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GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. (GILD) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$25.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$17.16 $94.66
bear $17.16 base $52.83 bull $94.66 margin of safety $25.00 market price* $156.19
Gilead Sciences is one franchise with a portfolio attached. HIV medicines were $20.8 billion of 2025 revenue of $29.4 billion, led by the once-daily tablet Biktarvy; the rest is liver disease (Epclusa, Vemlidy, Livdelzi), cell therapy (Yescarta, Tecartus), Trodelvy for breast cancer and the COVID antiviral Veklury. About 70% of sales are in the United States. EARNING POWER. Cash generation is far steadier than reported profit, which has swung between $0.1 billion and $8.5 billion because Gilead expenses purchased research immediately. After removing working-capital swings, stock-based pay and maintenance capital spending, owner earnings ran $5.79 to $9.98 a share from 2018 to 2025, median about $7.31. Adding back about $1 billion of yearly interest gives about $8.05 a share, roughly $10 billion a year before lenders are paid. We use 2018-2025 because that is today's HIV franchise with hepatitis C already normalized; 2016 was the tail of the hepatitis C boom and 2017 was distorted by the tax-reform accrual. 2025 was the best year at $9.98, up about 20%, but about $2.1 billion of it came from a swing in tax balances, so it is not treated as the new normal; the first forecast year grows only about 3%. THE KEY JUDGEMENT. Gilead's pipeline is largely bought. Acquisition cash (Kite, Immunomedics, CymaBay, and in 2026 Arcellx for its anito-cel cell therapy) leaves through investing activities, not operating cash flow, so cash flow alone overstates what owners keep. Purchases averaged about $3.5 billion a year in 2021-2025, and $11.3 billion went out in the first half of 2026. Every case below deducts a recurring business-development cost of $2.5 to $4 billion a year. Amortization of acquired products is added back, so the decay of those assets is carried in the declining earnings paths below. TWO DATES. A 2025 patent settlement means no US generic Biktarvy before April 1, 2036, more than two years later than previously expected. But in January 2026 Biktarvy was selected for Medicare price negotiation, with negotiated prices effective in 2028. The twice-yearly HIV prevention injection Yeztugo (lenacapavir), approved in 2025, is protected to 2037 but contributes little to the earnings record, so no growth from it is credited outside the bull case. BASE CASE ($52.83). Business cash flow of about $10.5-10.8 billion in 2026-27, stepping down to about $10 billion from 2028 as Medicare pricing bites, flat to 2035 because Gilead has a long record of replacing its own HIV regimens before they lose protection, then falling to about $7 billion after Biktarvy generics arrive in 2036. A business-development cost of $3.5 billion a year runs throughout. The business is worth about $85 billion. It owes $26.2 billion of bonds against $3.2 billion of cash. Most of the debt is fixed at roughly 3-4% for many years, well below today's long-term borrowing rates, which is worth about $3.5 billion, so net debt counts as about $19.6 billion. Equity is about $65.7 billion, or $52.83 per share. BEAR CASE ($17.16). Medicare and commercial price pressure take business cash flow down to about $8 billion by 2028 and $6.2 billion by 2035, the kind of price reset HIV and hepatitis C makers have already lived through. Biktarvy generics arrive on schedule in 2036, acquisitions keep failing at the 2022-2024 pace (about $6.9 billion of write-offs of bought research), and buying replacement products costs $4 billion a year. The business is worth about $41 billion against $19.6 billion of net debt, leaving about $21 billion of equity. Interest of about $1 billion stays covered throughout. BULL CASE ($94.66). Yeztugo and long-acting HIV treatment extend the franchise; business cash flow rises to about $12 billion by 2032 and settles near $9.5 billion after 2036, with a lower $2.5 billion business-development cost. The business is worth about $137 billion; equity about $118 billion. MARGIN OF SAFETY PRICE: $25. The earnings level is well documented, with eight straight years of $5.79 or more per share, so we are confident about where the business stands today. The worst plausible outcome is a Biktarvy price reset deeper than modeled combined with another expensive acquisition that fails; the balance sheet would survive it because the debt is long-dated, fixed-rate and covered many times by cash flow. The three things we are most likely to be wrong about are the depth of Medicare pricing, the cost of replacing Biktarvy, and whether Yeztugo becomes material. If all three go against us, the shares are worth roughly the bear case, high teens to low $20s, still well above zero. The business pays a dividend of $3.16 a share (about $4 billion a year), roughly 12-13% of a $25 price, which makes up much of the 20% target over the holding period. From $25 the bear outcome implies roughly that dividend with a modest decline in value, and a base outcome implies roughly double the price within a few years. Above about $25 the bear outcome no longer comfortably supports the target, so that is where we draw the line. CHANGES SINCE THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS. The business facts are largely unchanged; the Arcellx purchase, completed in 2026, added to the debt. Earlier figures were built on a different basis and are not comparable.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $9.98 ▼
Recomputed: prior record used superseded basis (CFO - capex - SBC, no working-capital removal). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$10,019M; dWC (AR -367, inventories -1,036, prepaid -311, AP -132, income tax assets/liabilities -2,108, accrued +6) = -$3,948M added back; SBC=$894M; capex=$563M, growth capex=2.59% x $689M rev increase=$18M so maintenance=$545M; OE=$12,528M; diluted shares=1,255M; OE/sh=$9.98. Caution: the -$2,108M tax line is a large swing (tax payments exceeding provision) that may partly recur; the anchor uses the median, not this year. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000882095-26-000006.
2024 $8.28 ▼
Recomputed: prior record used superseded basis (CFO - capex - SBC, no working-capital removal). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$10,828M; dWC (AR +139, inventories -426, prepaid -259, AP +290, income taxes -732, accrued +108) = -$880M added back; SBC=$835M; capex=$523M, growth capex=2.59% x $1,638M rev increase=$42M so maintenance=$481M; OE=$10,392M; diluted shares=1,255M; OE/sh=$8.28. Note: CFO adds back $4,663M acquired IPR&D (CymaBay) whose cash left via investing; the valuation charges ongoing business development separately. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000882095-26-000006.
2023 $7.12 ▼
Recomputed: prior record used superseded basis (CFO - capex - SBC, no working-capital removal). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$8,006M; dWC (AR +157, inventories -842, prepaid +39, AP -347, income taxes -1,768, accrued +458) = -$2,303M added back; SBC=$766M; capex=$585M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance=$585M; OE=$8,958M; diluted shares=1,258M; OE/sh=$7.12. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0000882095-26-000006.
2022 $7.50 ▼
Recomputed: prior record used superseded basis (CFO - capex - SBC, no working-capital removal). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$9,072M; dWC (AR -406, inventories -310, prepaid +70, AP +226, income taxes -568, accrued -775) = -$1,763M added back; SBC=$637M; capex=$728M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance=$728M; OE=$9,470M; diluted shares=1,262M; OE/sh=$7.50. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000882095-23-000007.
2021 $7.72 ▼
Recomputed: prior record used superseded basis (CFO - capex - SBC, no working-capital removal or maintenance-capex split). OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$11,384M; dWC (AR +313, inventories +11, prepaid -42, AP -118, income taxes -364, accrued +689) = +$489M removed; SBC=$635M; capex=$579M, growth capex=2.59% x $2,616M rev increase=$68M so maintenance=$511M; OE=$9,749M; diluted shares=1,262M; OE/sh=$7.72. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000882095-23-000007.
2020 $6.79 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$8,168M; dWC (AR -1,171, inventories -195, prepaid -214, AP +80, income taxes -778, accrued +640) = -$1,638M added back; SBC=$643M; capex=$650M, growth capex=2.59% x $2,240M rev increase=$58M so maintenance=$592M; OE=$8,571M; diluted shares=1,263M; OE/sh=$6.79. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000882095-23-000007.
2019 $6.65 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$9,144M; dWC (AR -218, inventories -95, prepaid -307, AP -61, income taxes +272, accrued -389) = -$798M added back; SBC=$636M; capex=$825M, growth capex=2.59% x $322M rev increase=$8M so maintenance=$817M; OE=$8,489M; diluted shares=1,277M; OE/sh=$6.65. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000882095-20-000006.
2018 $5.79 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$8,400M; dWC (AR +480, inventories -310, prepaid +903, AP -39, income taxes -1,459, accrued -514) = -$939M added back; SBC=$845M; capex=$924M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance=$924M; OE=$7,570M; diluted shares=1,308M; OE/sh=$5.79. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000882095-20-000006.
2017 $4.22 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$11,898M; dWC (AR +754, inventories -253, prepaid +358, AP -430, income taxes +5,497 [TCJA transition tax accrued, not yet paid], accrued -818) = +$5,108M removed; SBC=$638M; capex=$590M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance=$590M; OE=$5,562M; diluted shares=1,319M; OE/sh=$4.22. Year distorted by TCJA tax accrual. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0000882095-20-000006.
2016 $10.58 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$17,047M; dWC (cash effect of AR +1,192, inventories -488, prepaid -520, AP +47, income taxes +1,010, accrued +305) = +$1,546M removed; SBC=$380M; capex=$748M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance capex=$748M; OE=$14,373M; diluted shares=1,358M; OE/sh=$10.58. Reconciliation NI+D&A+non-cash-maint capex matches by construction. Source: FY2017 10-K, accession 0000882095-18-000008.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) roughly 70% of revenue; Europe (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain); Rest of World including Japan, Canada, Australia, Brazil and China
Historical growth strategy
Builds franchises largely by acquisition and licensing (Pharmasset for hepatitis C, Kite for cell therapy, Immunomedics for Trodelvy, CymaBay for Livdelzi, Arcellx for anito-cel), then extends them through in-house reformulation - most clearly in HIV, where it has repeatedly replaced its own single-tablet regimens (Atripla, Stribild, Genvoya, Biktarvy) before patents expire. Returns excess cash through a steadily rising dividend and buybacks.
Chart analysis
A chartist would describe a very long base: after peaking near $120 in 2015 at the height of the hepatitis C boom, the shares spent most of 2016-2023 trapped in a broad $60-$85 range with repeated failures at the top of that band. The 2024-2025 move broke decisively out of that multi-year range and retested the 2015 highs, a classic long-base breakout. The key questions for a technician are whether the old $85-$90 resistance has become support on pullbacks and whether the stock can clear and hold above the 2015 high; failure there would read as a double top.
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