-$14.53
$33.07
bear -$14.53
base $8.71
bull $33.07
margin of safety $5.00
market price* $20.45
WHAT THE BUSINESS IS. Liberty Capital Corporation (formerly GCI Liberty) owns GCI Holdings, Alaska's largest communications company: broadband, wireless, voice and managed network services to homes, businesses, hospitals, schools and governments across Alaska, including hundreds of remote villages reached only by its fiber, microwave and satellite network. It was spun off from Liberty Broadband in July 2025. Revenue was $1,046M in 2025 and $1,016M in 2024; business data (largely health-care and school circuits) is the largest line at $500M. Federal Universal Service Fund programs supplied 46% of 2025 revenue (42% in 2024), so the business is as much a regulated contractor to the FCC's subsidy programs as it is a consumer telecom. WHAT IT EARNS. Owner earnings (operating cash flow, less working-capital swings, stock compensation and the capital spending needed to keep the network as it is) were about $100M in 2024 and $111M in 2025, or $3.45 and $3.58 per share. Capital grants received for network builds ($54M in 2024, $24M in 2025) were netted against capital spending. Because revenue is essentially flat, nearly all capital spending is treated as maintenance. Only two years of standalone figures exist. The 2025 year contained large one-off items from the separation - a $525M non-cash write-down of cable certificates and goodwill, a $391M deferred tax benefit, a $206M federal tax payable cancelled by Liberty Broadband, and $91M of state tax paid and then reimbursed by Liberty Broadband - all of which net out of cash earnings and were excluded. Adding back cash interest ($56M and $51M) gives the cash the business produced before its lenders: about $156M in 2024 and $162M in 2025. WHY THE NEAR-TERM PATH IS LOWER THAN 2025. Two consecutive quarters in 2026 show the business earning less: first-half revenue fell 2% to $517M (the video business was fully shut down in 2025), operating income fell from $109M to $59M, and operating cash flow fell from $226M to $164M. Business costs rose because GCI is now paying for capacity on the restored Quintillion network and higher circuit costs, and the company has said 2026 net capital spending will rise to about $290M, much of it to upgrade urban Anchorage-area cable plant. Separately, the FCC's Alaska Connect Fund raised high-cost support 30% for 2025-2026 for wireless and through 2028 for wireline, after which wireless support may be cut for areas deemed ineligible and, after 2030, in areas with more than one supported carrier. Owner earnings grew about 11% in 2025; our base case does not carry that forward. It starts 2027 well below 2025 because the 2026 quarters, the higher capital budget and the scheduled end of the temporary subsidy uplift are all already on the record. THE CASES. Each case values the cash the business produces before interest, then subtracts what the company owes. What it owes: about $1,263M of debt at June 30, 2026 ($600M of 4.75% notes due 2028, $596M under the bank facility, $67M of tower obligations and other), $10M of 12% preferred stock ranking ahead of the common, and roughly $200M still committed to the Quintillion acquisition (a $310M enterprise value, of which $160M was already lent to Quintillion with borrowed money, plus up to $50M of reimbursed construction on the Nome-to-Homer route), less about $447M of cash beyond operating needs: roughly $1,026M in all, against about 40 million shares. The 2028 notes cost less than current market rates, but only for two years, so no adjustment was made; GCI repurchased $129M of them after June. Base case ($8.71 per share): pre-interest cash flow of about $90M in 2027, $100M in 2028-2030 as the urban cable upgrade finishes and capital spending eases back toward the 2024-2025 level, $90M in 2031-2036 and $80M in 2037-2045 as wireless subsidy reductions arrive, fading to nothing by 2055. Quintillion is credited with about $20M a year, roughly what GCI was already paying for capacity on that network. The long tail is credited because GCI's owned fiber and microwave network into rural Alaska is a structural asset that is very hard to duplicate, but it is faded because the subsidy programs that pay for much of it are reset by the FCC on fixed terms. Business worth about $1.38B, owes about $1.03B, leaving about $350M. Bear case (-$14.53): Alaska's economy runs on oil and federal spending; the 2015-2017 oil collapse put the state into a three-year recession and GCI's own revenue went backward in that period. Layered on that is a subsidy reset of the kind already seen: in 2018 the FCC cut GCI's rural health-care rates about 26%, removing $28M of support, and the Alaska Connect Fund explicitly allows wireless support to be reduced after 2026 and again after 2030. The case runs about $55M in 2027, $50M in 2028-2030 and $40M in 2031-2036, fading to zero by 2046, with Quintillion adding nothing. At those levels cash flow does not cover the roughly $60-65M interest bill, which is why the case is negative: the business would be worth about $450M while owing about $1.03B, so the company would owe roughly $580M more than it is worth and the 2028 note maturity would have to be refinanced from a weak position. An unresolved FCC inquiry into conflicts of interest in GCI's historical rural health-care bidding, which the company cannot estimate, sits in this case as well. Bull case ($33.07): the higher 2026 capital spending is a one-time upgrade, spending returns to the 2024-2025 level, and pre-interest cash flow climbs back to about $165M a year in 2028-2035 - essentially what the business already earned in 2024-2025 - then $150M through 2045 before fading, with Quintillion contributing about $30M a year. No growth beyond the level already achieved is credited, because revenue has been flat for years and new markets or share gains are not in hand. Business worth about $2.35B, owes about $1.03B, leaving about $1.32B. WHAT WAS LEFT OUT. The planned dividend of about $60M a year from late 2026 is a use of the cash already counted, not extra value. Any value from future parent-level investments, a second tracking-stock group, or new subsidy programs (such as broadband grant funding not yet awarded) is excluded because none is contracted. Tax savings from the 2025 step-up in the tax basis of GCI's assets are already reflected in the low cash taxes inside the earnings figures. CHANGES SINCE THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS. The previous figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable. What has changed in the business since then: operating income in the first half of 2026 nearly halved, the company committed to the $310M Quintillion purchase and borrowed to fund part of it, leverage rose to 2.8 times at the operating company, capital spending guidance rose to about $290M, and a dividend was announced. THE MARGIN-OF-SAFETY PRICE. How sure are we of the earnings level? Not very: there are only two standalone years, both flattered by a temporary 30% subsidy uplift, and the two most recent quarters are running well below them. Nearly half of revenue depends on FCC programs whose terms are reset every few years, and the company has a history of having rates cut. The worst plausible outcome - an Alaska recession coinciding with a wireless subsidy cut around 2027-2030 and the 2028 notes needing refinancing - would leave the debt larger than the business, and that is a real possibility rather than a remote one given leverage near three times cash earnings. If we are wrong about the capital budget (it stays near $290M) and about subsidy levels after 2026, the shares are worth little more than zero; if we are wrong in the other direction, the business returns to its 2024-2025 earnings and the shares are worth $30 or more. The planned dividend of roughly $1.50 per share a year is funded largely from the $447M cash pile rather than from surplus earnings, so it should not be counted on beyond a few years. Because the range runs from negative to over $30 and the middle is under $10, the margin-of-safety price is set where the dividend plus a modest recovery toward the base case supplies the return without needing the bull case: $5.00 a share. From that price a few years of dividends equal a large part of the price, and a merely average outcome implies roughly a doubling within four years; at higher prices too much depends on subsidy decisions that cannot be seen.