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NEWMONT Corp /DE/ (NEM) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$65.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$97.00 $174.00
bear $97.00 base $146.00 bull $174.00 margin of safety $65.00 market price* $118.60
Newmont is the world's largest gold producer, and since absorbing Newcrest Mining in November 2023 it also produces meaningful copper and silver from mines in Ghana, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Mexico, Suriname, Argentina, Nevada, and a Dominican Republic joint venture. Following the Newcrest deal, Newmont's board approved a program to sell six non-core mines (Akyem, Cerro Vanguardia, CC&V, Éléonore, Porcupine, Musselwhite and Telfer) plus a stake in the Havieron project, sharpening the portfolio around its largest, longest-life mines. Proceeds have gone toward debt reduction — total debt fell from about $7.6 billion to $5.1 billion in a single year — and toward a $2 billion share buyback the board authorized in October 2024, running through October 2026. Because the business changed so much in late 2023, we valued it using only the two full years since the merger. On a cash basis — cash actually generated, after removing the swings caused by working-capital timing and after treating stock-based compensation as a real cost rather than a free add-back, and after setting aside the portion of capital spending needed just to keep current mines running versus building new capacity — Newmont generated roughly $3.40 per share in 2024 and about $9.04 per share in 2025, the big jump driven mainly by a much higher gold price. We used the average of the two years as our normalized starting point rather than assuming the stronger year continues. Because owner earnings nearly tripled in one year, we did not extrapolate that pace. Our base case assumes a normal single-digit start (helped by the new Ahafo North mine in Ghana, expected to reach production around late 2025, and by continued share buybacks) tapering toward roughly flat by the back half of the decade, once Newmont's next disclosed projects — the Tanami Expansion in Australia (targeted for 2027) and an expansion at the Cadia mine in Australia — have been absorbed. None of our cases assume the price of gold moves up or down from where it has recently been; we let the three cases differ only on how well Newmont executes. The bear case reflects things that have already happened here, not hypotheticals: a 2023 labor strike at the Peñasquito mine in Mexico that materially cut cash flow for a stretch, and a pattern of large non-cash write-downs — nearly $1.9 billion in 2023 and a further $1.1 billion tied to the divested mines in 2024 — suggesting Newmont has, more than once, paid more for assets than they returned. The bear case assumes flat-to-declining earning power for several years before stabilizing. The bull case assumes the disclosed growth projects land on the schedule and budget the company itself has guided to, and that the authorized buyback and debt paydown continue as planned. On this basis, we estimate a bear-case value of about $97 per share, a base case around $146, and a bull case near $174. The single biggest thing that could make all three of these numbers too high is the price of gold itself: this entire valuation rests on 2025's much stronger cash generation, which came substantially from a higher realized gold price, and we have deliberately not modeled a pullback in that price in any case, since that would mean speculating on the metals market rather than valuing the business. A reader should treat that as the largest source of uncertainty here — larger than the spread between our bear and bull cases. We would also note that Newmont's 2025 working-capital detail was reported differently than in prior years and had to be estimated from underlying balance-sheet data rather than read directly, adding some additional uncertainty to that year's figure specifically. Given that commodity-price risk sits outside our named cases, the margin-of-safety price carries a meaningful cushion — the margin-of-safety price is around $65 per share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $9.04 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$10,334M; SBC=$99M subtracted; capex=$3,035M; capex_ratio (2024-2025 mean)=15.8% x revenue growth ($18,682M to $22,669M = $3,987M) = $630M growth capex; maintenance capex=$2,405M. The working-capital reconciliation line itself was not separately reported as a single tagged figure in the FY2025 10-K's XBRL data (a different tagging convention was used than in prior years); it was reconstructed as $2,181M (use of cash, added back) from the itemized changes in receivables, inventories, other operating assets, payables, other accrued liabilities and accrued taxes payable disclosed in the filing's financial-data tags, cross-checked against the reported CFO total. This reconstruction carries more estimation uncertainty than other years and is flagged accordingly. OE=$10,011M; diluted shares=1,108M; OE/sh=$9.04. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001164727-26-000010.
2024 $3.40 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$6,363M (first full year including the Newcrest assets - Cadia, Lihir, Telfer/Havieron, Red Chris stake); WC reconciliation line = $1,025M use of cash, added back; SBC=$89M subtracted; capex=$3,402M. FY2024 revenue jump ($11,812M to $18,682M) is dominated by the Newcrest acquisition (inorganic), so growth capex is set to $0 and maintenance capex=$3,402M (all of capex), i.e. this transformation year is measured from the transformation forward rather than attributing acquisition-driven revenue growth to growth capex. OE=$3,897M; diluted shares=1,148M; OE/sh=$3.40. Independently reconciled: NI(incl NCI)=$3,381M + D&A $2,576M + impairment $78M + loss on assets held for sale $1,114M + other net non-cash/discontinued-ops items (net $105M) - maintenance capex $3,402M = $3,852M, within a few percent of the CFO-based figure (difference explained by rounding and the SBC treatment). Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001164727-25-000011.
2023 $0.63 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,763M (depressed by the 2023 Penasquito labor strike, which the company's own MD&A cites as reducing cash generation that year); WC reconciliation line = $513M use of cash, added back; SBC=$80M subtracted; capex=$2,666M. Revenue declined slightly ($11,915M to $11,812M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$2,666M (all of capex); this is also the year the Newcrest acquisition closed (November 2023), adding one-time deal costs and a large impairment charge (already correctly excluded from OE via the CFO-based approach, since impairments are non-cash). OE=$530M; diluted shares=841M; OE/sh=$0.63. This year is distorted by the strike and acquisition and is excluded from the valuation anchor. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001164727-24-000016.
2022 $2.33 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$3,220M; WC reconciliation line = $841M use of cash, added back; SBC=$76M subtracted; capex=$2,131M (start of the Ahafo North / Tanami Expansion 2 development capital program). Revenue declined slightly ($12,222M to $11,915M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$2,131M (all of capex) under the mechanical formula, which likely understates true growth capex during this build-out year since production from these projects had not yet been realized as revenue - flagged as a judgment call. OE=$1,854M; diluted shares=795M; OE/sh=$2.33. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001164727-23-000011.
2021 $4.01 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$4,279M; WC reconciliation line = $541M use of cash, added back; SBC=$72M subtracted; capex=$1,653M; capex_ratio (2019-2023 mean)=16.1% x revenue growth ($11,497M to $12,222M = $725M) = $117M growth capex; maintenance capex=$1,537M. OE=$3,212M; diluted shares=801M; OE/sh=$4.01. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001164727-22-000007.
2020 $4.32 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$4,882M; WC reconciliation line = $295M source of cash (subtracted, removing the favorable one-time WC release); SBC=$84M subtracted; capex=$1,302M; capex_ratio (2019-2023 mean)=16.1% x revenue growth ($9,740M to $11,497M = $1,757M) = $282M growth capex; maintenance capex=$1,020M. OE=$3,483M; diluted shares=806M; OE/sh=$4.32. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001164727-21-000027.
2019 $2.16 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,866M; WC reconciliation line = $309M use of cash, added back; SBC=$121M subtracted; capex=$1,463M. FY2019 revenue jump ($7,253M to $9,740M) reflects the Goldcorp merger (closed April 2019), not organic growth, so growth capex is set to $0 and maintenance capex=$1,463M (all of capex), consistent with treating a transformational-acquisition year as measured from the transformation forward rather than mechanically attributing inorganic revenue growth to growth capex. OE=$1,591M; diluted shares=737M; OE/sh=$2.16. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001558370-20-001041.
2018 $2.73 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$1,827M; WC reconciliation line = $743M use of cash, added back; SBC=$76M subtracted; capex=$1,032M; revenue declined ($7,379M to $7,253M) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$1,032M (all of capex). OE=$1,462M; diluted shares=535M; OE/sh=$2.73. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001558370-19-000806.
2017 $3.14 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,124M (latest restated); WC reconciliation line = $392M use of cash, added back; SBC=$70M subtracted; capex=$866M; capex_ratio (2016-2018 mean)=14.3% x revenue growth ($6,680M to $7,379M = $699M) = $100M growth capex; maintenance capex=$766M. OE=$1,680M; diluted shares=535M; OE/sh=$3.14. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001558370-18-000894.
2016 $4.06 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$2,786M (latest restated); net change in operating assets/liabilities (tag IncreaseDecreaseInOperatingCapital) = $493M use of cash, added back to strip the WC timing swing; SBC=$70M subtracted; capex=$1,133M; capex_ratio (2016-2018 mean)=14.3% x revenue growth ($6,085M to $6,680M = $595M) = $85M growth capex; maintenance capex=$1,048M. OE=$2,161M; diluted shares=532M; OE/sh=$4.06. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001558370-17-000729.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Ghana (West Africa); Australia and Papua New Guinea; United States – West (Nevada); Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Suriname (Latin America); Dominican Republic (Pueblo Viejo joint venture, Caribbean); Canada (legacy operations being divested)
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