-$20.07
$208.03
bear -$20.07
base $90.42
bull $208.03
margin of safety $45.00
market price* $104.75
What the business is. Brink's moves and processes cash and valuables for banks, retailers, governments and mints. In 2025 it booked $5.26 billion of revenue: 72% from cash and valuables management (armored cash-in-transit, cash processing, Brink's Global Services and other services such as guarding) and 28% from technology-enabled services - Digital Retail Solutions (smart safes such as Brink's Complete and CompuSafe) and ATM Managed Services. By segment, North America was 33% of revenue, Europe 27%, Latin America 25% and the Middle East, Africa and Asia 15%. The 2025 10-K attributes the 5% organic revenue growth that year mainly to inflation-based price increases and growth in the ATM and digital retail services. How we measured earnings. We start from operating cash flow and remove three things the cash-flow statement mixes in. (1) Customer money: Brink's holds cash on behalf of customers, and the yearly change in that restricted cash and the matching customer obligations runs through operating cash flow. We strip it, along with other receivable, payable and prepaid timing swings; together these added $182.8M to 2023 operating cash flow and $70.5M to 2025's. (2) Stock compensation, treated as a real cost. (3) Capital spending needed to keep the business running - and here we count the vehicles and equipment Brink's acquires through finance leases ($76.2M in 2025, $75.1M in 2024, $92.0M in 2023) as capital spending, because they are paid for through the financing section and would otherwise be missed. Only a small slice of spending (about 5.6% of each year's revenue gain) is treated as growth investment. Non-cash charges, including amortization of acquired intangible assets (about $59M a year) and currency remeasurement losses (largely Argentina), are added back; the decay of acquired customer relationships is carried in the growth assumptions instead. On this basis owner earnings per share ran $4.19 (2022), $4.52 (2023), $2.18 (2024) and $6.54 (2025). Because we value the business before its lenders and then subtract the debt, we add back cash interest paid ($239.6M in 2025), giving pre-interest cash flow of $318M, $408M, $333M and $517M for 2022-2025. Which years count. Brink's was reshaped by acquisitions through 2021, including the G4S cash operations, so we judge the current business on 2022-2025 only and take the median: about $370M a year before interest, roughly $8.90 per current share. The 2024 dip reflected a $45.7M charge for the U.S. Justice Department and FinCEN investigations (settled in January 2025 for $42M payable over three years) and non-cash currency gains; 2025 was the best year. Even if currency remeasurement gains and losses were treated as real, the anchor would move only to about $350M. Pre-interest cash flow grew 55% in 2025; we assume only 2.5% for year one, below that pace, because 2025 was helped by much lower investigation-related costs ($6.5M vs $45.7M) and first-half 2026 operating profit slipped about 4% ($243.5M vs $253.0M) even as revenue rose 8.6%. The NCR Atleos purchase. On February 26, 2026 Brink's signed a definitive agreement to buy NCR Atleos, the ATM maker and operator, for 11.5 million Brink's shares plus $2.2 billion in cash, and to assume about $2.6 billion of its debt, a transaction Brink's values at about $6.6 billion, with closing expected in the first quarter of 2027 subject to regulatory approval. Because the deal is signed, we value Brink's as if it closes: we add the value of NCR Atleos's business, subtract the cash Brink's will pay and the debt it takes on, and spread the result over about 53.0 million shares instead of 41.5 million. From NCR Atleos's own filings, its owner earnings were about $251M (2024) and $253M (2025) after interest expense of $309M and $270M, about $541M a year before interest. Its debt carries interest well above 6% (2025 interest expense equalled almost 10% of its borrowings), so each case adds a penalty for the years before it can be refinanced cheaper. Cost savings management hopes to achieve are not counted anywhere: they have not happened yet. If the deal fails, the standalone values would be about -$2 (bear), $68 (base) and $177 (bull) per share. The debt. At June 30, 2026 Brink's owed $4.24 billion (bank borrowings, notes and finance leases) against $1.66 billion of cash; we treat $500M of that cash as needed to run the operations, and also deduct about $132M for outside partners' stakes in subsidiaries. That leaves about $3.2 billion of standalone net debt, rising to about $7.8 billion with the NCR Atleos cash payment and assumed debt (net of about $250M of its spare cash). Brink's own notes are $600M at 4.625% due October 15, 2027, $400M at 6.5% due June 15, 2029 and $400M at 6.75% due June 15, 2032, plus a secured bank facility. The 2027 notes are the first real refinancing test; recent issues at 6.5-6.75% suggest it will be refinanced at roughly the 6% we use, so no other cost-of-debt adjustment is made. All cash flows are discounted at 6%. Bear case (-$20 per share). Customers keep shifting away from cash, a risk Brink's itself names in its 10-K, and Latin American currencies keep eroding dollar results: Brink's pre-interest cash flow starts at its 2022 level ($318M), shrinks 2% a year for ten years and 5% a year for fifteen more, then ends. NCR Atleos starts at $480M and declines 4% a year, and its expensive debt stays in place for several years. The combined business is worth about $7.0 billion against about $8.1 billion owed: on these assumptions the company would owe roughly $1.1 billion more than it is worth, and within about nine years its cash flow would no longer cover the interest on roughly $9 billion of gross debt, which is how shareholders end up with nothing. Base case ($90 per share). Brink's cash flow starts at the $370M median and grows 2.5% a year for ten years - the inflation-linked pricing and growth in longer-term ATM and smart-safe service contracts that lifted revenue every year from 2022 to 2025 - then declines 2% a year for thirty years as cash usage keeps falling. NCR Atleos holds flat at $541M for ten years (its owner earnings have been flat) and then declines 3% a year for twenty. Business value about $12.7 billion, debt about $7.9 billion, leaving about $4.8 billion for shareholders. Bull case ($208 per share). Brink's holds its 2025 cash flow ($517M), grows 4% a year for ten years as pricing and the technology services keep compounding, then holds flat for thirty years; NCR Atleos grows 1% a year for ten years and then holds flat, and its debt is refinanced quickly. Business value about $18.8 billion, debt about $7.8 billion, leaving about $11.0 billion. Margin-of-safety price. The spread between cases is wide because the business carries a lot of debt relative to its value: a modest shortfall in cash flow moves the shareholders' slice a great deal, and the bear case is worth nothing. The margin-of-safety price is $45. From that price, the shares would need to reach about $78 within three years for a 20% annual return; the base case is $90 today and the standalone business, if the deal fell apart, about $68 - so the target is reachable without the bull case, while the leverage-driven bear case is the reason the price is set no higher. What changed since our previous analysis. Our earlier estimate (bear $0, base $48, bull $122, margin-of-safety price $29) valued Brink's on its own and treated the NCR Atleos deal only as an unquantified risk. We now value the signed deal directly, discount every business at the same 6% rate rather than higher rates for riskier ones, count lease-financed vehicles and equipment as capital spending, and strip customer cash flows out of earnings. The lease and customer-cash adjustments lower earnings; the deal and the uniform 6% rate raise the value; the bear case is now negative because the combined company would carry about $9 billion of gross debt. What would make this wrong. The NCR Atleos deal failing or closing on different terms; a faster decline in cash use than assumed; a sharp devaluation in Argentina, Mexico or Brazil; or difficulty refinancing the October 2027 notes and the assumed NCR Atleos debt at rates near 6%. One limitation: we used NCR Atleos's interest expense as a stand-in for its cash interest paid, because its filings in our data did not break the latter out.