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RB GLOBAL INC. (RBA) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$44.00 ComplexityAverage Updated
$42.56 $81.37
bear $42.56 base $64.37 bull $81.37 margin of safety $44.00 market price* $84.30
RB Global runs two related online-and-yard marketplaces. Ritchie Bros. (founded 1958) auctions used heavy construction, transportation and agricultural equipment; IAA, acquired in March 2023, sells total-loss and damaged vehicles, mostly for insurance companies, where it and Copart are the two national players. RB Global earns fees on each sale and does not own most of what it sells. In May 2026 it also bought BigIron, a U.S. farm-equipment and farmland auctioneer, for $316.6 million in cash plus $15 million payable in 2029, paid for with $300 million of new borrowing. What changed since our last estimate. Our previous estimate put the shares at about $71 / $109 / $151. It is now $42.56 / $64.37 / $81.37, for three reasons. First, we had been removing IAA's yard rent along with ordinary working-capital swings. Most of IAA's salvage yards are leased, and those rent payments, $146.5 million in 2025, are a real, recurring cost of running the business, so we now charge them. That lowers normal cash earnings by about $0.78 a share a year. We also now count software development spending as capital spending in the pre-2023 years, as we already did for later years. Second, we previously valued the company's cash earnings after interest but never subtracted the debt, which assumed the IAA acquisition debt could be rolled over forever on today's terms. We now value the business before its lenders are paid and then subtract what it owes. Third, debt rose in the first half of 2026 because of the BigIron purchase and a $150 million share buyback. The first half of 2026 was also good news: revenue grew 11% in the second quarter, and spending on buildings and equipment fell from the 2025 level. That supports our starting level and our higher-case assumptions. Owner earnings. We start from operating cash flow and subtract stock-based pay, the capital spending needed to maintain the business (including software), and yard rent. We leave out short-term working-capital swings. On that basis the combined business produced $602 million in 2024 ($3.25 a share) and $549 million in 2025 ($2.94). Adding back the interest paid to lenders ($229 million and $189 million) gives cash produced before lenders of $831 million and $738 million. We anchor on the middle of those two full combined years, about $785 million. We exclude 2023 because it held only nine months of IAA and carried one-time deal and integration costs. On the same basis, before-interest cash fell about 11% from 2024 to 2025. Our base case starts year one at $785 million, about 6% above 2025. The reason: 2025 carried the one-time build-out of Australian salvage capacity for the exclusive Suncorp Group contract, signed in late 2024 and expected to reach about 65,000 vehicles a year, and the June 2026 quarterly filing shows lower spending on buildings and equipment and higher revenue. Depreciation and amortization of $483 million includes a large non-cash charge for customer relationships bought with IAA. We add it back because that price was paid in 2023. We account for the risk that those insurer relationships fade in the bear case instead: about 23% of 2025 revenue came from vehicles supplied by the three largest suppliers. What the company owes. At June 30, 2026, borrowings were $2.92 billion: a $971 million term loan and $580 million of revolving credit, both due April 2030 at about 5.2%; $550 million of 6.75% secured notes due March 2028; and $800 million of 7.75% unsecured notes due March 2031. We add $102 million of finance leases and the deferred BigIron payment. We add about $59 million because those notes carry interest above our 6% yardstick until they mature. We subtract $250 million of the $525 million cash balance as surplus; we treat the rest as needed to pay sellers after auctions. Net debt comes to about $2.84 billion. Ahead of the common shares sit $485.5 million of 5.5% Series A preferred shares. Holders can convert them at $71.58 a share, and from February 2027 they can demand a 7.5% dividend, which the company can avoid by redeeming. We count them at the larger of face value or their value on conversion. Lenders are covered comfortably: before-interest cash of $740 to $830 million a year compares with about $190 million of interest. The company reported it was in compliance with its covenants. Base case ($64.37). The insurer relationships and the equipment auction network continue. Earnings grow 2% a year for ten years because fees are charged as a share of the sale price of equipment and vehicles, and the company has a long record of small bolt-on acquisitions paid for from its own cash. After year ten, earnings stay flat indefinitely, because the two-player salvage market and the nearly 70-year-old auction network show no sign of fading. We credit no market-share gains from Copart and no margin expansion or new markets. We count BigIron at what was paid. The business is worth about $15.3 billion, it owes $2.84 billion of net debt plus the $0.49 billion preferred, and the remaining $11.98 billion is $64.37 per share. About 58% of the value comes after year ten. Bear case ($42.56). Two things go wrong. The used-equipment side goes through a two-year slump like 2017, when Ritchie Bros. revenue fell 14%. At the same time, one of IAA's three largest insurance suppliers moves its volume to Copart, which permanently cuts cash earnings by about 10%. Cash falls to about $618 million in years two and three, recovers to about $664 million, and does not grow after that. BigIron is worth 60% of its cost: $264.5 million of the price was goodwill, and farm-equipment demand is cyclical. The business is worth about $11.2 billion, it owes $3.33 billion including the preferred, and the remaining $7.92 billion is $42.56 per share. Even here, cash covers interest more than three times, so we do not assume a forced refinancing. The March 2028 notes are the first large maturity. Bull case ($81.37). Year one repeats 2024's $831 million, as the first half of 2026 suggests. Earnings then grow 4% a year for ten years, a pace the company has shown before, helped by the contracted Suncorp ramp and buyer-fee increases it has already made. After that, earnings stay flat. The business is worth about $18.5 billion. After $2.84 billion of net debt and the preferred, which is worth more converted in this case (about $0.55 billion), common equity is about $15.1 billion, or $81.37 per share. Margin-of-safety price. The business is durable, but it carries meaningful debt and half of it is tied to the construction-equipment cycle. The margin-of-safety price is about $44, roughly the bear-case value and about a third below the base case. From that price, the base case implies a return near 20% a year if the shares reach base-case value within about two years. What could make this wrong: losing a top insurer account, a long equipment downturn, or more debt-funded acquisitions that do not earn their cost. Two items rest on our judgment rather than on figures the filings state directly: how much cash the auctions need to operate, and what BigIron earns, since its standalone results were not disclosed.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $2.94 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$978.2M; reported net WC cash effect=$(136.2)M; WC cash effect ex-lease=+$10.3M. Operating-lease obligation payments $146.5M are excluded from the working-capital line because they are a real occupancy cost (ROU amortization $160.3M is added back above CFO, so leaving them in WC would strip lease cost out of OE). SBC=$66.0M; capex=PP&E $259.0M + intangible/software $116.5M=$375.5M; capex ratio 7.32% (mean 2024-2025 combined business), growth capex=$22.4M (revenue $4,284.2M to $4,590.7M); maintenance capex=$353.1M. OE=978.2-10.3-66.0-353.1=$548.8M; diluted shares=186.9M; OE/sh=$2.94. Reconciliation: NI 427.6 + D&A 483.4 + deferred tax (54.2) + gain on PP&E (2.2) + divestiture loss 9.6 + credit losses 1.4 + debt-cost amortization 9.4 + inventory write-downs 8.3 + other 4.8 + (ROU amortization 160.3 - lease payments 146.5) - maintenance capex 353.1 = $548.8M, ties. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-011682 (cash flow statement and Note 10).
2024 $3.25 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$932.0M; reported net WC cash effect=$(99.8)M; WC cash effect ex-lease=+$34.5M. Operating-lease obligation payments $134.3M are excluded from the working-capital line because they are a real occupancy cost (ROU amortization $154.4M is added back above CFO, so leaving them in WC would strip lease cost out of OE). SBC=$62.4M; capex=PP&E $167.4M + intangible/software $109.5M=$276.9M; capex ratio 7.32% (mean 2024-2025 combined business), growth capex=$44.3M (revenue $3,679.6M to $4,284.2M); maintenance capex=$232.6M. OE=932.0-34.5-62.4-232.6=$602.5M; diluted shares=185.3M; OE/sh=$3.25. Reconciliation: NI 412.8 + D&A 444.4 + deferred tax (69.2) + gain on PP&E (3.8) + credit losses 5.1 + debt-cost amortization 12.5 + inventory write-downs 14.9 + other (1.7) + (ROU amortization 154.4 - lease payments 134.3) - maintenance capex 232.6 = $602.5M, ties. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001628280-25-008201; WC/lease lines per FY2025 10-K Note 10.
2023 $0.96 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$544.0M; reported net WC cash effect=$(143.7)M; WC cash effect ex-lease=$(19.2)M. Operating-lease obligation payments $124.5M are excluded from the working-capital line because they are a real occupancy cost (ROU amortization $109.9M is added back above CFO). SBC=$55.8M; capex=PP&E $227.9M + intangible/software $118.3M=$346.2M; revenue jump was acquired (IAA, closed 20-Mar-2023), not capex-funded, so growth capex=0; maintenance capex=$346.2M. OE=544.0+19.2-55.8-346.2=$161.2M; diluted shares=168.2M; OE/sh=$0.96. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001628280-24-007570; WC/lease lines per FY2025 10-K Note 10. Stub year (IAA 9 months consolidated plus deal/integration costs), excluded from the valuation anchor.
2022 $1.76 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$463.1M; reported net WC cash effect=+$151.2M; WC cash effect ex-lease=+$164.1M (operating-lease obligation payments $12.9M excluded from WC as a real occupancy cost). SBC=$41.7M; capex=PP&E $32.0M + intangible/software $40.0M=$71.9M; capex ratio 3.49% (mean 2016-2022 pre-IAA, PP&E+intangible/software), growth capex=$11.1M; maintenance capex=$60.9M. OE=$196.4M; diluted shares=111.9M; OE/sh=$1.76. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001558370-23-001652. Last standalone pre-IAA year.
2021 $1.87 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$317.6M; reported net WC cash effect=+$24.4M; WC cash effect ex-lease=+$36.3M (operating-lease obligation payments $11.8M excluded from WC as a real occupancy cost). SBC=$31.3M; capex=PP&E $9.8M + intangible/software $33.7M=$43.5M; capex ratio 3.49% (mean 2016-2022 pre-IAA), growth capex=$1.4M; maintenance capex=$42.1M. OE=$207.9M; diluted shares=111.4M; OE/sh=$1.87. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001558370-22-001365; lease line per FY2022 10-K.
2020 $1.98 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$257.9M; reported net WC cash effect=$(29.1)M; WC cash effect ex-lease=$(18.0)M (operating-lease obligation payments $11.2M excluded from WC as a real occupancy cost). SBC=$16.6M; capex=PP&E $14.3M + intangible/software $28.9M=$43.1M; capex ratio 3.49% (mean 2016-2022 pre-IAA), growth capex=$2.0M; maintenance capex=$41.1M. OE=$218.2M; diluted shares=110.3M; OE/sh=$1.98. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001558370-21-001228.
2019 $1.77 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series removed operating-lease payments with working capital (2019+) and omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$332.8M; reported net WC cash effect=+$76.6M; WC cash effect ex-lease=+$90.0M (operating-lease obligation payments $13.4M excluded from WC as a real occupancy cost; first ASC 842 year). SBC=$12.7M; capex=PP&E $13.6M + intangible/software $27.4M=$41.0M; capex ratio 3.49% (mean 2016-2022 pre-IAA), growth capex=$5.2M; maintenance capex=$35.8M. OE=$194.2M; diluted shares=109.8M; OE/sh=$1.77. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001104659-20-026287; lease line per FY2020 10-K.
2018 $1.37 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$144.3M; reported net WC cash effect=$(65.5)M (pre-ASC 842, no lease line). SBC=$23.4M; capex=PP&E $16.9M + intangible/software $26.2M=$43.0M; capex ratio 3.49% (mean 2016-2022 pre-IAA, PP&E+intangible/software), growth capex=$6.9M (revenue $971.2M to $1,170.0M); maintenance capex=$36.1M. OE=144.3+65.5-23.4-36.1=$150.3M; diluted shares=109.4M; OE/sh=$1.37. Source: FY2018 10-K, accession 0001279569-19-000456.
2017 $0.72 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$147.6M (restated); reported net WC cash effect=+$10.3M (pre-ASC 842). SBC=$19.7M; capex=PP&E $10.8M + intangible/software $28.6M=$39.4M; revenue declined ($1,127.0M to $971.2M) so growth capex=0; maintenance capex=$39.4M. OE=147.6-10.3-19.7-39.4=$78.2M; diluted shares=108.1M; OE/sh=$0.72. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0001279569-18-000342 (CFO per FY2018 10-K restatement).
2016 $1.03 ▼
RECOMPUTED 2026-09-28 (whole series on one basis): prior series omitted intangible/software capex before 2023. OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$177.6M; reported net WC cash effect=+$10.7M (pre-ASC 842). SBC=$19.6M; capex=PP&E $18.9M + intangible/software $17.6M=$36.5M; no comparable 2015 revenue on the restated basis, so growth capex=0 and maintenance capex=$36.5M. OE=177.6-10.7-19.6-36.5=$110.8M; diluted shares=107.5M; OE/sh=$1.03. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001279569-17-000272.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (about 72% of 2025 revenue, sold nationwide across the Northeast, Midwest, West and South); Canada (about 15%); Europe (about 7%); Australia and other international markets (about 5%).
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
Over the long run the chart is a strong uptrend: the shares spent 2016-2018 in the high $20s, recovered quickly from the March 2020 plunge (low near $25), built a $50-$70 plateau through 2021-2023 while the IAA deal was digested, then broke out in 2024 to new highs near $98 and pushed on to roughly US$120 (about C$166 in Toronto) around September 2025. Since that peak the pattern has turned: a year of lower highs and lower lows has taken the price down about 30%, to around C$116 (roughly US$83) in September 2026, just above the 52-week low of C$112, with 90-day volatility near 40%, well above the stock's usual calm. A chartist would call the multi-year uptrend damaged but not yet reversed. The stock is sitting on the old 2024 breakout zone in the $80s-$90s, which now acts as support. A decisive break below it would point back toward the 2023 range in the $60s. Holding here and reclaiming the declining longer-term moving averages would mark the past year as a correction within the longer uptrend.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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