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VALVOLINE INC (VVV) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$23.00 ComplexitySimple Updated
$18.80 $72.40
bear $18.80 base $51.90 bull $72.40 margin of safety $23.00 market price* $31.46
Valvoline operates and franchises quick-lube service centers (Valvoline Instant Oil Change) in the United States and Canada. Since selling its Global Products business on March 1, 2023 it is purely a retail-services company. At June 30, 2026 the network had 2,456 stores, 1,232 company-operated and 1,224 franchised, up from 2,180 at September 30, 2025. Most of the jump is the purchase of Breeze Autocare (the Oil Changers chain) on December 1, 2025: 204 stores for $637.4 million in cash, of which 45 had to be sold under a Federal Trade Commission order (for $32.1 million, a $57.9 million loss), leaving 159. System-wide same-store sales have grown for 19 consecutive fiscal years, including 7.1% in fiscal 2024, 6.1% in fiscal 2025 and 7.4% in the first nine months of fiscal 2026, and the network has added 718 net stores over five years. How we measure earnings. We start with operating cash flow, strip out working-capital swings, deduct stock compensation as a real cost, and deduct only the capital spending needed to keep existing stores running. Valvoline discloses that maintenance figure: $29.5 million in fiscal 2023, $35.9 million in fiscal 2024 and $66.1 million in fiscal 2025, against $193.1 million spent building new stores in fiscal 2025. Owner earnings on this basis were $262.6 million, $268.8 million and $265.5 million, or $1.62, $2.05 and $2.06 per diluted share as buybacks shrank the share count. The pattern is striking: revenue rose 18% and the store count 21% over those three years, yet owner earnings were flat, because maintenance spending more than doubled, 39 company stores were sold to franchisees in late 2024, and corporate costs rose with a new accounting system. We use the fiscal 2023 to 2025 window because the 2023 sale transformed the company; earlier years describe a different business. Two accounting judgements matter. First, we accept the company's maintenance figure rather than depreciation, which was $104.9 million in fiscal 2025; a store base growing about 10% a year carries heavy depreciation on new stores that will need no replacement spending for years. If depreciation were the better measure, our base value would be roughly $8 per share lower. Second, we neither deduct the $190 million-plus a year spent building new company-operated stores nor credit the earnings those stores will produce: we assume that money earns about its cost, so it neither adds nor subtracts value. Growth from same-store sales and from stores franchisees build with their own money is credited as described below. Because the company now carries substantial debt, we value the business before interest and then subtract what it owes. Adding back cash interest, the business generated a median of about $332 million a year over fiscal 2023 to 2025. The 159 Breeze stores earned $5.8 million of net income on $50.8 million of revenue in the June 2026 quarter; on that demonstrated run-rate they add roughly $27 million a year of cash earnings, and 21 other stores bought this year add a few million more, for a starting level of about $364 million for fiscal 2026. Nine-month results, with operating cash flow of $284.6 million against $180.0 million a year earlier even after $16.7 million of deal costs, suggest the business is currently running somewhat above that level; we have deliberately not chased it. What the company owes. At June 30, 2026: $535 million of 3.625% notes due 2031; a $347.8 million term loan at about 6% that matures in late 2027 together with the revolving credit line; a new $738 million seven-year term loan at about 5.4% that funded Breeze; and roughly $315 million of finance leases on store properties. Against $84 million of cash, of which we treat $30 million as surplus, and giving credit for the below-market fixed rate on the 2031 notes, net obligations are about $1.86 billion, or $14.45 per share. Cash earnings before interest of about $360 million cover an interest bill of roughly $95 million nearly four times, and the company was in compliance with all covenants at June 30, 2026. Share repurchases have been paused since early 2025 to repay debt, and management has said it aims to bring leverage back to 2.5 to 3.5 times earnings over time. Base case, $51.90 per share. Cash earnings before interest grow 5% a year for five years and 3.5% for the following five, then stay flat. The drivers are same-store sales growth, a 19-year record running at 6 to 8% recently on higher tickets and non-oil services, and franchisee-funded store additions, 60 in the first nine months of this year. Both are credited well below their demonstrated pace because of the flat owner-earnings record of the last three years. No credit is given for Breeze synergies, margin expansion, or new company-built stores. The business is worth about $8.5 billion on this path; less $1.86 billion owed leaves $6.7 billion for shareholders. Bear case, $18.80 per share. Cash earnings slip about 8% over three years, stay flat through year ten, then decline 3% a year. Named drivers: maintenance spending keeps stepping up as it did in fiscal 2025; product margins stay pressured by low used-oil prices, the reason the company cut its fiscal 2026 profit outlook in April 2026; the Breeze stores earn no more than they do today; the 2027 term loan and revolver are refinanced at a higher cost, for which we add $30 million to the debt; and after year ten, electric-vehicle adoption, which the company itself says reduces demand for lubricant services, erodes store traffic. The business is worth about $4.3 billion, less $1.89 billion owed, or $2.4 billion for shareholders. Even on this path the business covers its interest more than three times. Bull case, $72.40 per share. Growth of 7% a year for five years, 4% for five more, then 1%: same-store sales continuing at the pace of the last three years, franchise additions continuing, and the Breeze stores brought up to Valvoline's own store margins. The business is worth about $11.2 billion, less $1.86 billion owed. Why the debt matters so much to the spread. The business itself is worth about twice as much in the base case as in the bear case. But the $1.86 billion owed comes off every case equally: it is 22% of the business in the base case and 44% in the bear case, so for shareholders the spread widens to nearly three to one. With no debt the bear case would be worth about $33 per share rather than $18.80. That is the cost of the borrowing used to buy Breeze, and it is why a wide discount is warranted: the margin-of-safety price of $23 sits 56% below the base case, about half of the base case as it would stand if depreciation were the right measure of maintenance spending, and 22% above the bear case, so that the one-in-ten outcome implies a decline of roughly 18% from that price. The flat owner-earnings record of the last three years, the leverage and the slow electric-vehicle headwind all argue for the wide margin. What changed from our prior view. We previously valued the shares on earnings after interest without separately subtracting the borrowings. On the corrected basis the bear case falls from about $28 to about $19, because a weak path carries the same $1.86 billion of obligations as a strong one, while the base case is little changed since adding interest back and subtracting the debt roughly offset along the median path. We also raised the bull case, which had been set below what the same-store record supports, and lowered the margin-of-safety price from $32 to $23 to reflect the lower bear case. What would make this wrong. On the downside: oil-change demand lost to electric vehicles faster than the slow turnover of the vehicle fleet implies; a sustained rise in floating rates on the two term loans; or evidence that maintenance spending has been understated. On the upside: the current run-rate of cash generation, which is running ahead of our starting level, persisting into fiscal 2027, and debt repayment shrinking the fixed claim ahead of shareholders. The company reported that a material weakness in its internal controls tied to the January 2024 accounting-system rollout remained open at September 30, 2025, with no misstatement identified; we could not confirm from the June 2026 filing whether it has since been closed. Finance lease balances at June 30, 2026 were estimated from the September 2025 balance plus leases acquired with Breeze.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $2.06 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops CFO=$307.1M; working-capital movement (receivables $(3.1)M, inventories $(5.4)M, payables and accrued +$3.3M, other assets and liabilities $(29.8)M)= $(35.0)M so removing it adds $35.0M; SBC=$10.5M; total capex=$259.2M, of which company-reported maintenance capex=$66.1M (growth $193.1M) - used instead of the ratio formula because the filing discloses it; OE=$265.5M; diluted shares=128.6M; OE/sh=$2.06. Reconciliation: NI from continuing ops 214.8 + D&A 119.4 + deferred tax 38.3 + pension remeasurement 26.6 + SBC 10.5 + other 3.6 - gain on sales 71.1 = 342.1, less WC 35.0 = CFO 307.1 (ties). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001674910-25-000135.
2024 $2.05 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$282.9M; working-capital movement (receivables $(0.9)M, inventories $(7.7)M, payables $(6.4)M, other $(18.8)M)=$(33.8)M, add back; SBC=$12.0M; maintenance capex=$35.9M (total capex $224.4M, growth $188.5M); OE=$268.8M; diluted shares=131.0M; OE/sh=$2.05. Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001674910-25-000135 and FY2024 10-K accession 0001674910-24-000152.
2023 $1.62 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops CFO=$353.0M; working-capital movement (receivables +$26.4M, inventories $(3.3)M, payables +$111.3M, other $(85.7)M)=+$48.7M, removed; SBC=$12.2M; maintenance capex=$29.5M (total capex $180.5M, growth $151.0M); OE=$262.6M; diluted shares=162.6M (weighted average, before the large FY2023-24 share repurchases); OE/sh=$1.62. Excludes discontinued-operations cash flows of $(393.8)M (Global Products sale-related). Source: FY2025 10-K accession 0001674910-25-000135; FY2024 10-K accession 0001674910-24-000152.
2022 $1.26 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Continuing-ops CFO=$134.4M; working-capital movement (receivables $(17.5)M, inventories $(5.4)M, payables +$24.5M, other $(128.5)M)=$(126.9)M, add back; SBC=$14.4M; maintenance capex=$19.3M (growth $112.7M); OE=$227.6M; diluted shares=180.4M; OE/sh=$1.26. Pre-sale year restated for continuing operations; not used in the anchor. Source: FY2024 10-K accession 0001674910-24-000152; FY2023 10-K accession 0001674910-23-000125 for maintenance capex.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States nationwide (Northeast, Midwest, South and West; the acquired Oil Changers stores are concentrated in California, Texas and the Midwest) and Canada
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
The stock spent most of the past year in a broad $32-41 range, peaking near $41, before breaking down sharply in August and September 2026 to a new 52-week low around $26-27, roughly 30% below the high. Price sits well below both the 50-day (about $34) and 200-day (about $35) moving averages, which have rolled over and converged - a bearish configuration, with the April 2026 gap-down on the guidance cut and the August breakdown level as overhead resistance. A chartist would want a base to form above $26 and a reclaim of the 200-day average before calling the downtrend over.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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