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JAKKS PACIFIC INC (JAKK) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$24.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$17.90 $57.10
bear $17.90 base $41.37 bull $57.10 margin of safety $24.00 market price* $28.53
JAKKS Pacific designs and sells toys, dolls, role-play items, Halloween costumes (under the Disguise name) and outdoor products built almost entirely on characters it licenses from others: Disney (Frozen, Princess, Encanto), Nintendo's Super Mario, Sega's Sonic the Hedgehog, Universal's Wicked, Marvel and more. Manufacturing is outsourced, much of it to Hong Kong-based Meisheng, which is also a minority shareholder with board representation; JAKKS itself is a US company. Two customers, Target (26.6%) and Walmart (26.1%), took over half of 2025 sales, with no long-term contracts beyond purchase orders, and international sales were 27% of the total. Licenses carry minimum royalty guarantees of about $57 million in 2026 and $190 million in total. We value the cash the business produces after its real running costs: cash from operations, with working-capital timing swings removed, stock-based pay charged as the real cost it is, and the capital spending needed to stay in business deducted. Measured that way, JAKKS earned about $4.16 per share in 2021, $3.81 in 2022, $3.64 in 2023, $2.90 in 2024 and $1.06 in 2025, a typical year of about $3.64. We use 2021-2025 because the company before its 2019-2020 recapitalization (convertible notes and preferred stock, then a 1-for-10 reverse split) was a different, over-levered business. Interest is now negligible (about $0.4 million paid in 2025), so cash before lenders is essentially the same figure. Stock-based pay has climbed from $2 million in 2021 to $11 million in 2025 and was still higher in the first half of 2026; we assume it stays. 2025 owner cash fell 63% as US retailers cut orders in response to tariffs on China-sourced goods. The first half of 2026 is better but not yet healed: sales rose about 6% (second quarter up 17%), operating cash flow was $26 million against a $16 million outflow a year earlier, but the company still had a small operating loss for the half. Our base case therefore credits only a partial recovery: about $20 million of owner cash in 2026 (above 2025's $12 million, justified by the first-half cash turnaround), $28 million in 2027 and about $34-36 million from 2028 onward, roughly $3.00 per share, below the 2021-2025 typical year because of higher stock pay and the loss of Amazon as a 10%-plus customer. We credit no growth beyond that: new licenses, new markets and international expansion are not in hand. Because every license expires and must be won again, we let the earning power fade slowly (about 3% a year) after the tenth year rather than continue forever; JAKKS has replaced lost licenses for three decades, which is why we do not cut it off. The base case business is worth about $457 million; the company has no borrowings on its $70 million BMO revolving facility (maturing June 2030) and about $35 million of cash beyond seasonal needs, for roughly $41 per share. The bear case repeats what actually happened to JAKKS in 2017-2019: sales fell about 24% from 2015 to 2018 as licenses lapsed and Toys R Us collapsed, and owner cash was negative for three straight years. We assume the partial recovery stalls near $12-22 million, then a two-year downturn of that kind (a major license or a big customer lost) produces cash losses of about $12 million and $6 million before a slow return to about $22 million a year, with a faster fade afterward. Without debt the company can fund those losses from cash and its unused revolver. Business value about $178 million, no debt, about $18 per share. The bull case assumes current licenses such as Sonic, Mario and Wicked keep selling and costs settle, bringing owner cash back to about $46 million a year, near the 2022 level in dollars but not beyond, with a slower fade: about $645 million, or $57 per share. Our earlier estimate of this business was built on a different basis and is not directly comparable; the main business change since is that 2025 came in well below the typical year and the first-half 2026 recovery, while real, has not yet restored operating profit. We are only moderately confident in the earnings level: three of the last five years sit near $3.64 per share, but the trend has been down every year since 2021 and the company depends on licensors and two retailers it cannot control. The worst plausible event is the loss of a major Disney or Nintendo license together with a cutback at Target or Walmart; with no debt the company would survive it, as it survived 2017-2019, but owners would earn little for several years. If we are wrong about the recovery and the 2025 level of about $1 per share becomes the norm, the shares are worth roughly the bear figure; if stock pay keeps rising, the base drifts toward the mid-$30s. The company pays $1.00 a year in dividends, about 4% at the margin-of-safety price, which pays modestly while waiting. Weighing these, the margin-of-safety price is about $24: from that price a return to even the base case path over three to four years implies the target return, and the bear case, built on the company's own worst history, implies a modest loss rather than a permanent one.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $1.06 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$8.492M, down sharply from $38.947M in 2024; FY2025 10-K attributes the net-sales decline (Costumes -10.2%, Toys/Consumer Products segments also down) primarily to US customers cutting order levels in reaction to 2025 tariffs on China-sourced goods, partly offset by higher international sales. ΔWC = AR $(7.026)M + Inventory $(7.025)M + Prepaid/other $(0.951)M + AP $8.183M + AP-Meisheng $(12.706)M + Accrued $(6.026)M + Sales-returns reserve $(2.248)M + Income tax payable $(1.591)M + Other liab $5.216M = $(24.174)M (working capital consumed cash). SBC=$10.913M (continuing a multi-year rise from $2.093M in 2021, a real and growing dilution cost). Capex=$9.563M; revenue declined YoY so maintenance capex=full capex=$9.563M. OE=8.492-(-24.174)-10.913-9.563=$12.190M. Diluted shares=11,491K. OE/sh=$1.06. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001185185-26-000723.
2024 $2.90 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$38.947M. ΔWC = AR $(9.229)M + Inventory $(0.133)M + Prepaid/other $(6.086)M + AP $0.508M + AP-Meisheng $1.117M + Accrued $2.867M + Sales-returns reserve $(2.714)M + Income tax payable $(2.375)M + Other liab $1.633M = $(14.412)M. SBC=$9.535M. Capex=$11.246M; revenue declined YoY so maintenance capex=full capex=$11.246M. OE=38.947-(-14.412)-9.535-11.246=$32.578M. Diluted shares=11,226K. OE/sh=$2.90. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001185185-25-000170.
2023 $3.64 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$66.404M. ΔWC = AR $(21.752)M + Inventory $27.972M + Prepaid/other $(0.012)M + AP $9.595M + AP-Meisheng $1.918M + Accrued $7.104M + Sales-returns reserve $(13.346)M + Income tax payable $(4.064)M + Other liab $3.504M = $10.919M. SBC=$8.027M (up sharply from $5.082M in 2022). Capex=$8.906M; revenue declined YoY so maintenance capex=full capex=$8.906M. OE=66.404-10.919-8.027-8.906=$38.552M. Diluted shares=10,590K. OE/sh=$3.64. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001185185-24-000243.
2022 $3.81 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$86.099M (peak revenue year). ΔWC = AR $44.390M + Inventory $3.335M + Prepaid/other $4.753M + AP $(18.056)M + AP-Meisheng $(5.411)M + Accrued $(9.073)M + Sales-returns reserve $5.592M + Income tax payable $9.875M + Other liab $(0.870)M = $34.535M. SBC=$5.082M. Capex=$10.389M; revenue grew YoY (+$175.071M) so growth capex=1.463%×175.071M=$2.562M, maintenance capex=$7.827M. OE=86.099-34.535-5.082-7.827=$38.655M. Diluted shares=10,155K. OE/sh=$3.81 (NI restated from $91.413M originally filed to $91.083M in later filings; restated figure used per methodology, no effect on CFO-based OE calc). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001185185-23-000342.
2021 $4.16 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(5.879)M (net loss year; includes non-cash $16.419M change in FV of convertible notes and $13.220M change in FV of preferred stock derivative liability, both added back). ΔWC = AR $(43.743)M + Inventory $(45.312)M + Prepaid/other $7.330M + AP $25.017M + Accrued $7.767M + Sales-returns reserve $4.177M + Income tax payable $(0.212)M + Other liab $(0.849)M = $(45.825)M (large WC build funding post-COVID demand recovery/inventory rebuild). SBC=$2.093M. Capex=$8.221M; revenue grew YoY (+$105.244M) so growth capex=1.463%×105.244M=$1.540M, maintenance capex=$6.681M. OE=-5.879-(-45.825)-2.093-6.681=$31.172M. Diluted shares=7,498K. OE/sh=$4.16. First year of the valuation anchor window (post-recapitalization business). Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001185185-22-000288.
2020 $1.08 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$43.567M (includes non-cash $6.206M PPP loan forgiveness gain and $2.800M debt-discount amortization, both non-cash addbacks). ΔWC = AR $14.069M + Inventory $15.617M + Prepaid/other $20.004M + AP $(20.761)M + Accrued $(0.211)M + Sales-returns reserve $3.743M + Income tax payable $(2.626)M + Other liab $(0.749)M = $29.086M (large WC release amid COVID-driven demand disruption). SBC=$2.303M. Capex=$8.268M; revenue declined YoY so maintenance capex=full capex=$8.268M. OE=43.567-29.086-2.303-8.268=$3.910M. Diluted shares=3,634K (as filed, post 1-for-10 reverse split effective May 2020). OE/sh=$1.08. First full year post-recapitalization; treated as transitional (still includes one-off PPP forgiveness) and not included in the valuation anchor window. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001185185-21-000348.
2019 -$5.33 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$21.826M (boosted by $13.205M non-cash loss on debt extinguishment and $5.112M non-cash change in fair value of convertible notes tied to the 2019 balance-sheet recapitalization, both added back correctly as non-cash). ΔWC = AR $3.472M + Inventory $(0.379)M + Prepaid/other $(6.190)M + AP $4.873M + Accrued $9.601M + Sales-returns reserve $8.962M + Income tax payable $2.599M + Other liab $0.894M = $23.832M. SBC=$2.868M. Capex=$9.415M; revenue grew YoY (+$30.839M) so growth capex=1.463%(anchor-window capex/revenue ratio)×30.839M=$0.451M, maintenance capex=$8.964M. OE=21.826-23.832-2.868-8.964=$(13.838)M. Diluted shares=2,598.0K (25,980K shares used in loss-per-share as reported, ÷10 for reverse split). OE/sh=$(5.33). Final pre-turnaround/recapitalization year (converts and preferred instruments later retired 2020-2024); excluded from valuation anchor. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001628280-20-007624.
2018 -$12.17 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(0.624)M. ΔWC = AR $10.593M + Inventory $4.552M + Prepaid/other $(11.000)M + AP $9.517M + Accrued $(12.231)M + Sales-returns reserve $11.781M + Income tax payable $0.197M + Other liab $(0.128)M = $13.281M. SBC=$2.434M. Capex=$11.770M; revenue declined YoY so maintenance capex=full capex=$11.770M. OE=-0.624-13.281-2.434-11.770=$(28.109)M. Diluted shares=2,310.4K (23,104K as reported, ÷10 for reverse split). OE/sh=$(12.17). Pre-turnaround year; excluded from valuation anchor. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001628280-19-003040.
2017 -$20.16 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$11.394M. ΔWC = AR $19.339M + Inventory $17.003M + Prepaid/other $(2.825)M + AP $(0.380)M + Accrued $3.500M + Sales-returns reserve $1.198M + Income tax payable $(0.987)M + Other liab $(0.467)M = $36.381M (large WC release as revenue and inventory contracted). SBC=$3.112M. Capex=$14.928M; revenue declined YoY ($613.1M vs $706.6M) so maintenance capex=full capex=$14.928M. OE=11.394-36.381-3.112-14.928=$(43.027)M. Diluted shares=2,134.1K (21,341K as reported, reverse-split-adjusted ÷10). OE/sh=$(20.16). 2017 included an $8.288M goodwill impairment and $5.248M intangible impairment (non-cash, added back in CFO) amid a period of declining revenue and high leverage; excluded from the valuation anchor as pre-turnaround. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001157523-18-000578.
2016 $6.98 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, all from filed cash-flow statement. CFO=$16.723M. ΔWC (source of cash) = AR $(10.212)M + Inventory $(14.891)M + Prepaid/other $38.031M + AP $10.558M + Accrued exp $(12.767)M + Sales-returns reserve $(0.843)M + Income tax payable $(21.018)M + Other liab $(0.151)M = $(11.293)M. SBC=$1.621M. Capex=$14.765M; revenue declined YoY ($706.6M vs $745.7M in 2015) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full capex=$14.765M. OE=16.723-(-11.293)-1.621-14.765=$11.630M. Diluted shares=1,666.5K (16,665K as originally reported, restated for the May-2020 1-for-10 reverse stock split so all years are comparable). OE/sh=$6.98. Note: FY2016-2019 predate JAKKS's 2019-2020 balance-sheet recapitalization (convertible-note/preferred-stock restructuring) and are treated as a different capital structure than today's business; excluded from the valuation anchor. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001157523-17-000818.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (all regions, mainly through Target and Walmart nationwide; about 73% of 2025 sales), with the remainder in Europe, Australia, Canada, Latin America and Asia.
Historical growth strategy
Licensing popular entertainment characters (Disney, Nintendo, Sega, Universal, Marvel and others) for toys, dolls, role-play, costumes and outdoor products, rotating new film and game franchises in as older ones fade, sold mostly through a few mass retailers; supplemented over the years by acquisitions of toy and costume businesses (notably Disguise) and a push to grow international sales.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a long boom-and-bust history: a multi-year slide through 2016-2019 that ended near penny-stock levels before a 1-for-10 reverse split, followed by a powerful multi-bagger rally from 2021 into 2023-2024 as the company returned to profitability. Since then the stock has rolled over with the 2025 tariff-driven sales drop, forming a series of lower highs; a chartist would watch whether the 2025 lows hold as support and treat a reclaim of the prior breakdown level as the signal that the downtrend from the highs is over.
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