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EZCORP INC (EZPW) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$10.50 ComplexityAverage Updated
$12.50 $26.20
bear $12.50 base $19.07 bull $26.20 margin of safety $10.50 market price* $33.00
EZCORP runs about 1,550 pawn stores: roughly half in the United States, concentrated in Texas and Florida, and the rest in Mexico, Central America, Peru and, since January 2026, 105 stores in 12 countries added by taking an 87.7% stake in Founders One, which controls Simple Management Group. It earns money in three ways: fees on small loans secured by jewelry, electronics and tools; selling goods customers forfeit; and melting down gold jewelry. The loans are short and fully secured, so bad debts are absorbed by the collateral rather than written off. How we measure earnings. We start from operating cash flow. We take out working-capital swings, stock compensation and the capital spending needed to keep stores running; spending on new stores is excluded. Store rent is treated as a real cost. Pawn loans are recorded as investing activity, so growth in the loan book is not charged against these figures. Measured this way, the cash the business generates before interest was about $72M in fiscal 2022, $70M in 2023, $97M in 2024 and $111M in 2025, on roughly 83M diluted shares. Fiscal 2020 shows the business's real downside: the COVID shutdown shrank pawn lending, and cash earnings fell to about 15% of the prior year, recovering to about 55% in 2021. Earlier figures are not comparable with our previous analysis because the stored history was rebuilt on a consistent basis. The starting level. We use the median of fiscal 2022 to 2025, about $85M before interest. Earlier years reflect a different company that was still restructuring and carried the Grupo Finmart and Cash Converters write-downs. We add about $7M for the Founders/SMG stores, which are already owned and consolidated. Founders reported $66M of gross profit for the nine months to September 2025, and we assume a modest cash margin on that. This gives a base level of $92M. Fiscal 2025 grew 18%, partly from record gold prices: jewelry-scrap gross margin was 26.6% against the roughly 15–20% management calls normal. For that reason the base case starts year one at only 1.5% growth, well below that trailing pace. The first nine months of fiscal 2026 show operating cash flow up about a third, but most of that came from the acquisition and gold, not underlying growth, so it does not raise the starting level. Base case: the business keeps doing what it has done for a decade, opening Latin American stores and buying small shops at a pace it has funded from its own cash, worth about 1.5% a year. Gold-scrap margins drift back to normal. The 2026 jump in store count is not repeated. After year ten, cash flow holds flat: pawn lending to people without bank credit has run for over a century, and nothing about the stores suggests it fades. The business is worth about $1.72B. Bear case: gold falls back and scrap margins return to the mid-teens, which takes normal earnings down to about $75M. Within the next few years comes a shock on the scale of 2020: lending dries up, cash earnings fall to 15% of normal for a year and 55% the next, then recover. There is no growth. Value is about $1.18B. Bull case: the Founders/SMG platform and Latin American openings continue at the faster pace of fiscal 2022 to 2026, and merchandise margins hold at about 38%. Earnings start near $110M and grow 3% a year for ten years, giving a value of about $2.32B. We did not credit a new large acquisition or continued record gold prices in any case. Debt. The company owes $300M of 7.375% senior notes due March 2032. Because that rate is above our yardstick, we add about $20M for the extra interest cost. It also owes $230M of 3.75% convertible notes due 2029, which convert at $11.23 a share. In the base and bull cases the shares are worth well above $11.23, so the notes are treated as about 20.5M new shares rather than as debt. In the bear case, repaying them in cash gives almost the same per-share figure. Cash was $311M at June 2026; we treat about $120M as needed to fund the stores and the loan book. Net of that cash, the senior notes, leases and outside owners' stakes, the company owes about $133M. Base: business $1.72B, minus $133M, gives about $19 per share. Bear: $1.18B minus $133M (or $363M with the converts repaid in cash, spread over fewer shares) gives about $12.50. Bull: $2.32B minus $133M gives about $26. Interest is roughly $25M a year against cash earnings of about $90M or more, so even the bear case's worst year is covered by cash on hand. The bear value is a little above tangible book value of roughly $10 a share. We justify that because pawn loans are overcollateralized, and in 2020 the business kept its cash earnings positive. Risks the cases do not fully capture: one shareholder owns all of the voting stock while the public holds non-voting Class A shares, so capital allocation is not checked by public shareholders. Results also depend on the Mexican peso and other Latin American currencies, and on US and state rules for small-dollar lending. Margin of safety price. How sure are we of the earnings level? Moderately. Four years of post-restructuring results agree within a range of about $70–111M, but the top of that range rests on gold. The worst plausible outcome is falling gold arriving together with a 2020-type shock. The structure would survive it: there is no maturity before 2029, there is $311M of cash, and the loan book turns over in about 90 days and can be shrunk to raise cash. The things we are most likely to be wrong about are normal scrap margins, what Founders/SMG really earns, and whether the controlling owner directs cash into a large, poorly priced acquisition. If all three go against our estimates, value sits near the bear case, about $12.50. The company pays no dividend and buys back only a little stock, so the full return has to come from the share price, and the price assumes about a three-year holding period. From $10.50, the bear-case value alone implies about a 20% return within a year. The base case over three years implies comfortably above 20% a year. That is why $10.50 is our margin of safety price.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $1.20 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted working-capital removal and deducted total capex). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2025, $K). CFO=148,985; dWC = reported WC lines -57,181 (service charges -3,833, inventory -18,179, prepaid -5,719, AP/other -41,420, layaway +11,712, taxes +258) plus non-cash lease expense 59,265 (operating lease payments sit in the AP/other line under ASC 842 and are a real cost) = +2,084 removed; SBC=12,465; capex=38,561; growth capex=3.686% x (1,274,280-1,161,602)=4,153; maintenance capex=34,408; OE=100,028; diluted shares=83,383K (if-converted, includes ~20.5M shares for $230M 3.75% 2029 converts); OE/sh=$1.20. Reconciliation: NI 109,613 + D&A 32,538 + debt-cost amortization 1,726 + deferred tax (3,084) + impairment 877 + other (1,942) + inventory reserve 858 + equity income (6,150) = 134,436, equal to CFO 148,985 - WC lines (-57,181) - lease 59,265 - SBC 12,465 = 134,436; ties. Jewelry scrap gross margin 26.6% vs 15-20% norm flatters the year. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0000876523-25-000094.
2024 $1.00 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted working-capital removal and deducted total capex). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2024, $K). CFO=113,600; dWC = reported WC lines -71,316 (service charges -5,217, inventory -8,488, prepaid -8,638, AP/other -57,158, layaway +2,950, taxes +5,235) plus non-cash lease expense 58,393 = -12,923 removed; SBC=10,406; capex=35,764; growth capex=3.686% x (1,161,602-1,049,041)=4,149; maintenance capex=31,615; OE=84,502; diluted shares=84,448K (if-converted); OE/sh=$1.00. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0000876523-25-000094.
2023 $0.73 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted working-capital removal and deducted total capex). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2023, $K). CFO=101,834; dWC = reported WC lines -58,055 (service charges -4,204, inventory -4,810, prepaid -1,814, AP/other -61,522, layaway +1,376, taxes +12,919) plus non-cash lease expense 56,937 = -1,118 removed; SBC=9,539; capex=40,446; growth capex=3.686% x (1,049,041-886,225)=6,001; maintenance capex=34,445; OE=58,968; diluted shares=80,865K (if-converted); OE/sh=$0.73. Net income includes a $28.5M equity-method loss (Cash Converters) that is non-cash and added back in CFO. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0000876523-25-000094.
2022 $0.78 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record omitted working-capital removal and deducted total capex). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2022, $K). CFO=66,535; dWC = reported WC lines -81,242 (service charges -4,572, inventory -15,341, prepaid +3,238, AP/other -65,141, layaway +3,359, taxes -2,785) plus ROU amortization 52,201 = -29,041 removed; SBC=5,053; capex=31,895; growth capex=3.686% x (886,225-729,551)=5,775; maintenance capex=26,120; OE=64,403; diluted shares=82,400K (if-converted, includes convertible notes); OE/sh=$0.78. Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000876523-22-000071.
2021 $0.37 ▼
Recomputed on current basis (prior record used CFO - total capex - SBC with no working-capital removal; whole series restated for consistency). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2021, $K). CFO=46,438; dWC = reported WC lines -50,361 (service charges -7,332, inventory +371, prepaid +7,373, AP/other -54,209, layaway +1,256, taxes +2,180) plus ROU-asset amortization 48,480 (operating lease payments sit in the AP/other line under ASC 842 and are a real cost, not working capital) = -1,881 removed; SBC=3,946; capex=23,601, revenue declined so maintenance=23,601; OE=20,772; diluted shares=55,949K (pre-ASU 2020-06, excludes convertible shares); OE/sh=$0.37. COVID recovery year. Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000876523-22-000071.
2020 -$0.02 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2020, $K). CFO=49,078. From FY2020 (ASC 842) operating lease cash payments run through the 'accounts payable, accrued expenses and other liabilities' line while right-of-use amortization (45,649) is added back above it; the lease payment is a real operating cost, not working capital, so dWC = reported WC lines (-19,151: service charges +11,021, inventory +14,466, prepaid -875, AP/other -37,401, layaway -1,647, taxes -4,715) plus ROU amortization 45,649 = +26,498 removed. SBC=-5,094 (reversal; subtracting a negative adds it). Capex=28,526, revenue declined so maintenance capex=28,526. OE=-852; diluted shares=55,313K; OE/sh=-$0.02. COVID shutdown year (pawn book collapsed). Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000876523-22-000071.
2019 $0.69 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2019, $K). CFO=103,517; dWC=+17,525 (service charges -732, inventory -493, prepaid +5,732, AP/accrued +22,246, layaway +1,176, taxes -10,404) removed; SBC=9,751; capex=38,839; growth capex=3.686% x (847,229-812,156)=1,293; maintenance capex=37,546; OE=38,695; diluted shares=55,984K; OE/sh=$0.69. Source: FY2019 10-K accession 0000876523-19-000069.
2018 $0.84 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2018, $K). CFO=88,981 (restated, FY2019 10-K); dWC=-8,732 (service charges -1,788, inventory -1,074, prepaid +477, AP/accrued -3,271, layaway +709, taxes -3,785) removed; SBC=10,784; capex=40,474; growth capex=3.686% x (812,156-747,951)=2,366; maintenance capex=38,108; OE=48,821; diluted shares=57,896K; OE/sh=$0.84. Source: FY2019 10-K accession 0000876523-19-000069.
2017 $0.80 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2017, $K). CFO=50,666 (latest restated, FY2019 10-K); dWC=-22,882 (service charges -285, inventory +721, prepaid +4,225, AP/accrued -30,894, layaway +241, taxes +3,110) removed; SBC=5,866; capex=25,001; capex/revenue mean FY17-25=3.686%; revenue 747,951 vs 730,505 so growth capex=643, maintenance capex=24,358; OE=43,324; diluted shares=54,368K; OE/sh=$0.80. Source: FY2019 10-K accession 0000876523-19-000069.
2016 $0.84 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex (FY ended 9/30/2016, $K). CFO=68,104 (as restated in FY2018 10-K); dWC=+3,612 (service charges rec +7,677, inventory -3,735, prepaid/other -11,696, AP/accrued -26,297, layaway +329, income taxes +37,334) removed; SBC=5,346; capex=13,251; first year of series (no prior-year revenue in the window) so maintenance capex taken as total capex=13,251; OE=45,895; diluted shares=54,427K; OE/sh=$0.84. Pre-ASC 842 (no lease adjustment). Pawn loan book growth sits in investing activities and is not deducted. Year distorted by Grupo Finmart disposition and restructuring. Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0000876523-18-000057 (cash flow), FY2016 10-K 0000876523-16-000217 (shares, revenue).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (South, especially Texas and Florida; West, including Colorado, Nevada and Arizona; Midwest), Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Peru, and additional Latin American countries added through the 2026 Founders One / Simple Management Group acquisition
Historical growth strategy
Steady opening of new pawn stores (de novo), mostly in Latin America, combined with frequent small acquisitions of independent pawn shops in the US and Latin America, funded from operating cash; occasional larger step-ups such as the January 2026 purchase of a majority stake in Founders One (105 stores in 12 countries). Inside existing stores, growth comes from growing the pawn loan book and higher merchandise sales.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see years of sideways trading in a broad single-digit-to-low-teens range from 2016 through 2023, including a deep 2020 trough. That was followed by a sustained breakout to multi-year highs, with higher highs and higher lows through 2025 and 2026, helped by record gold prices. The old range top in the low teens should now act as support. Momentum readers would say the long-term uptrend is intact, but the stock is extended above long-term averages and is sensitive to any pullback in gold.
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Circle of competence

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