Investview, Inc. (INVU) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Investview sells memberships to financial-education content, trading tools and budgeting software through Conectiv (formerly iGenius), a direct-selling network of independent distributors. It also sells health, beauty and wellness products, and since January 2026 a proprietary coffee. Its bitcoin mining unit, SAFETek, was shut down on 8 July 2026. The company still holds about 67.6 bitcoin. What changed since our last look. The decline has deepened. Membership revenue was $2.1 million in the second quarter of 2026, against $7.8 million a year earlier. Total revenue from continuing operations was $5.8 million in the first half, against $18.4 million. In 2025 membership revenue had already fallen 38%, which management put down to weaker discretionary spending across direct selling. Continuing operations lost $4.3 million at the operating line in the first half and used $4.1 million of operating cash. Cash fell from $10.0 million at year-end to $2.0 million at 30 June. Against that, in August 2026 the company disposed of its units in Dream SPV, a vehicle holding a stake in an early-stage nuclear-power developer, for about $8.3 million. That was a gain of roughly $7 million, and it is the main reason management says it can fund operations for the next twelve months. Our previous figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable. How we measured earnings. We start from operating cash flow and remove working-capital swings, stock-based pay and the capital spending needed to stand still. Two adjustments matter here. First, the company pays some expenses in bitcoin and receives some revenue in bitcoin, and the cash-flow statement strips both out as non-cash. We put them back, because coins paid out are a real cost and coins earned are real revenue. This also explains a large restatement: 2024 operating cash flow was first reported as $8.3 million and later as $14.0 million, and on our basis 2024 owner earnings were about $6.4 million under either presentation. Second, we add back interest to value the business before its lenders, then subtract what it owes. On that basis the business made about $7.5 million in 2023 and $6.4 million in 2024, then lost $7.1 million in 2025 (about $6.2 million before interest). The first half of 2026 ran at roughly $7 million a year of losses before interest. We do not anchor on 2023 or 2024. Those years came from a membership business about four times today's size and a mining unit that no longer exists. The business as it now stands has not yet produced a year of positive owner earnings. Last year's actual change was a swing from +$6.4 million to -$7.1 million. Our base case starts year one at an $8 million loss before interest, no better than the current run rate. What it owes and what it owns, on a per-share basis of about 2.41 billion shares (1.84 billion common plus 564 million subsidiary units redeemable one-for-one into common). The claims ahead of the common are: - $3.3 million face of convertible notes owed to DBR Capital, an affiliate of the chairman. They carry 20% to 38.5% interest and are due April 2030, with conversion at $0.007 a share. We count them as debt. - About $2.2 million for the cost of that debt above a normal rate over its remaining life. - A $1.2 million related-party working-capital note that is overdue. - A $0.5 million SBA loan. - $6.3 million of liquidation preference on the 13% Series B preferred, which costs about $0.8 million a year in dividends. - $3.2 million for the cost of the preferred above a normal rate. - About $4.0 million accrued for a fine of PLN 14.7 million imposed in December 2025 by Poland's consumer-protection authority. The authority found the Polish direct-selling model to be an unlawful pyramid-style scheme and ordered it to stop. The company has appealed. - A $0.24 million dividend payable. Against these sit about $16.3 million of assets outside the operating business: $2.0 million of cash, the $8.3 million Dream SPV proceeds, $2.0 million of further SPV investment carried at cost, and about $4.0 million of bitcoin and stablecoins. Net, the claims exceed these assets by about $4.6 million before the operating business is valued at all. Bear case. Membership attrition continues at the pace of the last four quarters. The wellness and coffee lines do not cover overhead, and losses before interest run at $9 million, $7 million and $4 million over three years before the business is wound down. Bitcoin is held through a drawdown like 2022's, when the price fell about 75%, which costs about $1.5 million of value. The $2.0 million of SPV units still carried at cost prove worth nothing. The Polish appeal fails and the fine is paid in full. The business's losses are worth about -$18.6 million and the claims net of assets about -$8.2 million, so the company owes roughly $27 million more than it is worth: about -$0.011 a share. Base case. Cost cuts and the end of mining narrow the loss from roughly $8 million in the first year to $5 million in the second. After that the business either reaches break-even or is closed, and no value is credited beyond year two because nothing yet evidences a profitable steady state. The business is worth about -$12.4 million and the net claims are -$4.6 million, so the company owes about $17 million more than it is worth: about -$0.007 a share. Funding this path would consume nearly all of the cash, SPV proceeds and bitcoin. Bull case. Conectiv's distributor base stabilises at today's size, and the cost base already cut in 2026 brings the business to break-even in year two. It then earns about $1 million a year before interest, which is a fraction of what it earned in 2023 and 2024 on far higher revenue. The remaining SPV units are realised at a gain like August's. The business is worth about zero and net assets about +$6.7 million, so equity is about $6.6 million: about $0.003 a share. We credit no growth in any case. Rebuilding the distributor network would be a turnaround, not a demonstrated, repeatable process. What could make this wrong. The DBR notes could be converted into 471 million new shares rather than repaid, which would remove the debt but dilute the common by about a fifth. Either way the per-share result stays close to zero. The Polish appeal could succeed and remove a $4 million claim. Additional DBR advances of up to $5.7 million, convertible at low prices, would dilute holders further. Margin-of-safety price. We are not confident of any earnings level. The current business has never shown positive owner earnings at today's size, and revenue is still falling. The worst plausible outcome is that membership revenue keeps shrinking until the cash, the SPV proceeds and the bitcoin are spent, leaving preferred holders, the controlling lender and a foreign regulator ahead of the common with little or nothing left. The structure makes this worse: the chairman's affiliate holds high-cost convertible debt and board-appointment rights, and there is a $6.3 million preferred with a 13% coupon. If we are wrong about the attrition and the fine together, the shares are worth perhaps $0.003. The business pays common holders nothing during any holding period. Price alone does not justify the shares; the margin-of-safety price applies only once continuing operations generate cash on their own. Even then, a modest stream of a few hundred thousand dollars a year, behind about $11 million of senior claims, supports only a very small value per share across 2.4 billion shares. The margin-of-safety price is $0.001, which allows a margin against further dilution and a fair chance at a 20% annual return if the turnaround holds.