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Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc. (RHP) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$74.00 Updated
$52.00 $158.00
bear $52.00 base $125.00 bull $158.00 margin of safety $74.00 market price* $125.98
Business condition attached to the margin of safety 2026 or early-2027 results show the current group-booking softness stabilizing (net definite group room nights returning to growth) and the room-renovation programs at Gaylord Opryland and Gaylord Texan substantially complete.
Ryman Hospitality Properties owns a small collection of very large, purpose-built group and convention hotels -- including the Gaylord-branded resorts in Nashville, Orlando, Dallas, National Harbor (MD) and suburban Denver, plus two JW Marriott resorts acquired in San Antonio (2023) and Phoenix (2025) -- along with a smaller, growing entertainment business built around the Grand Ole Opry, Ryman Auditorium, Ole Red venues and other Nashville-adjacent brands. The hotels are leased to a taxable subsidiary and run by Marriott, so the company earns real operating cash flow from rooms, food and beverage, and meeting space, not just rent. We measure the value of the business using owner earnings: the cash a shareholder could actually take out of the company each year after the reinvestment needed to keep the existing hotels competitive, before any spending aimed at growing the portfolio. Because the company just closed two large hotel acquisitions (2023 and 2025) and is partway through a multi-year renovation and expansion program at several of its largest properties, recent reported cash flow bounces around: some years understate normal earning power because heavy, disclosed renovation spending is conservatively treated as upkeep rather than growth investment, and the most recent year (2025) includes only about seven of twelve months of the newly acquired Phoenix resort. We anchor our estimate on the middle of the last four normal (non-pandemic) years, which averages out these swings, and then build the growth path forward using facts the company has already disclosed rather than a flat growth assumption. The single biggest known, dated fact shaping the next year is that the Phoenix resort (JW Marriott Desert Ridge), bought in June 2025, will contribute a full twelve months for the first time in 2026 -- it added about $92 million of revenue in its first partial year of ownership. Set against that tailwind, the company's own disclosures show group meeting planners pulling back: bookings for future group business fell about 10% in 2025 and cancellations rose, which management attributes to economic and policy uncertainty. We take both of these as real and current, not as forecasts of a market recovery, and use them to shape the cases below. Our base case assumes the Phoenix resort's first full year lifts 2026 results, that the ongoing renovations at the Nashville and Dallas-area resorts wrap up over the next two years and repay themselves the way a similar completed renovation did at the Denver resort in 2024 (which drove an 8% revenue increase the following year), and that group booking softness gradually eases rather than deepens. Beyond the ten-year forecast, we value the hotels as assets that renew themselves indefinitely through the reinvestment already built into our owner earnings figure -- convention hotels of this scale are essentially irreplaceable and rarely built new -- capped at a modest, inflation-like growth rate; this long-run tail is a meaningful share of the total value, reflecting how much of what these properties are worth depends on decades of a durable, hard-to-replicate franchise rather than the next ten years alone. Our bear case takes the current group-booking softness as the start of a longer, harder cycle: bookings keep slipping, the Phoenix and San Antonio acquisitions take longer to pay off than planned, and the company's roughly $4 billion of debt -- recently added to at over 6% interest rates -- becomes a real constraint, limiting the ability to keep reinvesting or maintaining the dividend without raising additional, dilutive capital. Our bull case assumes the opposite: booking momentum turns positive, the ongoing renovations pay off across multiple hotels at once the way the Denver project did, the entertainment business scales faster, and the heavy capital-spending cycle tapers, freeing up more cash for shareholders. On this basis we estimate the shares are worth roughly $125 in our base case, with a bear case near $52 and a bull case near $158. Given the size of the gap between the bear and base cases -- appropriate for a business this dependent on group travel demand and carrying meaningful debt -- the margin-of-safety price sits meaningfully below our estimate of fair value, at around $74 a share, to allow for the downside case. The estimate would be revisited upward once 2026 results confirm the renovation programs are substantially finished and booking trends have stabilized, and downward if group cancellations continue to rise or the acquisitions underperform their initial run rate. We could not find anything in the filings that we were unable to reconcile.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $3.30 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$590.629M; ΔWC=+$26.777M; SBC=$14.061M; capex=$358.235M (Gaylord Opryland meeting-space/ballroom expansion and new sports bar/pavilion/event lawn, Gaylord Texan rooms renovation, ongoing maintenance); revenue rose to $2,577.061M from $2,339.226M (includes JW Marriott Desert Ridge, acquired June 10, 2025, contributing $91.6M of revenue for ~6.7 months) so growth capex=11.08%x$237.835M=$26.347M; maintenance capex=$331.888M. OE=$590.629M-$26.777M-$14.061M-$331.888M=$217.903M; diluted shares=65.957M; OE/sh=$3.304. Note: FY2025 understates the current run-rate because Desert Ridge contributed only ~6.7 of 12 months; a full year begins in FY2026. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-019035.
2024 $2.33 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$576.506M; ΔWC=+$26.223M; SBC=$13.891M; capex=$407.905M (disclosed renovation/expansion program: Gaylord Rockies events pavilion, Opryland meeting space, Wildhorse-to-Category 10 conversion, W Austin rooms, Ole Red Las Vegas, Gaylord Palms renovation); revenue rose to $2,339.226M from $2,158.136M so growth capex=11.08%x$181.090M=$20.059M; maintenance capex=$387.846M. OE=$576.506M-$26.223M-$13.891M-$387.846M=$148.546M; diluted shares=63.632M; OE/sh=$2.335. Judgment note: because revenue growth this year was modest relative to the heavy, disclosed discretionary renovation spend, the formula classifies most of that capex as 'maintenance,' conservatively understating owner earnings during the renovation cycle. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001558370-25-001286.
2023 $5.47 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$557.056M; ΔWC=+$56.462M; SBC=$15.421M; capex=$206.776M (JW Marriott Hill Country acquired June 30, 2023 for $791.466M is a separate investing-activity line, not included in this capex figure); revenue rose to $2,158.136M from $1,805.969M so growth capex=11.08%x$352.167M=$39.006M; maintenance capex=$167.770M. OE=$557.056M-$56.462M-$15.421M-$167.770M=$317.403M; diluted shares=58.061M; OE/sh=$5.467. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001558370-24-001613.
2022 $6.73 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$419.931M; ΔWC=+$32.342M; SBC=$14.985M; capex=$89.520M; revenue jumped to $1,805.969M from $939.373M (continued COVID recovery) so mechanical growth capex=11.08%x$866.596M=$95.978M exceeds capex, so maintenance capex clamped to $0. OE=$419.931M-$32.342M-$14.985M-$0=$372.604M; diluted shares=55.377M; OE/sh=$6.729. Note: the $0 maintenance-capex result is a mechanical artifact of a demand-recovery year and likely understates true maintenance capex; included in the anchor window with this caveat. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001558370-23-002012.
2021 $0.29 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$111.253M; ΔWC=+$51.834M (large working-capital rebuild as advance deposits/payables recovered post-COVID); SBC=$12.104M; capex=$77.426M; revenue recovered to $939.373M from $524.475M so growth capex=11.08%x$414.898M=$45.957M; maintenance capex=$31.469M. OE=$111.253M-$51.834M-$12.104M-$31.469M=$15.846M; diluted shares=55.047M; OE/sh=$0.288. Excluded from valuation anchor as a non-recurring pandemic-recovery distortion. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001558370-22-002101.
2020 -$5.86 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. COVID-19 shut down group/convention travel. CFO=-$161.524M; ΔWC=-$13.507M; SBC=$8.732M; capex=$165.463M (committed projects continued despite closures); revenue fell to $524.475M from $1,604.566M so growth capex=$0 (declining-revenue rule) and maintenance capex=full capex=$165.463M. OE=-$161.524M+$13.507M-$8.732M-$165.463M=-$322.212M; diluted shares=54.962M; OE/sh=-$5.863. Excluded from valuation anchor as a non-recurring pandemic distortion. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001558370-21-001956.
2019 $4.86 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$354.686M; ΔWC=-$21.553M (net use of cash); SBC=$7.833M; capex=$152.541M; revenue rose sharply to $1,604.566M from $1,275.118M (Gaylord Rockies first full year) so growth capex=11.08%x$329.448M=$36.494M; maintenance capex=$116.047M. OE=$354.686M+$21.553M-$7.833M-$116.047M=$252.359M; diluted shares=51.975M; OE/sh=$4.856. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001558370-20-001342.
2018 $2.40 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$321.919M; ΔWC=+$12.161M; SBC=$7.656M; capex=$188.217M; revenue rose to $1,275.118M from $1,184.719M so growth capex=11.08%x$90.399M=$10.013M; maintenance capex=$178.204M. OE=$321.919M-$12.161M-$7.656M-$178.204M=$123.898M; diluted shares=51.507M; OE/sh=$2.405. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001558370-19-001107.
2017 $2.00 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$295.830M; ΔWC=+$7.673M; SBC=$6.640M; capex=$182.565M; revenue rose to $1,184.719M from $1,149.207M so growth capex=11.08%x$35.512M=$3.933M; maintenance capex=$178.632M. OE=$295.830M-$7.673M-$6.640M-$178.632M=$102.885M; diluted shares=51.371M; OE/sh=$2.003. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001193125-18-060772.
2016 $3.23 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC(cash effect) - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$293.601M; ΔWC=+$10.313M (=-ΔAR(-7.215)+ΔAP&accrued(1.148)-Other(-1.950)); SBC=$6.128M; capex=$117.977M; capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue over 2019/2022/2023/2024/2025 anchor)=11.08%; revenue rose to $1,149.207M from $1,092.124M(2015) so growth capex=11.08%x$57.083M=$6.323M; maintenance capex=$117.977M-$6.323M=$111.654M. OE=$293.601M-$10.313M-$6.128M-$111.654M=$165.506M; diluted shares=51.312M; OE/sh=$3.226. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001193125-17-061161.

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