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KAANAPALI LAND LLC (KANP) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$13.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$9.00 $34.68
bear $9.00 base $25.43 bull $34.68 margin of safety $13.00 market price* $29.70
Kaanapali Land, LLC owns about 3,900 acres on Maui, Hawaii, of which about 1,500 acres are conservation land that cannot be developed. Its day-to-day operations (Mauigrown coffee farming, pasture leases, irrigation systems and the carrying costs of the land) lose money. The real business is turning land into cash through occasional parcel sales. There are 1,845,000 units (1,792,613 common plus 52,000 Class C) and no borrowings of any kind; total liabilities at June 30, 2026 were $8.4 million, mostly deferred taxes and payables. No distributions are paid and the company says it does not expect to make any for the foreseeable future, so the return comes only from what the land and cash are worth. Starting point. On March 10, 2026 the company's Pioneer Mill subsidiary closed the sale of about 21 acres in Lahaina, the former mill site, for $19.9 million in cash. Cash rose from $15.8 million at the end of 2025 to $38.0 million at June 30, 2026, about $20.57 per unit. Every case starts from that cash. Pension-related assets set aside in a replacement plan are being allocated to employees and are not counted as owner money. Owner earnings. Cash from operations, less working-capital swings and maintenance capital spending (the company pays no stock compensation), has been very lumpy. Per unit: about -$0.11 in 2016, +$6.39 in 2017, -$1.34, -$2.97, -$2.61 and -$4.07 in 2018 to 2021, +$9.51 in 2022, +$6.28 in 2023, -$3.10 in 2024 and -$2.95 in 2025. Six of ten years were losses averaging about -$2.84 per unit (about $5.2 million a year of carrying cost), and the three land-sale years more than made up for them. Because a typical year is a loss and the value arrives in a few big years, the middle year would misstate this business, so the level used is the full ten-year average of about +$0.50 per unit a year, which nets dry years against sale years over a period that includes a four-year drought (2018 to 2021). The 2025 figures tie to the cash flow statement; 2024 differs by about $0.3 million because wildfire insurance items could not be fully separated. Growth check: owner earnings went from -$3.10 in 2024 to -$2.95 in 2025; year one of the base case assumes the +$0.50 average. That is above the trailing year because a sale has already closed in 2026 (already counted in cash), and the case then assumes only the demonstrated average pace of sales, not a rebound. The first half of 2026, apart from the sale, was roughly cash-neutral as coffee inventory built in 2025 was sold, which supports rather than lifts that level. Base case, $25.43 per unit. Cash of $20.57 plus $4.86 for fifteen years of +$0.50 a year, and nothing after that. What is credited: a mechanism the company has actually repeated, parcel sales in 2016-2018, 2022-2023 and 2026, at no more than its demonstrated average. Fifteen years is used because that is as far as the record supports a steady cadence; the remaining land would last longer, but extending the same thin average another fifteen years adds only about $2 per unit. What is left out: the 61-lot KCF Mauka subdivision and the 940-unit Puukolii Village, because subdivision approval and State water-use permits are still pending, and any coffee recovery, because the coffee mill destroyed in the August 2023 Lahaina fire has not been rebuilt (bids were received in March 2026 and are still being assessed). The business owes nothing, so its worth and the value per unit are the same. Bear case, $9.00 per unit. A sale drought half again as long as the worst in the record: six straight years with no sales at the $2.84 per unit average loss, consuming $13.97 of the $20.57 in cash and leaving $6.60. Land sales then resume at the long-run average pace for the following nine years, worth $2.40, because the company would still own roughly 2,400 developable acres in West Maui and has sold parcels through every past slow period. This case does not size three disclosed exposures: the two reservoirs the State classifies as high hazard, which the filing says could require significant and costly improvements; the arbitration brought in August 2024 by Newport Hospital Corporation over a 14.9-acre infrastructure agreement (rescheduled for July 2026 unless settled; the company's $1.1 million receivable is already fully reserved, but the claim seeks unspecified damages); and legacy asbestos claims against a bankrupt former subsidiary. Each is a way a bad outcome could be worse than $9.00. It owes nothing, so worth and value per unit are both $9.00. Bull case, $34.68 per unit. The best five-year stretch in the record, 2019 to 2023, averaged +$1.23 per unit a year; crediting that for twenty years is worth $14.11, on top of $20.57 of cash. This is what happens if sales continue at the pace the company has already shown at its best. No surge from Puukolii Village or KCF Mauka is credited, since both depend on pending approvals. Nothing is owed, so worth and value per unit are both $34.68. What would make this wrong: a sale drought longer than six years; a large reservoir remediation or arbitration award; or cash spent on a mill rebuild and development work that does not lead to sales. The wide spread between cases reflects how uneven land sales are. Margin of safety price, $13.00. We are sure of the cash, which the filings show and which carries no debt against it, and much less sure of the earnings level, since three years in ten produced nearly all the value. The worst plausible outcome is several years without sales while about $5 million a year of costs continue, plus a dam or arbitration charge no case sizes. The structure survives that: there are no lenders, no maturities, and the land is scarce, hard Maui real estate whose most recent sale fetched about twice its book cost. If we are wrong about the pace of sales or the reservoirs, the units are worth something near the bear value. The price assumes a wait of up to about four years, the longest gap between sales in the record, for a sale to show up, and nothing is paid during that time. The margin-of-safety price of $13.00 is roughly the cash that would remain after three more years without any sale, with nothing assigned to the land; in our estimate, a single sale of the size the company has made three times in the past decade would lift value well above the 20% annual target, while the bear case implies a value below the margin-of-safety price.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$2.95 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(5,923)K; WC cash effect (inventory $(2,546)K + other assets $79K + AP/accrued/deposits $400K)=$(2,067)K outflow, removed; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$1,577K; revenue declined ($1,645K vs $1,951K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$1,577K; OE=-5,923+2,067-1,577=$(5,433)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(2.95). Reconciliation: net loss $(3,726)K + D&A 133 + credit loss 62 + inventory provision 778 + deferred tax (968) + retirement plan interest (135) = $(3,856)K = CFO less WC effect, before capex. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001079973-26-000354.
2024 -$3.10 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(2,779)K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(187)K + other operating assets $134K)=$(53)K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$2,997K; revenue declined ($1,951K vs $5,254K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$2,997K; OE=-2,779+53-2,997=$(5,723)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(3.10). Lahaina wildfire year (coffee mill destroyed; insurance proceeds partly outside operating cash flow). Source: FY2024 10-K accession 0000892626-25-000011.
2023 $6.28 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$8,153K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(5,859)K + other operating assets $598K)=$(5,261)K outflow, removed; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$1,823K; revenue declined ($5,254K vs $9,224K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$1,823K; OE=8,153+5,261-1,823=$11,591K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$6.28. Land sale year. Source: FY2023 10-K accession 0000892626-24-000006.
2022 $9.51 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,955K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(7,872)K + other operating assets $(6,727)K)=$(14,599)K outflow, removed; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$332K; revenue rose $4,471K so growth capex = 34.8% x 4,471K = $1,556K > capex, maintenance capex=$0; OE=2,955+14,599-0=$17,554K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$9.51. Land sale year. Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000892626-23-000012.
2021 -$4.07 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(988)K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $2,532K + other operating assets $3,982K)=$6,514K inflow, removed; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$436K; revenue rose $1,400K so growth capex = 34.8% x 1,400K = $487K > capex, maintenance capex=$0; OE=-988-6,514-0=$(7,502)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(4.07). The 2021 inflow reverses in 2022 (see FY2022). Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000892626-22-000017.
2020 -$2.61 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(5,418)K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(520)K + other operating assets $(763)K)=$(1,283)K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$680K; revenue declined ($3,353K vs $4,184K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$680K; OE=-5,418+1,283-680=$(4,815)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(2.61). Source: FY2020 10-K accession 0000892626-21-000007.
2019 -$2.97 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(4,837)K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(141)K + other operating assets $151K)=$10K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$641K; revenue declined ($4,184K vs $6,418K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$641K; OE=-4,837-10-641=$(5,488)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(2.97). Source: FY2019 10-K accession 0000892626-20-000013.
2018 -$1.34 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(1,568)K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(223)K + other operating assets $654K)=$431K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$474K; revenue declined ($6,418K vs $15,959K) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$474K; OE=-1,568-431-474=$(2,473)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(1.34). Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0000892626-19-000047.
2017 $6.39 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$9,841K; WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(182)K + other operating assets $(1,774)K)=$(1,956)K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$562K; revenue rose $7,566K so growth capex = mean capex/revenue 34.8% x 7,566K = $2,633K > capex, maintenance capex=$0; OE=9,841+1,956-0=$11,797K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$6.39. Land sale year. Source: FY2017 10-K accession 0000892626-18-000064.
2016 -$0.11 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(702)K (latest restated, FY2018 10-K); WC cash effect (AP/accrued $(956)K + other operating assets $33K)=$(923)K; SBC=$0 (LLC); capex=$423K; 2015 revenue not in series so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$423K; OE=-702+923-423=$(202)K; diluted units=1,845K; OE/unit=$(0.11). Source: FY2016 10-K accession 0000892626-17-000060 and restated CFO in 0000892626-19-000047.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Maui, Hawaii (land sales in West Maui including Lahaina and Kaanapali; Mauigrown coffee sold mainly in Hawaii, with some sales to the mainland United States West and international buyers)
Historical growth strategy
No operating growth strategy. The company monetizes a legacy Maui land bank of about 3,900 acres through occasional parcel sales to third parties, and spends its own cash on entitlements, infrastructure and subdivision planning (Kaanapali Coffee Farms, Puukolii Village, KCF Mauka) to make future sales possible. It carries no debt and pays no distributions.
Chart analysis
The units trade over the counter, and the price history is choppy, with long flat stretches broken by sharp jumps. A chartist would see a multi-year sideways base while the company reported operating losses, followed by a step up around the 2026 Lahaina Pioneer Mill Site sale. With a price history this choppy, support and resistance levels are unreliable and gaps are common; a chartist would want a sustained move on rising volume before calling a new trend.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.