-$0.26
$0.48
bear -$0.26
base $0.05
bull $0.48
margin of safety $0.02
market price* $1.52
i-80 Gold is a Nevada gold company assembling a 'hub-and-spoke' business: several underground deposits (Granite Creek, Cove, Archimedes at the Ruby Hill complex, Mineral Point) feeding a company-owned refractory-ore processing plant at Lone Tree that it is now refurbishing. Today it produces a small amount of gold (about 11,100 ounces in the June 2026 quarter) from Granite Creek, with ore toll-milled by a third party until Lone Tree restarts, targeted for the fourth quarter of 2027. Track record. The business has never produced positive owner cash flow. Measured as operating cash flow excluding working-capital swings, less stock compensation and the capital spending needed to sustain operations, it lost about $106 million in 2023, $83 million in 2024 and $90 million in 2025 (-$0.39, -$0.23 and -$0.13 per share; the per-share improvement is mostly heavy share issuance, not better results). The first half of 2026 ran at a loss rate of roughly $120 million a year. Interest is paid outside operating cash flow here, so these figures are already before lenders. Because there is no profitable history to anchor to, the value rests entirely on what the company's mineral deposits can be shown to produce. What is proven and what is not. As of its February 2026 annual report, none of the company's properties had mineral reserves; all were exploration-stage. On September 21, 2026 the company declared its first reserves: 556,500 ounces at Granite Creek underground (2.2 million tonnes at 7.87 g/t), supporting an 8.5-year mine averaging about 54,000 ounces a year (about 75,000 in 2028-2032) at life-of-mine all-in sustaining costs near $2,270 an ounce, with about $145 million of remaining capital including its share of the Lone Tree rebuild. That is the only part of the business we credit as a proven mine plan. The other projects (Cove, Archimedes, Mineral Point) rest on earlier studies whose economics depend on inferred material; the company's own figures show that using only the better-defined measured and indicated ounces, their all-in cost ran about $3,300-$3,400 an ounce and the projects were uneconomic at the $2,175 gold price then used. Those studies' larger values from inferred ounces are left out of every case, because the filings themselves say inferred material has no demonstrated economic viability. The 2026 recapitalization. In February-March 2026 the company raised about $660 million: $225 million from Franco-Nevada for a 1.5% royalty on all its properties (rising to 3.0% from January 2031), a $150 million gold prepayment from National Bank of Canada and Macquarie repayable by delivering 39,978 ounces between January 2028 and mid-2030, and $287.5 million of 3.75% convertible notes due 2031 (conversion price about $1.93). This retired about $175 million of older, costlier debt and left $464.6 million of cash at June 30, 2026. The 2025 audited statements had carried a substantial-doubt warning about the company's ability to continue, driven by a working-capital deficit; following this financing the company reported that the doubt no longer exists. The cash is not surplus: it is earmarked for the development plan (Lone Tree, Archimedes, Cove), so we value it by what it can be expected to earn back. How the cases are built (all at a 6% discount rate, about 866 million shares): - Base (gold $3,500/oz): Granite Creek worth about $317 million on its reserve plan. The development cash is spent on Cove, Archimedes and Lone Tree; at $3,500 gold, projects costing about $3,400 all-in roughly return their capital over 2028-2035, worth about $340 million today. Corporate overhead of about $25 million a year for ten years costs about $184 million. Business value about $473 million. Owed: convertible notes $262 million (the $287.5 million face reduced for their below-market 3.75% coupon), the gold prepayment $119 million (ounces owed, valued at $3,500 and discounted), and about $48 million of closure obligations at sites other than Granite Creek. Left for shareholders about $44 million, or $0.05 per share. - Bear (gold $2,750/oz): Granite Creek worth about $113 million (the study's own low-price case); development projects built at an all-in cost above the gold price recover well under their cost, worth about $236 million; overhead $170 million over nine years. Business about $179 million against about $404 million owed. The company would owe roughly $225 million more than it is worth (-$0.26 per share), and the 2031 convertible notes could not be repaid from operations, pointing to dilution or a restructuring. - Bull (gold $4,500/oz, roughly where it has traded in 2026): Granite Creek about $574 million; Archimedes (first underground gold targeted late 2026) and Cove (feasibility due fourth quarter 2026) are built on schedule and earn a healthy margin on their better-defined ounces, worth about $515 million; overhead $210 million over twelve years. Business about $879 million against about $463 million owed (the gold prepayment costs more at a higher price). About $416 million, or $0.48 per share. The convertible notes stay debt, since this value is far below their conversion price. What was left out and why: any value from inferred resources or future discoveries, since neither is yet demonstrated; any growth from gold prices above each case's deck; and the undrawn $100 million prepayment accordion and $25 million royalty tranche. What would make this wrong: Cove and Archimedes converting to reserves at low costs would lift the base case materially; a restart delay at Lone Tree beyond late 2027 or costs above the Granite Creek study would lower it, since the gold prepayment deliveries start in January 2028 regardless. The value is highly sensitive to the gold price and to execution on a plant and mines not yet operating.