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Spire Global, Inc. (SPIR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.20 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$0.50 $2.25
bear -$0.50 base $0.50 bull $2.25 margin of safety $0.20 market price* $8.95
Business condition attached to the margin of safety At least two consecutive quarters of narrowing owner-earnings losses in continuing operations (an improving adjusted-EBITDA trend) achieved without another large dilutive stock offering, confirming the cash burn is stabilizing rather than worsening.
Spire Global operates a constellation of small satellites that collect space-based data -- weather data used for forecasting, aviation and space-domain-awareness/reconnaissance signals -- and sells it, along with "Space Services" (building and operating satellites for other companies and governments), mainly to commercial and government customers. About half of revenue comes from the United States, with most of the rest split between the United Kingdom, other Europe, Canada, and Asia-Pacific. The company has been substantially reshaped recently. On April 25, 2025, it sold its maritime ship-tracking business to Kpler Holding SA for roughly $239 million and used the proceeds to pay off all of its outstanding debt. Spire is now smaller in revenue, but simpler (it reports as a single business segment) and debt-free. That sale followed a difficult stretch: the company restated several years of financial statements, disclosed material weaknesses in its internal accounting controls, and received a subpoena from the SEC in July 2025 relating to the restatement and to an annual report that had been filed prematurely; a related shareholder lawsuit was dismissed. Separately, a late quarterly filing triggered a formal NYSE notice of non-compliance with listing standards in November 2025; the filing was completed in December 2025 and the notice was resolved. The company's latest annual report also states that a going-concern doubt flagged a year earlier no longer applies, given its current cash position. The problem this business has not solved is that it still loses a large amount of cash every year, and that has not improved since the maritime sale -- if anything it has gotten worse. On the company's own preferred profitability measure, the loss widened from about $16 million in 2024 to about $40 million in 2025. In the first half of 2026, the continuing business burned through roughly $50 million of real, after-cost cash flow (after stock compensation and the capital spending needed to keep the satellite fleet flying) on about $34 million of revenue -- a pace of roughly $100 million a year against revenue running near $70 million a year. Management itself says in its latest filing that costs tied to the continuing business have been rising, not falling, even as total costs drop because maritime is gone. Revenue has also been roughly flat to slightly down (the second quarter of 2025 compared with the second quarter of 2026, both after the maritime sale, shows revenue down about 6%). The company has been funding this gap by selling new stock. In the first half of 2026 it raised roughly $65 million through stock issuance, and the share count used to calculate earnings per share rose by about a fifth in six months. That ongoing dilution, layered on top of the cash burn, is the central risk in owning these shares. On the other side of the ledger, the company holds about $92 million in cash and short-term investments, no debt, and a contracted order book of about $202 million -- close to three years of current revenue -- which limits how far revenue can fall in the near term. There is also a pending arbitration with a Space Services customer, NorthStar Earth & Space, seeking about $15 million in damages over an alleged contract breach; the company denies the claims and has countersued for about $5 million, with the outcome still unresolved. We could not find a specific, already-in-place plan -- a signed contract, a funded cost-reduction program, or a demonstrated trend -- showing this business turning cash-flow-positive; management's own recent commentary points the other way. Our base case therefore assumes the loss rate seen so far in 2026 continues for some time, easing only gradually as the satellite fleet (largely already built) needs less new spending and the existing order book is worked through -- it does not assume the losses stop. On that basis the operating business is worth little on its own, and per-share value mainly reflects the net cash on hand, offset by continued burn. Our bear case assumes the loss does not ease and instead worsens somewhat, in line with the trend actually reported through 2025 and into 2026, with the cash cushion exhausted within a few years without a specific fix -- in that scenario existing shares are worth little or nothing. Our bull case assumes the company follows through on its own stated intent to bring down continuing-operations costs, that the capital spending which was unusually high in 2025 for satellite launches steps back down toward earlier, lower levels, that the order book converts on schedule, and that the NorthStar dispute is resolved in the company's favor -- in that case the cash cushion is largely preserved and the business is worth a modest amount above its cash. Given how far this business is from demonstrating it can fund itself, and the real chance that today's shareholders are further diluted before that is proven, the margin-of-safety price is set at a large discount to our base-case estimate, and it takes effect only once the burn rate actually stabilizes -- at least two consecutive quarters of narrowing losses without another large stock sale.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$3.91 ▼
OE = CFO - deltaWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Transition year: includes roughly four months of the maritime business, sold April 25, 2025 to Kpler Holding SA for $238.9M gross proceeds, plus one-time transaction and debt-extinguishment items; not representative of the current continuing-operations run rate (see H1 2026 in the dcf_analysis). CFO=$(59.829)M. Working-capital cash effect: AR +$8.915M, contract assets $(0.846)M, other current assets $(2.936)M, other LT assets +$1.361M, AP +$1.607M, contract liabilities +$2.899M, other accrued expenses +$5.117M, operating lease liabilities $(2.375)M, other LT liabilities $(0.008)M -> total +$13.734M. SBC=$18.702M. Capex=$32.776M; revenue fell to $71.553M from $110.451M, entirely divestiture-driven, so per methodology growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=total capex=$32.776M. OE = -59.829 - 13.734 - 18.702 - 32.776 = -$125.041M. Diluted shares=31,950,850. OE/share=-$3.914. Reconciliation check: net income $51.305M = CFO + non-cash add-backs (D&A 12.405, SBC 18.702, ROU amortization 3.084, warrant FV change (3.193), earnout FV change (1.455), satellite decommissioning loss 9.281, loss on debt extinguishment 12.008, gain on sale of maritime business (154.305), transaction costs on sale (23.744), other 2.349) + working-capital total (13.734); gap = $0 (exact match). Sale proceeds were used to eliminate all outstanding debt; long-term debt was $0 at 12/31/2025. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-116169.
2024 -$3.43 ▼
OE = CFO - deltaWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Last full fiscal year before the April 2025 Maritime divestiture; figures include the now-divested maritime business and the pre-payoff debt load -- historical reference only, not the anchor for the current, smaller continuing-operations business. CFO=$(18.453)M. Working-capital cash effect: AR $(5.034)M, contract assets +$3.119M, other current assets +$12.445M, other LT assets +$1.954M, AP +$2.649M, contract liabilities +$2.748M, other accrued expenses +$8.073M, operating lease liabilities $(4.720)M, other LT liabilities $0 -> total +$21.234M. SBC=$19.990M. Capex=$26.581M; revenue grew to $110.451M from $97.612M (+13.15%); capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, FY2021-FY2024 whole-company basis)=26.8%; growth capex=$3.437M; maintenance capex=$23.144M. OE = -18.453 - 21.234 - 19.990 - 23.144 = -$82.821M. Diluted shares=24,159,770. OE/share=-$3.428. Reconciliation check: net income (restated) -$103.359M = CFO + non-cash add-backs (D&A 21.729, SBC 19.990, ROU amortization 4.843, warrant FV change 5.254, earnout FV change 1.235, warrant issuance 2.399, satellite decommissioning loss 4.023, other 4.199) + working-capital total (21.234); gap = $0 (exact match). Source: FY2025 10-K (restated comparative column), accession 0001193125-26-116169.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (about half of revenue); remainder spread across the United Kingdom, other Europe, Canada, and Asia-Pacific, with no single non-U.S. country representing a large concentration.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a classic post-SPAC pattern: a sharp decline from the 2021 listing highs through 2022-2023 as the broader de-SPAC/small-cap growth trade unwound, sharpened by an accounting-restatement drawdown of its own. A 1-for-20 reverse split in early 2024 -- a typical marker of a name fighting to stay above minimum listing-price rules -- reset the share count, after which the stock traded in a choppy, high-volatility range. The spring-2025 announcement and closing of the maritime-business sale produced a sharp positive gap, but the stock has stayed volatile and range-bound since, with the company's ongoing at-the-market stock sales adding new supply -- a headwind a technician would flag against any sustained breakout. Overall this is a chart driven by discrete, binary news events (restatement disclosures, the reverse split, the divestiture) rather than a smooth trend, and would be read as high-beta and event-driven rather than tradeable on technical patterns alone.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.