eagle Ford/Maverick Basin), West (New Mexico - Delaware Basin; Colorado - DJ Basin; Utah - Uinta Basin). Oil, natural gas and NGLs sold to U.S. purchasers at U.S. hub prices.
Historical growth strategy
Organic drilling of its own acreage (Midland Basin and South Texas for most of the past decade), periodically reshaped by large, debt- or stock-funded portfolio moves: the 2016 Permian acreage purchases and Rockies/Williston exits, the 2024 Uinta Basin acquisition, and the 2026 all-stock merger with Civitas Resources (DJ and Delaware Basins), followed by non-core asset sales to repay debt.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a classic commodity-producer chart: a collapse from the 2014 highs to single digits during the 2015-16 oil crash and again in 2020, a powerful multi-year recovery into 2022 tracking crude, and then a choppy, range-bound pattern with lower highs through 2024-2025 as oil prices softened and the stock fell around the Civitas merger announcement and share issuance. The share count roughly doubled at the January 2026 close. A sustained break above the post-merger trading range would be read as the first sign of a new uptrend, while a failure back toward the 2025 lows would confirm the longer-term downtrend.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of SM. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

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