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Southland Holdings, Inc. (SLND) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$11.56 -$9.19
bear -$11.56 base -$9.60 bull -$9.19 margin of safety $0.00 market price* $0.74
Business condition attached to the margin of safety The sureties' cash advances, the lender debt they now hold and the Washington State Convention Center judgment are resolved or converted so that shareholders' equity is positive again, and the company reports gross profit (not gross losses) on its contracts for several consecutive quarters.
Southland Holdings builds bridges, tunnels, pipelines, water and civil infrastructure through its American Bridge, Oscar Renda, Johnson Bros. and Mole Constructors units. It reported $772 million of revenue in 2025 (down from $1.28 billion in 2021) and had roughly $2.0 billion of contracted backlog at year-end. The problem is that the backlog has not been turning into cash. Owner earnings (operating cash flow after removing working-capital swings, stock compensation and maintenance capital spending) were about +$63 million and +$81 million in 2021 and 2022, but those profits were largely booked on claims and contract assets that later had to be written down: about -$43 million in 2023, -$142 million in 2024 and -$233 million in 2025. In the first half of 2026 revenue fell 37% to $286 million, the company reported a gross loss of $76 million (including a $71 million gross loss in the second quarter), lost $115 million and used $172 million of operating cash. Cash was $35 million at June 30, 2026 and shareholders' equity was about negative $248 million. In 2025 the growth in owner earnings was negative (a further decline of roughly $91 million); we do not assume any recovery on that path. How we valued it. We measured the business before its lenders, then subtracted what it owes, using a flat 6% discount rate. We used the 2023-2025 results as the reference period (the earlier years reflect profits that have since been reversed) and did not credit any margin recovery, new awards or share gains, because nothing in the filings secures them. The only earnings we credited are small cash distributions from unconsolidated joint ventures, which have a record ($7.0 million in 2023, $4.1 million in 2024, $0.9 million in 2025). What the company owes. At June 30, 2026 borrowings were $207 million (the credit agreement, maturing September 30, 2028, is now held by the company's surety insurers, who waived principal and interest until maturity on March 17, 2026; we reduced the debt figure by about $14 million for the interest that will not be charged). We also count $41 million of financing obligations, the roughly $89 million judgment from the December 2025 ruling against American Bridge on the Washington State Convention Center project, and surety advances. The sureties had advanced $14 million by year-end and another $102 million by March 2026, repayable no earlier than March 27, 2027; long-term liabilities other than debt then rose by about $190 million between December and June, so we estimate roughly $206 million of advances are outstanding (this is our inference from the balance sheet, not a disclosed figure). Total: about $529 million after the interest adjustment. Base case: the legacy projects are completed with no further cash needs beyond the advances already made, and the business earns only the joint-venture distributions at their 2025 level (about $0.9 million a year, worth about $7 million). Business worth about $7 million, owes about $529 million, difference about negative $523 million, or about -$9.60 per share. The company appears to owe far more than it is worth. Bear case: the losses seen in early 2026 continue for another 12 months, adding about $100 million of surety funding, and the joint-venture distributions stop. Business worth $0, owes about $629 million, roughly -$11.56 per share. The sureties control the debt and the advances, so shareholders would likely be left with nothing in a restructuring. Bull case: the remaining backlog is completed at roughly break-even and joint-venture distributions average $4 million a year as in 2023-2025. Business worth about $29 million, owes about $529 million, difference about negative $500 million, or about -$9.19 per share. What was left out. We did not count the $108.6 million (present value) claim recovery on the Tappan Zee bridge joint venture, because it is an unresolved claim and the company has just lost a similar claim in Washington; $58 million of it is already owed to a third party. We did not count any release of working capital (about $117 million of net current assets at June 30, 2026), contract assets of $272 million or plant and equipment of $95 million, because their collection depends on completing projects that are currently losing money. Even if all of that were collected in full, equity would still be negative on our numbers. What would make this wrong: a large recovery on the Tappan Zee claim or on other disputed contract claims, the sureties converting their advances and debt into equity on generous terms, or the remaining backlog proving far more profitable than the recent gross losses suggest. Shareholders' equity is negative, the stock traded around $0.92 in March 2026 and the shares trade on NYSE American, so continued listing is also a concern. Note that the 10-K reports management believes liquidity is sufficient for twelve months only because of the surety support described above.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$4.31 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-035302. CFO=$16,581K; working-capital movement=$244,429K (AR 23,070; contract assets 116,841; other current assets (11,001); ROU 4,374; AP/retainage/accrued 23,617; contract liabilities 2,828; operating lease liabilities (4,369); other noncurrent liabilities 89,069 = accrual of the WSCC judgment, treated as a timing item), so CFO-dWC=$(227,848)K (ties to NI (308,363) + D&A 23,213 + deferred taxes 57,258 + other non-cash and Other = (227,848), gap 0%); SBC=$1,184K; capex=$3,846K, revenue declined ($772.2M vs $980.2M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$3,846K; OE=$(232,878)K; diluted shares=54.050M; OE/sh=$(4.31). Cash interest paid=$35,281K (added back only when valuing the business).
2024 -$2.95 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-035302 (FY2024 comparative; also FY2024 10-K 0001558370-25-002183). CFO=$1,927K; working-capital movement=$134,296K (AR 9,924; contract assets 70,713; other current assets 757; ROU (2,410); AP/accrued (3,652); contract liabilities 56,426; operating lease liabilities 2,538), so CFO-dWC=$(132,369)K (ties to NI (105,528) + D&A 23,298 + deferred taxes (44,751) + other non-cash and Other = (132,369), gap 0%); SBC=$2,049K; capex=$7,416K, revenue declined ($980.2M vs $1,160.4M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$7,416K; OE=$(141,834)K; diluted shares=48.074M; OE/sh=$(2.95).
2023 -$0.91 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001104659-26-035302 (FY2023 figures as presented there, agree to FY2023 10-K 0001558370-24-002367). CFO=$(10,264)K; working-capital movement=$20,715K, so CFO-dWC=$(30,979)K (ties to NI (18,715) + D&A 30,529 + other non-cash incl. earnout fair-value gain (20,689) and Other = (30,979), gap 0%); SBC=$891K; capex=$10,846K, revenue flat/declined ($1,160.4M vs $1,161.4M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$10,846K; OE=$(42,716)K; diluted shares=47.089M; OE/sh=$(0.91).
2022 $1.72 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001558370-24-002367 (comparative year). CFO=$(66,202)K; working-capital movement=$(151,950)K, so CFO-dWC=$85,748K (ties to NI 62,650 + D&A 45,697 + other non-cash and Other lines = 85,748, gap 0%); SBC=$0; capex=$4,765K, revenue declined ($1,161.4M vs $1,279.2M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$4,765K; OE=$80,983K; per-share uses 47.089M (FY2023 weighted diluted shares) as proxy, no public share count before the Feb-2023 merger; OE/sh=$1.72.
2021 $1.34 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. Pre-merger Southland operating company figures as presented in the FY2023 10-K (accession 0001558370-24-002367; the FY2021 10-K filed by the SPAC shell carries no operating results). CFO=$(90,573)K; working-capital movement (AR, contract assets, other current assets, ROU assets, AP/accrued, contract liabilities, operating lease liabilities)=$(172,451)K, so CFO-dWC=$81,878K (ties to NI 41,530 + D&A 47,468 + other non-cash and Other lines = 81,878, gap 0%); SBC=$0; capex=$18,797K, prior-year revenue not available so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=total capex; OE=$63,081K; per-share uses 47.089M (FY2023 weighted diluted shares) as proxy because the company had no public share count before the Feb-2023 merger; OE/sh=$1.34. Note: 2021 profit was later reversed by claim/contract-asset write-downs.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (projects nationwide across the Northeast, South, Midwest and West, including Texas and New York), Canada (including a tunnel project), and the Bahamas
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
A chartist would see a stock that came public through a merger in February 2023 at a redemption value near $10.30 and has been in a long, deep downtrend since, with the shares below $1 by March 2026 (about $0.92 on March 20, 2026), far below the $11.50 warrant strike price. That is a classic broken chart: a persistent series of lower highs and lower lows, no visible base or trend reversal, and price stuck under every long-term moving average. Any bounces have been short. Nothing in the price history shows accumulation; the stock would need to reclaim well above $1 on rising volume before a chartist would call the downtrend over.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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