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Health In Tech, Inc. (HIT) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.20 ComplexityAverage Updated
$0.17 $1.54
bear $0.17 base $0.56 bull $1.54 margin of safety $0.20 market price* $0.65
Business condition attached to the margin of safety The FY2026 10-K or subsequent quarterly filings show the H1 2026 buildup in receivables (~$7.8 million in six months) substantially collected or clearly explained as the tail of the now-resolved carrier settlement, and SMR revenue growth visibly resumed on a sequential basis.
Health In Tech (HIT) runs a health-insurance technology marketplace for stop-loss coverage sold to self-funded employer benefit plans. Its Stone Mountain Risk (SMR) subsidiary lets licensed brokers get a bindable insurance quote in about two minutes through an AI-assisted underwriting tool, while a second subsidiary, International Captive Exchange (ICE), provides underwriting-modeling and captive-management services to the carriers that write the policies (branded eDIYBS). A third unit, HI Card, is an add-on hospital-network card; it produced 15% of revenue in 2024 but effectively nothing in 2025, and we have not assumed any recovery there since nothing in the filings points to one. HIT went public in December 2024, so it has only two full fiscal years of results on its current public-company cost structure: 2024 and 2025. Total revenue grew from $19.5 million to $33.3 million, driven almost entirely by SMR, which nearly tripled from $9.8 million to $26.5 million - a genuinely strong, demonstrated growth record for the core marketplace product. 2025 was complicated by a one-time item worth walking through plainly. One carrier relationship, which ended in 2024, carried an unusual clause letting the carrier true up what it paid HIT's underwriting-modeling unit based on actual claims experience. That true-up reduced 2025 revenue by about $3.9 million; of that, $3.0 million was already paid out in cash during 2025, with the remaining roughly $0.9 million still owed at year end and final numbers due around May 2026. We treated the cash actually paid as a real cost of the year rather than as an ordinary swing in receivables and payables that reverses over time, because it doesn't reverse - the cash left the company for a dated, disclosed, one-off reason. That judgment call lowers our estimate of 2025's underlying cash-generating power (what we call owner earnings) by roughly $3 million compared with a more mechanical reading of the cash flow statement. We also corrected something the prior analysis of this business missed: HIT capitalizes ongoing software development ($0.9 million in 2024, $3.2 million in 2025) as an investing outflow rather than as capital expenditure in the usual sense, so it didn't show up under a typical capex line. It is nonetheless real, recurring reinvestment needed to keep the platform running and growing, and our updated figures now account for it. On this basis, owner earnings came to roughly $675,000 in 2024 (about $0.013 per share) and roughly $1.6 million in 2025 (about $0.028 per share). The picture darkens in the two most recent quarters. In the first half of 2026, revenue actually slipped slightly year over year (to $16.8 million from $17.3 million), the company swung to a net loss of about $4.1 million and negative operating cash flow of about $6.2 million, and receivables rose by a large, so-far-unexplained $7.8 million in six months. We could not fully reconcile the cause from the information available to us - it may be the tail of the carrier settlement working itself out, slower collections as the core marketplace scales, or some of both - and we say so plainly rather than assume the more favorable explanation. What two consecutive quarters of actual results tell us is that the strong growth of 2024-2025 has not continued into 2026, and our near-term assumption reflects that directly rather than assuming a quick bounce-back. Three cases: Bear case: the 2026 slowdown persists - receivables prove harder to collect, and competitors (several of whom already have larger broker and carrier networks, by HIT's own account) chip away at growth. Owner earnings stay near breakeven for a couple of years before a slow recovery to roughly half of 2025's per-share level by year ten. Discounted at a 6% rate, this case is worth about $0.17 per share. Base case: the carrier settlement fully resolves as scheduled in May 2026, removing that specific drag, and SMR's growth continues but at a much slower pace than 2024-2025's tripling, since there is no evidence that pace is repeatable. Owner earnings per share is roughly flat in 2026, recovers to about the 2025 level by 2029, and grows moderately before leveling off - HIT's own filings note that competitors can copy its platform, so we have not assumed any durable pricing advantage beyond the current growth phase. This case is worth about $0.56 per share. Bull case: SMR keeps compounding at something closer to its demonstrated 2024-2025 pace for a few more years as more brokers and carriers join the platform, the fixed cost of the technology platform provides real operating leverage as revenue scales, and the carrier settlement resolves cleanly. Growth decelerates in the back half of the ten-year window, again because nothing in the filings supports assuming a permanent moat. This case is worth about $1.54 per share. In every case we stopped assuming growth once we ran out of a specific, dated reason to expect it. The company carries no meaningful debt, and nothing in its filings raises a genuine question about its ability to keep operating. It has, however, funded part of 2026 with new stock (shares outstanding rose from about 57 million to about 63 million over the first half of the year), which dilutes existing holders if it continues. Given the shares' real volatility, the short public track record, the concentration of about a fifth of 2025 revenue in the underwriting-modeling business that just went through a costly one-off settlement, and the unresolved receivables increase in 2026, the margin-of-safety price sits at a substantial discount to our base-case estimate, around $0.20 per share, and assumes the 2026 receivables issue actually resolves and SMR's revenue growth visibly resumes, confirming the 2026 slowdown is temporary rather than the start of a structural stall.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $0.03 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO = $3,133,813. Ordinary working-capital lines (AR +$907,049, other receivables -$3,345,149, prepaid expenses -$1,948,184, operating lease ROU -$551, AP/accrued +$2,358,113, income taxes payable -$205,253) net to -$2,233,975 (use of cash) and are removed. JUDGMENT CALL (per project instructions section 7.5): the reconciliation separately contains a non-cash 'Provision for refund liability' addback of $3,891,598 and a 'changes in operating liabilities' outflow of -$3,000,000 labeled 'Other current liabilities.' Both relate to one named, already-ended (2024) carrier relationship whose contract had an unprecedented performance-based true-up clause; final reconciliation is due ~May 2026, and $891,598 remained an unpaid liability at 12/31/2025. The $3,891,598 is kept as an ordinary non-cash addback. The -$3,000,000 is NOT stripped out as ordinary working-capital timing noise, because it is an actual cash payment already made against a dated, one-off contractual settlement, not a recurring revenue-scaling swing that reverses. Mechanically stripping it (i.e. the plain independent check below) raises OE to $4,589,647 - implausibly 6.8x the FY2024 level, i.e. treats a real, largely cash-settled $3.9M cost as increasing owner earnings, which is economically wrong. SBC = $1,570,419 subtracted once. Capex (capitalized internal-use software development, tag PaymentsToDevelopSoftware) = $3,189,921. capex_ratio = mean(capex/revenue) over the FY2024-FY2025 window = 7.10%. Revenue grew from $19,490,906 (2024) to $33,327,511 (2025), so growth capex = 7.10% x $13,836,605 = $982,199; maintenance capex = clamp($3,189,921-$982,199,0,$3,189,921) = $2,207,722. OE = $3,133,813 + $2,233,975 (WC removed) - $1,570,419 - $2,207,722 = $1,589,647. Diluted shares = 57,742,798. OE/sh = $0.0275. Mechanical independent check (NI $1,278,842 + D&A $900,577 + other non-cash incl. the $3,891,598 provision - maintenance capex $2,207,722) = $4,589,647, a 65% gap from the $1,589,647 used here, entirely attributable to the disclosed $3,000,000 reclassification above. Source: FY2025 10-K filed 2026-03-25, accession 0001213900-26-034211.
2024 $0.01 ▼
OE = CFO - working-capital movement - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO (NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities) = $2,176,209. Ordinary working-capital lines (AR +$586,685, other receivables +$1,180,848, prepaid expenses -$514,242, operating lease ROU -$1,889 net... actually +$1,889, AP/accrued -$851,963, income taxes payable -$246,693) net to +$156,524 (source of cash) and are removed. SBC=$468,489 subtracted once (CFO already adds it back). Capex = capitalized internal-use software development (tag PaymentsToDevelopSoftware, presented as 'Development of software' investing outflow, since this filer has no PP&E capex tag): $900,755. capex_ratio = mean(capex/revenue) over the FY2024-FY2025 anchor window = 7.10%. Revenue grew from $19,151,502 (2023) to $19,490,906 (2024), so growth capex = 7.10% x $339,404 = $24,098; maintenance capex = clamp($900,755-$24,098,0,$900,755) = $876,657. OE = $2,176,209 - $156,524 - $468,489 - $876,657 = $674,539. Diluted shares = 53,662,677. OE/sh = $0.0126. Independent check (NI $670,477 + D&A $541,141 + other non-cash $337,700 (bad debt $1,878, deferred tax benefit -$93,304, amortization of debt discount $495,000, interest income -$63,996) - maintenance capex $876,657) reconciles exactly to $674,539, 0% gap. FY2023 excluded from anchor: pre-IPO (IPO closed 2024-12-24), zero SBC, different two-class share structure, and included a discontinued-operations line, so it describes a different business. Source: FY2025 10-K filed 2026-03-25, accession 0001213900-26-034211, FY2024 comparative column.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - nationwide. HIT sells stop-loss insurance marketplace access and underwriting/captive-management services to licensed insurance brokers, carriers, and self-funded employers across all US regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West); its Medicare-linked provider network under HI Card spans all 50 states. No single state or region concentration is disclosed.
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