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biote Corp. (BTMD) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$1.75 ComplexityAverage Updated
-$3.00 $5.44
bear -$3.00 base $0.22 bull $5.44 margin of safety $1.75 market price* $1.09
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Two consecutive quarterly reports showing (a) GAAP gross margin of at least 70%, (b) procedure revenue flat or higher than the same quarter a year earlier, and (c) compliance with the 3.75x total net leverage covenant without a waiver or amendment of the Truist credit agreement.
Biote trains and certifies independent physicians, nurse practitioners and other clinicians to offer bioidentical hormone pellet therapy, and sells those practices the hormone pellets, procedure kits and disposable trocars they use, plus a line of Biote-branded dietary supplements. The pellets are compounded drugs rather than FDA-approved products; they come from outside compounding pharmacies and, increasingly, from the company's own outsourcing facility, Asteria Health. Revenue in 2025 was $192.2 million, roughly three-quarters from pellet procedures and most of the rest from supplements. What has changed since our previous estimate. We previously treated the 2023-2025 level of cash earnings as the company's normal earning power and valued the shares at about $9.50 in the middle case. The first half of 2026 shows that level no longer holds. Revenue fell 8.9% to $89.2 million. Procedure revenue fell 13.9% in the second quarter to $30.3 million, or about 9% if you exclude the roughly $3.3 million of sales lost to the January 2026 voluntary recall of pellets shipped by Asteria Health between May 2025 and January 2026 because of possible metal particles. Gross margin fell from about 73% to 67% as the company bought replacement pellets from outside suppliers at higher cost. Selling, general and administrative costs rose from $50.9 million to $60.2 million, including a $5.1 million charge for legal settlements. Operating profit went from $20.5 million to a $0.3 million loss. Two consecutive weak quarters, following a $13.3 million drop in procedure revenue in 2025 that the company tied to fewer new clinics joining, are enough for us to lower the earnings level we start from. The earlier per-share figure for 2025 also counted some exchangeable units twice; correcting that raises 2025 cash earnings per share slightly but does not change the dollar figures used here. How we measure earnings. We start from operating cash flow, remove working-capital swings, and deduct stock compensation (about $7.5-9 million a year, a real cost to owners) and the capital spending needed to keep the business running. We then add back cash interest so the business is valued before its lenders, and subtract the debt separately. On that basis the business produced about $34 million in 2023, $29 million in 2024 and $36 million in 2025. In the first half of 2026 it lost about $6 million on the same basis, or roughly broke even after adding back the one-time legal settlements and the $2.2 million of costs the company attributes to the recall. That implies a current run rate of about $9 million a year. About $1-1.5 million of first-half operating cash outflow could not be matched to a specific line in the filings, and we have treated it as a cost. We assume about $4-6.5 million a year of upkeep capital spending, below the 2024-2026 level, which included building out Asteria. The debt. In May 2026 the company replaced its old term loan with a new Truist Bank facility: a fully drawn $125 million term loan and an undrawn $50 million revolver, both maturing May 8, 2031, at SOFR plus 2.50-2.75% (about 6.15% at June 30, close to our 6% valuation rate). With $11.2 million of cash, net debt is about $114 million and annual interest about $7.7 million. The loan caps total net leverage at 3.75 times EBITDA, falling to 3.25 times from December 31, 2027, and requires fixed-charge coverage of at least 1.25 times. Our own estimate of 2026 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, stock compensation and the one-time items is roughly $25-27 million, which puts leverage at about 4.2-4.5 times. The company was in compliance at June 30, but as the stronger 2025 quarters drop out of the calculation that cushion disappears, so an amendment, a waiver or a repricing looks likely. Bear case: procedure revenue keeps falling at the roughly 9% a year of the last two years, Asteria's cost disadvantage persists, legal costs continue at recent levels, and costs adjust only slowly. Cash earnings before interest fall to about $1.4 million next year and about zero the year after, then settle near $2 million a year once costs are cut. That does not cover the interest bill, so the leverage covenant is breached and lenders reprice or restructure the loan. We charge about $14 million for three extra points of interest through 2031. The business would be worth about $31 million against roughly $128 million owed, meaning the company would owe about $97 million more than it is worth, or about -$3.00 a share. In practice shareholders would likely be wiped out or heavily diluted. Base case: the one-time legal and recall costs do not recur, Asteria recovers half of its lost margin, and half of the recall-related sales return, for a starting level of about $14 million. Procedure revenue keeps shrinking but more slowly (8%, then 5%, then 3%) while clinic attrition stays around the 8% management reports, and each lost dollar of procedure revenue costs about 35 cents of profit. That gives cash earnings before interest of about $10.4 million, then $8.4 million, then a steady $7.2 million a year, which the recurring nature of pellet therapy across an established practitioner network sustains thereafter. The business is worth about $124 million. Subtracting about $114 million of net debt and about $3 million for the likely cost of amending the leverage covenant leaves about $7 million, or about $0.22 a share. In this case the business earns little more than its interest bill and cannot pay down the loan from its own cash. Bull case: Asteria's restored production (the company says it has added a second shift and is back to normal inventory levels) brings gross margin back to the roughly 71.5% earned in 2025, recall-related sales return in full, and procedure revenue declines only 4% and then 2% before holding steady. Cash earnings before interest are about $18 million next year, settling at about $17.3 million a year. The business is worth about $290 million. Less $114 million of net debt, that leaves about $176 million, or about $5.44 a share. Per-share values use about 32.3 million economic shares: roughly 27.1 million Class A shares plus 5.2 million units exchangeable into Class A. They exclude about 3.6 million earnout shares and units that vest only at share prices far above these values, as well as out-of-the-money options, whose cost is already covered by deducting stock compensation. What we did not credit: further growth in Biote-branded supplements (up 12% in the first half of 2026, but only a two-year record), the acquisitions management says it is evaluating, cost cuts beyond those described in the cases, and any return to the 2023-2025 earnings level, which was earned on a larger procedure business that has since shrunk. Management's adjusted earnings guidance was not used to set any figure. Risks and what could make this wrong: the business depends on continued access to compounded bioidentical hormones and on how regulators treat them. The recall shows how one manufacturing problem at the in-house facility can hit both margins and practitioner confidence. The company is run by an interim chief executive. It has also faced repeated litigation, including disputes with its founder that ended with the $18.5 million repurchase of his remaining shares in January 2026. On the upside, if the procedure decline stops quickly and margins recover in full, the value would sit near the bull case. The range of outcomes runs from shareholders being wiped out to about $5.44 a share, with the middle close to zero, so price alone does not establish a margin of safety. If the company shows two quarters of restored margins, stable procedure revenue and covenant compliance without lender relief, the margin-of-safety price is $1.75 a share. That leaves room for a 20% annual return while the debt is still outstanding.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $0.75 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, consolidated basis. CFO=$35,194K (reconciled: NI $31,597K + D&A $3,670K + bad debt $1,721K + debt-issuance amort $833K + obsolete-inventory provision $2,023K + non-cash lease $545K + non-cash interest on share repurchase liability $3,184K + SBC $8,921K + FV gain on earnout liability $(13,023)K + deferred taxes $3,975K + ΔWC $(8,252)K = $35,194K, matches reported). ΔWC=$(8,252)K (AR $(958)K, inventory $(6,242)K, other current assets $1,694K, AP $1,013K, deferred revenue $(400)K, accrued expenses $(2,743)K, TRA payment $(93)K, operating lease liabilities $(523)K). SBC=$8,921K. Capex=PP&E $5,015K + capitalized software $1,849K=$6,864K; revenue DECLINED $4,972K vs FY24, so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$6,864K. OE=$35,194+8,252-8,921-6,864=$27,661K. Diluted shares=36,666,766 (Class A weighted-average diluted; per the FY2025 10-K EPS note the 5,221,653 Class V units were NOT antidilutive in 2025 and are already included in this diluted count). OE/sh=$0.7544. CORRECTED 2026-10-02: prior value $0.6603 added the 5,221,653 Class V units a second time (41,888,419 shares) - arithmetic/basis error. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-106099.
2024 $0.51 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, consolidated basis. CFO=$45,243K (reconciled: NI $46K + D&A $3,574K + bad debt $1,490K + debt-issuance amort $819K + obsolete-inventory provision $503K + non-cash lease $815K + non-cash interest on share repurchase liability $2,620K + SBC $8,735K + FV loss on earnout liability $19,605K + deferred taxes $(2,898)K + ΔWC $9,934K = $45,243K, matches reported). ΔWC=$9,934K (AR $(2,267)K, inventory $3,714K, other current assets $2,882K, AP $1,545K, deferred revenue $190K, accrued expenses $4,632K, operating lease liabilities $(762)K) — a net one-time source of cash, stripped out per methodology. SBC=$8,735K. Capex=PP&E $6,430K + capitalized software $526K=$6,956K; revenue grew $11,831K vs FY23; using 2.854% capex ratio, growth capex=$338K, maintenance capex=$6,618K. OE=$45,243-9,934-8,735-6,618=$19,956K. Shares: Class A weighted-avg-diluted 34,270,809 + Class V outstanding at year-end 5,221,653 (sharply lower than FY23 due to a large cash-funded buyout of founder/physician Class V units during 2024, disclosed as 'payments on repurchase liability' of $62.2M in financing activities) = 39,492,462. OE/sh=$0.5053. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000950170-25-039394.
2023 $0.45 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, on consolidated (100%, pre-NCI-allocation) basis, using ProfitLoss as CFO's starting net income line. CFO=$26,883K (reconciled: NI $(2,805)K + D&A $2,994K + bad debt $663K + debt-issuance amort $794K + capitalized-software write-off $313K + inventory-obsolescence benefit $(26)K + non-cash lease $499K + shares issued in litigation settlement $1,199K + SBC $9,057K + FV loss on warrant liability $13,411K + FV loss on earnout liability $8,990K + deferred taxes $721K + ΔWC $(8,927)K = $26,883K, matches reported). ΔWC=$(8,927)K (AR $(505)K, inventory $(6,098)K, other current assets $(5,418)K, AP $(165)K, deferred revenue $1,433K, accrued expenses $2,223K, operating lease liabilities $(397)K). SBC=$9,057K. Capex=PP&E $359K + capitalized software $2,354K = $2,713K; capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue FY23-25)=2.854%; revenue grew $20,403K vs FY22, so growth capex=$582K, maintenance capex=$2,131K. OE=$26,883+8,927-9,057-2,131=$24,622K. Diluted, as-exchanged shares (Up-C structure: Class A weighted-avg-diluted 25,709,343 + Class V/NCI economic units outstanding at year-end 28,819,066)=54,528,409. OE/sh=$0.4515. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0000950170-24-032101, and FY2024 10-K accession 0000950170-25-039394 (comparative detail). FY2021-2022 excluded from series: FY2021 is the pre-IPO private predecessor (no Up-C/NCI structure, SBC not comparably disclosed) and FY2022 was the de-SPAC transition/stub year distorted by an $82.2M one-time equity-compensation charge tied to the business combination; both describe a different corporate structure than the business as it exists now.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (nationwide network of independent healthcare practitioner clinics across the South, Midwest, Northeast and West, with its home base in Texas), with small international sales in Canada, Puerto Rico, Mexico and the Dominican Republic.
Historical growth strategy
Organic growth by recruiting, training and certifying independent clinicians in its hormone-pellet method, then selling that practitioner network recurring consumables (pellets, procedure kits, trocars) and Biote-branded supplements; more recently vertical integration through its own Asteria Health compounding facility and direct-to-consumer supplement e-commerce. Capital has gone mainly to debt-funded repurchases of founder-held shares rather than acquisitions.
Chart analysis
A chartist would see a long, persistent downtrend. Since listing through a SPAC merger in 2022 near $10, the stock has made a series of lower highs and lower lows, and 2026 brought a further breakdown after the pellet recall and weak results. It now sits at its 52-week low near $1.15, against a 52-week high of about $3.26, below falling 50- and 200-day moving averages. Nearby resistance is around $1.21-$1.30, and the $1 level is the obvious psychological support. No base or reversal pattern has formed; a chartist would want the price to reclaim its moving averages before calling a bottom.
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