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Hyatt Hotels Corp (H) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$28.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$17.00 $90.00
bear $17.00 base $55.00 bull $90.00 margin of safety $28.00 market price* $169.13
Hyatt Hotels is a global hotel company. Most of its profit now comes from fees: it manages and franchises hotels owned by others (about $1.2 billion of gross fees in 2025, up from $1.1 billion in 2024 and $970 million in 2023), and it runs a large loyalty program (World of Hyatt) funded partly by co-brand credit card deals. A smaller part is owned and leased hotels (about $1.4 billion of revenue in 2025) and distribution (all-inclusive resort travel sales). Reported revenue of $7.1 billion includes $3.6 billion of costs reimbursed by hotel owners, which carry no profit. How we measured earnings. We start from operating cash flow, remove the swing in receivables and payables, deduct stock compensation ($74 million in 2025) and deduct only the capital spending needed to keep hotels and systems up to standard, treating the rest as growth spending. We left payments to hotel owners for signing contracts ('key money', about $134 million in 2025) inside earnings because Hyatt has to keep making them to keep growing its fee base. On that basis, per-share earnings were roughly $5.90 in 2022, $5.50 in 2023, $3.50 in 2024 and $2.35 in 2025. 2020 (a loss of about $6 per share) and 2021 (still pandemic-depressed) were excluded from our estimate of normal earnings. 2022 and 2023 were flattered by the travel rebound and by large cash inflows from customer deposits and loyalty-program prepayments, which are timing rather than lasting profit. We settled on normal earnings of about $2.50 per share. That is slightly above 2025 because 2025 cash flow was reduced by acquisition and integration costs for Playa Hotels, which the company itself cites, plus higher interest and taxes. It is well below 2022-2023 because those years contained one-off help. Earnings fell about 33% in 2025, and we do not assume a rebound beyond that return to normal. Base case: $55 per share. Earnings of $2.50 grow about 4% a year for ten years, driven by hotels already signed and in the development pipeline that add to the fee base, a process Hyatt has delivered steadily. After year ten we hold earnings flat, reflecting brands and long-term management and franchise contracts already in place, and credit no further growth. We do not credit new brands, market expansion, or margin improvement. Bear case: $17 per share. Earnings drop to about $1.50 and shrink about 2% a year. The named risks are real: about $4.3 billion of debt (mostly fixed-rate notes of 4.4% to 5.75% at Hyatt, but larger after the Playa purchase), the owned and leased hotels that lose money quickly in a travel downturn (2020 cash flow was negative $611 million), and a history of asset write-downs ($213 million in 2024 and $40 million in 2025). No recovery is credited afterwards. Bull case: $90 per share. Earnings return to about $3.20, near the 2024 level, and grow about 7% a year for ten years as the signed pipeline opens on schedule, then hold flat. What could make this wrong. Cash flow has a lot of moving parts (loyalty prepayments, contract liabilities, taxes on asset sales). We could not fully tie every line of the cash-flow statement to net income and reconcile it, and part of 2018-2019 weakness (low cash flow in years with large asset sales) may reflect taxes on gains rather than operations. Hyatt has sold billions of owned real estate and bought Playa Hotels in 2025 then resold much of it; the mix of the business keeps changing, which makes any earnings level less certain. The estimates would be too high if fee growth slows below 4% or if 2025 earnings of $2.35 is the true run rate rather than a trough.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $2.35 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$379M; WC cash effect=$(118)M; SBC=$74M; capex=$220M, growth capex=$21.2M, maint=$198.8M; OE=$224.2M; diluted shares=95.5M; OE/sh=$2.35. CFO depressed by Playa transaction/integration costs and higher interest and taxes. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001468174-26-000007.
2024 $3.50 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$633M; WC cash effect=$41M; SBC=$64M; capex=$170M, revenue declined so maint=$170M; OE=$358M; diluted shares=102.4M; OE/sh=$3.50. Source: FY2024 10-K accession 0001468174-25-000009.
2023 $5.50 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$800M; WC cash effect=$(29)M; SBC=$75M; capex=$198M, growth capex=$36.3M, maint=$161.7M; OE=$592.3M; diluted shares=107.7M; OE/sh=$5.50. Includes $290M contract-liability and $202M loyalty deferred-revenue inflows left in CFO. Source: FY2023 10-K accession 0001468174-24-000014.
2022 $5.92 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$674M; WC cash effect=$(113)M; SBC=$61M; capex=$201M, growth capex=$134M, maint=$67M; OE=$659M; diluted shares=111.3M; OE/sh=$5.92. Rebound year. Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0001468174-23-000009.
2021 $1.81 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$315M; WC cash effect=$2M; SBC=$59M; capex=$111M, growth capex=$45.0M, maint=$66.0M; OE=$188M; diluted shares=104.0M; OE/sh=$1.81. COVID-depressed, excluded from anchor. Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0001468174-22-000016.
2020 -$6.17 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$(611)M; WC cash effect=$(136)M; SBC=$28M; capex=$122M, revenue declined so maint=$122M; OE=$(625)M; diluted shares=101.3M; OE/sh=$(6.17). COVID year, excluded from anchor. Source: FY2020 10-K accession 0001468174-21-000011.
2019 $0.72 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$396M; WC cash effect=$(58)M (AP tag values differed across filings; latest used); SBC=$35M; capex=$369M, growth capex=$26.5M, maint=$342.5M; OE=$76.5M; diluted shares=106.3M; OE/sh=$0.72. Source: FY2019 10-K accession 0001468174-20-000015.
2018 $0.71 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$341M; WC cash effect=$(66)M; SBC=$28M; capex=$297M, revenue declined so growth capex=0, maint=$297M; OE=$82M; diluted shares=115.1M; OE/sh=$0.71. Source: FY2018 10-K accession 0001468174-19-000009.
2017 $1.52 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$587M; WC cash effect=$77M; SBC=$32M; capex=$298M, growth capex=$12.0M, maint=$286.0M; OE=$192.0M; diluted shares=126.3M; OE/sh=$1.52. Source: FY2017 10-K accession 0001468174-18-000014.
2016 $1.75 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. WC = receivables, inventories, AP/accrued only (key money, prepaids, deferred revenue left in CFO as recurring). CFO=$462M (restated); WC cash effect=$(5)M; SBC=$26M; capex=$211M, capex/rev mean 4.68%, growth capex=$4.7M so maint=$206.3M; OE=$234.7M; diluted shares=133.9M; OE/sh=$1.75. Source: FY2016 10-K accession 0001468174-17-000010 (revenue series from later 10-Ks).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (all regions, Northeast, Midwest, South and West, with notable exposure to Florida, California, New York and Hawaii); Mexico; Dominican Republic; Jamaica; Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy); Middle East; Asia-Pacific (China, Japan, India, Australia); Latin America; Canada
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