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JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. (WLY) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$24.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$13.48 $54.28
bear $13.48 base $40.92 bull $54.28 margin of safety $24.00 market price* $52.72
What the business is. John Wiley & Sons is a 219-year-old publisher with two businesses. Research (about $1.13 billion of the $1.68 billion of revenue in the year to April 2026) publishes scientific and scholarly journals, sold through library subscriptions, multi-year "transformational" agreements with universities and author-paid open-access fees; it grew 4% at constant currency last year, with open-access article output up about 25%. Learning (about $547 million) sells academic textbooks, courseware and professional books (the "For Dummies" franchise among them); it shrank 7% last year as print and retail sales fall. A newer line licenses Wiley's content to artificial-intelligence developers: $49 million last year ($33 million in Research, $16 million in Learning), against roughly $40 million the year before. On June 1, 2026 Wiley bought Emerald Publishing (480 journals, 8,000 books; about $83 million of revenue in calendar 2025) for about $452 million, paid from cash and its revolving credit line. How we measured earning power. We start from the cash the business actually produced from operations, strip out the swings in receivables, payables and deferred revenue, and then charge stock compensation and all reinvestment as real costs. We count three kinds of reinvestment: technology and equipment, book development spending, and purchases of journal publishing rights; growing years get a small allowance for growth spending. Cash spent on restructuring, pension contributions and leases stays in as a cost, because Wiley has restructured almost every year for a decade. Amortization of acquired journals and brands is added back as a non-cash charge; the fact that these assets wear out is handled instead by shrinking Learning in every case and by the declines in the bear case. On this basis, cash per share ran $1.83 (FY2017), $2.57, $2.82, $2.86, $3.49, $3.75 (FY2022), $3.19, $2.15, $2.24 and $3.99 (FY2026). Before interest, the business produced about $174 million in FY2025 and $255 million in FY2026. Which years count. Years before FY2025 describe a different company: Wiley sold University Services, Wiley Edge and CrossKnowledge over FY2024-FY2025, took large goodwill write-downs, and paid out $38.5 million in restructuring cash in FY2024 alone. We therefore measure the current business on FY2025-FY2026 and take the midpoint, about $215 million a year before interest, plus about $17 million for Emerald. FY2026's $255 million is not used as the starting level. Part of its jump came from a smaller drain in miscellaneous operating items than in FY2025, and cost savings in Research were partly used up by the decline in Learning. Last year's cash grew 47% before interest. Our base case assumes a slight decline in year one, because AI licensing is not under long-term contract and the 2026 result was unusually strong. Base case. Research's core cash (about $120 million) grows 2% a year for ten years. That rate is below last year's 4% and rests on a long record of renewing library and university agreements with built-in price increases. After that it holds flat, on the strength of a journal portfolio that has held its place for generations. Learning's cash (about $70 million) shrinks 5% a year with no end date, in line with Academic's 5% fall last year. AI licensing contributes $20 million a year for five years, then $10 million, then nothing. Emerald adds about $17 million, growing with Research; we estimated this from Wiley's own Research profit margin of 33% before depreciation, because Emerald's profit is not disclosed. The business is worth about $3.38 billion. It owes about $1.28 billion: $1.29 billion drawn on its bank facilities at July 31, 2026, less a $15 million note owed to Wiley from a past sale. Cash of $106 million is treated as working cash, since balances of $75 to $107 million have sat alongside revolver borrowing for five years. That leaves about $2.11 billion, or $40.92 per share on about 51.5 million diluted shares. Bear case. A research-integrity crisis like the 2023 collapse of Wiley's Hindawi journals, which led to thousands of retractions, closed the brand and wiped out tens of millions of dollars of revenue, cuts Research cash 12% in year two with no recovery. Research then shrinks 2% a year after year ten as open access and AI tools erode subscriptions. Learning falls 10% a year indefinitely, the pace Professional fell last year, and this absorbs a recession hit to professional books like 2008-2009. AI licensing dries up after two years. Emerald earns only $8 million, echoing how Hindawi and the Learning House/University Services purchase both ended in write-downs. The bank facilities mature in November 2027, and the case assumes renewal at a spread one percentage point wider, costing about $88 million in today's money. The business is worth about $2.06 billion and owes about $1.36 billion, leaving about $0.69 billion, or $13.48 per share. Even at its weakest, cash flow of about $138 million a year still covers interest of roughly $96 million. Bull case. Research grows 3.5% a year, close to last year's pace, and Learning's decline slows to 3%. AI licensing holds at $30 million a year for ten years. Emerald earns $22 million and grows with Research. The business is worth about $4.07 billion and owes about $1.28 billion, leaving about $2.80 billion, or $54.28 per share. What was left out. We give no value to Wiley's share of Anthropic's $1.5 billion copyright settlement, because Wiley says its portion has not been determined. We credit no cost savings from integrating Emerald and no growth in AI licensing, since neither is contracted. Research growth beyond the 2% base is not counted because it depends on a growing market. Testing the case. The base case leans on Research growth and on AI licensing holding up. Revenue in the July 2026 quarter fell 3% even with two months of Emerald included, and operating income fell to $2.9 million from $31.0 million; the company attributes the decline to Learning while Research and AI grew. That fits Learning shrinking faster than Research grows, which is why the starting level sits well below FY2026. AI licensing in Learning already fell from about $29 million to $16 million in one year, which is why it fades in every case. Margin-of-safety price. We are reasonably confident of the earnings level. About two-thirds of revenue comes from Research, which is mostly recurring journal income, and cash before interest has stayed between $165 million and $255 million in each of the last three years despite the divestitures. The worst plausible outcome is another integrity scandal or the AI disruption of textbooks hitting at the same time as the November 2027 refinancing, with roughly $1.29 billion drawn after Emerald. Wiley would survive it: debt is roughly three times yearly operating profit before depreciation and amortization, no single customer matters much, and the business still covers its interest in the bear case. But its assets are intangible and the shareholder cushion would shrink fast. The three things we are most likely to be wrong about are Research growth, AI licensing and what Emerald earns. If Research does not grow at all, AI licensing disappears and Emerald earns $8 million, the shares are worth about $28. Over the holding period, Wiley pays about $1.42 a share in dividends, which it has raised for more than thirty consecutive years, and in the base case its cash would cut debt by about $1.50 a share a year. The margin-of-safety price is $24. From that price, the base case implies well over 20% a year over three years. Even the case where we are wrong on all three implies roughly 10% a year including dividends. Only the bear case, with a sharp fall in Research income on top of a hard refinancing, implies a loss. Previous estimates. Our earlier figures were built on a different basis and did not include the debt taken on for Emerald, so they are not comparable with these.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2026 $3.55 ▼
OE = CFO - Capex - SBC = 260,519 - 51,166 - 20,608 = 188,745 (thousands USD, FY ended 4/30/2026). OE/diluted share = 188,745 / 53,247 = 3.545. Source: FY2026 10-K (accession 0001628280-26-045111), most recent fiscal year.
2025 $2.17 ▼
OE = CFO - Capex - SBC = 202,591 - 61,473 - 22,222 = 118,896 (thousands USD, FY ended 4/30/2025). OE/diluted share = 118,896 / 54,830 = 2.169. Source: FY2026 10-K (accession 0001628280-26-045111).
2024 $1.94 ▼
OE = CFO - Capex - SBC = 207,638 - 76,080 - 24,982 = 106,576 (thousands USD, FY ended 4/30/2024). OE/diluted share = 106,576 / 54,945 = 1.940. Source: FY2026 10-K (accession 0001628280-26-045111) cash flow statement comparatives and EPS note.
2023 $3.01 ▼
OE = CFO - Capex - SBC = 277,071 - 81,155 - 26,504 = 169,412 (thousands USD, FY ended 4/30/2023). OE/diluted share = 169,412 / 56,355 = 3.007. Source: FY2023 10-K (accession 0000107140-23-000092).
2022 $3.97 ▼
OE = CFO - Capex - SBC = 339,100 - 88,843 - 25,705 = 224,552 (thousands USD, FY ended 4/30/2022). OE/diluted share = 224,552 / 56,598 = 3.967. Source: FY2023 10-K (accession 0000107140-23-000092) cash flow statement comparatives and diluted share count from EPS note.
2021 $3.49 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$359.9M; ΔWC=$15.1M (receivables, inventories, payables/royalties, contract liabilities, other accrued liabilities, accrued income taxes, royalty advances net; removed); SBC=$22.0M; capex=$133.2M (product development $26.0M + technology/PP&E $77.4M + publication rights $29.9M); growth capex=$7.3M (10-yr capex/revenue 0.0661 × revenue change $110.0M) so maintenance capex=$125.9M; OE=$196.9M; diluted shares=56.461M; OE/sh=$3.49. Restructuring payments, pension contributions, operating-lease payments and 'Other' operating items kept as cash costs. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001140361-21-023449.
2020 $2.86 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$288.4M; ΔWC=$(7.1)M (receivables, inventories, payables/royalties, contract liabilities, other accrued liabilities, accrued income taxes, royalty advances net; removed); SBC=$20.0M; capex=$117.0M (product development $26.6M + technology/PP&E $88.6M + publication rights $1.8M); growth capex=$2.1M (10-yr capex/revenue 0.0661 × revenue change $31.4M) so maintenance capex=$115.0M; OE=$160.5M; diluted shares=56.209M (net-loss year, diluted equals basic); OE/sh=$2.86. Restructuring payments, pension contributions, operating-lease payments and 'Other' operating items kept as cash costs. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001140361-21-023449.
2019 $2.82 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$250.8M; ΔWC=$(41.4)M (receivables, inventories, payables/royalties, contract liabilities, other accrued liabilities, accrued income taxes, royalty advances net; removed); SBC=$18.3M; capex=$111.1M (product development $24.4M + technology/PP&E $77.2M + publication rights $9.5M); growth capex=$0.3M (10-yr capex/revenue 0.0661 × revenue change $4.0M) so maintenance capex=$110.8M; OE=$163.1M; diluted shares=57.840M; OE/sh=$2.82. Restructuring payments, pension contributions, operating-lease payments and 'Other' operating items kept as cash costs. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001140361-21-023449.
2018 $2.57 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$382.3M; ΔWC=$50.2M (receivables, inventories, payables/royalties, contract liabilities, other accrued liabilities, accrued income taxes, royalty advances net; removed); SBC=$11.2M; capex=$177.4M (product development $36.5M + technology/PP&E $114.2M + publication rights $26.7M); growth capex=$5.1M (10-yr capex/revenue 0.0661 × revenue change $77.6M) so maintenance capex=$172.3M; OE=$148.6M; diluted shares=57.888M; OE/sh=$2.57. Restructuring payments, pension contributions, operating-lease payments and 'Other' operating items kept as cash costs. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000107140-19-000026.
2017 $1.83 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$314.9M; ΔWC=$13.1M (receivables, inventories, payables/royalties, contract liabilities, other accrued liabilities, accrued income taxes, royalty advances net; removed); SBC=$17.6M; capex=$177.5M (product development $43.6M + technology/PP&E $105.1M + publication rights $28.8M); growth capex=$0 (revenue declined from $1,727.0M to $1,718.5M) so maintenance capex=$177.5M; OE=$106.8M; diluted shares=58.199M; OE/sh=$1.83. Restructuring payments, pension contributions, operating-lease payments and 'Other' operating items kept as cash costs. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000107140-19-000026.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (about 51% of revenue; nationwide across the Northeast, Midwest, South and West), United Kingdom (about 29%, including sales to European and other international customers booked there), Germany, and the rest of the world.
Historical growth strategy
Grows mainly by buying journals, publishers and education businesses (Blackwell in 2007, Atypon in 2016, Learning House in 2018, Hindawi in 2021, Emerald in 2026) and by signing publishing partnerships with scholarly societies, on top of low single-digit organic growth from journal price increases and open-access article volume. It periodically prunes the portfolio through divestitures and restructuring, and returns cash through a dividend raised every year for more than three decades plus share buybacks.
Chart analysis
Over the past year WLY has traded between a 52-week low of about $28 and a high of about $57, nearly doubling off the low before pulling back; at roughly $47.50 in early October 2026 it sits in the upper half of that range, about 17% below the high. A chartist would read the rally off the low as a reversal of the multi-year downtrend that ran from 2021, and the pullback from the high as a test of whether the mid-$40s, former resistance, now holds as support. A break back below the low $40s would suggest the rebound is failing, while a move through the high $50s would confirm a new uptrend. A low beta (about 0.75) means moves tend to be gradual rather than sharp.
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Circle of competence

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