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PERDOCEO EDUCATION Corp (PRDO) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$34.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$38.26 $68.26
bear $38.26 base $58.33 bull $68.26 margin of safety $34.00 market price* $33.73
Perdoceo Education Corporation runs three accredited universities: Colorado Technical University (CTU, about 32,100 students at June 30, 2026), the American InterContinental University System including Trident University (about 10,500), and the University of St. Augustine for Health Sciences (USAHS, about 4,200), a graduate health-sciences school bought in December 2024. About 91% of students study fully online, and roughly three-quarters of cash tuition comes from federal student aid. The business needs little capital (capital spending runs about 1% of revenue) and carries no bank borrowings; its only financing debt is about $57 million tied to the new St. Augustine campus building. The company holds about $735 million of cash and investments. Earning power. We measure cash owner earnings: operating cash flow with working-capital swings removed, stock compensation charged as a cost, and only maintenance-level capital spending deducted. For valuation we also strip out after-tax interest income on the cash pile, because we credit that cash separately. On that basis the original CTU/AIU business produced between about $135 million and $196 million a year from 2019 to 2024, with a median of about $174 million. We use that median as the level for the legacy schools because it spans the pandemic enrollment surge (2020) and the post-pandemic trough (2022). 2025 came in at about $215 million, but $25 million or so of that is USAHS's first full year, and the rest reflects a strong year at CTU; we do not treat one strong year as the new normal. Adding about $25 million for USAHS gives a starting level of about $199 million, or roughly $3.13 per share. Accounting note: about $17 million a year of amortization on intangibles bought with USAHS is added back as non-cash; we carry the risk that this purchase wears down through the USAHS assumptions below rather than by lowering today's earnings level twice. What changed since our last analysis. The 2025 federal reconciliation law (H.R. 1) ends Grad PLUS loans for new borrowers from July 1, 2026 and caps graduate borrowing at $20,500 a year. Under the rulemaking consensus, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech-language pathology and nursing are not 'professional' programs, so most USAHS students lose access to the higher limits, and the company says many USAHS graduate students relied on Grad PLUS. Existing borrowers are grandfathered for up to three academic years. We previously credited USAHS as a growth engine; we now treat it as a unit that likely shrinks as grandfathering runs off. Mid-2026 results also show total enrollment growth slowing to 0.7% (CTU +0.6%, AIU System -1.0%, USAHS +6.0%), so we credit no enrollment growth at the legacy schools. Together these lower our estimates. Growth check. Owner earnings rose about 15% in 2025, almost all from the acquisition. Our base case assumes about -1% to -2% in each of the next few years. That is below the trailing rate because the acquisition boost does not repeat and the Grad PLUS change is a dated, legislated headwind. Base case: about $58 per share. The legacy schools hold their median earnings level for ten years and beyond, with no real growth credited; tuition increases and CTU's employer partnerships (38% of CTU enrollment) are assumed only to offset cost inflation. USAHS earnings fall 30% between 2027 and 2029 as grandfathered borrowers graduate. The business is worth about $3.2 billion; adding about $508 million of surplus cash after setting aside $150 million of operating cash, restricted cash and the $57 million campus financing gives about $3.7 billion, or $58 per share. About 56% of this value lies beyond year ten and rests on the schools keeping their accreditation and Title IV eligibility. Bear case: about $38 per share. For-profit education has gone through severe regulatory and enrollment downturns before. This company's own record in 2010-2018 (as Career Education Corporation) shows revenue falling by more than half and earnings disappearing amid gainful-employment rules and campus closures. We model a smaller version: from 2028, the new earnings-premium test, which cuts federal loans to programs whose graduates earn too little in two of three years, plus a tight hiring market cut legacy earnings in half for four years. They then recover to 75% of today's level and shrink 2% a year thereafter. USAHS falls to about a third of its current earnings. The business is worth about $1.9 billion, there is no debt to service, and the cash cushion adds about $8 per share. Bull case: about $68 per share. Earnings hold at roughly the 2026 run rate (about $230 million on our basis, matching the 2025 actual plus mid-2026 trends), with USAHS replacing lost Grad PLUS funding through private lending as management expects, and no real growth beyond that. We do not credit share-count shrinkage from buybacks, new program launches or enrollment gains, because none of those is secured. Testing the case. We tested the assumption that USAHS keeps its earnings. The 10-K states plainly that the nursing and therapy programs fall outside the professional-program definition, and management's guidance relies on private loans filling the gap, which has no track record at this school. We therefore kept the USAHS decline in the base case. Margin-of-safety price: $34. We are reasonably confident in the legacy earnings level because it has held between $135 million and $196 million through a pandemic surge and a post-pandemic trough, with no debt and heavy cash generation. The worst plausible outcome is regulatory: a large share of CTU or AIU programs failing the earnings-premium test, or the institutions losing eligibility under the new administrative-capability rule linking Pell to failing programs. The balance sheet would survive that, since there is no debt and about $8 per share of surplus cash, but the earnings stream would not, and this company has lived through that scenario before. If we are wrong about the durability of legacy earnings and about USAHS, the shares are worth around the bear case in the high $30s. The price assumes a three-to-four-year holding period for the regulatory picture to clear. In that time the business pays a dividend of about $0.68 a year and buys back stock. From $34, a move to the base-case value over about three years plus dividends implies roughly 20% a year. Even the bear case implies about breakeven rather than a permanent loss from that price. That is why the margin-of-safety price is $34 and not higher.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $3.45 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$225,240K; NI=$159,914K; non-cash addbacks (per FY2025 10-K cash-flow statement): asset impairment $6K, D&A $41,627K (incl. ~$17.1M of acquired-intangible amortization from the USAHS deal, a wasting item reflected in the growth path rather than the earnings level), bad debt provision $29,492K, SBC $11,730K, deferred taxes $3,830K, sum=$246,599K=NI+non-cash=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(21,359)K (student receivables (4,898), allowance (27,601), other receivables (2,072), prepaid/other 2,510, other non-current assets (383), AP 1,466, accrued/other 9,937, deferred revenue 1,104, ROU/lease (1,422); sum=(21,359), reconciles exactly to reported CFO; reconciliation check passed, <1% gap). OE before capex=$246,599K minus SBC $11,730K=$234,869K. capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, FY2019-FY2025)=1.166%. Revenue rose from $681,263K to $846,096K (+$164,833K, mostly the first full year of USAHS); growth capex=1.166%x$164,833K=$1,923K; maintenance capex=$8,576K-$1,923K=$6,653K. OE=$234,869K-$6,653K=$228,216K. Diluted shares 66,156K. OE/sh=$3.45. First full year including USAHS (closed Dec 2, 2024); not used as the anchor (median of FY2019-FY2025 used instead) to avoid anchoring on a single elevated year, per methodology. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-059331.
2024 $2.95 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$161,594K; NI=$147,590K; non-cash addbacks (per FY2025 10-K 3-yr detail): asset impairment $4,453K, D&A $14,645K, bad debt provision $33,719K, SBC $10,188K, deferred taxes $2,656K, sum=$213,251K=NI+non-cash=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(51,657)K (student receivables (4), allowance (27,981), other receivables (8,052), prepaid/other 4,473, other non-current assets 692, AP (727), accrued/other (5,792), deferred revenue (10,612), ROU/lease (3,654); sum=(51,657), reconciles exactly). OE before capex=$213,251K minus SBC $10,188K=$203,063K. Revenue fell from $710,004K to $681,263K, so growth capex=$0; maintenance capex=total capex $4,625K. OE=$203,063K-$4,625K=$198,438K. Diluted shares 67,242K. OE/sh=$2.95. University of St. Augustine for Health Sciences (USAHS) acquired Dec 2, 2024 for ~$137.8M cash, contributing only 1 month of results. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000950170-25-022187.
2023 $2.76 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$112,025K; NI=$147,652K; non-cash addbacks: asset impairment $14,263K, D&A $16,887K, bad debt provision $33,215K, SBC $8,078K, deferred taxes $3,761K, less gain on disposition of assets $22,086K, net=$54,118K; NI+non-cash=$201,770K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(89,745)K (verified directly against the FY2025 10-K's 3-year cash-flow detail: student receivables +15,929, allowance for credit losses (38,573), other receivables (3,922), prepaid/other (2,994), other non-current assets 478, AP (4,878), accrued/other liabilities (19,235), deferred revenue (34,375), ROU/lease (2,175), sum=(89,745), reconciles exactly to reported CFO). OE before capex=$201,770K minus SBC $8,078K=$193,692K. Revenue rose from $695,208K to $710,004K (+$14,796K); growth capex=1.166%x$14,796K=$173K; maintenance capex=$6,411K-$173K=$6,238K. OE=$193,692K-$6,238K=$187,454K. Diluted shares 67,826K. OE/sh=$2.76. This is the median (anchor) year of the FY2019-FY2025 valuation window. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0000950170-24-017946.
2022 $2.13 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$148,186K; NI=$95,867K; non-cash addbacks: asset impairment $2,994K, D&A $19,734K, bad debt provision $41,574K, SBC $8,751K, deferred taxes $(677)K; NI+non-cash=$168,243K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(20,057)K. OE before capex=$168,243K minus SBC $8,751K=$159,492K. Revenue rose from $693,034K to $695,208K (+$2,174K); growth capex=1.166%x$2,174K=$25K; maintenance capex=$12,620K-$25K=$12,595K. OE=$159,492K-$12,595K=$146,897K. Diluted shares 69,031K. OE/sh=$2.13. Post-pandemic enrollment normalization (trough year of the enrollment cycle). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-004119.
2021 $2.48 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$191,116K; NI=$109,637K; non-cash addbacks: D&A $16,766K, bad debt provision $44,349K, SBC $14,972K, deferred taxes $15,331K; NI+non-cash=$201,055K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(9,939)K. OE before capex=$201,055K minus SBC $14,972K=$186,083K. Revenue rose from $687,314K to $693,034K (+$5,720K); growth capex=1.166%x$5,720K=$67K; maintenance capex=$10,453K-$67K=$10,386K. OE=$186,083K-$10,386K=$175,697K. Diluted shares 70,881K. OE/sh=$2.48. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001564590-22-006719.
2020 $2.79 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$179,956K; NI=$124,264K; non-cash addbacks: asset impairment $612K, D&A $14,786K, bad debt provision $47,561K, SBC $13,379K, deferred taxes $20,366K; NI+non-cash=$220,968K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(41,012)K (COVID-era enrollment surge boosted receivables/deferred revenue). OE before capex=$220,968K minus SBC $13,379K=$207,589K. Revenue rose from $627,704K to $687,314K (+$59,610K); growth capex=1.166%x$59,610K=$695K; maintenance capex=$9,768K-$695K=$9,073K. OE=$207,589K-$9,073K=$198,516K. Diluted shares 71,265K. OE/sh=$2.79. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001564590-21-008099.
2019 $1.94 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$73,085K; NI=$69,982K; non-cash addbacks: D&A $9,145K, bad debt provision $43,470K, SBC $9,274K, deferred taxes $21,674K; NI+non-cash=$153,545K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(80,460)K. OE before capex=$153,545K minus SBC $9,274K=$144,271K. capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, FY2019-FY2025 anchor window)=1.166%. Revenue rose from $581,296K to $627,704K (+$46,408K); growth capex=1.166%x$46,408K=$541K; maintenance capex=$5,174K-$541K=$4,633K. OE=$144,271K-$4,633K=$139,638K. Diluted shares 72,085K. OE/sh=$1.94. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001564590-20-005289.
2018 $1.51 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$56,987K; NI=$55,181K; non-cash addbacks: D&A $9,394K, bad debt provision $32,042K, SBC $5,614K, deferred taxes $18,037K; NI+non-cash=$120,268K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(63,281)K. OE before capex = $120,268K minus SBC $5,614K = $114,654K. Revenue fell from $596,435K to $581,296K, so growth capex=$0; maintenance capex = total capex $6,732K. OE = $114,654K minus $6,732K = $107,922K. Diluted shares 71,482K. OE/sh=$1.51. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001564590-19-003457.
2017 $0.99 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$(21,789)K; NI=$(31,897)K; non-cash addbacks: D&A $13,990K, bad debt provision $27,571K, SBC $4,970K, deferred taxes $65,255K (large one-time item tied to 2017 tax reform); NI+non-cash=$79,889K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(101,678)K. OE before capex = $79,889K minus SBC $4,970K = $74,919K. Revenue fell from $704,392K to $596,435K, so growth capex=$0; maintenance capex = total capex $6,332K. OE = $74,919K minus $6,332K = $68,587K. Diluted shares 68,949K. OE/sh=$0.99. Deferred-tax swing driven by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; year still reflects regulatory-restructuring period, excluded from valuation anchor window. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001564590-18-002683.
2016 $0.23 ▼
OE = CFO minus working-capital movement minus SBC minus maintenance capex. CFO=$6,475K; NI=$(18,712)K; non-cash addbacks: asset impairment $1,164K, D&A $22,747K, bad debt provision $32,049K, SBC $3,237K, deferred taxes $(17,254)K; NI+non-cash=$23,231K=CFO minus working-capital effect, so working-capital effect=$(16,756)K (cash use). OE before capex = $23,231K minus SBC $3,237K = $19,994K. Revenue fell from $847,273K (2015) to $704,392K (2016), so growth capex=$0; maintenance capex = total capex $4,129K. OE = $19,994K minus $4,129K = $15,865K. Diluted shares 68,373K. OE/sh=$0.23. This year reflects the company mid regulatory restructuring (enrollment declines, campus closures) and is not used as the valuation anchor. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001564590-17-002207.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (students nationwide across Northeast, Midwest, West and South, primarily online; USAHS campuses in Florida, California and Texas)
Historical growth strategy
Grows mainly by retaining and enrolling online students at Colorado Technical University and the AIU System, notably through employer tuition-assistance partnerships, funded entirely from internal cash; supplements this with occasional bolt-on acquisitions of smaller institutions (Trident University 2020, DigitalCrafts 2021, University of St. Augustine for Health Sciences 2024) and returns excess cash through buybacks and a rising dividend.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a long recovery from the 2016-2018 lows in the single digits into a multi-year uptrend, with higher highs and higher lows from 2022 through 2025 as the stock moved into the $20s and then $30s. The trend is supported by rising long-term moving averages, but the stock is prone to sharp, headline-driven gaps around Department of Education rulemaking news, and prior highs act as resistance zones where rallies have stalled.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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