$30.50
$78.13
bear $30.50
base $52.63
bull $78.13
margin of safety $28.00
market price* $39.52
Molson Coors brews and sells beer, including Coors Light, Miller Lite, Coors Banquet, Molson Canadian, Carling and Staropramen, across the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom and Central and Eastern Europe. It has recently added smaller pieces such as Fever-Tree mixers in the U.S., ZOA and Monaco Cocktails. The shares are best thought of as a large, cash-generative but slowly shrinking beer business that carries meaningful debt. How we measured it. We start with cash from operations, remove swings in working capital, subtract stock-based pay as a real cost, and subtract only the capital spending needed to keep the breweries and packaging lines running (growth spending is carved out by a formula and is small here). We then add back cash interest to see what the business produces before its lenders are paid, value that stream at a flat 6% a year, and subtract net debt. On this basis, cash flow before interest was about $1,593M in 2019, $1,293M in 2020, $1,346M in 2021, $1,247M in 2022, $1,571M in 2023, $1,599M in 2024 and $1,420M in 2025. We use the median of 2019 to 2025, $1,420M, as the normal level. Earlier years were left out: 2016 was only a partial year after the MillerCoors joint venture was consolidated in October 2016, 2017 was depressed by a $310M pension contribution, and 2018 was unusually high at about $2,034M. Recent quarters do not lift or lower that level; they shape the path below. Why the path points down. Cash flow before interest fell 11% in 2025 (from $1,599M to $1,420M). The 2025 annual report shows shipment volumes down 8.6% in the Americas and 6.8% in Europe and Asia-Pacific, only partly offset by higher prices; sales before excise taxes fell 5% to $13.0B, though they were essentially unchanged from 2019. In the first half of 2026 the company reported Americas volume down 4.8% and Europe and Asia-Pacific down 3.1%, and cited roughly $130M of extra full-year cost from the aluminum Midwest premium (company results release, August 6, 2026). Our base case therefore assumes a 2026 decline of 11%, the same as the 2025 decline, not a rebound. Over 2019 to 2025, cash flow before interest slid about 1.9% a year, which is the demonstrated trend we build on. We credit no growth in any case: the $450M three-year cost savings program is a management target rather than something already delivered, and new products and share gains have no record we can point to. Base case, about $52.63 a share. Cash flow before interest falls to about $1.26B in 2026, then declines 2% a year and keeps declining at that pace after year ten, because century-old brands and an established distribution network keep earning but volume losses have outrun price increases. The business is worth about $15.8B, it owes about $5.9B, leaving about $9.9B for shareholders on about 187.7M shares. Bear case, about $30.50 a share. The cost pressure and volume losses land at the bad end: cash flow before interest falls 18% in 2026 to about $1.16B, then declines 4% a year, as volume losses like 2025's outrun pricing. The 2025 write-down of $3.65B of goodwill and about $274M of intangible assets shows management has already had to mark down the value of parts of the business. The business is worth about $11.6B, it owes about $5.9B, leaving about $5.7B. Debt is manageable here: cash interest is about $240M a year against roughly $0.8B to $1.2B of cash flow, and the $2.0B of 3.0% notes due in 2026 were repaid in July using new 2031 and 2036 notes plus cash, so there is no near-term maturity wall. The next large maturities are the 5.0% notes due 2042 and the 4.2% notes due 2046. Bull case, about $78.13 a share. Cash flow before interest falls only 5% in 2026 to about $1.35B, supported by first-half 2026 operating cash flow of $820M versus $628M a year earlier, then holds flat for ten years, as it did across 2019 to 2025, when it stayed between $1.25B and $1.60B every year while volumes fell and prices rose, and then declines 1% a year. The business is worth about $20.6B, it owes about $5.9B, leaving about $14.7B. Debt. At June 30, 2026 borrowings were about $7.71B against $2.13B of cash. We treat $1.63B of the cash as spare (keeping $0.5B for operations), add $0.32B for outside owners' stakes in partly owned subsidiaries, and reduce the debt by about $0.48B because $1.1B of 5.0% notes due 2042 and $1.8B of 4.2% notes due 2046 cost less than 6% for roughly 16 and 20 years. That gives net debt of about $5.92B. Operating leases, payables and pension contributions at their current level are not counted, because they already run through operating cash flow. The interest rates on the new 2031 and 2036 notes were not available in the filings we reviewed, so no adjustment was made for them. What changed since our last analysis. We previously estimated $38.31, $61.23 and $87.52 a share for the bear, base and bull cases. All three are lower now. Part of that is method: we now value the business before its lenders at a flat 6% and subtract $5.9B of net debt directly, rather than valuing cash flow after interest at higher discount rates. Part is business news: 2025 volumes fell more sharply, the goodwill write-down was recorded, and 2026 carries an aluminum cost headwind. Not everything moved the same way: we no longer treat 2023 as a one-time boost, since cash flow before interest was higher still in 2024, and the first-half 2026 cash flow is better than a year ago. What could make this wrong. We tested whether the base decline of 2% a year is too kind, given 2025's volume declines. Sales held level from 2019 to 2025 and cash flow fell only about 1.9% a year, so we kept it, but if volume declines of 7% to 9% persist without matching price increases the bear case is closer to the truth. The 10-K also names consumers shifting to other categories, such as cannabis, hemp-derived products and online gambling, as a risk. On the other side, delivered cost savings or stable volumes would move the outcome toward the bull case.