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indie Semiconductor, Inc. (INDI) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.65 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$5.84 -$2.35
bear -$5.84 base -$2.82 bull -$2.35 margin of safety $0.65 market price* $1.82
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Owner earnings after stock-based pay turn positive, at least $0.25 per share, in two consecutive fiscal years as reported in the annual filings, without issuing shares or new debt to fund operations.
What the business is. indie Semiconductor, based in Aliso Viejo, California, designs chips for cars that it has manufactured by outside foundries: radar, camera and vision processors and LiDAR parts for driver-assistance systems (ADAS), in-cabin and user-experience chips, lighting and electrification controllers, plus lasers and optical parts from its acquisitions of indie Switzerland (2023) and emotion3D (2025). It sells to parts suppliers and carmakers around the world. 47% of 2025 revenue shipped to Greater China, and a majority-owned subsidiary in Wuxi, China has minority outside shareholders. Revenue was $223 million in 2023, $217 million in 2024 and $217 million in 2025. The first half of 2026 was $119.5 million, up 13%, with the second quarter up 24%. What it earns for owners. In every year since 2020 the business has used more cash than it produced. Owner earnings, meaning operating cash flow with working-capital swings removed, less stock-based pay and less the capital spending needed to keep the business as it is, were minus $105 million in 2023, minus $155 million in 2024 and minus $137 million in 2025. We treat stock pay ($65 million in 2025) as a real cost. It is paid in new shares, and the average Class A share count rose from 145 million in 2023 to 212 million in the second quarter of 2026. We count design-software licenses that are paid for over time ($8 million in 2025) as capital spending, even though the payments appear under financing. Non-cash items drop out: $32 million a year of amortization on acquired technology and a $29 million non-cash gain in 2024 from revaluing acquisition earn-outs. The Wuxi subsidiary is counted in full. Before interest, the business consumed $98 million in 2023, $148 million in 2024 and $122 million in 2025. We use the middle of those three years, a $122 million annual loss, as the starting point, because 2023 onward is the business in its current form. The first half of 2026 ran at the same pace, about $122 million a year. The loss narrowed about 18% in 2025. We assume no further improvement in the first year because restructuring savings already show up in the 2025 and 2026 figures. What it owes. At June 30, 2026 the company owed $427.9 million: $218.5 million of 3.5% convertible notes due December 2029, $170.5 million of 4.0% convertible notes due March 2031 (issued in March 2026, mostly to repurchase $104 million of the 4.5% notes due November 2027), $26.0 million of those 2027 notes still outstanding, and about $13 million of bank loans. Cash was $149.0 million, so net debt is $278.9 million. The notes convert only far above the business's value, so we treat them all as debt. Where the notes are refinanced on normal terms, their below-market coupons are worth about $29 million to owners, which leaves $250 million. The per-share figures divide by 228.5 million shares: 212 million Class A plus 16.5 million Class V shares that can be exchanged for Class A. The cases. We do not count management's 'strategic backlog' or its design-win pipeline. These are management estimates, not orders, and the filing's risk factors say they may never become revenue or profit. We also do not count a return to profitability the business has not yet achieved. Every case therefore shows the company owing more than it is worth. Bear: the risks named in the filings play out. Heavy exposure to Greater China meets tariffs and export controls, and the planned exit from lower-margin non-ADAS products shrinks sales. Losses run at the 2024 level of about $148 million a year for ten years, paid for by new shares and debt as they have been every year since 2021. At the end, half of today's $111 million of working capital is recovered. The business is worth about minus $1.06 billion, it owes $279 million net, and the shares are worth about minus $1.34 billion, or minus $5.84 per share. Base: losses stay near $122 million a year until the March 2031 maturity, the last funding already in place. Nothing funds operations beyond that, and 80% of working capital is recovered. The business is worth about minus $395 million against $250 million of net debt, leaving minus $645 million, or minus $2.82 per share. Bull: the 2024 and 2025 restructurings, together with second-quarter 2026 sales growth, hold losses to the best recent year, about $98 million, through March 2031, with all working capital recovered. The business is worth about minus $288 million against $250 million of net debt, leaving minus $538 million, or minus $2.35 per share. What would make this wrong. The shares are worth something only if the business starts earning cash for its owners after paying its staff, including stock pay. For example, the second quarter's 24% sales growth would need to continue while costs stay flat, lifting results to break-even and beyond, and the 2029 and 2031 notes would need to be repaid or refinanced without large new share issues. None of that has happened yet. The margin-of-safety price applies only after two consecutive years of positive owner earnings of at least $0.25 per share. On that record, and allowing a wide margin for a cyclical, China-exposed, indebted chip business, the margin-of-safety price is about $0.65 per share.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.69 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(57.1)M; dWC=$(7.9)M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$65.1M; capex=$22.3M (PP&E $14.3M + purchased licenses $0.0M + financed software payments $8.0M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$0.1M (capex/revenue ratio 9.71% mean FY2020-FY2025 x revenue increase $0.7M), so maintenance capex=$22.2M; OE=$(136.6)M; diluted shares=197.2M; OE/sh=$(0.69). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2025 figures from 10-K accession 0001193125-26-082535.
2024 -$0.89 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(58.6)M; dWC=$7.8M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$67.2M; capex=$21.5M (PP&E $14.3M + purchased licenses $1.7M + financed software payments $5.5M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$0 (revenue declined), so maintenance capex=$21.5M; OE=$(155.2)M; diluted shares=175.0M; OE/sh=$(0.89). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2024 figures from 10-K accession 0001193125-26-082535.
2023 -$0.73 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(104.4)M; dWC=$(53.8)M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$43.7M; capex=$21.9M (PP&E $12.8M + purchased licenses $0.0M + financed software payments $9.1M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$10.9M (capex/revenue ratio 9.71% mean FY2020-FY2025 x revenue increase $112.4M), so maintenance capex=$11.0M; OE=$(105.3)M; diluted shares=145.2M; OE/sh=$(0.73). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2023 figures from 10-K accession 0001193125-26-082535.
2022 -$0.92 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(76.7)M; dWC=$(15.3)M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$41.9M; capex=$11.7M (PP&E $7.6M + purchased licenses $0.0M + financed software payments $4.2M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$6.1M (capex/revenue ratio 9.71% mean FY2020-FY2025 x revenue increase $62.4M), so maintenance capex=$5.7M; OE=$(109.0)M; diluted shares=118.7M; OE/sh=$(0.92). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2022 figures from 10-K accession 0001628280-23-009556.
2021 -$1.05 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(55.8)M; dWC=$(9.3)M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$22.9M; capex=$6.3M (PP&E $2.7M + purchased licenses $1.4M + financed software payments $2.3M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$2.5M (capex/revenue ratio 9.71% mean FY2020-FY2025 x revenue increase $25.8M), so maintenance capex=$3.8M; OE=$(73.3)M; diluted shares=70.0M; OE/sh=$(1.05). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2021 figures from 10-K accession 0001628280-23-009556.
2020 -$0.57 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(21.2)M; dWC=$(4.5)M (receivables, inventory, payables, accrued expenses, accrued payroll, deferred revenue, prepaids; operating-lease and other long-term liability lines left in CFO as recurring costs); SBC=$0.0M; capex=$1.0M (PP&E $0.6M + purchased licenses $0.0M + financed software payments $0.4M, the latter paid through financing but an ongoing cost of operating); growth capex=$0 (prior-year revenue not reported in filings, so all capex treated as maintenance), so maintenance capex=$1.0M; OE=$(17.7)M; diluted shares=31.2M; OE/sh=$(0.57). Reconciliation: net loss + non-cash charges ex-SBC + lease/other LT lines - maintenance capex equals the same figure (CFO identity, 0% gap). Consolidated figures include 100% of the Wuxi subsidiary. Source: FY2020 figures from 10-K accession 0001628280-22-008866.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) about 47% of sales; Europe about 20% (Germany, Portugal and others); United States about 15%; South Korea about 7%; remainder in Mexico, Canada, Japan and other Asian countries.
Historical growth strategy

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Chart analysis
A chartist would call INDI a long-term downtrend. Since the 2021 SPAC listing the stock has made a series of lower highs and lower lows and is down roughly three-quarters over five years. At about $3 in late September 2026, it is down about 23% over twelve months and about 14% for the year. The 19% one-day jump on June 30, 2026 faded, and September alone brought a drop of nearly 19%, a failed rally that returned the stock to the bottom of its range. Frequent 5%-plus daily swings mark it as a high-volatility, momentum-driven name. A chartist would want to see it hold its recent lows and then break above the summer 2026 high before calling a reversal.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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