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Beachbody Company, Inc. (BODI) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$7.50 ComplexityAverage Updated
$2.50 $33.00
bear $2.50 base $15.00 bull $33.00 margin of safety $7.50 market price* $4.41
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Revenue decline continues to decelerate toward the low double digits or better over the next 2-3 reported quarters, and cash flow from operations turns reliably positive again (H1 2026 CFO was negative despite positive net income) - confirming the post-Pivot subscriber and nutrition base is stabilizing rather than continuing its multi-year collapse.
BODi (formerly The Beachbody Company) sells home fitness content through a digital streaming subscription (workout programs, live and on-demand classes) alongside nutrition products, most notably its long-running Shakeology shake line, sold direct to consumers primarily in the United States, with smaller sales in Canada, the United Kingdom and France. The business has been shrinking for five straight years. Revenue peaked near $874 million in 2021, the year the company went public through a merger with a special-purpose acquisition company, and has fallen every year since as pandemic-era demand faded and digital subscribers and nutrition customers both declined. In 2025, revenue fell again to $252 million, down 40% from the prior year, with both the digital subscription business (down 32%) and the nutrition business (down 48%) shrinking sharply. The pace of decline moderated somewhat in the first half of 2026, down about 24% from a year earlier, but the business is still contracting. What changed in 2025 is profitability, not growth. Management ran a cost-restructuring program (referred to internally as "the Pivot") that cut stock-based compensation by two-thirds and reduced selling and marketing spending by over 10 percentage points of revenue. As a result, 2025 was the first year in several that the company generated real cash profit after accounting for the true ongoing cost of the business, including the cost of continually producing new workout content (which this analysis treats as an ongoing operating cost, not a one-time or reversible item, since stale content is what drives subscriber cancellations). That is a meaningful, already-realized change, not a hoped-for one. In the first half of 2026 the company also refinanced its previous, extremely expensive loan (which carried a 28% effective interest rate) into a new asset-based credit facility maturing in 2028, carrying a materially lower but still elevated rate (currently in the 13-15% range, falling further only if certain profitability covenants are met). Cash on hand roughly offsets this debt today, so the balance-sheet drag on a per-share basis is small, but the facility's cost is a genuine ongoing burden and its 2028 maturity is a date to watch if the business has not stabilized by then. The central question for value is whether the business's decline is decelerating toward a stable, smaller size, or continuing indefinitely. The base case assumes the deceleration seen so far continues, gradually approaching a much smaller but durable subscription and nutrition business over the next several years, informed by the discipline already shown on costs. The bull case assumes stabilization happens sooner and the cost discipline delivers real operating leverage once revenue stops shrinking, supported by the improvement already achieved. The bear case assumes the recent deceleration does not hold, revenue keeps falling at a high rate throughout the next decade, and fixed costs (including the interest cost on the credit facility) erode profitability faster than management can cut, leaving little value beyond the company's current cash. Only two quarters of deceleration data exist so far, which is a real limitation: this is not yet a proven floor, only a promising trend. That uncertainty is the main reason for the wide range between the bear and bull outcomes here, and is the assumption most likely to be wrong in either direction.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $2.30 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$21,750K; ΔWC(true timing items only: inventory $5,402K, prepaid $2,211K, other assets $25,764K, AP $(4,191)K, accrued $(6,762)K, deferred rev $(24,003)K, other liab $(2,733)K; content-asset cash spend of $2,987K left embedded in CFO, not treated as reversible WC)=$(4,312)K; SBC=$5,615K; PP&E capex=$4,399K (maintenance=full, revenue declined 40% YoY); OE=$16,048K; diluted shares=6,971,428; OE/sh=$2.302. Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001193125-26-100284). First full year reflecting the Pivot restructuring's realized cost base (SBC down 67% YoY, S&M down 1,060bps as % of revenue) - used as valuation anchor.
2024 -$1.11 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$2,562K; ΔWC(ex content assets - content-asset cash spend of $6,487K left embedded in CFO as a recurring content-library reinvestment rather than reversible timing, per judgment call)=$(11,501)K; SBC=$17,069K; PP&E capex=$4,542K (maintenance=full, revenue declined); OE=$(7,548)K; diluted shares=6,818,052; OE/sh=$(1.107). Source: FY2025 10-K (accession 0001193125-26-100284), FY2024 comparative cash-flow detail. Transitional year - Pivot restructuring underway but not fully realized (SBC still elevated, $20M goodwill impairment).
2023 -$6.85 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$(22,537)K; ΔWC(ex content)=$(10,238)K; SBC=$23,891K; capex=$6,576K (revenue declined, full capex=maintenance); OE=$(42,766)K; diluted shares=6,238,777; OE/sh=$(6.854). Source: FY2023 10-K (accession 0000950170-24-029409). Excluded from anchor - restructuring ("Pivot") just beginning; cost base not yet reset.
2022 -$14.68 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$(47,173)K; ΔWC(ex content)=$(977)K; SBC=$17,620K; capex=$26,493K (revenue declined vs 2021, so maintenance capex=full capex); OE=$(90,309)K; diluted shares=6,149,784 (post 1-for-50 reverse split, restated basis per FY2022 10-K/A accession 0001193125-23-126991); OE/sh=$(14.684). Source: FY2023 10-K (accession 0000950170-24-029409), FY2022 comparative column, cash-flow detail. Excluded from anchor - pre-Pivot restructuring cost base.
2021 -$0.82 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$(215,249)K; ΔWC(ex content)=$(83,093)K; SBC=$16,413K; capex=$77,911K, growth capex=3.48%x(873,645-863,582)=$350K, maintenance capex=$77,561K; OE=$(226,130)K; diluted shares=275,358,771 (pre reverse split); OE/sh=$(0.8211). Source: FY2021 10-K (accession 0000950170-22-002537). Excluded from anchor - de-SPAC year with heavy goodwill/intangible impairment and warrant FV swings, pre-restructuring.
2020 -$0.00 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex. CFO=$61,430K; ΔWC(ex content assets)=$23,026K; SBC=$5,398K; capex=$37,933K, capex_ratio(mean 2019-2025)=3.48% of revenue, growth capex=3.48%x(863,582-755,779)=$3,753K (revenue grew), maintenance capex=$34,180K; OE=$(1,174)K; diluted shares=239,540,090 (pre reverse split); OE/sh=$(0.0049). Source: FY2021 10-K (accession 0000950170-22-002537). Excluded from valuation anchor - pre-transformation, includes now-discontinued hardware/Connected Fitness era cost structure.
2019 $0.15 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maint capex (predecessor Beachbody LLC financials, pre-SPAC). CFO=$42,017K; ΔWC(ex content assets, true timing items only: prepaid,other assets,AP,accrued,deferred rev,other liab,inventory)=$(25,908)K; SBC=$3,580K; PP&E capex=$23,810K (no prior-year revenue on file to compute growth split, treated as full maintenance); OE=$40,535K; diluted shares=276,090,222 (pre reverse split); OE/sh=$0.1468. Source: FY2021 10-K (accession 0000950170-22-002537), FY2019 comparative column. Excluded from valuation anchor - predecessor entity, pre-transformation.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
Predominantly United States (nationwide, direct-to-consumer digital and e-commerce sales, not concentrated in any single US region); smaller international sales concentrated in Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, with no other single country exceeding 10% of revenue.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
A classic 'broken SPAC' chart. Shares debuted via SPAC merger in mid-2021 near the top of the pandemic home-fitness boom, then entered a multi-year waterfall decline of well over 90% as subscriber losses mounted and losses piled up. A 1-for-50 reverse split was executed in 2023 to preserve exchange listing compliance, creating a sharp technical discontinuity in any unadjusted long-term chart. The stock then based in a low, choppy range through 2023-2024 alongside continued restructuring, with a voluntary move from the NYSE to Nasdaq in September 2025 coinciding with early signs of profitability. A chartist would flag the multi-year downtrend as still the dominant structure and watch for a higher-low base-building pattern as confirmation the decline is ending.
Competitors

We don't have competitor information for this company yet.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.