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GoodRx Holdings, Inc. (GDRX) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.45 ComplexityAverage Updated
-$0.06 $1.78
bear -$0.06 base $0.89 bull $1.78 margin of safety $0.45 market price* $3.36
GoodRx runs a U.S. consumer platform that shows cash-paying patients lower prices on prescription drugs. It earns money in three ways: fees from pharmacy benefit managers when a consumer uses a GoodRx discount code at a pharmacy (prescription transactions, still the large majority of revenue), a paid subscription (GoodRx Gold, 674 thousand plans at the end of 2025), and a pharma-direct business in which drug makers pay GoodRx to lower the counter price of their own branded drugs. What drives it. Revenue has been flat for four years: $766.6M in 2022, $750.3M in 2023, $792.3M in 2024 and $796.9M in 2025. Inside that flat total, the discount-code business is shrinking. It fell $33.5M (6%) in 2025 as monthly active consumers dropped 14%, which the company attributes to retail pharmacy store closures and a material volume cut in one integrated savings program run by a pharmacy benefit manager. Pharma direct grew $44.1M (41%). The first half of 2026 shows the pressure continuing: revenue of $394.4M against $406.0M a year earlier and net income of $9.7M against $23.9M. Management has also said that more spending on pharma direct and subscriptions will hurt prescription-transaction economics and revenue in 2026. How we measure earnings. We start from operating cash flow and remove working-capital timing swings. We then subtract stock compensation, because it is a real cost to owners. We also subtract the spending needed to keep the platform running. For GoodRx that spending is mostly capitalized software development ($70.5M in 2025, $69.1M in 2024), not equipment. Measured this way, and before interest so that the debt can be valued separately, the business produced about $45.5M in 2023, $65.0M in 2024 and $108.5M in 2025. Most of the improvement came from stock compensation falling ($104.8M in 2023 to $76.6M in 2025) as the grants made around the 2020 IPO roll off, not from the business growing. Amortization of acquired intangibles is added back, but the earnings path below does not grow, so that cost is not treated as free value. We set the normal level at about $78M a year. That is below 2025's $108.5M because 2025 had the lowest stock-compensation cost and the 2026 results are clearly weaker. It is above the 2023-2024 years because those still carried the heavier IPO-era stock compensation. In 2025 this measure rose 67%. The base case does not assume that repeats: year 1 starts lower, at $78M. Debt. GoodRx owes about $492.5M on a term loan that pays a floating rate 3.75 points over SOFR and matures on July 10, 2029, with $1.25M of principal due each quarter. Cash was $296.1M at June 30, 2026. We treat about $150M of that as working cash, because the pharma-direct and reimbursement programs require GoodRx to pay pharmacies before manufacturers reimburse it. We also include a $25M accrued class-action settlement, plus about $27M for the loan costing roughly 8% instead of a long-bond rate until 2029. That gives net obligations of about $398M. Base case. Cash flow holds at about $78M a year for three years while pharma-direct growth offsets the shrinking code business. It then edges down about 1% a year to year 10 as the code business keeps losing pharmacy volume. Pharma direct is only about three years old, so we have not credited it with continued 40% growth. Its growth depends on signing more manufacturers, which is not yet secured. After year 10 the cash flow fades to zero over the following decade, because no contract or patent locks in GoodRx's role between consumers, pharmacies and benefit managers. The business is worth about $709M, less about $398M owed, or about $311M: roughly $0.89 per share. Bear case. The pharmacy-industry pressures already disclosed continue: more store closures, renegotiation of pharmacy reimbursement, and further cuts by benefit managers to the integrated savings programs they control. Cash flow starts at $66M and falls 10% a year for four years to about $43M, then holds before fading to zero after year 10. At that level cash flow barely covers interest. The 2029 refinancing is assumed to cost about 2 points more, adding about $34M to what is owed. The business would be worth about $410M against about $432M owed: shareholders would be left with nothing, and the company would owe roughly $22M more than it is worth (about -$0.06 per share). Bull case. Pharma direct keeps compounding and the code business stabilizes after the current wave of store closures. Cash flow climbs from $88M to $114M by year 5, holds to year 10, then fades over the following decade. The business is worth about $1,017M less $398M owed, or about $619M: roughly $1.78 per share. What changed since our previous analysis. Our earlier figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable. Since then, the 2026 interim results have confirmed a further decline in revenue and profit. Margin of safety. We are reasonably confident in the earnings level, because it is anchored on audited cash flows. We are less confident in its direction. The largest revenue stream depends on pharmacy benefit managers and pharmacies that GoodRx does not control. A single benefit manager's program change cost it real volume in 2025, and the company has disclosed that this pressure is ongoing. The worst plausible outcome is that one or more large benefit managers or pharmacy chains withdraw from GoodRx codes ahead of the 2029 maturity. The company has no hard assets to fall back on, and the term loan is secured by substantially all of its assets, so lenders would come first. If we are wrong about stability and the bear path plays out, the shares are worth nothing. The business pays no dividend; cash has gone to buybacks ($216.4M in 2025). The price assumes about a three-year holding period, through the 2029 refinancing window. On the base path the shares would be worth about $0.90 in three years. From $0.45 the base path implies about 26% a year, which leaves room for some of the bear case to come true and still reach a 20% return. The margin-of-safety price is $0.45 per share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $0.40 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$167,904K; WC cash effect=-$56,444K (use of cash; AR +$88.0M and prescription reimbursement assets +$75.4M use of cash, partly offset by prescription reimbursement liabilities +$114.3M source, tied to scaling pharma-manufacturer-funded Consumer Direct Pricing program - matches MD&A-disclosed $58.5M YoY swing in WC drag); SBC=$76,626K (9.6% of revenue, continuing post-IPO normalization); capex=$3,521K, growth capex=$17K, maintenance capex=$3,504K. OE=167,904+56,444-76,626-3,504=$144,218K; diluted shares=356,973K (declining YoY on active buybacks); OE/sh=$0.4040. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001809519-26-000031.
2024 $0.21 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$183,892K; WC cash effect=+$2,094K (net source); SBC=$99,026K (12.5% of revenue); capex=$1,240K, growth capex=$157K, maintenance capex=$1,083K. OE=183,892-2,094-99,026-1,083=$81,689K; diluted shares=392,172K; OE/sh=$0.2083. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001809519-26-000031.
2023 $0.13 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$138,292K; WC cash effect=-$21,936K (incl. new prescription reimbursement asset/liability lines, reclassified out of prepaid/AP starting the FY2025 10-K presentation); SBC=$104,820K (14.0% of revenue); capex=$1,043K, revenue declined vs 2022 so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$1,043K. OE=138,292+21,936-104,820-1,043=$54,365K; diluted shares=410,315K; OE/sh=$0.1325. Reconciliation: NI(-$8,868K)+D&A($107,668K, incl $59.0M intangible amort)-maint capex leaves a residual vs CFO-based OE explained largely by a $65.6M non-cash deferred-tax benefit (partial NOL valuation-allowance release) plus other smaller non-cash items - resolved, no missed/mis-signed WC item. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001809519-26-000031 (3-yr CF comparative, latest restated presentation).
2022 $0.10 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$146,780K; WC cash effect=-$20,290K; SBC=$120,234K (15.7% of revenue); capex=$3,967K, growth capex=$79K, maintenance capex=$3,888K. OE=146,780+20,290-120,234-3,888=$42,948K; diluted shares=412,858K; OE/sh=$0.1040. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-005262.
2021 $0.06 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$178,779K; WC cash effect=-$11,796K; SBC=$160,462K (post-IPO RSU vesting still elevated, 21.5% of revenue); capex=$4,571K, growth capex=$727K (revenue grew $194.7M), maintenance capex=$3,844K. OE=178,779+11,796-160,462-3,844=$26,269K; diluted shares=409,981K; OE/sh=$0.0641. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-005262.
2020 -$0.92 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex, all on diluted (Class A+B combined, economically identical) share count. CFO=$131,341K; WC cash effect (AR+prepaid+AP+accrued+other liab+operating lease liab, per CF statement)=-$32,459K (use of cash, matches MD&A-disclosed ~$32.5M); SBC=$397,285K (includes ~$370M+ one-time IPO-related RSU vesting/acceleration charge); capex=$20,553K, capex_ratio(2021-25 avg)=0.37%, revenue grew YoY so growth capex=$607K, maintenance capex=$19,946K. OE=131,341+32,459-397,285-19,946=-$253,431K; diluted shares=274,696K; OE/sh=-$0.9226. Distorted by IPO (Sept 2020) mega SBC grant vesting; excluded from valuation anchor window. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-005262 (3-yr CF comparative).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (nationwide: Northeast, Midwest, South and West); consumers, partner pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States; no material sales outside the United States.
Historical growth strategy
Grew a free consumer prescription-discount app and website into a national price-comparison network monetized through fees paid by pharmacy benefit managers, then layered on a paid subscription (GoodRx Gold), telehealth, and a pharma-direct program funded by drug manufacturers. Supplemented organic growth with acquisitions (roughly $140M in 2021, $157M in 2022 and $43M in 2025) and, since 2022, large share repurchases funded from operating cash flow.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a stock in a long-term primary downtrend since its September 2020 debut, when it traded in the mid-$50s. The shares slid through 2021-2022, spent 2023-2025 in a lower range roughly between $3 and $5, broke down to a monthly low near $1.87 in February 2026, and have since rebounded toward about $3.50. The pattern is a series of lower highs over six years; the 2026 bounce off the low is the first sign of a possible base, but the stock remains well below its old trading range, which would act as overhead resistance.
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