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INNSUITES HOSPITALITY TRUST (IHT) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.10 ComplexityAverage Updated
-$0.44 $0.19
bear -$0.44 base -$0.14 bull $0.19 margin of safety $0.10 market price* $1.19
Business condition attached to the margin of safety A completed sale of the Tucson Oracle hotel (closing reported in an SEC filing, not merely a listing or signed contract) at a gross price of at least $14 million, together with either a declared distribution of the sale proceeds to shareholders or an adopted plan of liquidation for the Trust.
InnSuites Hospitality Trust owns partial stakes in two older all-suite hotels affiliated with Best Western: the Tucson Oracle hotel in Tucson, Arizona and a hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Trust manages both and earns a fee of 5% of room revenue plus an accounting fee. It does not own either hotel outright. It owns 79% of RRF Limited Partnership, which owns 51.7% of the Tucson hotel, so the Trust's look-through share of Tucson is about 41%. It owns 21.9% of the Albuquerque hotel. Outside partners own the rest, and the Trust has funded itself in part by selling more of these hotel interests (about $0.9 million in fiscal 2025). WHAT THE BUSINESS EARNS. Revenue has been flat at about $7.5-7.6 million for three years. In fiscal 2026 (year ended January 31, 2026) occupancy was 77% and the average daily rate fell 4.1% to $95.57. We measure the cash the owners could take out each year after keeping the hotels in repair. That figure was negative in 8 of the last 10 years: minus $1.11 million (minus $0.13 per share) in fiscal 2026 and minus $1.15 million in fiscal 2025. We removed one-time COVID money from every year: about $2.7 million of employee retention credits and a $967,000 forgiven PPP loan. Those credits made fiscal 2023 and 2024 look profitable when the underlying business was not. Before interest, the median over fiscal 2023-2026 (the business as it stands today) is about minus $540,000 a year. The hotels themselves roughly break even after their own mortgage interest and depreciation, which we can tell because the outside partners' share of hotel profit is close to zero. The losses therefore come from the Trust's corporate overhead. General and administrative cost was $2.18 million, 29% of revenue, and runs about $1.3 million a year above the fees the Trust earns. Recent quarters improved slightly: the first-half fiscal 2027 loss narrowed by about $140,000 from a year earlier, but revenue rose only 0.6%. We credit no growth in any case because nothing is contracted or demonstrated. DEBT AND RECENT EVENTS. The Tucson mortgage of $7.70 million is cheap, fixed at 4.69% to June 2042. The Albuquerque mortgage of $1.11 million reset to 7.57% in December 2025. Its loan covenant was not met at year-end, so it is now classed as due within a year, and the Trust guarantees it. In June 2026 the NYSE American exchange said the Trust's equity was below its $2 million minimum. On August 19, 2026 a $3.0 million credit line owed to Rare Earth Financial, an affiliate of chief executive James Wirth, was converted into 1,829,268 new shares at $1.64. That lifted equity to about $2.08 million, and the exchange accepted the compliance plan, which runs to December 24, 2027. Continued losses would push equity back below the minimum, and management is openly pursuing a reverse merger with a private company that wants the listing. A reverse merger would heavily dilute today's holders. After the conversion there are about 11.2 million shares, and Trust-level borrowings fall to roughly $0.47 million of other notes. OTHER ASSETS. (1) A $1.23 million employee retention credit receivable that has been outstanding since 2023, part of which belongs to the hotel partnerships. (2) A $1.925 million note from the 2018 sale of IBC Hotels, at 3.25% and due 2030; no interest income was recorded on it in fiscal 2026. (3) A $1.0 million convertible note and $0.44 million of stock in UniGen Power, an early-stage clean-energy company that was written down by $223,000 in fiscal 2026. We give UniGen no value in any case because nothing in the filings shows it can pay. HOW WE VALUE IT. The operation loses money, so the value lies in what the hotels would sell for, minus the overhead spent before a sale and minus what the Trust owes. Our evidence for hotel value is that a bank lent $8.4 million against the Tucson hotel in March 2022. Hotel lenders typically lend 60-75% of value, which implies about $11-14 million. The hotel-level cash flow of about $0.75 million a year before mortgage interest supports the same range. Management advertises asking prices of $18.5 million for Tucson and $9.5 million for Albuquerque. It says these are not appraisals, and both hotels have been available for about seven years without a sale, so we do not use them. Per-share figures are the Trust's look-through share, discounted at 6%. BASE CASE (about -$0.14 per share). Overhead of about $1.3 million a year continues for three years, until funding runs short and the Tucson hotel is sold for $11.2 million and Albuquerque for $1.5 million. Half of the tax credit and half of the IBC note are collected. The Trust's share of hotel equity after mortgages is worth about $1.35 million today, and the receivables about $1.03 million. Less $3.47 million of overhead, that is about -$1.10 million. The Trust owes about $0.47 million more, for a total of about -$1.56 million. On these facts the Trust owes about $1.6 million more than its stake is worth. BEAR CASE (about -$0.44 per share). Overhead runs at the fiscal 2025 level of $1.4 million for four years. Tucson then sells for only $8.4 million, the amount of its 2022 loan, as room rates keep slipping. The Albuquerque lender enforces the covenant and that equity is gone, and the receivables and UniGen are not collected. Worth: $0.39 million of hotel equity less $4.85 million of overhead, about -$4.46 million. Owes $0.47 million, for about -$4.93 million. In this case the company owes roughly $4.9 million more than it is worth. BULL CASE (about $0.19 per share). Cost cuts continue, so overhead is $1.1 million a year. The Board's stated plan to sell both hotels within 36 months goes through, supported by its record of selling four hotels between 2015 and 2019 through the same broker. Tucson sells for $14.0 million and Albuquerque for $2.5 million, and the tax credit and IBC note are collected in full. Worth: about $2.51 million of hotel equity plus $2.06 million of receivables less $2.02 million of overhead, about $2.56 million. Owes $0.47 million, for about $2.09 million. MARGIN-OF-SAFETY PRICE. On today's facts no price is supported by a 20% annual return, because the base case is below zero. The $0.10 margin-of-safety price applies only after a Tucson sale actually closes for at least $14 million and the proceeds are committed to shareholders. At that point the Trust's share would be worth roughly $0.18-0.24 per share, depending on whether the receivables are collected, and a price of $0.10 leaves room for overhead that lingers during a wind-down. WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE OUR PREVIOUS ANALYSIS (August 2026, $0.05 / $0.40 / $1.60). The new figures are lower for four reasons. (1) We now count the outside partners' 48% of Tucson and 78% of Albuquerque, which the earlier view treated as the Trust's. (2) We no longer apply an earnings multiple to an operation that loses money. (3) We removed the COVID-credit years that flattered earnings. (4) The Albuquerque covenant breach and rate reset are new. Two things push the other way: the $3 million debt conversion removed most of the Trust's own debt, and we credit the hotels at well above their $6.7 million book value. WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG. Upside: a closed sale near the asking prices with the proceeds paid out, or a sharp, lasting cut in corporate overhead. Downside: more sales of hotel interests, more share issuance, or a dilutive reverse merger. Three things could not be fully reconciled from the filings. The related-party loans are described as bearing 7%, but only $25,000 of interest on other notes was recorded. The filings do not show where the tax credit receivable sits between the Trust and the hotels. Hotel-level and Trust-level profit are not reported separately, so our split is inferred from the outside partners' share of profit.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2026 -$0.13 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex (consolidated, incl. non-controlling interests). FY ended 1/31/2026. CFO=$(10,949); ΔWC cash effect=+$361,118 (AR +98,019, prepaid +61,855, op lease (4,614), AP/accrued +205,858) removed; SBC=$21,600; capex (improvements and additions to hotel properties)=$718,599, revenue declined ($7,593,516→$7,567,275) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$718,599; OE=$(1,112,266); diluted shares=8,763,485; OE/sh=$(0.1269). Reconciliation: NI $(1,390,548) + depreciation $773,964 + UniGen impairment $222,917 − maint capex $718,599 = $(1,112,266), exact match. Capex ratio 6.3% = mean capex/revenue FY2019–FY2026 (two-hotel era). Source: FY2026 10-K, accession 0001493152-26-024361.
2025 -$0.13 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex (consolidated). FY ended 1/31/2025. CFO=$(1,058,795); ΔWC cash effect=$(372,846) (AR (82,997), prepaid +111,658, op lease (4,601), AP/accrued (396,906)) removed; SBC=$0; capex=$466,105; capex ratio 6.3% (mean capex/revenue FY2019–FY2026) × revenue growth $109,118 = growth capex $6,874, maintenance capex=$459,231; OE=$(1,145,180); diluted shares=8,790,992; OE/sh=$(0.1303). Reconciliation: NI $(1,391,632) + depreciation $705,683 − maint capex $459,231 = $(1,145,180), exact. Source: FY2026 10-K, accession 0001493152-26-024361 (comparative column).
2024 -$0.10 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex, excluding one-time COVID Employee Retention Credit (ERC). FY ended 1/31/2024. CFO=$1,431,821 includes ERC cash effects of $1,923,592 (ERC income $1,403,164 in net income plus $520,428 ERC receivable collection) which are removed as non-recurring; ΔWC=$(68,087) (AR (10,209), prepaid (110,462), op lease (4,590), finance lease (2,065), AP +59,239) removed; SBC=$23,147; capex=$520,861, growth capex=6.3%×$338,711=$21,339, maintenance capex=$499,522; OE=$(946,353); diluted shares=9,161,286; OE/sh=$(0.1033). Reconciliation: NI ex-ERC $(1,125,988) + depreciation $679,157 − maint capex $499,522 = $(946,353), exact. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001641172-25-007998, and FY2024 10-K, accession 0001493152-24-013409.
2023 -$0.03 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2023. CFO=$54,219 (already excludes $1,403,164 non-cash ERC income); ΔWC=$(53,730) (AR +26,533, prepaid (82,561), op lease (85,131), finance lease (1,493), AP +88,922) removed; SBC=$52,693; capex=$332,561; revenue $7,145,687 vs pre-COVID peak $6,568,171 (FY2020) so growth capex=6.3%×$577,516=$36,384 (rebound to prior level not treated as growth), maintenance capex=$296,177; OE=$(240,921); diluted shares=9,159,107; OE/sh=$(0.0263). Reconciliation: NI $737,051 − ERC $1,403,164 + note correction $18,983 + depreciation $702,386 − maint capex $296,177 = $(240,921), exact. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001493152-24-013409.
2022 $0.09 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2022. CFO=$263,457 (already excludes non-cash PPP forgiveness $967,141 and ERC $350,791); ΔWC=$(870,836) (AR (67,713), income tax receivable +68,661, prepaid +51,024, op lease +28,171, finance lease (109), AP (950,870)) removed; SBC=$187,110; capex=$116,207; revenue rise $4.20M→$6.41M was COVID recovery below the FY2020 level so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$116,207; OE=$830,976; shares=9,108,672 (basic=diluted); OE/sh=$0.0912. Reconciliation: NI $1,539,735 − PPP $967,141 − ERC $350,791 + depreciation $725,380 − maint capex $116,207 = $830,976, exact. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001493152-22-015364.
2021 -$0.22 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2021 (COVID year). CFO=$(807,398); ΔWC=+$1,160,726 (AR +524,669, income tax receivable +225,741, prepaid (91,086), op lease +3,817, finance lease +28,954, AP +468,631) removed; SBC=$28,800; capex=$37,443, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$37,443; OE=$(2,034,367); shares=9,158,361 (basic & diluted); OE/sh=$(0.2221). Reconciliation: NI $(2,827,840) + depreciation $830,916 − maint capex $37,443 = $(2,034,367), exact. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001493152-22-015364, and FY2021 10-K, accession 0001493152-21-011629.
2020 -$0.06 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2020 (first full year as a two-hotel business). CFO=$(952,767); ΔWC=$(733,387) (AR (348,284), income tax receivable (294,402), prepaid +17,747, AP (108,448)) removed; SBC=$32,400; capex=$324,445, growth capex=6.3%×$399,206=$25,150, maintenance capex=$299,295; OE=$(551,075); shares=9,324,530 (basic & diluted); OE/sh=$(0.0591). Reconciliation: NI $(1,978,444) + note impairment $825,000 + depreciation $901,664 − maint capex $299,295 = $(551,075), exact. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001493152-20-015642; shares from FY2021 10-K, accession 0001493152-21-011629.
2019 -$0.17 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2019 (year of hotel and IBC sales; includes operations later sold). CFO=$(1,799,421) (excludes $13,573,418 gain on disposals); ΔWC=$(608,867) (AR +133,382, prepaid +43,278, accrued interest income (36,008), AP (749,519)) removed; SBC=$32,400; capex=$936,784, growth capex=6.3%×$602,762=$37,974, maintenance capex=$898,810; OE=$(2,121,764); diluted shares=12,436,556; OE/sh=$(0.1706). Reconciliation: NI $11,105,883 − gain $13,573,418 + depreciation $1,244,581 − maint capex $898,810 = $(2,121,764), exact. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001493152-19-009454.
2018 -$0.38 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2018 (four-hotel business being sold down; not comparable to today). CFO=$(1,551,058); ΔWC=+$547,262 (AR +399,966, prepaid +13,376, AP +133,920) removed; SBC=$86,683; capex=$2,778,817, revenue declined so maintenance capex=$2,778,817; OE=$(4,963,820); diluted shares=13,085,223; OE/sh=$(0.3793). Non-cash items (goodwill impairment $500,000, intangible amortization $433,000, financing-fee amortization) are captured via CFO. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001493152-19-009454 (comparative column).
2017 -$0.19 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. FY ended 1/31/2017 (four-hotel business; not comparable to today). CFO=$(870,966); ΔWC=$(552,520) (AR (475,702), prepaid (50,329), AP (26,489)) removed; SBC=$97,265; capex=$2,254,499, growth capex=6.3%×$1,598,866 revenue increase=$100,729, maintenance capex=$2,153,770; OE=$(2,569,481); diluted shares=13,366,737; OE/sh=$(0.1922). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001493152-17-004575, and FY2018 10-K, accession 0001493152-18-007218.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States: West - Arizona (Tucson) and New Mexico (Albuquerque)
Historical growth strategy
Built a small portfolio of mid-market all-suite hotels in the Southwest under the InnSuites name with Best Western affiliation, then shifted to shrinking: four hotels sold between 2015 and 2019, minority ownership units in the remaining two hotels sold to outside investors to fund the Trust, small diversification bets (IBC Hotels services business, later sold; UniGen Power clean-energy investment), and now pursuit of a reverse merger with a private company seeking a listing.
Chart analysis
IHT is a thinly traded micro-cap, so its chart is prone to sharp spikes and slow fades. Over the past year it has ranged between roughly $0.95 and $2.11 and sat near $1.42 in mid-September 2026, in the lower-middle of that range and below the $1.64 level where insider debt was converted into shares in August 2026, a level a chartist would treat as nearby overhead resistance. The roughly $1.00 area that held over the past year is the obvious support. With a very low beta and sparse trading, trend signals here are weak and easily overturned.
Competitors

Companies we consider competitors of IHT. Tap a ticker to open our analysis of that company in a new tab.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.