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GREENBRIER COMPANIES INC (GBX) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$20.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
$16.26 $63.45
bear $16.26 base $39.00 bull $63.45 margin of safety $20.00 market price* $39.11
Greenbrier builds new freight railcars (tank cars, covered hoppers, intermodal and boxcars) in Mexico, the United States and Europe; owns a fleet of about 20,600 railcars that it leases to shippers and railroads; and manages fleets for other owners. It is a cyclical, capital-heavy business: new-car orders follow freight volumes, steel costs and periodic replacement waves, while the lease fleet produces steadier income. Roughly three-quarters of revenue comes from customers in the United States and the rest mainly from Europe. What changed since our last analysis. Our previous estimate valued Greenbrier's cash earnings after interest and never subtracted the roughly $1.8 billion the company owes. That quietly assumed the debt would be rolled over forever on today's terms, much of it at unusually cheap fixed or swapped rates set in 2021-2023. We now value the business as if it had no debt, then subtract what it owes. This is the main reason our estimates are much lower: base value falls from $84 to $39 a share. A second reason is the business itself: fiscal 2026 (ended August 2026) is a down year. Nine-month revenue fell 25% to $1.87 billion, nine-month net earnings fell from $173 million to $69 million, and the backlog dropped to 13,800 cars worth about $2.0 billion at May 31, 2026, with third-quarter orders (2,200 cars) well below deliveries (3,600). How we measured earning power. We start from reported operating cash flow, strip out working-capital swings, and subtract stock pay and the capital spending needed to stay in business. For the factories we treat all capital spending as upkeep except the share tied to revenue growth; for the lease fleet we treat spending equal to fleet depreciation as upkeep and anything above that as fleet expansion. Because the fleet expansion was paid for largely with borrowed money, that borrowing is counted in full in the debt we subtract. We then add back cash interest paid, which gives the cash the business produces before paying its lenders: about $4.21 a share in fiscal 2020, $5.22 in 2021, $3.97 in 2022, $6.17 in 2023, $6.48 in 2024 and $7.81 in 2025, and roughly $4.50 for fiscal 2026 based on the nine months already reported. We measure from fiscal 2020 because the July 2019 purchase of ARI's railcar manufacturing business changed the company; that window covers the COVID trough, the 2023-2025 upswing and the current slowdown. Its median is about $5.22 a share. To that we add about $0.50 a share for the roughly 4,400 used railcars Greenbrier bought for $227 million in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, which are already owned, leased (fleet utilization 99%) and financed, but not yet reflected in past results; we assume they earn about 7% a year after upkeep. That gives a normal level of about $5.75 a share, or roughly $183 million a year. Intangible amortization is small here and does not affect the result. Growth check. Cash earnings after interest rose 37% in fiscal 2025 (20% before interest), but the current year is running well below that. Our base case starts fiscal 2027 at $4.50 a share, a decline, not a continuation of last year's growth. We credit no growth beyond returning to the normal level the business has already reached under its current footprint. Management's goal of doubling lease revenue by 2028 is a target, not something already paid for, so it is left out; so is any benefit from tariffs or a new tank-car replacement mandate. After year ten. We do not assume growth, but we do assume the earning power continues at a flat level. The North American freight fleet has to be replaced as cars wear out over roughly 40-50 years, Greenbrier has been one of the few large builders for decades, and it owns a leased fleet that keeps producing rent. That keeps the flat stream going; nothing beyond it is credited. What it owes. At May 31, 2026, Greenbrier carried $1,805.6 million of debt: $733 million backed by the company as a whole (revolving lines in North America, Europe and Mexico, a corporate term loan maturing May 2030, and $373.8 million of 2.875% convertible notes due April 2028, which must be repaid in cash) and $1,072 million secured only by lease railcars (a warehouse line maturing 2029, leasing term debt refinanced in the third quarter with a six-year extension, and asset-backed notes). We subtract about $1,815 million of borrowings and add back $174 million of the $274 million cash balance (keeping $100 million to run the business). Outside partners own part of some consolidated operations, including the Mexican manufacturing joint venture, so we also subtract their $155 million share. Some of the debt is cheaper than our 6% yardstick: the convertible notes at 2.875% and the 2022 railcar notes at about 2.9%. Together with interest-rate swaps on much of the floating debt, this is worth about $45 million to shareholders in the base and bull cases. That leaves net obligations of about $1,751 million, or $55.07 a share. Bear case ($16.26 a share). The order slowdown visible in the backlog lasts: cash generation before interest stays near $3.50 a share for two years, recovers only to $4.00 in year three, and then settles at $4.50, about the level of the weaker post-2019 years. The $373.8 million convertible must be refinanced in 2028 at market rates, so we give no credit for cheap debt. The business is worth about $2,313 million, it owes about $1,796 million, and about $517 million is left for shareholders. Even at the bear level, the business produces about $111 million a year before interest, against interest of roughly $85 million, so it can carry its debt, though with little room to spare. Base case ($39.00 a share). Fiscal 2027 runs at about $4.50 a share, similar to 2026; fiscal 2028 recovers to $5.10; after that the business earns its normal $5.75 a share, including the railcars already bought, with no growth. The business is worth about $2,992 million, it owes about $1,751 million, and about $1,241 million is left for shareholders. Bull case ($63.45 a share). The Europe plant consolidation, now finished, and the higher manufacturing margins earned in fiscal 2024-2025 hold. Earnings return to the 2023-2025 average plus the added fleet, about $7.30 a share, after $5.00 and $6.20 in the next two years. The business is worth about $3,769 million, it owes about $1,751 million, and about $2,018 million is left for shareholders. Each $1 a share change in yearly earning power moves the value by about $17 a share. Because the debt takes a fixed $55 a share off the top, that swing is large compared with what is left for shareholders, which is why the range is wide. An order book that recovers, like the 3,400 cars worth about $600 million ordered in the fiscal fourth quarter, supports the base case. An extended slowdown with falling lease rates pushes toward the bear case. What would make this wrong: a new regulatory tank-car replacement wave, or lease-fleet returns well above 7%, would lift value; a multi-year order drought like 2020-2021, rising refinancing costs on the $1.1 billion of railcar-secured debt, or losses in Europe would lower it. Margin-of-safety price. This is a cyclical manufacturer with a lot of debt relative to its value, so the margin of safety is wide: roughly half the base value. From about $20 a share, a return to the base value within about four years, plus the quarterly dividend, implies more than 20% a year, and the bear case is only about 20% below that price. One item we could not fully reconcile: the fiscal 2026 figure is estimated from nine months of reported results because the full-year annual report has not yet been filed. Nine-month operating cash flow was only $8 million. The interim figures available to us did not break out the cause, so we treated the gap between earnings and cash flow as working-capital timing, in line with this company's long record of large swings in inventory and in railcars built for sale to investors, rather than as lost earning power.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $5.25 ▼
CFO=$265.7M; consolidated net earnings=$213.1M; D&A=$121.5M; SBC=$17.5M; equity income from unconsolidated affiliates $20.1M excluded as non-cash. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -4.6, income tax receivable +0.2, inventories +62.0, leased railcars for syndication -107.8, other assets +29.6, AP & accrued -67.0, deferred revenue -15.9) = -$103.5M. Manufacturing capex $139.9M; Manufacturing segment revenue fell to $3,090.1M from $3,549.4M, so growth capex=$0, maintenance=full $139.9M. Leasing capex $140.5M vs leasing D&A $43.1M; leasing maintenance=$43.1M, growth=$97.4M. Total maintenance capex=$183.00M. OE = 265.7 + 103.5 - 17.5 - 183.00 = $168.7M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=32.139M. OE/share=$5.25. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-25-253612.
2024 $3.83 ▼
CFO=$329.6M; consolidated net earnings=$172.7M; D&A=$115.6M; SBC=$17.1M; equity income from unconsolidated affiliates $11.0M excluded as non-cash. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR +9.2, income tax receivable -2.9, inventories +50.0, leased railcars for syndication -5.1, other assets +24.6, AP & accrued -63.5, deferred revenue +11.5) = +$23.8M. Manufacturing capex $121.3M; Manufacturing segment revenue fell to $3,549.4M from $4,047.0M, so growth capex=$0, maintenance=full $121.3M. Leasing capex $277.0M vs leasing D&A $43.5M; leasing maintenance=$43.5M, growth=$233.5M. Total maintenance capex=$164.80M. OE = 329.6 - 23.8 - 17.1 - 164.80 = $123.9M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=32.363M. OE/share=$3.83. Source: FY2025 10-K (comparative), accession 0001193125-25-253612.
2023 $4.10 ▼
CFO=$71.2M; consolidated net earnings=$75.6M (includes a $46.7M non-cash asset impairment/disposal/exit charge, added back with other non-cash items); D&A=$106.3M; SBC=$12.1M; equity income from unconsolidated affiliates (incl. the Mexican GIMSA JV) of $9.2M excluded as non-cash. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -14.6, income tax receivable -2.4, inventories -17.2, leased railcars for syndication -123.7, other assets -42.4, AP & accrued +16.3, deferred revenue +21.7) = -$162.3M. Manufacturing capex $89.2M; Manufacturing segment revenue rose to $4,047.0M from $2,668.2M (+$1,378.8M); growth capex=$41.98M, maintenance=$47.22M. Leasing capex $272.9M vs leasing D&A $35.5M; leasing maintenance=$35.5M, growth=$237.4M. Total maintenance capex=$82.72M. OE = 71.2 + 162.3 - 12.1 - 82.72 = $138.68M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=33.799M. OE/share=$4.10. Source: FY2025 10-K (three-year comparative table), accession 0001193125-25-253612.
2022 $2.63 ▼
CFO=-$150.4M; consolidated net earnings=$53.8M; D&A=$102.0M; SBC=$15.5M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -198.2, income tax receivable +72.3, inventories -267.9, leased railcars for syndication -40.6, other assets -28.1, AP & accrued +165.3, deferred revenue -5.6) = -$302.8M (major inventory/receivables build during the order-cycle upswing, partly offset by an AP increase). Manufacturing+Maintenance Services capex $57.50M; Manufacturing segment revenue rose to $2,668.2M from $1,403.5M (+$1,264.7M); growth capex=$38.50M, maintenance=$19.00M. Leasing capex $323.2M vs leasing D&A $29.6M; leasing maintenance=$29.6M, growth=$293.6M (major fleet expansion). Total maintenance capex=$48.60M. OE = -150.4 + 302.8 - 15.5 - 48.60 = $88.3M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=33.631M. OE/share=$2.63. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-22-020502.
2021 $4.39 ▼
CFO=-$40.5M; consolidated net earnings=$35.1M; D&A=$100.7M; SBC=$14.7M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -82.1, income tax receivable -103.0, inventories -166.5, leased railcars for syndication -11.9, other assets -5.8, AP & accrued +109.9, deferred revenue +0.4) = -$259.0M (large working-capital rebuild as volumes recovered). Manufacturing+Maintenance Services capex $35.20M; Manufacturing segment revenue fell to $1,403.5M from $2,312.5M (COVID-affected trough year), so growth capex=$0, maintenance=full $35.20M. Leasing capex $103.8M vs leasing D&A $20.9M; leasing maintenance=$20.9M, growth=$82.9M. Total maintenance capex=$56.10M. OE = -40.5 + 259.0 - 14.7 - 56.10 = $147.7M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=33.665M. OE/share=$4.39. Source: FY2022 10-K (comparative), accession 0000950170-22-020502.
2020 $3.26 ▼
CFO=$272.2M (COVID-year working-capital release); consolidated net earnings=$87.6M; D&A=$109.9M; SBC=$9.0M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR +144.4, income tax receivable -9.1, inventories +166.6, leased railcars for syndication -12.9, other assets -65.0, AP & accrued -108.8, deferred revenue -27.9) = +$87.3M. Manufacturing+Wheels&Parts/Maintenance Services capex $59.90M; Manufacturing segment revenue fell to $2,312.5M from $2,528.6M, so growth capex=$0, maintenance=full $59.90M. Leasing capex $7.0M, below leasing D&A of $19.3M (fleet under-maintained/shrinking that year); leasing maintenance=$7.0M (all of it), growth=$0. Total maintenance capex=$66.90M. OE = 272.2 - 87.3 - 9.0 - 66.90 = $109.0M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=33.441M. OE/share=$3.26. Source: FY2022 10-K (three-year comparative table), accession 0000950170-22-020502.
2019 $1.25 ▼
CFO=-$21.24M (negative, driven by the ARI acquisition's working-capital build); consolidated net earnings=$105.81M (includes a $10.03M non-cash goodwill impairment, added back with other non-cash items); D&A=$83.73M; SBC=$11.15M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR +13.02, inventories -143.17, leased railcars for syndication -96.11, other assets +6.84, AP & accrued +55.91, deferred revenue -19.28) = -$182.78M (large inventory/fleet build tied to the July 2019 ARI manufacturing acquisition). Manufacturing+Wheels&Parts capex $98.45M; Manufacturing segment revenue rose to $2,528.6M from $2,162.7M (+$365.9M); growth capex=$11.14M, maintenance=$87.31M. Leasing capex $99.79M vs leasing D&A $21.47M; leasing maintenance=$21.47M, growth=$78.32M. Total maintenance capex=$108.78M. OE = -21.24 + 182.78 - 11.15 - 108.78 = $41.60M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=33.165M. OE/share=$1.25 - the low point of the decade, reflecting acquisition integration and a large working-capital swing, not a change in underlying earning power. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001193125-19-277713.
2018 $3.01 ▼
CFO=$103.34M; consolidated net earnings=$172.06M; D&A=$74.36M; SBC=$29.31M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -83.55, inventories -26.59, leased railcars for syndication -54.02, other assets +34.12, AP & accrued +54.03, deferred revenue -20.23) = -$96.25M. Manufacturing+Wheels&Parts capex $64.91M; Manufacturing segment revenue rose to $2,162.7M from $1,744.5M (+$418.2M); at 3.04% ratio growth capex=$12.73M, maintenance=$52.18M. Leasing capex $111.94M vs leasing D&A $19.36M; leasing maintenance=$19.36M, growth=$92.58M (large fleet build-out). Total maintenance capex=$71.54M. OE = 103.34 + 96.25 - 29.31 - 71.54 = $98.74M; reconciles exactly. Diluted shares=32.835M. OE/share=$3.01. Source: FY2019 10-K (comparative), accession 0001193125-19-277713.
2017 $4.38 ▼
Same method as FY2016. CFO=$285.60M; consolidated net earnings=$160.46M; D&A=$65.13M; SBC=$26.43M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -25.27, inventories -2.79, leased railcars for syndication +41.02, other assets +17.56, AP & accrued -25.42, deferred revenue +33.04) = +$38.13M. Manufacturing+Wheels&Parts capex $58.10M; Manufacturing segment revenue fell to $1,744.5M from $2,185.5M, so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=full $58.10M. Leasing capex $27.96M vs leasing D&A $20.18M; leasing maintenance=min=$20.18M, growth=$7.78M. Total maintenance capex=$78.28M. OE = 285.60 - 38.13 - 26.43 - 78.28 = $142.77M; reconciles exactly via NI+D&A+other non-cash-maintenance capex. Diluted shares=32.562M. OE/share=$4.38. Source: FY2019 10-K (three-year comparative table), accession 0001193125-19-277713.
2016 $7.39 ▼
OE = CFO - net working capital & other reconciling items - SBC - maintenance capex, using the full as-filed cash-flow reconciliation (all lines, correctly signed) rather than an estimated plug. CFO=$331.67M (as filed; a later 10-K shows $337.17M for FY2016 as a comparative, ~1.6% restatement, immaterial and nets out of the WC line). Consolidated net earnings=$284.82M; D&A=$63.35M; SBC=$24.04M. Net WC & other reconciling items (AR -32.05, inventories +53.71, leased railcars for syndication +19.15, other assets -16.99, AP & accrued -91.43, deferred revenue +50.71) = -$16.89M (net use of cash). Capex split: Manufacturing+Wheels&Parts segment capex $61.48M against Manufacturing segment revenue of $2,185.5M (up from $2,143.6M in FY2015); applying the 10-year average Manufacturing capex/revenue ratio of 3.04% gives growth capex $1.28M, so manufacturing maintenance capex=$60.21M. Leasing & Fleet segment capex $77.53M vs leasing segment D&A $24.24M (used as a proxy for fleet-replacement spend); leasing maintenance capex = min(capex, D&A) = $24.24M, remaining $53.29M treated as fleet-growth investment (funds a recurring lease-income stream, not deducted). Total maintenance capex=$84.45M. OE = 331.67 + 16.89 - 24.04 - 84.45 = $240.08M; cross-check via NI + D&A + other non-cash (deferred tax, gain on disposition, NCI adj., other, excluding SBC) - maintenance capex reconciles exactly to $240.08M. Diluted shares=32.468M. OE/share=$7.39. Source: FY2016 10-K, accession 0001193125-16-746547.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (about 75% of revenue; nationwide across the Northeast, Midwest, West and South, sold to Class I railroads, shippers and railcar lessors); Europe (about 25% together with other foreign sales, mainly European Union countries); Canada and Mexico.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
A chartist would call GBX a stock in a downtrend within a wide range. At about $42.50 in late September 2026, it sits near the bottom of its 52-week range of roughly $38 to $59 and about 28% below the 52-week high. Rallies toward the high $50s have faded, and the shares have made lower highs through 2026 as earnings fell. The $38-40 area is the obvious support to watch; a clean break below it would confirm the downtrend, while a move back above the mid-$40s would be the first sign of a base forming. Momentum readers would describe the tone as weak but not in freefall, with the price holding just above its lows rather than breaking down.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.