$0.70
$1.05
bear $0.70
base $0.91
bull $1.05
margin of safety $0.35
market price* $2.13
Zentalis Pharmaceuticals is a clinical-stage cancer drug developer with one lead program: azenosertib, a WEE1 inhibitor being tested in Cyclin E1-positive platinum-resistant ovarian cancer. It has no approved product and no recurring revenue. Its 2024 revenue of $67.4 million included the licensing and sale of preclinical antibody-drug conjugate assets to Immunome, Inc., and its cash flow statement shows $47.4 million of 2024 revenue was non-cash; revenue in 2025 was zero. The main test comes from the DENALI Part 2 study (about 100 patients), with a topline readout expected by the end of 2026 and, if successful, a possible path to accelerated approval subject to FDA review. A Phase 3 study, ASPENOVA, was planned to start in the first half of 2026. How we measure earnings. We start from cash used in operations, remove one-off working-capital swings, and deduct share-based compensation as a real cost. Capital spending is tiny (under $1 million in each of the last two years) and is all treated as maintenance. On that basis owner earnings per share were about -$4.22 (2020), -$4.98 (2021), -$4.28 (2022), -$4.11 (2023), -$3.12 (2024) and -$1.90 (2025). Losses have narrowed for two years, helped by a roughly 40% workforce reduction announced in January 2025. We do not credit any further improvement: the trend depends on spending decisions not yet made, and the study spending ahead is likely to rise, not fall. Owner earnings were negative in every year we measured, so the earnings stream itself adds no value; what is left is the cash on hand. What the shares are worth. We give no value to azenosertib being approved or to any future sales. A successful readout would be a real event, but it has not happened, and no product sales or partnership payments are secured today. The value that can be defended is therefore the cash the company still holds after the spending needed to reach the readout, less obligations it cannot avoid. At June 30, 2026, cash and marketable securities were about $174.6 million (down from $245.9 million at December 31, 2025). Cash used in operations was $70.2 million in the first half of 2026. Lease obligations were $39.6 million at December 31, 2025 ($3.9 million current and $35.7 million long-term). Share count used: about 71.3 million diluted shares. Bear case, about $0.70 per share. The study spending rises: second-half 2026 cash use is about $85 million, roughly 20% above the first half, in line with the larger loss in the second quarter (about $42.3 million, against about $35.4 million in the first quarter). The readout does not lead to a viable path and the company winds down. Leases are paid in full. About $89.6 million of cash remains at year end, or about $50.0 million after leases. Base case, about $0.91 per share. Second-half cash use matches the first half at about $70 million. About $104.4 million of cash remains at year end, or about $64.8 million after leases. No value is given to the drug. Bull case, about $1.05 per share. The company keeps cutting cash use, as it did from 2024 to 2025 when operating cash burn fell from about $171 million to about $125 million. Second-half 2026 cash use is about $60 million, leaving about $114.6 million at year end, or about $75.0 million after leases. Even this case gives no value to the drug, because approval and sales have not been secured. Margin-of-safety price. The margin-of-safety price is $0.35 per share, roughly half the bear case. The main risk to any cash-based value is that the company keeps spending it, and it says its cash will fund operations only into late 2027 and will not be enough to complete development of azenosertib, so more share issuance is likely if it continues. That dilution would fall on today's holders. A positive DENALI Part 2 readout is not something we can value today, and the margin-of-safety price does not depend on it; it would be upside not included in any case above. What would make this wrong. The cash-based values are too low if azenosertib succeeds and the company reaches approval; the numbers here would then understate the business, and we would revisit them with the results in hand. They are too high if cash burn rises well above the pace shown in the first half of 2026, if lease obligations cost more to exit than their stated balances, or if wind-down costs are larger than the cash cushion. We could review only the reported financial figures from the second-quarter 2026 filing, not its narrative disclosures.