valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

Polaris Inc. (PII) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$32.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$21.10 $85.55
bear $21.10 base $60.88 bull $85.55 margin of safety $32.00 market price* $52.15
Polaris builds off-road vehicles (Ranger utility and RZR recreational side-by-sides, Sportsman ATVs), snowmobiles, Slingshot three-wheelers, pontoon boats (Bennington, Godfrey, Hurricane) and small European quadricycles (Aixam and Goupil). It sells through independent dealers, mostly in the United States and Canada, and earns a steady stream from parts, garments and accessories for the vehicles already in use. Off-road vehicles are the core, at roughly three-quarters of sales. What the business earns. We measure the cash the business produces before paying its lenders: operating cash flow without short-term swings in inventory and receivables, less stock-based pay and the capital spending needed to keep the business at its current size, plus the interest it pays. Over 2016-2025 that ran from about $1.25 a share (2025) to about $9.60 (2022). The decade is a full cycle: a soft 2016, steady years near $6 in 2018-2020, a stimulus-driven boom in 2021-2022, and a hard bust in 2024-2025 as demand cooled, dealers cut inventory, promotions rose and import tariffs added cost. We use the middle of that cycle, about $6.00 a share, as normal earning power. It adds back the non-cash write-offs of 2025 (the $330 million loss on exiting Indian Motorcycle and $156 million of other impairments), because they recognised value already lost rather than a recurring cost. What changed in 2026. Polaris sold a majority stake in Indian Motorcycle to Carolwood LP for a nominal price, closing in the first quarter of 2026 and paying about $79 million in cash to complete it. Indian had about $478 million of yearly revenue and lost money; management says the exit adds roughly $50 million a year of operating earnings, and we credit only part of that. First-half 2026 results improved: second-quarter sales rose 9%, North American off-road retail rose about 5%, ahead of the industry, and first-half net income was $59 million against a $146 million loss a year earlier. The second quarter included a one-time $74 million tariff refund, which we do not treat as recurring. Operating cash flow for the half was negative $90 million because of seasonal working capital, and borrowings rose to about $1.95 billion at June 30, 2026 from $1.54 billion at year-end. What it owes. At June 30, 2026 Polaris had about $1.95 billion of borrowings ($500 million of 6.95% notes due March 2029, $500 million of 5.60% notes due March 2031, a $475 million term loan and a revolving credit line due December 2029, plus smaller notes) against about $300 million of cash: net debt of roughly $1.65 billion, about $28 a share. Its interest rates are close to long-run norms, so we make no adjustment for cheap or expensive debt. Base case. 2026 recovers to about $4.50 a share of cash before interest, against $1.25 in 2025. That is well above last year's falling trend, and we accept it for dated reasons in the 2026 filings: Indian's losses ended with the first-quarter closing, dealer inventories ended 2025 lean (off-road down 9%, snowmobiles down 43%) so shipments now match retail, and first-half net income has already swung by about $205 million. Earnings return to the normal $6.00 plus a partial credit for the Indian exit, about $6.45 a share, by 2030, and stay there. We credit no further growth: Polaris has grown mainly through new products and acquisitions, neither secured nor routine. The earning power lasts because of structural features held for decades - leadership in side-by-sides and snowmobiles, the dealer network and the accessories stream - which we hold for thirty years and then fade over ten. The business is worth about $5.2 billion, or $89 a share; after $28 of net debt the shares are worth about $61. Bear case. A one-in-ten outcome built from what this industry has actually done. The recovery stalls at about $4.50 a share as tariffs stay, promotions stay heavy and BRP's Can-Am and lower-priced imports take share. Around 2031-2032 a second downturn as deep as 2024-2025 cuts cash before interest to $1.50-$2.00 a share for two years, below the interest bill, as in 2025 when lenders still refinanced the company. The 2031 notes are refinanced at that trough at a higher rate. Earnings then return to about $4.50 and fade out over ten years from 2046. The business is worth about $2.9 billion, or $50 a share; after debt and costlier refinancing the shares are worth about $21. Recurring product-liability suits over vehicle fires and rollovers are part of why this case is not better. Bull case. Polaris's own levers work: the Indian exit delivers the full savings management described, tariff costs ease, and the side-by-side and snowmobile share gains of 2025-2026 hold. Cash before interest reaches about $7.90 a share by 2030, near the 2020 level and below the boom, and holds for forty years. The business is worth about $6.6 billion, or $114 a share; after debt the shares are worth about $86. What could make us wrong. Most of the value in every case lies beyond ten years, so the central question is whether $6 a share is truly normal or whether 2018-2022 was a high-water mark. If normal is nearer $4.50, the shares are worth roughly the bear case. The second risk is debt: about $1 billion comes due in 2029, and a downturn at that moment would hurt. Earlier estimates were built on a different basis and are not directly comparable. Margin-of-safety price. We are only moderately confident in the earnings level: the swing from $9.60 to $1.25 a share in three years shows how far it moves, and debt magnifies that for shareholders. The worst plausible outcome is a long tariff-heavy slump in which competitors take share, dealers cut stock again (Polaris must buy back repossessed dealer inventory from dealer lenders, up to about $334 million at end-2025), and the 2029 maturities must be refinanced at a bad moment. The business came through 2024-2025 without cutting its dividend, so the structure is sound, but shareholders would not come out whole. If we are wrong on the normal level and the timing, the shares are worth around $21. The price assumes a three-to-five-year holding period, with a dividend of about $2.65 a share a year if it is maintained. From $32, the base case's return to normal earnings over about four years implies roughly doubling with dividends, about 20% a year, while the bear case implies a limited loss from that price. The margin-of-safety price is $32.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.95 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. NI=-$464.8M (includes $155.9M impairment charges and $327.1M loss on the Indian Motorcycle disposal group held for sale, both non-cash); D&A=$286.5M; SBC=$59.9M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$42.1M, deferred income taxes -$139.1M, impairment charges +$155.9M, loss on disposal group held for sale +$327.1M, other net +$5.2M) sum to +$307.0M; CFO=$741.0M with working-capital movement=+$552.4M, largely a release of previously-built inventory (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$128.7M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$182.9M; revenue declined slightly to $7,152.0M from $7,175.4M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=full capex=$182.9M. OE=$128.7M-$182.9M=-$54.2M; diluted shares=56.9M; OE/sh=-$0.95. On October 10, 2025 Polaris signed a definitive agreement to sell a majority interest in Indian Motorcycle for a nominal price (sale closed Q1 2026); the large impairment/loss-on-disposal charges are non-cash and added back per the formula, but reflect a real, near-zero-value exit from that business. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-008033.
2024 $0.44 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. NI=$111.2M; D&A=$286.3M; SBC=$49.2M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$53.8M, deferred income taxes -$86.7M, impairment charges +$29.5M, other net +$0.1M) sum to -$110.9M; CFO=$268.2M with working-capital movement=-$67.6M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$286.6M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$261.7M; revenue declined to $7,175.4M from $8,934.4M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=full capex=$261.7M. OE=$286.6M-$261.7M=$24.9M; diluted shares=56.8M; OE/sh=$0.44. Weak year: soft retail demand, dealer destocking, tariff-related cost pressure. Source: FY2025 10-K (comparative column), accession 0001628280-26-008033.
2023 $4.03 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. NI=$502.7M; D&A=$258.9M; SBC=$57.4M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$41.5M, deferred income taxes -$86.8M, other net -$0.8M) sum to -$129.1M; CFO=$925.8M with working-capital movement=+$235.9M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$632.5M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$412.6M; revenue grew to $8,934.4M from $8,589.0M (+$345.4M); growth capex=$12.7M, maintenance capex=$399.9M. OE=$632.5M-$399.9M=$232.6M; diluted shares=57.7M; OE/sh=$4.03. Source: FY2025 10-K (comparative column), accession 0001628280-26-008033.
2022 $8.45 ▼
Computed on a continuing-operations basis (TAP aftermarket business sold in 2022, excluded from all periods as discontinued). OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops NI=$603.4M (reported NI $447.6M + $13.2M loss from discontinued operations + $142.6M loss on sale of discontinued operations added back); D&A=$232.8M; SBC=$62.9M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$15.1M, deferred income taxes -$48.9M, other net -$0.5M) sum to -$64.5M; continuing-ops CFO=$534.5M with working-capital movement=-$300.1M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$771.7M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$306.6M; continuing-ops revenue grew to $8,589.0M from $7,439.2M (+$1,149.8M); growth capex=$42.4M, maintenance capex=$264.2M. OE=$771.7M-$264.2M=$507.5M; diluted shares=60.1M; OE/sh=$8.45. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001628280-23-004043.
2021 $8.33 ▼
Computed on a continuing-operations basis (TAP aftermarket business excluded as discontinued). OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops NI=$496.6M (reported NI $494.3M + $2.3M loss from discontinued operations added back); D&A=$216.4M; SBC=$60.6M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$7.7M, deferred income taxes +$15.2M, loss on sale of businesses +$34.8M, other net +$7.1M) sum to +$49.4M; continuing-ops CFO=$286.8M with working-capital movement=-$536.2M, i.e. a large cash outflow to build inventory during the post-COVID demand surge (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$762.4M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$282.8M; continuing-ops revenue grew to $7,439.2M from $6,281.4M (+$1,157.8M); growth capex=$42.7M, maintenance capex=$240.1M. OE=$762.4M-$240.1M=$522.3M; diluted shares=62.7M; OE/sh=$8.33. Source: FY2022 10-K (comparative column, restated to continuing operations), accession 0001628280-23-004043.
2020 $5.95 ▼
Computed on a continuing-operations basis (Transamerican Auto Parts/TAP aftermarket business, divested 2022, reclassified as discontinued and excluded). OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops NI=$360.5M (reported NI $124.9M + $235.6M loss from discontinued operations added back); D&A=$235.8M; SBC=$65.3M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$18.5M, deferred income taxes -$83.7M, goodwill impairment +$81.1M, other net +$1.8M) sum to -$19.3M; continuing-ops CFO=$961.8M with working-capital movement=+$319.5M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$577.0M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$204.3M; continuing-ops revenue declined to $6,281.4M from $6,782.5M so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=full capex=$204.3M. OE=$577.0M-$204.3M=$372.7M; diluted shares=62.6M; OE/sh=$5.95. Source: FY2022 10-K (comparative column, restated to continuing operations), accession 0001628280-23-004043.
2019 $4.76 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex (equivalently NI + D&A + other non-cash - maintenance capex). NI=$323.9M; D&A=$234.5M; SBC=$75.0M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$32.5M, deferred income taxes -$9.5M, impairment charges +$3.6M, other net +$1.6M) sum to -$36.8M; CFO=$655.0M with working-capital movement=+$58.5M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$521.6M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$251.4M; revenue grew to $6,782.5M from $6,078.5M (+$704.0M); growth capex=$26.0M, maintenance capex=$225.4M. OE=$521.6M-$225.4M=$296.2M; diluted shares=62.292M; OE/sh=$4.76. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001628280-20-001541.
2018 $5.54 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex (equivalently NI + D&A + other non-cash - maintenance capex). NI=$335.3M; D&A=$211.0M; SBC=$64.0M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$30.1M, deferred income taxes +$23.4M, impairment charges +$24.3M, other net -$8.5M) sum to +$9.1M; CFO=$477.1M with working-capital movement=-$142.2M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$555.4M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$225.4M; revenue grew to $6,078.5M from $5,428.5M (+$650.0M); growth capex (3.689% of revenue growth)=$24.0M, maintenance capex=$201.4M. OE=$555.4M-$201.4M=$353.9M; diluted shares=63.949M; OE/sh=$5.53. Source: FY2019 10-K (comparative column), accession 0001628280-20-001541.
2017 $4.49 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex (equivalently NI + D&A + other non-cash - maintenance capex). NI=$172.5M; D&A=$191.1M; SBC=$50.1M; other non-cash (noncash income from financial services -$27.0M, deferred income taxes +$73.6M, impairment charges +$25.4M, other net +$3.4M) sum to +$75.4M; CFO=$585.4M with working-capital movement=+$96.4M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$439.0M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$184.4M; revenue grew to $5,428.5M from $4,516.6M (+$911.8M); 10-yr average capex/revenue=3.689% so growth capex=$33.6M, maintenance capex=$150.8M. OE=$439.0M-$150.8M=$288.2M; diluted shares=64.180M; OE/sh=$4.49. Source: FY2019 10-K (comparative column), accession 0001628280-20-001541.
2016 $1.92 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex (equivalently NI + D&A + other non-cash - maintenance capex). NI=$212.9M; D&A=$167.5M; SBC=$57.9M; other non-cash items (noncash income from financial services -$30.1M, deferred income taxes -$26.1M, excess tax benefits from SBC -$3.6M, other net +$13.5M) sum to -$46.3M; CFO=$571.8M with working-capital movement=+$179.7M (check: CFO-WC-SBC=$334.2M = NI+D&A+other non-cash, ties exactly). Capex=$209.1M; 2016 revenue ($4,516.6M) declined vs 2015 ($4,719.3M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full capex=$209.1M. OE=$334.2M-$209.1M=$125.0M; diluted shares=65.158M; OE/sh=$1.92. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001628280-17-001442.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Midwest, South, West, Northeast), Canada, Europe (France, Germany, Scandinavia), Australia, Mexico
Historical growth strategy
Grew by launching new vehicle categories and models (notably creating and leading the side-by-side market with RZR and Ranger), building a large independent dealer network, expanding high-margin parts, garments and accessories, and making acquisitions (Indian Motorcycle, Aixam, Transamerican Auto Parts, Boat Holdings/Bennington), several of which were later sold or written down; shareholder returns came through steady dividend increases and buybacks.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a long-term topping pattern: the stock peaked near $145-150 in 2021, then made a series of lower highs and lower lows through 2024-2025, breaking below the 2020 pandemic low and multi-year support in the $40s-$50s before basing. A rebound in 2026 off the lows would be read as a possible bottoming attempt, but until the price reclaims its long-term moving averages and the prior breakdown zone, the primary trend would still be described as down.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of PII. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.