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LPRO stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$1.35 ComplexityAverage Updated
$1.28 $4.79
bear $1.28 base $2.85 bull $4.79 margin of safety $1.35 market price* $3.14
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Certified-loan volume (the count of auto loans enrolled in the Lenders Protection Program), which has declined every year since 2021 and was still down year-over-year in the most recent quarter, is flat or better for two consecutive quarters.
Open Lending runs the Lenders Protection Program, a platform that helps credit unions, banks and auto-finance captives make near-prime and non-prime auto loans with more confidence. Lenders pay a program fee to use the platform's risk-based pricing, and separately the company shares in the underwriting profit (or loss) that independent insurance carriers earn on the pool of loans the platform certifies. The insurance carriers, not Open Lending, carry the credit risk on any individual loan; Open Lending's own economics rise and fall with how that pooled risk performs over time, and with how many loans lenders choose to run through the platform. That structure has produced a real credit cycle in the numbers. Loan volume through the platform peaked in 2021 and has fallen every year since - down roughly 43% by 2025 - as higher interest rates and normalizing used-car values made near-prime auto lending less attractive industry-wide. The pullback showed up most dramatically in 2024, when the company recorded a $96 million downward revision to its estimate of profit-sharing revenue, reflecting worse-than-expected losses on loans written during the 2021-2022 boom. 2025 was calmer on that front - the revenue estimate barely moved - but loan volume kept falling (down about 12%), and the company also made an $11 million one-time payment to its largest referral partner to lock in lower ongoing fees going forward, which depressed this year's reported cash flow. Because profit-sharing revenue is recognized on a forward-looking estimate rather than as cash is received, both reported profit and cash flow swing significantly whenever that estimate is revised; we have anchored owner earnings to a multi-year midpoint (fiscal 2023) rather than any single year, so the valuation isn't overstated by a good estimate year or understated by a bad one. The balance sheet is a genuine strength. The company holds about $177 million of cash against $85 million of debt (a term loan due in 2027, recently paid down by $48 million in a single voluntary prepayment), leaving it in a net cash position of roughly $70-90 million. There is no sign of financial distress. Three cases: - Bear case: the volume decline that has run since 2021 continues for several more years before the business stabilizes at a much smaller size, consistent with the ongoing concentration of revenue among a handful of large lending partners named in the filings. Even here, cash reserves comfortably cover the now-modest debt, so this is a case of a smaller, less valuable business rather than one at risk. - Base case: the decline continues in the near term - it was still running in the most recent quarter - before gradually leveling off. This leans on the fact that the company kept adding new lending-partner relationships all through the downturn (roughly 40-45 a year), a sign the distribution network itself has not been shrinking even as volume per relationship has. - Bull case: those newer lending relationships mature and begin contributing meaningful loan volume of their own, gradually offsetting the broader pullback in near-prime auto lending - without assuming the industry credit cycle itself turns. On these assumptions the shares are worth on the order of $1.30 in the bear case, $2.85 in the base case and $4.80 in the bull case; a bit over $0.60 of that in every case is simply the net cash on the balance sheet rather than value from the operating business. Before finalizing this, we checked the assumption that the lending-partner network is a strengthening growth engine: the number of new lender contracts signed actually fell from 58 in 2024 to 46 in 2025, and revenue in the first quarter of 2026 was down against a year earlier by more than the full-year 2025 decline. Both facts argue against crediting any near-term acceleration, and the base and bull cases have been kept conservative accordingly. A margin-of-safety price of $1.35 reflects the cushion a cyclical, partner-concentrated business like this needs, and it does not assume a recovery: a stop in the loan-volume decline for a couple of quarters would be the first evidence of one.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.00 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=-$3,194K; NI=-$4,236K; non-cash addbacks=D&A $2,410K+amort. deferred financing cost $413K+SBC $7,043K+non-cash lease $814K+deferred tax $0+loss on extinguishment of debt $203K (from a $48.0M voluntary term-loan prepayment)+other -$177K. ΔWC=-$9,664K (use of cash as contract assets grew with a $0.4M positive profit-share estimate revision, partly offset by a one-time $11.0M payment made to reseller Allied Solutions in Aug 2025 to buy out ongoing referral-fee obligations, which is included in operating expenses/CFO this year and depresses this year's OE by roughly that amount); SBC=$7,043K; capex=$1,030K ($56K PP&E+$974K capitalized software); revenue grew vs FY2024 (+$69,193K, mostly a reversal of the prior year's negative estimate revision rather than volume growth—certified loans actually fell 12% y/y) so growth capex=4.09%×$69,193K=$2,830K>capex, maintenance capex=$0 (clamped). OE=-$3,194K-(-$9,664K)-$7,043K-$0=-$573K; diluted shares=118,603,000; OE/sh=-$0.00483. Note: excluding the one-time $11.0M Allied payment, underlying FY2025 OE would be roughly +$10.4M (~$0.088/sh), consistent with a business stabilizing near breakeven after the FY2024 trough. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001806201-26-000024.
2024 -$0.55 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$17,598K; NI=-$135,010K (driven by a disclosed $96.1M negative change-in-estimate to profit share revenue reflecting higher realized/forecast auto-loan losses on 2021-2022 vintages, plus a $70,113K non-cash deferred tax valuation-allowance charge); non-cash addbacks=D&A $1,674K+amort. deferred financing cost $427K+SBC $8,677K+non-cash lease $705K+deferred tax $70,113K+other $127K. ΔWC=+$70,885K (mechanically offsetting most of the NI shortfall as the negative revenue estimate reduced contract assets, a source of cash); SBC=$8,677K; capex=$3,896K ($165K PP&E+$3,731K capitalized software); revenue declined so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$3,896K. OE=$17,598K-$70,885K-$8,677K-$3,896K=-$65,860K; diluted shares=119,179,766; OE/sh=-$0.5527. Source: FY2025 10-K (3-yr comparative), accession 0001806201-26-000024.
2023 $0.14 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$82,658K; NI=$22,070K; non-cash addbacks=D&A $1,159K+amort. of deferred financing cost $428K+SBC $9,492K+non-cash lease $620K+deferred tax benefit -$4,985K+other $15K. ΔWC=+$53,859K (large positive swing from a $46,116K decrease in contract assets as profit share cash collections caught up to revenue already recognized); SBC=$9,492K; capex=$2,178K ($123K PP&E+$2,055K capitalized software, first year software capitalization appears); revenue declined vs FY2022 so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$2,178K. OE=$82,658K-$53,859K-$9,492K-$2,178K=$17,129K; diluted shares=121,474,880; OE/sh=$0.1410. This is the median year of the FY2021-2025 window and is used as the valuation anchor. Source: FY2025 10-K (3-yr comparative), accession 0001806201-26-000024.
2022 $0.54 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$107,431K; NI=$66,620K; non-cash addbacks=D&A $1,339K+SBC $5,449K+non-cash lease $579K+deferred tax $375K. ΔWC=+$33,069K; SBC=$5,449K; capex=$624K (PP&E only); revenue declined vs FY2021 (-$36,061K) so growth capex=$0, maintenance capex=$624K (full capex). OE=$107,431K-$33,069K-$5,449K-$624K=$68,289K; diluted shares=126,261,614; OE/sh=$0.5410. Reconciliation: NI+addbacks-maint capex=$68,289K, matches. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001806201-23-000033.
2021 $0.96 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex. CFO=$95,156K; non-cash addbacks=D&A $1,122K+SBC $3,815K+non-cash lease $544K+deferred tax $20,055K+loss on extinguishment of debt $8,778K-gain on extinguishment of Tax Receivable Agreement $55,422K (one-time, non-cash, nets to zero CFO impact); NI=$146,082K. ΔWC(changes in operating assets/liabilities per CF statement)=-$29,818K; SBC=$3,815K; capex=$1,987K (PP&E only, no capitalized software yet); revenue grew vs FY2020 (+$106,763K) so growth capex=4.09%×$106,763K=$4,365K>capex, maintenance capex=$0 (clamped). OE=$95,156K-(-$29,818K)-$3,815K-$0=$121,159K; diluted shares=126,390,435; OE/sh=$0.9586. Reconciliation check: NI+non-cash addbacks-maint capex=$121,159K, matches CFO-based figure exactly. Source: FY2022 10-K (comparative column), accession 0001806201-23-000033.
2020 $0.49 ▼
OE=CFO-ΔWC-SBC-maintenance capex (post-SPAC-merger transition year; distorted, excluded from valuation anchor). CFO=$24,640K; non-cash addbacks (D&A $1,310K+SBC $2,828K+non-cash lease $458K+deferred tax $4,734K+$131,932K non-cash change in fair value of contingent consideration from the June 2020 SPAC merger earnout)=$141,262K; NI=-$97,564K; ΔWC(net operating asset/liability change)=-$19,058K; SBC=$2,828K; capex(total, PP&E only)=$1,196K, revenue grew vs FY2019 so growth capex=$656K (using period capex/revenue ratio 4.09%), maintenance capex=clamp($1,196K-$656K,0,$1,196K)=$540K. OE=$24,640K-(-$19,058K)-$2,828K-$540K=$40,330K; diluted shares=82,908,772; OE/sh=$0.4864. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001806201-21-000012 (as restated in later filings).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (nationwide); auto loans are originated and booked by U.S. credit unions, banks and captive/OEM auto lenders across the country, with no single state or region called out as concentrated in the filings.
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