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SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO (SMG) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$28.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$24.52 $76.57
bear $24.52 base $58.56 bull $76.57 margin of safety $28.00 market price* $54.57
Scotts Miracle-Gro sells consumer lawn and garden products under the Scotts, Miracle-Gro, Ortho and Tomcat brands and markets Roundup for Bayer in the United States. Home Depot and Lowe's together took 52% of fiscal 2025 sales, so the business is essentially a branded supplier to two retailers, with sales concentrated in the spring season. In April 2026 the company handed its loss-making hydroponics business, Hawthorne, to Vireo Growth in exchange for Vireo shares; the remaining company sells no cannabis and the Vireo stake is not counted in our value. Earnings level. We measured the cash the business throws off before paying its lenders: operating cash flow with working-capital swings stripped out, stock pay charged as a cost, and the capital spending needed to stand still deducted. Over fiscal 2016-2025 that figure ran $341M, $284M, $202M, $322M, $527M, $590M, $165M, $124M, $281M and $367M. The 2020-2021 boom and the 2022-2023 bust were both driven largely by Hawthorne and retailer destocking. The ten-year median is about $300M, which we use as the normal level for the remaining consumer business. Fiscal 2025's $367M is flattered by about $70M of deferred tax: cash taxes were only $13M because of earlier losses, and that shelter runs out. Intangible amortization is small (about $12M a year), so no wasting-asset adjustment was needed. What it owes. At June 27, 2026 borrowings were about $2.11 billion against $28M of cash. They include fixed notes at 4.5% due 2029, 4.0% due 2031 and 4.375% due 2032, plus the $250M of 5.25% notes due December 2026 and a bank term loan. About $160M of receivables sold to JPMorgan under an uncommitted program that must be renewed each year works like debt, so we add it. The cheap fixed coupons are worth roughly $90M against that. We put net debt at about $2.15 billion, or roughly $36 per share. Leverage was 4.1 times at September 2025 against a 5.0 times covenant. Dividends are restricted while leverage is above 4.0 times. Base case: $58.56 per share. The business starts at $300M a year before interest and grows 1.5% a year for ten years, then holds flat. That growth is credited only to price increases the brands have pushed through over many years, not to volume or share gains. Owner earnings rose sharply last year off a depressed base; we assume 1.5% for year one, well below that rate, and nine-month continuing sales are up only about 2%. The business is worth about $5.6 billion, it owes about $2.15 billion, and roughly $3.47 billion is left for shareholders. Bear case: $24.52 per share. We model a repeat of the 2022-2023 lawn and garden downturn, when retailers cut inventory and wet springs hit volume. Cash flow before interest falls to about $150M for two years, recovers to $200M, then settles at $240M for good as the tax shelter is used up and the two big retailers press on terms. Refinancing the 2026 notes and the term loan at higher rates pushes the effective debt to about $2.35 billion. In that case the business is worth about $3.8 billion against $2.35 billion owed. Cash flow only just covers interest in the trough years, which is why this case cannot be made milder. Bull case: $76.57 per share. With Hawthorne's losses gone and the disclosed cost-savings program delivering, the consumer business earns about $330M before interest and grows 2.5% a year. It is worth about $6.7 billion against $2.15 billion owed. What could make this wrong. The earnings level rests on a ten-year history that includes very different business mixes. The two-retailer concentration and the $2 billion of debt mean a bad spring or a lost shelf could move value quickly. The receivables program expires each September and is uncommitted. Margin-of-safety price: $28. We are only moderately confident in the $300M level. The worst plausible outcome is a multi-year weather or retailer downturn while the 2029 notes and the term loan need refinancing. Leverage would then breach the covenant, and the company would have to cut the dividend or issue shares at depressed prices. The bear case, at about $24, is close to that outcome. From $28 the bear case implies a modest loss. If the business simply holds its normal level, value of around $58 is reached within four to five years. Meanwhile the $2.64 dividend, if maintained, is more than 9% a year of that price, and together those imply more than a 20% annual return. The dividend is not secure while leverage stays above 4 times, so we do not lean on it. Previous figures were prepared on a different basis and are not comparable.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $4.02 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$371.3M; dWC (AR -16.6, inventory -17.9, prepaid -2.3, AP -0.3, other current liab 16.0, other non-current -9.2, other net -0.6) = $(30.9)M, removed so +30.9; SBC=$69.0M; capex=$97.4M, revenue declined so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$97.4M; OE=371.3+30.9-69.0-97.4=$235.8M; diluted shares=58.7M; OE/sh=$4.02. Reconciliation: NI 145.2 + impairment 21.7 + D&A 75.0 + deferred tax 70.8 + loss on sale 17.7 + equity loss 2.8 - capex 97.4 = 235.8 (ties). Note $70.8M deferred tax add-back (cash taxes only $12.9M). Updated: prior record used total capex and did not remove working capital (superseded basis). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000825542-25-000022.
2024 $2.17 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$667.5M; dWC (AR 128.2, inventory 293.8, prepaid 10.2, AP -1.6, other current liab -45.4, other non-current -6.2, other net 0.7) = +$379.7M, removed; SBC=$80.4M; capex=$84.0M, revenue up only $1.4M so growth capex=$0.03M, maintenance capex=$84.0M; OE=667.5-379.7-80.4-84.0=$123.4M; diluted shares=56.8M; OE/sh=$2.17. AR release partly reflects the receivables-sale program begun Oct 2023. Updated: prior record used total capex and did not remove working capital (superseded basis). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000825542-25-000022.
2023 -$0.88 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$531.0M; dWC (AR 77.7, inventory 450.5, prepaid 18.6, AP -153.6, other current liab 52.0, other non-current -30.7, other net 4.2) = +$418.7M, removed; SBC=$68.9M; capex=$92.8M, revenue declined so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$92.8M; OE=531.0-418.7-68.9-92.8=$(49.4)M; diluted shares=56.0M; OE/sh=$(0.88). Trough year with peak interest cost ($173.5M cash interest). Updated: prior record used total capex and did not remove working capital (superseded basis). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000825542-25-000022 (latest presentation).
2022 $0.94 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(129.0)M; dWC (AR 102.8, inventory -203.8, prepaid -3.3, AP -171.2, other current liab -68.4, other non-current 20.1, other net -5.2) = $(329.0)M, removed so +329.0; SBC=$34.3M; capex=$113.5M, revenue declined so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$113.5M; OE=-129.0+329.0-34.3-113.5=$52.2M; diluted shares=55.5M; OE/sh=$0.94. Hydroponics collapse year; $666.8M non-cash impairment/restructuring added back via CFO. Updated: prior record used total capex and did not remove working capital (superseded basis). Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001546380-23-000037.
2021 $9.23 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$271.5M; dWC (AR 15.5, inventory -496.5, prepaid -76.5, AP 202.5, other current liab -21.6, other non-current -10.1, other net 1.3) = $(385.4)M, removed so +385.4; SBC=$40.6M; capex=$106.9M, growth capex = 2.33% mean capex/revenue x (4925.0-4131.6) = $18.5M, maintenance capex=$88.4M; OE=271.5+385.4-40.6-88.4=$527.9M; diluted shares=57.2M; OE/sh=$9.23. Peak hydroponics year; inventory build later unwound. Updated: prior record used total capex and did not remove working capital (superseded basis). Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001546380-23-000037.
2020 $7.94 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$558.0M; dWC (AR -188.1, inventory -80.6, prepaid -19.4, AP 172.2, other current liab 154.6, restructuring -6.0, other non-current -24.8, other net 0.7) = +$8.6M, removed; SBC=$57.9M; capex=$62.7M, growth capex = 2.33% x (4131.6-3156.0) = $22.7M, maintenance capex=$40.0M; OE=558.0-8.6-57.9-40.0=$451.5M; diluted shares=56.9M; OE/sh=$7.94. Pandemic gardening and hydroponics boom year. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001546380-20-000045.
2019 $4.06 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$226.8M; dWC (AR 0.6, inventory -65.0, prepaid -11.0, AP 54.3, other current liab 49.7, restructuring and other -100.2, other non-current -0.3, other net 0.8) = $(71.1)M, removed so +71.1; SBC=$38.4M; capex=$42.4M, growth capex = 2.33% x (3156.0-2663.4) = $11.5M, maintenance capex=$30.9M; OE=226.8+71.1-38.4-30.9=$228.6M; diluted shares=56.3M; OE/sh=$4.06. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001546380-20-000045.
2018 $2.11 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$342.5M; dWC (AR -2.7, inventory 14.3, prepaid 18.0, AP -3.9, other current liab 4.5, restructuring and other 100.1, other non-current -13.6, other net -2.5) = +$114.2M, removed; SBC=$40.4M; capex=$68.2M, growth capex = 2.33% x (2663.4-2642.1) = $0.5M, maintenance capex=$67.7M; OE=342.5-114.2-40.4-67.7=$120.2M; diluted shares=57.1M; OE/sh=$2.11. Restructuring accrual (largely the $100M+ charge tied to the wind-down) treated as working capital. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001546380-20-000045.
2017 $3.55 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$363.2M (as restated in FY2018 10-K); dWC (AR 48.6, inventory 3.6, prepaid -12.2, AP 9.0, other current liab 26.9, restructuring -8.7, other non-current -10.4, other net 0.9) = +$57.7M, removed; SBC=$25.2M; capex=$69.6M, growth capex = 2.33% mean capex/revenue x (2642.1-2506.2) = $3.2M, maintenance capex=$66.4M; OE=363.2-57.7-25.2-66.4=$213.9M; diluted shares=60.2M; OE/sh=$3.55. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001546380-18-000030.
2016 $4.63 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$244.0M (as restated in FY2017 10-K); dWC (sum of changes in assets and liabilities lines: AR -29.8, inventory -29.4, prepaid -9.3, AP -45.3, other current liab 22.9, restructuring -7.3, other non-current -11.8, other net -3.6) = $(113.6)M, removed so +113.6; SBC=$15.6M; capex=$58.3M, capex/revenue mean 2016-2025 = 2.33%, growth capex = 2.33% x (2506.2-2371.1) = $3.1M, maintenance capex=$55.2M; OE=244.0+113.6-15.6-55.2=$286.8M; diluted shares=62.0M; OE/sh=$4.63. Recomputed on current basis (prior series used total capex and no working-capital removal). Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001546380-17-000042; FY2016 10-K 0001546380-16-000078.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) with the majority of sales booked through national home-center and mass retailers; smaller sales in Canada and Europe through licensing and the Roundup marketing agreement.
Historical growth strategy
Growth has come from building and acquiring consumer lawn and garden brands (Scotts, Miracle-Gro, Ortho, Tomcat, Roundup marketing rights) sold through big-box retailers, steady price increases, and, from 2014 to 2022, a debt-funded acquisition spree into hydroponic supplies (Hawthorne) that was later written down and divested in April 2026 to refocus on the US consumer core.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a long boom-and-bust: a parabolic run to all-time highs above $240 in early 2021 on the pandemic gardening and hydroponics boom, followed by a collapse of more than 80% into 2023 that broke every major support level. Since then the stock has carved out a wide basing range roughly between the mid-$40s and the high-$80s, with repeated failed rallies at the declining 200-week moving average. Until price can close decisively above that long-term average and the top of the range, a technician would treat it as a basing pattern inside a longer-term downtrend rather than a confirmed reversal.
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