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COMCAST CORP (CCZ) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$38.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$58.00 $111.00
bear $58.00 base $78.00 bull $111.00 margin of safety $38.00 market price* $65.70
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Two consecutive quarters of stabilizing domestic broadband customer losses (flat-to-improving net adds rather than continued acceleration of the ~700,000 annual losses seen in 2025), and the first post-separation quarters showing no material stranded corporate overhead left behind by the Versant spin-off.
Comcast is best known as the parent of Xfinity — residential and business broadband, video and wireless service across a large part of the United States — and of NBCUniversal, which includes the NBC broadcast network, Telemundo, the Peacock streaming service, Universal Pictures, and the Universal theme parks in Orlando and Hollywood. It also owns Sky, a pay-TV and broadband provider across the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. One important clarification: the specific security tied to this record is a small, decades-old exchangeable subordinated debenture Comcast assumed from a prior corporate transaction, which trades separately on the New York Stock Exchange — not Comcast's common stock. The figures below value a share of Comcast's common equity using our standard cash-based approach; they are not a valuation of that bond and should not be read as its fair yield or price. Broadband has been Comcast's profit engine for two decades, but 2025 was the first full year in which the customer count clearly turned down — domestic broadband customers fell by about 711,000 to 31.3 million, pressured by fixed-wireless competitors and fiber overbuilders. Revenue in that business held roughly steady anyway, because average rates rose enough to offset the customer losses — a real, filed fact that shapes how much weight we put on pricing power going forward. Wireless (Xfinity Mobile), which piggybacks on another carrier's network at low capital cost, kept growing briskly (+1.5 million lines in 2025) and is becoming a meaningful offset. Traditional pay-TV continues to shrink (-1.3 million video customers in 2025), a well-understood, decades-long trend. Peacock, the streaming service, is still losing money but the loss narrowed from $1.8 billion in 2024 to $1.1 billion in 2025 as paid subscribers grew by 8 million to 44 million. Epic Universe, a third Orlando theme park costing several billion dollars to build, opened in May 2025 and is already contributing revenue; major theme parks typically take a couple of years to reach mature attendance. On January 2, 2026, Comcast completed the spin-off of Versant Media Group — a collection of its older cable networks (including the channel formerly known as MSNBC, USA Network, Syfy, E!, Golf Channel and CNBC) — into an independent public company. This permanently removes a modest slice of revenue and cash flow from Comcast's results starting in 2026, and we built that reduction into the starting point of every case below rather than into the long-term growth rate. We build cash generation from actual operating cash flow rather than reported net income, and then back out stock-based compensation and the cash used for working-capital swings, leaving only the capital spending needed to maintain (not grow) the business. Two items would otherwise distort the picture if net income were used directly: an approximately $10.6 billion one-time, non-cash tax benefit from the 2017 tax law, and an $8.6 billion non-cash write-down of certain assets in 2022. Neither affected the cash-flow-based figures used here. Separately, cash income taxes paid swung sharply — $7.1 billion in 2024 (tied to the taxable gain on selling Comcast's Hulu stake) versus $0.8 billion in 2025 (helped by a tax refund and new tax-law deductions). Both years are real, disclosed cash events, and the anchor we used reflects the middle of several recent years, not the most recent one ($4.08/share). Bear case: broadband customer losses continue to worsen rather than stabilize as fixed-wireless and fiber competition intensifies; video losses continue their long decline; and roughly $99 billion of total debt, combined with rising refinancing costs, slows the pace of share buybacks. Cash generation per share drifts down modestly for the next decade before leveling off. Base case: broadband losses continue at roughly their current pace but pricing keeps segment revenue close to flat, as it did in 2025; wireless keeps growing; Peacock's losses keep narrowing without a firm profitability date assumed; Epic Universe ramps up over the next few years; and the company continues its buyback program, though at a somewhat more measured pace given the debt load. Bull case: the same drivers play out at the better end of what's already visible — wireless and Epic Universe growth are stronger, Peacock reaches sustained profitability on the strength of its two-year trend, and buybacks continue near their historical pace. We valued each case using a fixed discount rate rather than one that changes with perceived risk — the riskiness of the business is expressed in how far apart the three cases are — and we did not subtract any debt from the result, since the cash flow used here is already after real cash interest payments; the debt load is instead reflected as a headwind inside the bear case. What would have to be true for this to be wrong: if broadband and video losses accelerate meaningfully faster than pricing can offset, or if the debt load forces buybacks to stop, actual results would land nearer the bear case. If Peacock's losses stop narrowing and start widening again, or if Epic Universe's ramp disappoints, the same is true. Conversely, if broadband stabilizes and wireless keeps compounding, results could run above the base case. One item we could not fully reconcile: after rebuilding 2025 cash flow independently, our figure came in a few percent below actual reported operating cash flow — a modest, unexplained gap likely tied to a smaller reconciling item not separately broken out in the filing. It does not change our conclusions, but we note it for completeness. The margin-of-safety price sits meaningfully below our base-case estimate, and assumes early evidence that the broadband subscriber decline is stabilizing rather than accelerating, and that the recent corporate spin-off has not left behind meaningful stranded costs.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $5.71 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$33,643M; ΔWC=$(551)M; SBC=$1,288M; capex=$11,750M. Revenue declined slightly 2024→2025 ($123,731M→$123,707M), so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=total capex=$11,750M. OE=33,643−(−551)−1,288−11,750=$21,156M. Diluted shares=3,709M. OE/sh=21,156/3,709=$5.71. Note: 2025 CFO was boosted by a federal income tax refund from a capital-loss carryback (2024 internal reorganization) and additional 2025 tax-legislation deductions, plus a large non-cash net gain on investment activity that reduced taxable cash outflows versus 2024's Hulu-sale-related tax payment — cash income taxes paid fell to $755M from $7,096M. This one-time tax-timing benefit means 2025 is not treated as the new run-rate; it is one input to the median anchor, not the anchor itself. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-004994.
2024 $4.08 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$27,673M; ΔWC=$(1,559)M; SBC=$1,288M; capex=$12,181M. capex_ratio (2019-2025 window)=9.15%; revenue 2023=$121,572M, 2024=$123,731M, ΔRev=$2,159M; growth capex=9.15%×2,159=$198M; maintenance capex=12,181−198=$11,983M. OE=27,673−(−1,559)−1,288−11,983=$15,961M. Diluted shares=3,908M. OE/sh=15,961/3,908=$4.08. Note: 2024 CFO was depressed by unusually high cash income taxes paid ($7,096M) tied to the taxable gain on the Hulu stake sale to Disney; this is a real, disclosed cash item, not adjusted out, but is a factor in why 2024 sits at the low end relative to 2025. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-004994.
2023 $4.12 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$28,501M; ΔWC=$(2,055)M; SBC=$1,241M; capex=$12,242M. capex_ratio (2019-2025 window)=9.15%; revenue 2022=$121,427M, 2023=$121,572M, ΔRev=$145M; growth capex=9.15%×145=$13M; maintenance capex=12,242−13=$12,229M. OE=28,501−(−2,055)−1,241−12,229=$17,086M. Diluted shares=4,148M. OE/sh=17,086/4,148=$4.12. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001166691-25-000011.
2022 $4.04 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$26,413M; ΔWC=$(3,006)M; SBC=$1,336M; capex=$10,626M. capex_ratio (2019-2025 window)=9.15%; revenue 2021=$116,385M, 2022=$121,427M, ΔRev=$5,042M; growth capex=9.15%×5,042=$461M; maintenance capex=10,626−461=$10,165M. OE=26,413−(−3,006)−1,336−10,165=$17,918M. Diluted shares=4,430M. OE/sh=17,918/4,430=$4.04. Note: reported net income of $5,370M was depressed by an $8,583M non-cash goodwill/long-lived-asset impairment; since OE is built from CFO (which already reflects the impairment as a non-cash add-back within net income, and CFO itself was not materially affected by the impairment), the impairment does not distort this OE figure. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001166691-24-000011.
2021 $4.58 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$29,146M; ΔWC=$(1,499)M; SBC=$1,315M; capex=$9,174M. capex_ratio (2019-2025 window)=9.15%; revenue 2020=$103,564M, 2021=$116,385M, ΔRev=$12,821M; growth capex=9.15%×12,821=$1,173M; maintenance capex=9,174−1,173=$8,001M. OE=29,146−(−1,499)−1,315−8,001=$21,329M. Diluted shares=4,654M. OE/sh=21,329/4,654=$4.58. 2021 benefited from COVID recovery (theme park reopening, ad rebound). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001166691-23-000010.
2020 $3.14 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$24,737M; ΔWC=$(178)M; SBC=$1,193M; capex=$9,179M. Revenue declined 2019→2020 ($108,942M→$103,564M, COVID-19 impact on theme parks/advertising/Sky sports), so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=total capex=$9,179M. OE=24,737−(−178)−1,193−9,179=$14,543M. Diluted shares=4,624M. OE/sh=14,543/4,624=$3.14. 2020 was depressed by COVID-19 (theme park closures, advertising declines); flagged as a non-recurring distortion and excluded from the anchor window median. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001166691-22-000009.
2019 $3.99 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$25,697M; ΔWC=$(2,335)M; SBC=$1,021M; capex=$9,953M (accn 0001166691-21-000008, latest restated). capex_ratio (2019-2025 post-Sky window)=9.15%; revenue 2018=$94,507M, 2019=$108,942M, ΔRev=$14,435M; growth capex=9.15%×14,435=$1,321M; maintenance capex=9,953−1,321=$8,632M. OE=25,697−(−2,335)−1,021−8,632=$18,379M. Diluted shares=4,610M. OE/sh=18,379/4,610=$3.99. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001166691-21-000008.
2018 $3.46 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$24,297M; ΔWC=$(1,313)M; SBC=$826M; capex=$9,774M (all accn 0001166691-20-000008, latest restated). capex_ratio (2016-2018 window)=10.96%; revenue 2017=$85,029M, 2018=$94,507M, ΔRev=$9,478M; growth capex=10.96%×9,478=$1,039M; maintenance capex=9,774−1,039=$8,735M. OE=24,297−(−1,313)−826−8,735=$16,049M. Diluted shares=4,640M. OE/sh=16,049/4,640=$3.46. FY2018 was the first full year including Sky (acquired Oct 2018), a major structural addition to the business. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001166691-20-000008.
2017 $2.50 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$21,261M (latest restated, accn 0001166691-19-000005); ΔWC=$(546)M (latest restated, per FY2019 10-K accn 0001166691-20-000008 MD&A table; originally reported as $(510)M in the FY2017 10-K prior to ASC 606 adoption restatement — latest figure used per methodology). SBC=$751M; capex=$9,550M. capex_ratio (2016-2018 window)=10.96%; revenue 2016=$80,736M, 2017=$85,029M (restated), ΔRev=$4,293M; growth capex=10.96%×4,293=$471M; maintenance capex=9,550−471=$9,079M. OE=21,261−(−546)−751−9,079=$11,977M. Diluted shares=4,786M. OE/sh=11,977/4,786=$2.50. Note: reported net income of $22,735M this year was inflated ~$10.6B by a one-time non-cash deferred tax benefit from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; because OE is built from CFO rather than net income, this non-cash item does not distort the figure. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001166691-20-000008 (comparative figures).
2016 $2.47 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex (ΔWC subtracted as reported, so a negative/use-of-cash WC line adds back to OE). CFO=$19,691M (latest restated, FY2018 10-K accn 0001166691-19-000005); ΔWC (Changes in operating assets and liabilities, per MD&A cash-flow reconciliation, FY2017 10-K accn 0001166691-18-000004, restated in later filings)=$(1,430)M; SBC=$640M; capex=$9,135M. Maintenance capex: capex_ratio=mean(capex/revenue) 2016-2018=10.96%; revenue 2015=$74,510M, 2016=$80,736M (restated), ΔRev=$6,226M; growth capex=10.96%×6,226=$683M; maintenance capex=9,135−683=$8,453M. OE=19,691−(−1,430)−640−8,453=$12,028M. Diluted shares=4,875M (post Feb-2017 2-for-1 split, restated). OE/sh=12,028/4,875=$2.47. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001166691-19-000005 (comparative figures).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (nationwide broadband/video/wireless footprint historically concentrated in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic — Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York — with material presence in the South, including Florida and Georgia, the Midwest, including Illinois and Michigan, and the West, including California, Washington and Colorado; theme park revenue booked in Florida and California); United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Sky pay-TV and broadband); and licensing/theme-park royalty revenue from Japan and China (Universal Studios Japan and Universal Studios Beijing joint ventures).
Historical growth strategy

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Circle of competence

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