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Shift4 Payments, Inc. (FOUR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$20.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$8.00 $68.00
bear $8.00 base $37.00 bull $68.00 margin of safety $20.00 market price* $39.43
Shift4 provides the payment-processing and point-of-sale software that restaurants, hotels, stadiums and specialty retailers use to take payments and run their businesses, chiefly through its SkyTab platform. Because software and payments are sold together, switching means replacing hardware and software, not just a card terminal, and revenue kept growing through the 2020 shutdown. Since July 2025 it also owns Global Blue, a European leader in tax-free shopping and currency conversion for international travelers (about $320 million of revenue in the first half of 2026), and it added Smartpay (Australia/New Zealand) in November 2025 and Bambora (about 140,000 merchants in the U.S. and Canada, bought from Worldline for about $92 million) in March 2026. What those deals cost is the central fact. Debt is about $4.5 billion: $1.65 billion of 6.75% notes due 2032, a $1.0 billion term loan due 2032, €1.1 billion of 5.5% notes due 2033, and $633 million of 0.5% convertible notes due August 2027. In addition there is $1.04 billion of 6% mandatory convertible preferred stock (cash dividends of about $62 million a year until it converts in May 2028), about $123 million owed to minority holders (mostly Global Blue's Japanese joint venture) and about $226 million still owed under tax-sharing agreements (the founder's share was waived in February 2026). Cash was $356 million at June 30, 2026, after $321 million of share repurchases, $141 million paid to the founder's holding company and $31 million of preferred dividends in the first half. A $550 million revolving credit line was undrawn. Interest now runs about $250 million a year. Our measure of what the business earns: the cash it produces before paying lenders, after stock compensation, after the equipment it leases to merchants, capitalized software development ($99 million in 2025) and the cost of signing new merchants, and with swings in receivables and payables removed. We also removed interest earned on cash, since cash is counted separately. On that basis the combined business produces roughly $580 million a year: about $430 million from the core and about $150 million from Global Blue (including Smartpay). Two checks agree: 2025 results adjusted for the half-year of Global Blue and about $30 million of one-time deal costs, and the last four reported quarters, both land at $575-590 million. Cash flow from operations fell to $197 million in the first half of 2026 from $238 million, but that includes about $120 million absorbed by receivables, payables and prepaid items; we could not fully explain that swing from the filings (receivables kept rising even though $155 million were sold to banks) and we excluded it rather than assume it either reverses or repeats. Merchant relationships acquired in the deals ($2.5 billion, amortized over about 18 years) are a non-cash charge that we added back, but we assume Global Blue's earnings stay flat and then fade to zero rather than live forever, and the bear case treats them as a wasting asset. Bear case: a 2020-style shutdown in year two. The core loses 30% of its cash generation that year and recovers to about 90-95% by years three and four, with no growth credited. Global Blue follows its own record: its adjusted EBITDA was €170.7 million in the year to March 2020, a loss of €9.9 million in the year to March 2022, and only €78.0 million (46% of the pre-pandemic level) in the year to March 2023, so we take it to zero in year two and rebuild to 85% of today's level. We also charge about $96 million for refinancing the 2027 notes at about 9.5%. The business is worth about $6.4 billion; it owes about $5.7 billion (debt, preferred, minority interests and tax-sharing payments, less $256 million of surplus cash, plus the refinancing cost); the difference is about $0.6 billion, or about $8 per share. In the trough year, cash generation (about $300 million) roughly covers interest and preferred dividends (about $312 million), with the undrawn revolver as backstop. Base case: the core grows 5% a year slowing to 2% by year ten, well below its demonstrated record (U.S. revenue grew 14% in 2025 and 18% in 2024, funded from its own cash, and the company has grown through the 2020 shutdown), net of the equipment and software spending that growth requires; Global Blue is held flat for ten years and then fades to zero by year 25, and the core is held flat to year 25. Not credited: cross-selling into Global Blue's merchants, tourism growth, margin gains, future acquisitions, and the tax deductions created by the February 2026 share exchange. The business is worth about $8.6 billion; it owes about $5.7 billion; the difference is about $2.9 billion, or about $37 per share. Bull case: the core compounds at 8% slowing to 3%, Global Blue grows 3% a year for eight years, and the story runs 30 years. The business is worth about $11.1 billion against about $5.7 billion owed, a difference of about $5.4 billion, or about $68 per share. Because debt and preferred stock are a large slice of the total, small changes in the earnings base move the share value a lot: 10% less cash generation cuts the base value to about $26, and a Global Blue that earns nothing cuts it to about $18. Other things that would make this wrong: a prolonged fall in international travel (the Middle East conflict already cost about $20 million in the second quarter), difficulty refinancing the August 2027 notes, restaurant spending staying soft, or the core growing more slowly than we credit. Previous figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable. The margin-of-safety price is $20. We are fairly sure of the core's cash generation but less sure of Global Blue's, which has only four quarters inside Shift4 and a pre-pandemic history we cannot treat as a floor. The worst plausible outcome, a travel and hospitality shock together with a costlier 2027 refinancing, leaves the structure intact but would push shareholder value toward the single digits, and if we are wrong about Global Blue's earning power the shares are worth closer to the high teens than the high thirties. At $20 the price allows for being wrong about Global Blue: if it earns nothing, the shares should still be worth about $20 in three years, and if the base case plays out, retained cash of roughly $0.9 billion over three years (after interest and preferred dividends) and share repurchases would take the value to the mid-$40s, which implies above 20% a year. The price assumes about a three-year holding period; there is no common dividend, so any return comes through retained cash flow and buybacks over that period.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $4.59 ▼
CFO=$634.0M; SBC=$82.0M; standard WC movement=$(11.0)M (AR $5.0M, prepaid $(5.0)M, AP $4.0M, accrued $(4.0)M, contingent-liability payments $(1.0)M, ROU/lease $(4.0)M, deferred revenue $(6.0)M); OE before capex = 634.0-(-11.0)-82.0 = $563.0M. Capex = PP&E $10.0M + equipment for lease $125.0M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $61.0M = $196.0M; revenue grew $4,180.0M-$3,331.0M=$849.0M; growth capex at 4.90% = $41.6M; maintenance capex = $196.0M-$41.6M=$154.4M. OE = 563.0-154.4 = $408.6M; diluted shares (Class A 87,620,658 + Class C 1,333,686) = 88,954,344; OE/sh = $4.59. FY2025 includes only a stub period (about six months) of the July 3, 2025 Global Blue acquisition ($2,612M net purchase price, funded largely with new debt and $1,000M of mandatory convertible preferred stock), plus roughly $30M of one-time acquisition-related professional expenses; it is not a clean run-rate for the combined company and is excluded from the valuation anchor for that reason (see Analysis record). Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001794669-26-000010).
2024 $3.96 ▼
CFO=$500.0M; SBC=$65.0M; standard WC movement=$(37.0)M (AR $(75.0)M, prepaid $(2.0)M, AP $25.0M, accrued $42.0M, contingent-liability payments $(11.0)M, ROU/lease $(1.0)M, deferred revenue $(15.0)M); OE before capex = 500.0-(-37.0)-65.0 = $472.0M. Capex = PP&E $7.0M + equipment for lease $101.0M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $39.0M = $147.0M; revenue grew $3,331.0M-$2,565.0M=$766.0M; growth capex at 4.90% = $37.5M; maintenance capex = $147.0M-$37.5M=$109.5M. OE = 472.0-109.5 = $362.5M; diluted shares (Class A 89,854,352 + Class C 1,668,826) = 91,523,178; OE/sh = $3.96. The large jump in the change in TRA liability non-cash addback ($289.0M in 2024) is a remeasurement of the tax receivable agreement liability tied to the Up-C structure, not a cash item, and does not affect CFO or this calculation. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001794669-26-000010), comparative FY2024 figures.
2023 $4.12 ▼
CFO=$346.0M; SBC=$57.0M; standard WC movement=$(62.0)M (AR $(53.0)M, prepaid $0.0M, AP $15.0M, accrued $2.0M, contingent-liability payments $(18.0)M, ROU/lease $0.0M, deferred revenue $(8.0)M); OE before capex = 346.0-(-62.0)-57.0 = $351.0M. Capex = PP&E $14.0M + equipment for lease $78.0M + intangibles $2.0M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $34.0M = $128.0M; revenue grew $2,565.0M-$1,993.6M=$571.4M; growth capex at 4.90% = $28.0M; maintenance capex = $128.0M-$28.0M=$100.0M. OE = 351.0-100.0 = $251.0M; diluted shares (Class A 59,048,350 + Class C 1,942,054) = 60,990,404; OE/sh = $4.12. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001794669-26-000010), comparative FY2023 figures.
2022 $1.46 ▼
CFO=$275.4M; SBC=$49.6M; standard WC movement=$48.3M (AR $4.1M, prepaid $(1.5)M, inventory $2.8M, AP $37.3M, accrued $8.1M, ROU/lease $(0.3)M, deferred revenue $(2.2)M); OE before capex = 275.4-48.3-49.6 = $177.5M. Capex = PP&E $8.0M + equipment for lease $53.8M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $25.2M = $87.0M (excludes the $275.5M cash cost of the 2022 residual commission buyout strategic distribution-insourcing program, judged to be acquisition-like, not maintenance capex); revenue grew $1,993.6M-$1,367.5M=$626.1M; growth capex at 4.90% = $30.7M; maintenance capex = $87.0M-$30.7M=$56.3M. OE = 177.5-56.3 = $121.2M; diluted shares (Class A 78,903,737 + Class C 3,864,579) = 82,768,316; OE/sh = $1.46. 2022 is a transition year (mid-way through insourcing sales distribution from third parties) and is excluded from the valuation anchor for that reason. Source: FY2022 10-K (accession 0001794669-23-000006).
2021 -$0.56 ▼
CFO (restated, latest)=$3.0M; SBC=$40.8M; standard WC movement=$(57.8)M (AR $(120.7)M, prepaid $(0.7)M, inventory $1.8M, AP $56.5M, accrued $5.1M, ROU/lease $(0.5)M, deferred revenue $0.7M); OE before capex = 3.0-(-57.8)-40.8 = $20.0M. Capex = PP&E $8.2M + equipment for lease $45.9M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $26.2M = $80.3M; revenue grew $1,367.5M-$766.9M=$600.6M; growth capex at 4.90% = $29.4M; maintenance capex = $80.3M-$29.4M=$50.9M. OE = 20.0-50.9 = $(30.9)M; diluted shares (Class A 47,594,839 + Class C 7,329,534) = 54,924,373; OE/sh = $(0.56). 2021 included a TSYS outage that cost roughly $25.8M in nonrecurring merchant/partner payments, per the FY2022 10-K MD&A; this year is judged not representative of the current business given both this one-time item and the still-small, immature scale of the platform. Source: FY2022 10-K (accession 0001794669-23-000006), restated comparatives.
2020 -$1.63 ▼
OE = CFO - WC movement - SBC - maintenance capex, per diluted share. CFO (restated, latest)=$4.0M; SBC=$66.2M; standard WC movement=$(26.0)M (AR $(19.3)M, prepaid $(1.8)M, inventory $1.2M, AP $(2.0)M, accrued $(5.3)M, ROU/lease $0.0M, deferred revenue $1.2M); OE before capex = 4.0 - (-26.0) - 66.2 = $(36.2)M. Capex = PP&E $4.8M + equipment for lease $14.5M + capitalized customer acquisition costs $19.4M = $38.7M; revenue grew $766.9M-$731.4M=$35.5M; using the series-wide capex ratio of 4.90% of revenue, growth capex = $1.7M, maintenance capex = $38.7M-$1.7M=$37.0M. OE = -36.2-37.0 = $(73.2)M; diluted shares (Class A 28,148,355 + Class C 16,882,903) = 45,031,258; OE/sh = $(1.63). 2020 was Shift4's IPO year (COVID period); revenue still grew but cash generation was minimal once real customer-acquisition and equipment reinvestment are deducted. Source: FY2020 10-K (accession 0001564590-21-011368) and FY2022 10-K (accession 0001794669-23-000006) for the restated cash-flow figures.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Primarily the United States, sold nationwide with no state or regional concentration disclosed (U.S. revenue $3,312M of $4,180M total in 2025). International revenue is concentrated in Europe (cross-border payment processing and, since July 2025, tax-free shopping and currency conversion for international travelers through Global Blue across Europe and parts of Asia, including Japan), Australia and New Zealand (Smartpay, acquired November 2025) and, since March 2026, Canada (Bambora, acquired from Worldline).
Historical growth strategy
Pairs payment processing with integrated software (SkyTab point-of-sale and a network of independent software partners), then converts gateway-only merchants to full processing; reinvests internally generated cash in terminals, software and merchant acquisition; supplements this with frequent, increasingly large debt-funded acquisitions (Vectron, Revel, Finaro, Smartpay, Global Blue for $2.6B in 2025, Bambora in 2026). In 2022 it bought out third-party sales partners' future commissions to bring distribution in-house.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a stock in a long, damaged downtrend: well off a 52-week high above $100, with a new 52-week low in late February 2026 after earnings, a retest in March, a rally to the mid-$50s into early August, and then a sharp gap down after the August earnings report. The prior analysis recorded the shares breaking below the $37 support zone in early October, with $34-35 (the 52-week low area) as the next major support and $46 as the first level that would suggest a trend change. These levels were not independently re-verified for this draft.
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