valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

MediaAlpha, Inc. (MAX) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$4.20 ComplexityHigh Updated
$2.14 $11.10
bear $2.14 base $8.32 bull $11.10 margin of safety $4.20 market price* $11.50
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Confirmation (from a subsequent quarterly filing) that the 2021 Credit Facilities, whose non-extended tranches matured in July 2026, were refinanced or extended without a material increase in borrowing cost or the addition of restrictive covenants.
MediaAlpha runs a two-sided online marketplace that matches insurance carriers and agents (buyers of customer leads) with publishers and websites that generate consumer interest (sellers of that traffic), across auto, home, health, life and Medicare insurance. It takes a spread on that matching activity rather than underwriting any insurance risk itself, and it is essentially asset-light: it spends almost nothing on equipment and capitalizes no software development costs, so nearly all of its operating cash flow is available to owners once working-capital swings are stripped out. The defining feature of this business is that its revenue is not MediaAlpha's to control. It rises and falls with how much insurance carriers choose to spend on customer acquisition, which in turn depends on the carriers' own underwriting profitability. This is not a hypothetical risk: it already happened. When auto-claims costs spiked in 2022-2023, carriers pulled back marketing budgets sharply, and revenue fell from roughly $645 million (2021) to $388 million (2023), pushing owner earnings from roughly break-even to deeply negative in both years. As carrier underwriting profitability recovered in 2024-2025, revenue rebounded strongly (to $865 million and then $1.11 billion), and owner earnings swung back to solidly positive. That round trip is the single most important fact in valuing this business: it can and does swing from meaningfully cash-generative to cash-consuming within a couple of years, for reasons entirely outside its own control. A second fact worth flagging plainly: MediaAlpha's revenue is concentrated. Its single largest buyer accounted for 25% of 2025 revenue and its second-largest another 24% — essentially half of all revenue running through two counterparties — and that concentration has been rising, not falling (a combined 41% in 2024). A pullback by either partner would hit results faster and harder than the industry-wide slowdown of 2022-2023. Given this, the three cases are built as follows. The base case assumes the 2024-2025 recovery continues to normalize — high single-digit growth next year, tapering to flat within about four years — because nothing in the filings suggests MediaAlpha has any contracted or locked-in revenue; it depends entirely on partners' ad budgets, so growth is not carried indefinitely. The bear case assumes a repeat of exactly the kind of shock the business already lived through: carrier underwriting deteriorates again (plausibly triggered by a pullback from one of the two concentrated partners), owner earnings turn negative for two years at roughly the same magnitude seen in 2022-2023, before a partial, incomplete recovery to a lower steady level. The bull case assumes the current recovery simply keeps running for a few more years before flattening, which is a continuation of an already-observed trend, not a new hoped-for catalyst. MediaAlpha also carries real debt: roughly $153 million of term loan and revolver borrowings, plus a $124 million liability under a tax receivables agreement tied to its corporate structure (a contractual obligation to pay certain pre-IPO owners a share of tax savings), against about $47 million of cash. After allowing for a reasonable operating cash cushion, net debt and debt-like obligations come to roughly $3.60 per share. That is subtracted after valuing the business itself in every case. One item to watch: a portion of the company's credit facilities came due in mid-2026, and as of the most recent annual filing the company was still negotiating its refinancing; the bear case assumes this gets done on somewhat worse terms, and the base and bull cases assume it is refinanced without materially higher borrowing costs. Putting it together: the business, before debt, is worth on the order of $11.90 per share in the base case, $6.30 in the bear case and $14.70 in the bull case; after subtracting net debt, per-share value comes to about $8.32 (base), $2.14 (bear) and $11.10 (bull). Given the demonstrated swing between strongly positive and deeply negative owner earnings, the customer concentration, and the leverage sitting on top of that cyclicality, the margin-of-safety price is set at a meaningful discount to the base-case estimate, with confirmation that the mid-2026 refinancing was completed on reasonable terms as an added condition.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $0.44 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, whole-company basis (net income before NCI split, $26,761K, reconciles exactly to CFO). CFO=$65,598K; ΔWC (AR 20,086, Prepaid (672), Other assets (3,915), AP (14,469), Accrued 4,194) = +$5,224K net source of cash; SBC=$30,331K; capex=$340K (company capitalizes $0 software development costs; PP&E purchases only), revenue grew so growth-capex test applied but is immaterial at this scale, maintenance capex ≈ total capex. OE = 65,598 - 5,224 - 30,331 - 340 = $29,703K. Diluted shares: GAAP if-converted weighted-average diluted count used (66,786,155), dilutive and reflecting total economic shares that year. OE/sh = 29,703/66,786,155 = $0.44. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001818383-26-000049.
2024 $0.57 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, whole-company basis. CFO=$45,872K; ΔWC (AR (89,656), Prepaid (244), Other assets 500, AP 49,284, Accrued 14,044) = -$26,072K net use of cash (AR grew sharply as revenue rebounded +123% YoY, a growth-driven WC investment, added back); SBC=$34,083K; capex=$254K, revenue grew strongly so growth-capex test applied but capex is immaterial in dollar terms at this asset-light company (mean capex/revenue ~0.03%), so growth capex ≈ $0 and maintenance capex ≈ total capex =$254K. OE = 45,872 - (-26,072) - 34,083 - 254 = $37,607K. GAAP diluted share count (53,043,576) equaled basic that year (if-converted anti-dilutive despite net income, a result of the tax-effect reallocation under the Up-C EPS method); whole-company OE uses total economic shares instead, approximated at the average of FY2023-end (65.5M) and FY2024-end (55.5M Class A-1 + 11.6M Class B-1 = 67.1M) = ~66.3M. OE/sh = 37,607/66,300,000 = $0.57. Source: FY2025 10-K comparative cash-flow statement, accession 0001818383-26-000049; unit counts per FY2024 10-K, accession 0001818383-25-000022.
2023 -$0.73 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, whole-company basis. CFO=$20,231K; ΔWC (AR 6,220, Prepaid 2,287, Other assets 500, AP 2,287, Accrued 1,996) = +$13,290K net source of cash; SBC=$53,321K; capex=$73K (revenue declined YoY so growth capex=$0, maintenance=total capex). OE = 20,231 - 13,290 - 53,321 - 73 = -$46,453K. Diluted share count approximated as total economic shares (Class A-1 + Class B-1 units at FY2023-end: 47.4M + 18.1M = 65.5M; averaged with FY2022-end 62.6M = ~64.05M) since GAAP diluted EPS again excluded NCI units as anti-dilutive. OE/sh = -46,453/64,050,000 = -$0.73. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001818383-24-000011.
2022 -$0.71 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, whole-company basis. CFO=$28,274K; ΔWC (AR 17,335, Prepaid 4,507, Other assets 417, AP (7,796), Accrued (494)) = +$13,969K net source of cash; SBC=$58,472K; capex=$98K (maintenance≈total, revenue declined YoY so growth capex=$0 per formula). OE = 28,274 - 13,969 - 58,472 - 98 = -$44,265K. GAAP diluted EPS share count (41,944,874) was anti-dilutive that year (loss) and excludes non-controlling LLC unit holders; for a whole-company OE figure we instead use total economic shares (Class A-1 + Class B-1 units outstanding at FY2022-end: 43.7M + 18.9M = 62.6M) as a more representative denominator. OE/sh = -44,265/62,600,000 = -$0.71. Source: FY2023 10-K comparative cash-flow statement, accession 0001818383-24-000011; unit counts per FY2022 10-K risk factors, accession 0001818383-23-000033.
2021 -$0.03 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex, whole-company basis (before NCI split, consistent with the consolidated cash flow statement). CFO=$28,621K; ΔWC (AR -20,058 + Prepaid +2,703... i.e. per the reconciliation: AR 20,058, Prepaid (2,703), Other assets 500, AP (36,476), Accrued 2,902) = -$15,719K net use of cash; SBC=$45,713K; capex (PP&E purchases, company capitalizes $0 software) =$650K, revenue grew slightly vs 2020 so growth capex trivially small at this scale, maintenance capex ≈ total capex =$650K. OE = 28,621 - (-15,719) - 45,713 - 650 = -$2,023K. Diluted shares: GAAP if-converted weighted-average diluted count used (61,255,925), which reflects total economic shares (Class A + exchangeable Class B-1/LLC units) since if-converted was dilutive that year. OE/sh = -2,023/61,255,925 = -$0.03. Source: FY2023 10-K comparative cash-flow statement, accession 0001818383-24-000011 (also FY2021 10-K, accession 0001818383-22-000023).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States, nationwide. Revenue comes from insurance carriers and agents across the Northeast, Midwest, South and West who pay for consumer referrals sold to U.S. consumers for auto, home, health, life and Medicare insurance; no material international revenue (a small Taiwan-based subsidiary is an engineering office, not a sales operation).
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
A chartist would note a classic post-IPO round trip: MAX listed via SPAC merger in late 2020, rallied into early 2021, then entered a severe, multi-year downtrend through 2022-2023 that erased the large majority of its value as the fundamentals (carrier ad spend) deteriorated — a decline steep and prolonged enough to look like a structural breakdown rather than a routine pullback. From the 2022-2023 lows, the stock carved out a bottoming base and then established a strong, sustained uptrend through 2024-2025 alongside the earnings recovery, with the kind of higher-highs/higher-lows structure typical of a name re-rating off a cyclical trough. Given the underlying business's sensitivity to a small number of large customers and to the insurance-carrier ad-spend cycle, the stock has historically been high-beta and prone to sharp, fast moves in both directions around earnings prints — a name where support/resistance levels have shifted quickly when the underlying carrier-spend narrative changed.
Competitors

We don't have competitor information for this company yet.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.