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RAVE RESTAURANT GROUP, INC. (RAVE) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$1.45 ComplexitySimple Updated
$1.68 $3.31
bear $1.68 base $2.58 bull $3.31 margin of safety $1.45 market price* $2.18
Rave Restaurant Group is a small franchisor of the Pizza Inn and Pie Five pizza brands. It owns no restaurants and has no debt. Franchisees run the stores; Rave earns royalties on their sales, incentive payments from the food distributors and suppliers that serve the system, and fees. In fiscal 2026 (year ended June 28, 2026) revenue was $12.9 million, up 7% from $12.0 million: royalties were $4.7 million, supplier and distributor incentives $5.7 million (up from $4.9 million) and $2.2 million was advertising-fund money passed through. Net income was $2.9 million and operating cash flow $3.6 million. The company holds $13.6 million of cash and Treasury bills and paid no dividend and bought back no stock this year (fiscal 2025 financing used $1.4 million, mainly buybacks). What is really being valued. The profitable core is the Pizza Inn buffet: 80 of the 109 franchised Pizza Inn restaurants, a count that has held between 77 and 83 since 2020 (83 in 2020, 77 in 2023, 79 in 2025, 80 now), with domestic comparable sales up 2.4% to $107.1 million this year. Everything around it is shrinking. Franchised Pizza Inn restaurants fell from 176 in 2020 to 152 in 2023, 117 in 2025 and 109 now as small Express and Delco formats and international stores closed (18 international units, from 22). Pie Five fell from 42 units in 2020 to 13, and its franchise revenue dropped 24% to $0.9 million; it produced only $0.6 million of segment income against $8.9 million for Pizza Inn, before about $6.1 million of corporate overhead. Pie Five's 2015-2020 build-out also lost heavily (company net losses of $8.9 million in fiscal 2016 and $12.5 million in fiscal 2017), which is why we do not credit management with a record of profitable expansion. How we measured earnings. Reported cash flow flatters the franchise business. About $0.9 million of fiscal 2026 earnings came from using up old tax losses (roughly $12 million of federal loss carryforwards remain, so current tax was only about $0.1 million of a $1.0 million tax charge), and part of the cash flow is interest on the Treasury bills. We value the franchise business as if it paid full tax and earned nothing on its cash, and then add the surplus cash and the remaining tax shield separately. Stock compensation ($0.3 million in 2026) is counted as a real cost. On that basis the franchise business earned about $0.11, $0.17, $0.17 and $0.18 per share in fiscal 2023 through 2026. We base our estimate on $0.17, the middle of those four years rather than the latest and highest, because supplier incentives jumped 16% this year to a level above the previous two years and the filing does not disclose the length or terms of the distributor agreements behind them (one supplier accounted for 14% of revenue). Fiscal 2022 is left out (a $5.7 million non-cash tax benefit, a $0.7 million one-time employee retention credit and a pandemic recovery year), and earlier years describe the company when it still ran stores of its own. Earnings per share grew about 8% in fiscal 2026 on this basis; our first forecast year is lower than that level (about $0.16) because Pie Five keeps running off, and we credit no growth. Base case: $2.58 per share. The franchise business holds at about $0.17 a share ($2.4 million) with no growth credited. Pie Five's roughly $0.5 million of after-tax earnings runs off at about 25% a year (its revenue fell 24% this year) while the Pizza Inn buffet system holds flat; we carry that level to year 15 and then fade it to zero by year 25, since the evidence for the buffet core (a brand since 1958 and a stable buffet count for six years) does not extend further. That is worth $1.61 per share, plus $0.81 of surplus cash (we hold back $2.0 million for operations) and $0.16 for the remaining tax shield, with nothing owed to lenders. Left out: same-store sales gains of 2.4% (they have been offset by rising overhead, with general and administrative cost up 12.7% in fiscal 2026), new buffet openings (four this year against three closures), and buybacks, which our earlier estimate assumed at about 2.5% a year but which did not occur this year. Bear case: $1.68 per share. Pie Five disappears within a few years; a one-time $1.0 million (pre-tax) is spent on the dispute below; and the business suffers a repeat of the pandemic: revenue fell about 30% between fiscal 2019 and fiscal 2021 (partly pandemic, partly the closing of company-run stores) and took until fiscal 2023 to recover most of it, with the buffet count permanently 7% lower (83 to 77 between 2020 and 2023). We model two years of near-zero earnings, a partial recovery, 7% permanent loss, then 3% a year erosion through year 20 and a fade to zero by year 25. Because of the Pie Five record, half the surplus cash is assumed wasted and the tax shield is used up more slowly. Worth $1.14 for the business, $0.41 of cash and $0.13 of tax shield, with nothing owed; earnings stay positive in every year, so there is no debt to be refinanced. Bull case: $3.31 per share (components are rounded). Earnings start from fiscal 2026's level of $0.18 and the Pizza Inn side grows 3% a year for five years and 2% for five more, in line with 2.4% comparable sales, 3.4% domestic retail sales growth and Pizza Inn segment income rising from $6.8 million in fiscal 2023 to $8.9 million in fiscal 2026; held flat to year 20 and faded to zero by year 30. Worth $2.33 for the business, $0.81 of cash and $0.16 of tax shield. What could change this. Our previous estimate (September 2026: $2.01, $3.14 and $4.49) was built on a different basis and is not comparable; in the business itself, the company bought back no stock this year, total units kept falling, and the CEO dispute below surfaced in the new annual report. In August 2026 the CEO, Brandon Solano, sent the audit committee chair a complaint alleging discrimination and harassment by the board and Chairman Mark Schwarz, after asking for pay rising to $2.3 million a year by fiscal 2029 (the chairman called that a non-starter). He says he also filed a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission. The company hired an outside law firm to investigate on September 1, 2026 and says it cannot yet assess the claims. We cannot size the outcome from the filing; a leadership break is the largest unmodelled risk to a company this small, and it is reflected only through the bear case allowance and the margin-of-safety price. If supplier incentives fell back to earlier levels, the base value would fall by about $0.33 per share; if the buffet count fell 20%, by about $0.97; if half the surplus cash were spent unwisely, by about $0.41. Margin-of-safety price: $1.45. We are fairly sure of the level of earnings (a flat buffet base and no debt) within about 15-20%, but not of its direction after a year in which units and international stores kept closing. The worst plausible outcomes are a pandemic-style hit to dine-in buffets, loss or repricing of the distributor relationship behind supplier incentives (44% of revenue), a rupture with the CEO, or cash spent on another expansion. The balance sheet survives all of them: no borrowings and $13.6 million of cash cover more than a year of total costs, but a 109-restaurant brand has little cushion if the buffet base shrinks, and the business pays no dividend during the holding period. The price assumes a three-to-five-year holding period; the franchise business would add roughly $0.17 a share a year to cash if left alone, but nothing obliges management to return it. At $1.45, about $0.97 is covered by surplus cash and the tax shield, leaving about $0.48 for a franchise that earns about $0.17 a share after full tax and kept earning in our bear case. That cushion, plus the bear case staying above $1.45, is why the margin-of-safety price is set there and not higher given the unresolved leadership dispute.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2026 $0.25 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2026 (ended 2026-06-28): CFO=$3,552k; working-capital cash effect=$(412)k (A/R (282), notes receivable +42, deferred contract charges (68), prepaid/other (278), A/P (4), accrued +78, deferred revenue +100), removed so OE adds it back; operating-lease items (ROU amortization +313, non-cash lease expense +10, lease liability payments (382)) are treated as rent, left in CFO; SBC=$298k; capex=$49k, capex ratio (mean capex/revenue FY2019-26)=0.79%, growth capex=0.79%×($12,910k−$12,039k)=$7k so maintenance capex=$42k; OE=$3,552k+$412k−$298k−$42k=$3,624k; diluted shares=14,304k; OE/sh=$0.2533. Includes deferred-tax add-back $892k (federal NOL use) and $172k of Treasury-bill interest within CFO. Reconciliation: NI $2,878k + D&A/amortization $167k + SBC $298k + ROU amort $313k + non-cash lease $10k + credit loss $7k + deferred tax $892k − T-bill discount accretion $219k − lease liability payments $382k − maintenance capex $42k = $3,922k = CFO − WC − maint capex (ties exactly). Source: FY2026 10-K, accession 0001140361-26-037514.
2025 $0.23 ▼
Recomputed on the full OE basis (prior version did not remove working capital and deducted total capex). OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2025 (ended 2025-06-29): CFO=$3,395k; working-capital cash effect=$(197)k (A/R +261, notes +27, deferred contract charges +16, prepaid (168), A/P trade (152), accrued (60), deferred revenue (121)); operating lease liability payments $(429)k kept in CFO as rent; SBC=$136k; capex=$56k, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$56k; OE=$3,395k+$197k−$136k−$56k=$3,400k; diluted shares=14,561k; OE/sh=$0.2335. Includes deferred-tax add-back $761k (federal NOL use) and about $239k of Treasury-bill/cash interest within CFO; these are normalized in the valuation, not in the stored series. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001140361-25-036080.
2024 $0.22 ▼
Recomputed on the full OE basis (prior version did not remove working capital and deducted total capex). OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2024 (ended 2024-06-30): CFO=$2,845k (restated figure; $2,740k as originally filed); working-capital cash effect=$(546)k (A/R (335), notes (14), deferred contract charges +30, prepaid +37, A/P trade (143), accrued +25, deferred revenue (146)); operating lease liability payments $(511)k kept in CFO as rent; SBC=$149k; capex=$76k, growth capex=0.79%×($12,150k−$11,889k)=$2k so maintenance capex=$74k; OE=$2,845k+$546k−$149k−$74k=$3,168k; diluted shares=14,630k; OE/sh=$0.2165. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001140361-25-036080.
2023 $0.14 ▼
Recomputed on the full OE basis (prior version did not remove working capital and deducted total capex). OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2023 (ended 2023-06-25): CFO=$2,841k (restated figure in the FY2025 10-K; $2,629k as originally filed); working-capital cash effect=+$214k (A/R +763, notes +240, deferred contract charges +7, prepaid (58), A/P trade (167), accrued (272), deferred revenue (299)); operating lease liability payments $(558)k kept in CFO as rent; SBC=$345k; capex=$65k, growth capex=0.79%×($11,889k−$10,692k)=$9k so maintenance capex=$56k; OE=$2,841k−$214k−$345k−$56k=$2,226k; diluted shares=15,911k; OE/sh=$0.1399. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001140361-25-036080.
2022 $0.13 ▼
Recomputed on the full OE basis (prior version did not remove working capital and deducted total capex). OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2022 (ended 2022-06-26): CFO=$1,384k; working-capital cash effect=$(1,251)k (A/R (1,116), notes +80, deferred contract charges (18), prepaid +50, A/P trade +25, accrued +158, other current liabilities +35, deferred revenue (465)); operating lease liability payments $(465)k kept in CFO as rent; deferred tax benefit of $(5,772)k (valuation allowance release) is non-cash and already netted in CFO; SBC=$169k; capex=$66k, capex ratio (mean capex/revenue FY2019-26)=0.79%, growth capex=0.79%×($10,692k−$8,593k)=$17k so maintenance capex=$49k; OE=$1,384k+$1,251k−$169k−$49k=$2,417k; diluted shares=17,993k; OE/sh=$0.1343. CFO includes $704k employee retention credit. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001140361-22-034473.
2021 $0.04 ▼
Recomputed on the full OE basis (prior version did not remove working capital and deducted total capex). OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2021 (ended 2021-06-27): CFO=$1,485k; working-capital cash effect=+$491k (A/R +47, notes (119), deferred contract charges +33, prepaid (22), deposits +5, A/P trade +198, A/P lease terminations (428), accrued +149, other current liabilities +46, deferred revenue +582; $51k of CFO is unreconciled, 3.4%); operating lease liability payments $(793)k kept in CFO as rent; SBC=$80k; capex=$212k, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$212k; OE=$1,485k−$491k−$80k−$212k=$702k; diluted shares=18,105k; OE/sh=$0.0388. COVID-affected year; CFO includes deferred revenue/PPP-era timing. Source: FY2022 10-K comparative column, accession 0001140361-22-034473.
2020 $0.06 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2020 (ended 2020-06-28), COVID year and closing of remaining company stores (excluded from the anchor window). CFO=$(360)k; working-capital cash effect=$(1,184)k (A/R +132, operating notes +104, inventories +7, prepaid +167, restricted cash (1), deferred revenue (587), A/P trade +46, A/P lease terminations (985), accrued/deferred rent (67)); operating lease liability payments of $(494)k kept in CFO as rent; SBC=$(104)k (net reversal of prior accruals, treated as reported); capex=$56k, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$56k; OE=$(360)k+$1,184k+$104k−$56k=$872k; diluted shares=15,144k (basic, loss year); OE/sh=$0.0576. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001140361-20-021733.
2019 $0.12 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2019 (ended 2019-06-30), Pie Five/Pizza Inn wind-down of company stores (excluded from the anchor window). CFO=$659k; working-capital cash effect=$(1,295)k (A/R +226, notes +50, inventories (1), prepaid/deposits (446), deferred revenue (409), A/P trade (21), A/P lease termination (418), accrued/deferred rent (276)); SBC=$36k; capex=$81k, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$81k; OE=$659k+$1,295k−$36k−$81k=$1,837k; diluted shares=15,070k; OE/sh=$0.1219. Source: FY2020 10-K (prior-year column), accession 0001140361-20-021733.
2018 -$0.04 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2018 (ended 2018-06-24), transition year while company stores were sold/closed (excluded from the anchor window). CFO=$(3,902)k; working-capital cash effect=$(4,460)k (A/R +908, inventories +73, prepaid +25, deferred revenue (767), A/P trade (4,241), accrued/deferred rent (458)); deferred tax asset increase of $(3,479)k is a non-cash item already netted in CFO; SBC=$115k; capex=$1,081k, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$1,081k; OE=$(3,902)k+$4,460k−$115k−$1,081k=$(638)k; diluted shares=14,983k; OE/sh=$(0.0426). Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001010549-18-000340.
2017 -$0.43 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY2017 (ended 2017-06-25), company-operated Pie Five/Pizza Inn era before the refranchising (a different business; excluded from the anchor window). CFO=$(5,548)k; working-capital cash effect=$(1,568)k (A/R (576), inventories +118, prepaid +116, deferred revenue (107), A/P +350, accrued (1,469)); SBC=$58k; capex=$573k, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$573k; OE=$(5,548)k+$1,568k−$58k−$573k=$(4,611)k; diluted shares=10,617k; OE/sh=$(0.4343). Source: FY2018 10-K (prior-year column), accession 0001010549-18-000340.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States, predominantly the South: Pizza Inn restaurants are concentrated in North Carolina (about 21% of domestic units), Texas (18%), Arkansas (11%) and South Carolina (10%); about 18 international Pizza Inn restaurants outside the United States; Pie Five units are in the United States.
Historical growth strategy
Pure franchising: Pizza Inn (founded 1958 in Dallas, Texas; first franchise 1963; buffet format since 1969) grew through franchisees and international master licenses, with income from royalties and distributor/supplier incentives. In the 2010s the company tried to build the Pie Five fast-casual concept (first opened 2011) largely with company-operated stores, which lost heavily in fiscal 2016-2020 and was unwound into an asset-light franchise model; since then growth has come from new buffet and ghost-kitchen franchisees, cost cuts and share repurchases, while total unit counts have declined.
Chart analysis
Based on the roughly three months of daily and monthly prices reviewed (July to early October 2026), a chartist would see a small-cap that held a range of about $2.75 to $3.35 through July and August (closing near $3.15 on July 31 and $3.14 on August 31) and then broke down hard: the stock fell about 17% in a single session on September 24, 2026, the day the annual report was filed, gapping from the $2.75-$2.82 area to about $2.29, and has since closed near $2.30 (September 30 and October 5). That is a breakdown below multi-month support, with the old range now overhead resistance (the gap fill zone near $2.75-$2.85, then $3.10-$3.35). Support is the $2.23-$2.30 area where it is basing; a close below it would open further downside, while a reclaim of $2.75 would be the first sign of recovery. Thinly traded microcaps like this tend to overshoot in both directions. Longer-term chart history was not reviewed.
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Circle of competence

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